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Abstract
This is an analysis of the investment behaviour of Turkish firms at the aggregate and
sectoral levels. Despite the growing literature of empirical private investment studies, a
theory-based approach to modelling investment is rare both for developing countries in
general and for Turkey in particular. One of the most commonly used modelling
strategies is to adapt the main elements of the neoclassical accelerator model subject to
additional structural modifications for a developing country. However, many of these
studies are eclectic in the sense that they are not based on any specification of the
microeconomic optimisation problem of firms. The central purpose of the thesis is to
develop econometrically estimateable investment functions based on a sound
microeconomic framework.
This study theoretically examines both the investment behaviour of firms and
the role of financial decisions in investment behaviour in earlier chapters. Subsequent
empirical chapters are built upon the main findings of the theoretical chapters, and
accommodate three empirical models, all of which originate from an explicit
optimisation problem of a representative firm. The first empirical model is derived
from the cost minimisation of the firm subject to a given level of demand in the output
market and two alternative production technology assumptions (namely putty-putty and
putty-clay assumptions). The second model recognises the presence of adjustment
costs of the capital stock, and develops an error-correction representation of an
investment model from an quadratic cost function minimisation. These first two
models analyse the roles of the neoclassical determinants of investment (the accelerator
and the relative cost of capital) and credit constraints resulting from imperfections in
capital markets in Turkey. However, the inclusion of the financial variable is less
sound in these two models. The significance of capital market imperfections in the
forms of a rising cost schedule of borrowing and quantitative constraints is the subjects
of the third model. A dynamic model is developed through a maximisation of the
intertemporal discounted cash flow of a representative firm subject to capital market
imperfections, borrowing constraints and capital adjustment costs. An Euler equation
for the rate of capital accumulation is derived by re-arranging the first-order condition
for capital, which is influenced by the binding borrowing constraint through an
unobservable shadow price.
These three models are applied to annual aggregate and sectoral data from
Turkey. The empirical findings of this thesis suggest that fiscal and monetary policies
influence investment behaviour both via the relative cost of capital and via credit
availability to the private sector in Turkey. In particular, the empirical results imply that
a high interest rate policy in an imperfect capital market imposing extra cost on the
market rate through the risk premium may have discouraging effects on investment
decisions either through its impact on the user cost of capital or through the risk
premium component of cost of borrowing as in the third model. However, high
interest rate policies may also affect credit availability as postulated in the McKinnon-
Shaw hypothesis.
Contents
Acknowledgement iii
Abstract iv
List ojTables Xll
1 Introduction
I The Importance of Studies on Investment
2 A Brief Theoretical Backround 2
3 The Importance of Modelling Investment in Developing Countries and Turkey 5
4 Aims of the Study 8
5 Outline of the Study 9
Part 1
Theoretical Discussions on the Determinants of Fixed Capital Investment
2 The Neoclassical Theory of Investment 12
Introduction
2 Accelerator Models
2.1 The Naive Accelerator Model
2.2 The Flexible Accelerator Model
2.3 Ex ante and Ex post Substitutability of Capital and Labour
3 Jorgenson's Neoclasical Theory of Investment
3.1 Main Assumptions
3.2 The Derivation of the Optimal Capital Stock and Myopic Rule
12
13
13
14
17
19
23
25
Contents vi
3.3 Takayama's Criticism
3.4 The Neoclassical Investment Demand Schedule
4 Investment Behaviour Under Constraints
5 Comparative Statics
5.1. The Unconstrained Case
5.2. The Constrained Case
6 Adjustment Costs
6.1 Introducing an Adjustment Cost Function in The Firm's
Revised MaximisationProblem
6.2 The Speed of Adjustment and Flexible Accelerator Models
7 Conclusion
Appendix - Maximum Principle of Optimum Control
29
30
32
39
40
43
46
49
54
57
59
3 The Theory of Investment and Finance 62
I Inrotoduction
2 The Modigliani and Miller Theorem
3 Financial Market Imperfections and Investment Behaviour
3.1 Capital Market Imperfections in the Form of Quantitative
Constraints on Investment
3.1.1. The Irreversibility Constraint
3.1.2. Current Profits as a Financial Constraint
3.1.3. Retained Earnings as a Financial Constraint
3.2. Capital Market Imperfections in the Form of Increasing
Cost of Borrowing
4 Keynesian Theory of Investment and Financial Factors
4.1 The Marginal Cost of Finance
4.2 Keynes and Stock Market Prices
5 Tobin's q Theory of Investment
5.1 Tobin's q and The Neoclassical Theory of Investment
5.2 Adjustment Cost Functions in Tobin-q Theory
5.3 Marginal-q and Average-q
6 Conclusion
Appendix- The Relationship Between Marginal-q and A verage-q
under Hayashi's Assumption
62
66
69
69
73
78
83
84
89
92
94
94
96
97
99
101
102
4 Modelling Private Investment in Developing Countries 106
Introduction
2 Modelling Accelerator and Financial Factors in Private
Investment Models
106
110
Contents vii
2.1 Financial Repression
2.2 Micro Level Studies
2.3 Macro Level Studies
2.3.1 Macroeconomic Adjustment and the Role of Savings
in the Determination of Private Investment
(i) Financial Intermediation and Investment
(ii) An Alternative Modelling Approach
(iii) The Modified Flexible Accelerator Model
3. Some Other Factors
3.1. Public Spending
3.2. Trade Liberalisation and Exchange Rate
3.3. Credibility and Instability
4 Conclusion
1 1 1
112
119
120
122
125
128
134
135
137
139
146
Part 2
An Empirical Analysis of The Determinants of The Turkish Private
Investment
5 The Turkish Economy from A Historical Perspective 148
Introduction 148
2 Brief Economic History 149
2.1 Dynamics of the Pre-1980 Economic Crisis 152
2.2 Adjustment and Recovery 159
2.3 Returning to Macroeconomic Instability (1987- ) 164
3 General Trends in Investment (1973-1993) 170
4 Some Key Factors Affecting Private Investment 174
5 Previous Studies on Turkey 177
6 The Description of the Data Used in the Empirical Chapters 183
7 Conclusion 184
6 Accelerator Effects, Borrowing Constraints, The Cost of
Capital, and The Turkish Private Investment Expenditures 186
I Introduction 186
2 Flexible Accelerator-Relative Costs Model with A Credit Constraint 189
3 Some Key Variables in the Model 195
4 The Estimation and Results 197
4.1. Naive Accelerator Models with a Clay-Clay Production Function 198
4.2. Accelerator Models with the Putty-Putty and Putty-Clay
Production Function Assumptions 199
Contents viii
5 Sundurarajan and Thakur's Model: A Modified Flexible Accelerator Model 210
6 Sectoral Private Investment Models (Flexible Accelerator) 212
7 Conclusion 218
Appendix-A. Panel Data Estimation of the Putty-Clay Model of Private
Investment 223
Appendix-B. Derivation of the Optimal Demand for Capital in An Effective
Demand Model 23 I
7 An Alternative Econometric Analysis 235
1 Introduction 235
2 Concepts of the New Econometric Methodology 236
2.1 Cointegration 236
2.2 Stationarity, Non-Stationarity, and Unit Roots 239
3 Error-Correction Representation of The Investment Model 242
4 Estimation Strategies 243
4.1 The Two-Stage Engle and Granger Method 247
4.2 The Johanson Maximum Likelihood Approach 248
5 Empirical Results 249
5.1 Unit Roots Tests 249
5.2 Aggregate Private Investment 253
5.3 Sectoral Private Investment 256
6 The Comparison of the Result of the ECM With Those of Earlier
Chapter 256
7 Conclusion 260
Appendix - A Hypothesis Test of the Error-Correction Process Against the
Partial Adjustment Mechanism 263
8 The Intertemporal Investment Decision of A Firm
Borrowing in The Imperfect Credit Market Subject
to A Borrowing Constraint 264
Introduction 264
2 Credit Market Imperfections and Credit Rationing 267
3 Financial Market Failures and Financial Liberalisation
In Developing Countries 269
4 The Turkish Experience 272
5 Capital Market Imperfections and Empirical Investment Equations 276
5.1 General Overview of the Recent Literature 277
5.2 Basic Fundamentals of the Model 280
5.2.1 Definitions and Assumptions 282
Contents ix
5.2.2 The Complete Model and The Solution 284
5.2.3 Empirical Specification 287
5.3 The Derivation of Estimateable Euler Equations 289
5.3.1 An Euler Equation With A Non-Binding Credit Constraint 290
5.3.2 An Euler Equation With A Binding Constraint 291
6 Empirical Results 292
7 Conclusion 300
Appendix - The Solution of The Intertemporal Maximisation of
The Firm's Value 303
9 Concluding Remarks 307
Bibliography 311
List of Tables
Table I. I The ratio of Investment to GDP and Growth rates in a Selected
Group of Developing Countries 7
Table 5.1 Basic Economic Indicators of the Turkish Economy (1963-1980) 15I
Table 5.2 The Effects of the First oil shock on Some Selected Foreign
Foreign trade Figures 152
Table 5.3 The Bonanza of Workers' Remittances 153
Table 5.4 Supply and Uses of Resources 154
Table 5.5 Public Sector Deficits 155
Table 5.6 Financing Current Account Deficits (1975-78) 156
Table 5.7 Medium and Long-term outstanding External Debt of Turkey 157
Table 5.8 Trade Performance of Turkey (1974-1979) 158
Table 5.9 Trade Performance ( 1980-1986) 160
Table 5.10 Macroeconomic Performance of the Turkish Economy, 1980-86 162
Table 5.11 Economic Performance of The Post-1986 Period 164
Table 5.12 Some Indicators on Deterioration in Public Sector Balance 165
Table 5.13 Measures of Currency Substitution in Turkey, 1986-1986 166
Table 5.14 Selected items from balance of Payments 167
Table 5.15 The Shares of Total, Private, and Public Investment in GNP 170
Table 5.16 Investment Shares for Some Selected Regions and Turkey 171
Table 5.17 Sectoral Distribution of Investment 172
Table 5.18 The Average Shares of Sectoral Outputs 173
Table 5.19 Empirical Specifications of Investment Models for Turkey 180
Table 6.1 Econometric Results for Putty-Putty Model 201
Table 6.2 OLS Estimation Results of the Naive Flexible Accelerator
Model with Putty-Clay Technology 204
List oj" Tables xi
Table 6.3 OLS Estimation Results of the Naive Flexible Accelerator
Model with Putty-Clay, Technology and the Credit Constraint 205
Table 6.4 Long-run Multipliers 207
Table 6.5 Instrumental variable Estimates of Sundurarajan and Thakur
Model (1963-1991) 212
Table 6.6 Putty-Putty Estimation for Manufacturing 213
Table 6.7 Sectoral Investment Equations 215
Table 6.8 Sectoral Long-Run Multipliers 217
Table 6.9 What Determines Private Investment in Turkey 219
Table 7.1 Unit Root Tests 250
Table 7.2 Co-integration Relationship 253
Table 7.3 Dynamic Equations for Private Investment 254
Table 7.4 Co-integration Relations for Agriculture, Manufacturing,
Services, and Mining 256
Table 7.5 Short-run Sectoral Private Investment 257
Table 7.6 The Comparison of the Results of the ECM with Those in
Chapter 6 259
Table 8.1 The Finance Structure of the Turkish Corporate Sector 275
Table 8.2 Aggregate Investment under the Rational Expectation
Assumption 294
Table 8.3 Sectoral Investment Equations under the Rational Expectation
Assumption 296
· Introduction
Chapter 1
1. The Importance of Studies on Investment
Two components of aggregate demand, consumption and investment, are of great
importance in economic theory. This thesis studies the investment component of
aggregate demand in a developing country, namely Turkey. Studying the determinants
of investment (particularly its private component) is, in general, important for two
reasons. First, from a long-run consideration, empirical studies in the recent literature
of economic growth have consistently found evidence of a strong positive relationship
between investment and economic growth. De Long and Summers (1993), for
example, reported higher growth rates for countries investing more in equipment.
Their findings become even stronger after excluding industrial countries from the
sample. Khan and Reinhart (1990), on the other hand, distinguished the quantitative
effects of private and public investment in developing countries, and noted that the
marginal productivities of private and public investment differ in favour of the private
component of aggregate investment.
Second, investment comprises a large and highly volatile component of
aggregate demand. Investment, in particular private investment, is highly sensitive to
external economic and technological shocks, and various government policies. Given
the positive causal relationship between investment and economic growth, governments
wish to stimulate investment by various fiscal and monetary measures (such as
investment grants, investment credit, depreciation allowance. interest rates, and
changes in demand conditions). Therefore, how responsive investment is to these
different factors is important for implementing new economic policies.
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Current macroeconomic studies have also revealed new evidence relating to the
old controversy on the effectiveness of monetary policies on economic decisions in the
real sector [e.g. see Kahn and Tsiang (1988)]. The possible link between monetary
policies and real decisions may be provided through the impacts of these policies on
financial factors that influence investment decisions. To investigate the effectiveness of
monetary policies on real decisions (such as private investment decisions), this causal
link between financial variables and private investment decisions must be studied first.
The effects of financial factors on investment is even more important in
developing countries than in developed countries. Imperfections in capital markets in
these countries restrict the financing of private investment to the use of internally
generated financial funds and bank credit. Because the corporate sector in LDCs is
highly dependent on borrowing from banks, the flow of bank credit to the private
sector may be more important than retained earnings and profits. The literature on
modelling private investment argues that various direct and indirect credit restrictions,
which reduce the supply of credit available for investment expenditure, have a direct
positive real effect on investment and thus on production [e.g. see McKinnon (1991),
and Fry (1988)]. Therefore, credit constraints become one of the potential determinants
of private investment particularly in developing countries.
2. A Brief Theoretical Background
Few aspects of economics have been more controversial than the theory of investment
[see Chirinko (1994) for a survey]. Different theories put special emphasis on different
determinants of investment spending, and postulate various microeconomic foundations
to justify the importance of these variables in investment decisions. No theory,
however, would be sufficient in explaining the behaviour of aggregate investment
alone. So far, the current literature of investment theory has revealed three main
determinants, namely output or sales (as an accelerator variable), the cost of capital, and
profits (i.e. internally generated funds). Controversies started with the accelerator type
of models, some of which considered only the effects of the accelerator variable, and
ignored relative prices. These models have been criticised largely due to the lack of a
comprehensive microeconomic foundation for investment decisions. Jorgenson's well-
known neoclassical investment model, which has been dominant and an inspiration of
various theoretical debates for many years, provided the first microeconomic
foundation for investment decisions. In this model, factor prices playa key role.
Although the model is formulated as an intertemporal problem, it turns out to be
essentially static. In Jorgenson's framework, the firm is able to make instantaneous
and costless adjustment in the capital stock in response to changes in its determinants.
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But Jorgenson's maximisation of the intertemporal cash flow does not provide a well-
defined investment function [Takayama (1991) and Haavelmo (1960)]. The main
advantage of this framework is a novel definition of the cost of capital. Jorgenson's
theory of investment (more accurately his capital demand theory) consists of two
stages. In the first stage, a representative firm determines the optimal level of the
capital stock (as well as other inputs) from the first-order condition of an intertemporal
cash flow optimisation, and derives the optimal demand for capital as a function of
output, the price of output, and the cost of capital. However, because of the
instantaneous adjustment assumption in the derivation of the optimal capital stock,
Jorgenson could not derive a stable, continuous investment demand function. He
derived the empirical investment function in the second stage, using an ad hoc partial
capital adjustment mechanism which may arise from costs of adjusting the capital stock
to its optimal level. He then justified the partial adjustment with the presence of
delivery lags, gestation period of already installed capital, and the cost of adjustment.
The ad hoc partial adjustment mechanism of Jorgenson's model was
endogenised by Eisner and Strotz (1963), Lucas (1967), Gould (1968), Treadway
(1969), assuming that capital adjustment is costly. This assumption finally provides a
theoretical justification for the derivation of a dynamic investment function in
Jorgenson's framework. In a conventional version of the adjustment cost literature, an
investment demand schedule is derived by assuming a rising supply price of capital
goods [see Mussa (1977)]. This rising supply price curve is mainly formulated with a
strictly convex adjustment cost function in the cash optimisation problem.
In his seminal survey of the literature, Jorgenson suggested the neoclassical
determinants of investment as being superior to financial variables [Jorgenson ( 1971)].
In his theoretical and empirical papers, he excluded financial variables chiefly because
of the Modigliani and Miller theorem that has been widely discussed in the finance
literature [Modigliani and Miller (1958), (1963), Stiglitz (1969), Sargent (1987)].
According to Modigliani and Miller, firms' real and financial decisions are, in fact,
determined independently of each other, so that the financial policy of firms is
exogenous and investment policy is not affected by their financial decisions.
Alternatively, at the same time as the seminal works of Jorgenson [Jorgenson (1963),
(1967)], the profit and the market value approach to investment took into account the
interdependence of financial and investment decisions [Kalecki (1954), Grundfeld
(1960), Kuh (1963)], and gained increasing momentum with the pioneering works of
Tobin which introduced the market value approach [Tobin (1969), ( 1978), and Tobin
and Brainard (1977)].
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The central hypothesis of the market value approach is that investment is an
increasing function of a measure of the marginal market value of the firm, namely
marginal-q (the ratio of the market value of a unit of capital installed to its replacement
cost). The q-theory has been an important competitive theory of investment to
Jorgenson's neoclassical specification [see Hall (1977)]. In many empirical studies,
the unobservable marginal-q is replaced by the observable average-q. The main
advantage of the q approach is that the investment decision becomes forward-looking
with the inclusion of the cost of capital adjustment. The empirical performance of the q
approach however has been disappointing. Even though the q variable has been highly
significant, the estimated equations have shown autocorrelation indicating
misspecification of the functional form (partly because of exclusion of the accelerator
and the relative prices, and partly because average-q is not a perfect substitute for
marginal-q). The attempts to improve the empirical performance of the q models cover
a large range of theoretical effort including the allowance for the presence of multi-
capital product, the inclusion both of financing options and taxation, and of imperfect
competitions.
More recent contributions to the literature of empirical investment modelling
have put special emphasis both on financial factors (such as imperfect information and
agency problems) and financial constraints (such as borrowing constraints), and
alternative formulation of investment demand functions. According to the financial
theory of investment, investment and financial decisions can be interdependent mainly
because of two reasons. One possibility is the dependence on the firm's financial
structure of the cost of borrowing from imperfect financial capital markets. With
respect to this explanation, the cost of borrowing is a rising function of the firm's debt-
equaty ratio (an indicator of the riskiness of the firm). The other reason is that the firm
may face a binding finance constraint on the use of external finance options, so that
both investment and financial decisions become interdependent.
Despite the fact that the empirical application of liquidity constraints In
consumption decisions is now quite frequent [Zeldes (1989)], investment decisions
with a binding liquidity constraint and imperfect financial capital market have started
receiving attention only very recently [see Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), Whited
(1992), and Bond and Meghir (1994)]. The recent financial theory of investment has
borrowed a well-known modelling approach from the consumer theory (mostly known
as the Euler equation approach). It has attempted to derive investment equations
directly from the optimisation of the intertemporal cash flows with a linear quadratic
capital adjustment cost function, and to estimate the resulting Euler equation directly
without requiring the q variable.
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3. The Importance of Modelling Investment In Developing Countries III
General and Turkey in Particular
The different economic structure of developing countries and the high sensitivity of the
economies of these countries to changes in internal and external economic conditions
necessitate a new look both at the determinants of private investment, and at the
interactions between these determinants and economic policies. These structural
differences, in connection with the lack of data on some essential variables (which are
required to test the conventional theories) such as the cost of capital, have already led
many researchers to modify the neoclassical flexible accelerator model, mostly in an
eclectic way [see Sundurarajan and Thakur (1980), and Blejer and Khan (1982)]. The
literature, however, severely lacks a suitable micro-based theoretical approach to
modelling private investment behaviour in developing countries, considering some
essential problems of developing countries such as the strong relationship between
financial factors and private investment decisions.
Research on private investment in developing countries has gained momentum
following a significant slowdown in investment ratios, and an accompaning decline in
economic growth, in the 1980s. Table 1.1 reports investment performance of a
selected group of developing countries. By regional breakdown, Sub-Saharan African
countries witnessed a drastic decline in total investment-GOP ratio from 22.9 percent in
the 1974-81 period to 15.8 percent in 1982-90. These countries were followed by
Latin American countries which suffered badly from the 1982 debt-crisis, and adjusted
their external imbalances mainly by cutting expenditures and public investment (see
Section 3 in Chapter 5). By income groups, the investment ratio of low-income
African countries fell from 21.9 percent in the 1974-81 period to 14.6 percent in 1982-
90. Highly indebted countries in Latin America, on the other hand, show great
similarity with a declining pattern of the ratio of total investment to GOP. Three
countries from East Asia (namely South Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand), however,
achieved an increase in investment by pursuing high growth rates. Compared with
other countries, Turkey's investment share in GOP almost remained stable.
Considering the fact that Turkey was one of the most indebted counties before 1982
and suffered a lot from external imbalances, this relatively stable (and not declining)
pattern of investment in Turkey has been considered as a success of the growth-
oriented structural adjustment programme undertaken in the eighties [van Wijnbergen
et. al. (1992)]. However, there is also growing concern about changes in the
composition of private investment.
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Many factors have been taken into account as causes of investment slumps in
developing countries, and each has been the subject to a number of theoretical and
empirical research [see Chapter 4, and Serven and Solimano (1993), Chhibber et al.
(1992)]. Among others, some factors, that have been received considerable attention,
arc deteriorations in terms of trade [see Bleaney and Greeneway ( 1993), and Faini and
de Melo (1990)], the decline in the availability of external borrowing and the high cost
of external borrowing following the 1982 debt crisis [see Serven and Solimano (1992),
Warner (1992), and Borensztein (1990)], structural adjustment to external imbalances
[see Serven and Solimano (1993)], the impact of structural adjustment lending (SALs)
[see Bleaney and Fielding (1995) and Fielding (1995)], and finally the volatility of the
economic and political environment [see Pindyck and Solimano (1993)].
Adverse conditions in the world economy, causing a shortage of external
finance. led many developing countries to adjust themselves to these new emerging
conditions largely by cutting public expenditures and relying on market-based
incentives. The elimination of distortions in the price system, deregulating commodity
and financial markets, and fiscal adjustment have been the main elements of these so-
called structural adjustment policies, with a belief that private investment (and so
growth) would respond strongly to new market-oriented incentives (as the McKinnon-
Shaw hypothesis, for example, predicts for financially repressed economies).
Investment in Turkey has shown great volatility in response to external shocks
and changes in economic policies. Starting from the first oil-price shock, the share of
investment in GDP in Turkey increased steadily until 1978. In general, expansionist
and public-led economic policies in the 1970s, despite the severe world economic
crisis, aimed to achieve a high growth rate around 7 percent over the period 1973-77
[see spa (1993)]. The finance of these high growth and investment rates was met
mostly by external sources, rather than by mobilising domestic sources to investment,
in an era when the world economy was booming and the access to external credit
market was easy. Especially in the Turkish case, the inflow of a large amount of
workers' remittances from Europe played an important role in pursuing expansionary
policies. However, the governments of the time were very slow to respond to external
shocks following the first oil-price shock, mostly because of the unstable political
situation. The delayed adjustment and ambitious public investment rates led the
economy to depend very much on short-run external borrowing, most of which was
used to finance public sector deficits. Besides, increased dependence on imported
investment goods and external imbalances leading to a binding foreign exchange
constraint has become a cause of the slowdown in investment, and in turn in growth
rates in the late 1970s.
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Table 1.1 The Ratio of Investment to GDP and Growth Rates in a Selected Group of
Developing Countries
Investment/GOP Growth Rate
1974-81 1982-90 ~ 1974-81 1982-90
Re~ions
Latin America 24.2 19.3 -4.9 4.5 1.3 -3.2
East Asia 29.4 32.8 3.4 6.3 7.8 1.5
South Asia 20.1 21.5 1.4 4.4 5.3 0.9
Sub-Saharan Africa 22.9 15.8 -7.4 3.2 2.2 -3.0
Middle East & N. Africa 26.7 23.4 -3.3 2.2 2.4 0.2
World 23.8 21.9 -1.9 2.7 3.1 (l.4
Income Groups
Low-Income Africa 21.9 14.6 -7.3 2.5 2.0 -0.5
Other Low Income 21.9 24.5 2.6 6.7 4.9 -1.8
Middle Income 26.3 23.1 -3.2 4.2 2.1 -2.1
High Income 23.1 21.2 -1.9 2.4 3.0 0.6
Hi~hlX Indebted
Countries
Argentina 23.4 11.7 -11.7 1.3 -0.5 -1.8
Bolivia 23.3 10.4 -12.9 3.2 0.1
-3.1
Brazil 23.7 20.4 -3.3 5.4 2.3 -3.1
Chile 17.6 15.3 -2.3 3.9 2.8 -1.1
Mexico 23.5 20.6 -2.9 6.7 0.9 -5.8
Uruguay 21.2 13.2 -8.0 4.2 -0.2 -4.4
Three Stable
Countries
Korea 29.9 30.8 0.9 7.9 l).6 1.7
Malaysia 28.3 30.3 2.0 7.4 5.l) -1.5
Thailand 26.5 26.7 0.2 6.8 8.0 1.2
TURKEY 22.0 22.3 0.3 4.6 5.5 O.l)
NQte: ~ indicates differences between two periods.
~: Author's calculation from Guy et al. (1992).
Turkey launched a combination of a stabilisation and structural adjustment
programme in 1980, under the supervision of the IMF and the World Bank. As a part
of the stabilisation policies, public expenditures were cut, but public investment kept its
historical level of I I percent of GDP in the early 1980s. The direction of public
investment, however, shifted from productive activities to infrastructure investment.
The elimination of distortions in the price system and liberalisation in commodity and
financial markets partly caused the cost of borrowing and production factors (except
labour) to increase, and had an adverse effect on private investment. The most
prominent change in the investment pattern was that, although the country attained the
historical share of private investment in GDP after 1986, its composition has drastically
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changed from the manufacturing sector to services sector, in which housing investment
represents the major part.
The performance of private investment generally in developing countries and
particularly in Turkey has been the subject of numerous policy debates [e.g. Chhibber
et al. (1992), and Serven and Salimano (1993)], and stimulated research on what
determines private investment in developing countries. There is already a fast growing
literature in this regard. However, theory-oriented approaches to modelling private
investment have been extremely rare.
4. Aims of the Study
Our theoretical aim is, first, to examine the investment decision of a single
representative firm in the presence of two main imperfections. They are the adjustment
cost of capital that may arise from a rising supply price of capital goods, and the
presence of upper liquidity constraints on investment expenditure. The second
theoretical aim is to analyse how the determinants of investment behaviour may differ in
developing countries from industrialised countries.
One of the most commonly used modelling strategies is to adapt the main
elements of the neoclassical accelerator model, subject to additional structural
modifications for a developing country. However, most of these studies are usually
eclectic in the sense that they are mainly on a macroeconomic level without strong
reference to specific formal microeconomic theory. The first empirical aim of this study
is to develop empirical investment models for a developing country with a satisfactory
microeconomic basis. The second is to see the importance of credit availability in
investment decisions in Turkey. The motivations of each of the empirical chapters can
be summarised as follows.
There has been no attempt to study the significance of different production
technology assumptions such as putty-putty and putty-clay technology assumptions.
To estimate an investment model, and to test the importance of neoclassical
determinants with different technology assumptions, are our first motivations in
Chapter 6. In doing so, a relatively larger sample size than previous studies is used,
and the same model is also applied to sectoral data.
A new econometric methodology stresses the difficulties associated with the use
of traditional model building (such as the one used in Chapter 6), and suggests the use
of the error-correction mechanism and cointegration analysis to cope with them.
Chhibber and Shafik (1992) and Fielding (1993) have applied this new methodology in
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the context of investment modelling in developing countries. Both also attempted to
provide a microeconomic framework for this rather eclectic and data-oriented approach.
In this regard, particularly, Chhibber and Shafik (1992) used the minimisation of a
quadratic cost function arising from being away from the optimal level of the relevant
control variable (investment in this case); however the objective function of their model
is wrongly specified, and does not yield the error-correction mechanism of investment.
Fielding (1993), on the other hand, fails to derive the cost of capital adjustment (which
is the essential part of this new econometric methodology), and fails to derive the
optimal investment demand from Jorgenson's cash flow optimisation. Our motivation
in Chapter 7 is then to provide a theoretical model that leads to the error-correction
representation of investment model with a strong microeconomic foundation.
In Chapter 6 and 7, financial factors (namely availability of credit to the private
sector) are included in the model in a rather eclectic way. In Chapter 8 our motivation
is to provide a theoretical model that endogenises financial decisions, and to solve the
optimisation problem with the presence of a binding borrowing constraint. Therefore,
testing the role of capital market imperfections in investment behaviour is the aim of this
chapter.
5. Outline of the Study
The thesis starts with, firstly, examining the neoclassical determinants of investment
(the accelerator, and the relative cost of capital), and their responses to exogenous
shocks under different technology assumptions in Chapter 2. The chapter initially
concentrates on Jorgenson's neoclassical model and on the myopic nature of his
derivation of the optimality condition from a critical perspective. Two crucial
assumptions of Jorgenson's model (instantaneous and cost less assumptions) are also
examined closely in this chapter. In subsequent sections, the instantaneous adjustment
assumption is relaxed by imposing a constant exogenous upper and lower constraint on
investment which the firm can undertake for each t. This particular form of the
adjustment mechanism of the capital stock to its optimal level is then generalised by
introducing the cost of adjustment. The chapter ends by endogenising the ad hoc partial
adjustment mechanism using the cost of capital adjustment.
The main concern of Chapter 3 is with the relevance of financial decisions for
the determination of investment behaviour. The influence of borrowing and liquidity
constraints arising from imperfections in financial capital markets on the optimal
accumulation rule and investment of a rising cost schedule is the primary subject of the
chapter. Having presented the main elements of Keynesian investment theory, an
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important extension of this theory, namely the so-called Tobin's q theory of
investment, is then explained.
Chapter 4 is devoted to a literature review of the determinants of private
investment in developing counties, and to modelling issues. In addition to neoclassical
determinants (the accelerator, and the relative cost of capital), some other factors such
as financial factors, public investment, trade and exchange rate policies, credibility and
instability, also playa key role in private investment decisions in developing countries.
Of these, financial factors represents the main theme of the chapter in conjunction with
Chapter 3. This chapter also considers the modelling issue by spelling out the eclectic
nature of most investment studies in the literature. Data availability on some crucial
variables to test the theory turns out to be a crucial factor that leads to such an approach
to modelling. Chapter 4 also groups the existing models into two classes according to
the data they use, namely micro and macro studies. Micro studies that are based on
firm or sector level data appear to be more theory-oriented studies than those using
macroeconomic time series.
Chapter 5 briefly presents an overview of the development experience of the
Turkish economy. General trends in aggregate as well as private investment, in
conjunction with international and sectoral comparisons, are also analysed in this
chapter. Chapter 5 reviews previous studies on private investment in Turkey, and
presents the main differences of the models presented in this thesis from them. Lastly,
the underlying data used in the empirical estimations are also inroduced in Chapter 5.
Chapter 6 is the first empirical chapter of this study, and investigates the
importance of the neoclassical determinants of investment (the accelerator, and the
relative cost of capital) under two assumptions on the production technology (namely
the putty-putty and putty-clay technology), with aggregate macroeconomic data as well
as with disaggregate data for five main sectors (manufacturing, agriculture, services,
mining, and energy). In contrast to many empirical models in the literature for
developing countries, the model in this chapter is an attempt to implement a theory-
based model for Turkey. This theoretical model is theflexihle-accelerator-relative-cost
model, basing on the cost minimisation of a representative firm subject to a demand
constraint in the output market. Given the fact that the reliance on debt finance has been
quite substantial in Turkey, the importance of credit constraints is also recognised by
including credits available to the private sector in the empirical model in this chapter.
The credit constraint is included in an eclectic way to test the importance of borrowing
constraints in investment decisions in Turkey.
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Chapter 7 continues to investigate the importance of the accelerator, the relative
cost of capital, and credit constraints in investment decisions, but this time applying a
different econometric methodology to Turkish data at the aggregate and sectoral levels.
This chapter focuses on the data-oriented time series analyses. The main motive of
writing this chapter is the fact that many macroeconomic time series are, in fact, not
stationary (indicating time dependent mean and variance), and using non-stationary
variables in a regression results in so-called spurious correlation [Granger and
Newbold (1974)]. Keeping this defect of the conventional econometric methodology in
mind (such as the one used in Chapter 6), Chapter 7 searches for further empirical
evidence of the importance of the neoclassical determinants, taking explicit account of
the non-stationarity of macroeconomic variables. The limited length of the data series,
however, restricts the use of extensive time series analyses. The results in this chapter
basically confirm the findings of Chapter 6, but the conclusion on which methodology
is superior remains unanswered because of the limited use of the time series analyses
and of the non-availability of a sufficiently long time series. However, the novelty of
the chapter is the introduction of an error-correction representation of investment
decisions. Despite the recent use of the error-correction and cointegration analyses in
modelling investment demand, the literature lacks a theoretical framework integrating
the innovative time series methodology into investment modelling. Chapter 7, in this
respect, aims to fill an important gap in the literature by suggesting a theoretical model.
The inclusion of the credit constraint into the empirical model still remains eclectic in
this chapter.
Chapter 8 is the last empirical chapter and is, in particular, devoted to
investigating the interaction between financial factors and investment. This chapter also
reviews imperfections in financial markets in industrial and developing countries. In
particular, financial liberalisation and its impacts on corporate sectors and financial
capital markets are presented. Chapter 8 relaxes the perfect capital market assumptions
of Jorgenson's model, and recognises the importance of asymmetric information and
agency problems in a representative firm's financial decisions, and its interaction with
real decisions. In contrast to the other two empirical chapters, financial variables are
endogenised for the first time in this chapter. Chapter 8 develops a new dynamic
investment model by a maximisation of the intertemporal discounted cash flow of a
representative firm subject to capital market imperfections, borrowing constraints, and
capital adjustment cost. This final model is applied to aggregate as well as sectoral data
from Turkey. Lastly, Chapter 9 is devoted to some conclusions from this thesis.
Part 1
Theoretical Discussions on the Determinants of Fixed
Capital Investment
Chapter 2
The Neoclassical Theory of Investment
1. Introduction
Investment expenditures have been an important topic on the agenda of economic
research for some time. Economists differ considerably on the relative importance of
the factors affecting investment spending. At the heart of the differences, there are
three main questions: They are i.) what the determinants of investment spending are,
ii.) how quickly investment spending responds to shocks associated with these
determinants, and iii.) what technology assumption about the specification of the
production should be appropriate in reality. While investment and the relationship
between investment and economic development still poses significant challenges for
academic economists and policy makers in developing countries, the debates on the
determinants of business investment expenditure in general have started gaining new
initiative very recently. Some economists assign a key role to the relative prices and
output, others to financial factors such as profit, borrowing etc.. Starting with the
Jorgenson representation of the investment behaviour of a firm in a theoretical
framework, all academic debates have reached a general conclusion about the key
determinants of investment expenditure in the 1960s and 1970s. Relatively poor
empirical evidence from a number of studies raises concern about the possibility of
there being some other determinants of investment apart from prices and output. The
direction of the new research agenda, on the other hand, pays attention to the role of
financial factors in the determination of corporate fixed capital investment.
In earlier studies, economic analysts diverge from each other as to whether
investment responds more quickly to changes in the relative prices than in output.
The central issue, in this regard, involves the choice of right specification about the
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production function that a priori determines the elasticities of the relative prices and
output. And finally, the last question addresses the issue of whether the rate of
substitution between capital and labour is variable ex post and ex ante. The choice of
technology also influences the relative roles of prices and output in the determination
of investment expenditures.
In this chapter, a general review of the neoclassical theory of investment,
which has been a starting point of many current studies, is presented. For this
purpose, the chapter is divided into seven sections. Following this introduction,
Section 2 gives a detailed account of the accelerator type of investment models. In
Section 3, the microeconomic foundations of the neoclassical model are presented by
using Jorgenson's formulations. Having addressed the novelty and weakness of this
approach, the effects of exogenous constraints on investment are discussed in Section
4. As a consequence of unexpected and permanent changes in interest rates and
output price, comparative dynamics of the neoclassical model are analysed with and
without any constraint in section 5. Section 6 is devoted to the discussion on
adjustment costs and its effects on Jorgenson's results. Conclusions drawn from the
chapter are summarised, as usual, in section 7.
2. Accelerator Models
This section summarises the earlier theoretical and empirical models of investment
before the Jorgenson's innovative representation of the theory. The first models to
explain the causes of the volatility of investment expenditures were accelerator
models. They are basically concerned with the roles of two variables, namely output
(or demand) and relative prices, as determinants of investment expenditures. Despite
the direct accelerator effects of output, relative prices (such as input prices and
interest rates) either do not play any explicit role or appear to have very restrictive
influence on capital demand in accelerator models. Depending on different
production technology assumptions, accelerator models and the role of relative prices
differ significantly. In what follows, I first present a naive accelerator model, and
then a flexible accelerator model, which have been mostly used to derive the dynamic
representation of the neoclassical investment demand function.
2.1. The Naive Accelerator Model:
The earliest example of the accelerator theory was put forward by Clark (1917), and
has been regarded as the 'naive' accelerator model. This model states that investment
expenditures occur as a constant proportion of any change in output, and relative
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prices (interest rates, wages, input prices), and profitability have no effects
whatsoever. This robust result of the naive model can be explained by the technology
assumption underlying the theory. If the production technology of a representative
firm is assumed to be a fixed-coefficient Leontief technology with constant returns to
scale, then the cost minimising proportion of capital and labour, determined by a
given output level, will be constant ex post and ex ante [see Varian (1992)]. The ex
post and ex ante rigidity of the rate of capital-labour substitution is also known as a
clay-clay technology assumption. Accordingly, if the firm's technology is the
Leontief fixed-coefficient technology, there is no factor substitution either ex post or
ex ante.
Bearing in mind these crucial features of the naive accelerator model, assume
at time period t that Q, and K, represent real output, and the capital stock respectively.
According to the naive accelerator model, net investment, I;', is given by
t; = 11K, = a( Q, - Qt-I ) (I)
where a is the fixed capital-labour ratio; ~ stands for the change in K between one
period and the next. Equation (1) simply indicates that a constant proportion of the
change in output is used for investment. By many empirical applications of the naive
model, instantaneous adjustment of capital stock and irresponsiveness to changes in
relative prices have emerged as a main weakness of the model. Wynn and Holden
(1974) also emphasised some other weaknesses of the naive model. First, if there is
excess capacity then output can increase without requiring net investment. Second,
the symmetry of the accelerator ensures that a one percent increase in output and a
one percent decrease in output will correspond exactly to the same amount of capital
being bought and sold. Third, there is no consideration of other variables such as
profitability, expectations, liquidity, interest rate etc.; for example, lack of finance
may prevent desired capital stock being achieved. And lastly, the constant capital-
output ratio may only be an approximation. If the firm's production technology
exhibits non-constant return to scale then the capital-output ratio also changes.
2.2. Flexible Accelerator Model:
In this slightly more complex form of accelerator models, investment is still
determined mainly by output [see Chenery (1952)], but to a certain extent, relative
prices may be allowed to affect capital spending. The adjustment of capital to its
optimum level is no longer assumed to be instantaneous, but is assumed to be a
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constant proportion of the gap between actual and the desired levels of investment:
that is
(2)
where 8 is the adjustment coefficient indicating the speed of adjustment of capital
towards its desired level. If 8 is assumed to be equal to unity, then the flexible
accelerator model is reduced to the naive one, so that actual capital is equal to desired
capital, thereby the adjustment becomes instantaneous.
The desired level of capital is determined by long-run considerations.
Changes in desired capital stock are transformed into actual investment by a
geometric distributed lag function. Note that equation (2) can alternatively be written
as a first-order difference equation as follows.
(3)
Solving (3) gives the actual level of investment as a weighted average of all past
levels of desired capital,
(4)
or
(4')
Given the fact that capital is, in fact, quasi-fixed equations (4) and (4') may state the
gradual adjustment of the capital stock, rather than the instantaneous.
In equation (4), the desired capital stock is not observable, but can be
specified in terms of other observable variables. The specification of desired capital
stock has been the subject of a long historical debate, and a main distinctive feature of
alternative versions of the basic flexible accelerator model. According to the
literature, five alternative approaches to the specification of the desired capital stock
can be defined, namely accelerator approach, liquidity approach, expected profit
approach, and neoclassical approach [see Jorgenson and Siebert (1968) for a survey].
In the Accelerator approach of investment, desired capital is assumed to be
proportional to output; i.e. K; = a,Q,. Substituting K; in (4') then yields
(5a)
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Unlike the naive accelerator model, equation (Sa) indicates that net investment is no
longer determined only by the constant proportion of the change in current output, but
by a weighted average of all past changes in output with geometrically declining
weights.
In the Liquidity approach of investment, desired capital stock is assumed to be
proportional to liquidity; K; = a2F, where F, is a measure of liquidity; (X2 the desired
ratio of capital to the flow of internal funds available for investment. With this
approach, liquidity can be measured by profits after tax plus depreciation less
dividends paid. Substituting desired capital stock in (4'), this time, yields
(Sb)
In the expected profit model of investment, desired capital stock is related to
the market valuation of the firm which can be measured as the market value of stocks
outstanding plus the book value of debt including short term liabilities at the
beginning of the period; K; = ay, where Vt is the market value of the firm as an
approximation of discounted value of expected future cash flow net of future
investment expenditure; U3 is the ratio of capital to market value of the firm. Then
the resulting flexible accelerator model can be written as
(Sc)
The neoclassical approach differs from others according to the determination
of desired capital stock and to the explicit inclusion of the effects of relative prices.
In equations (Sa)-(5c), a single variable - either output, profits or liquidity - enters the
flexible accelerator model. Restrictive assumptions embodied in accelerator models
are the fixity of the capital-output ratio, (Xi (i = 1, 2, 3), and the absence of the
substitution between capital and labour. As explained in Section 3, the neoclassical
investment model defines the desired capital stock from the first-order condition of
the discounted value of expected future net cash flow. The marginal product of
capital (JQ,/JK,) and the first order condition of capital from the optimisation
(oQ,/JK,)=(e/p), together give the optimal capital stock, K; =a4(pQ/e), where p, is
the price of output, c, is a variable measuring the cost of capital. Amending equation
(4') in line of the neoclassical criticism, the following can be written
(6)
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The neoclassical theory emphasises the effects of relative prices in the determination
of investment spending. From the empirical point of view, choosing the correct
specification of the production function is crucial in estimating the relative impacts on
investment spending of the cost of capital and output variables. This is because the
partial elasticities of the relative price and output variable are determined by the
production function. Jorgenson assumed a Cobb-Douglas specification with
decreasing returns to scale [see e.g. Jorgenson and Stephenson ( 1967), and Jorgenson
and Siebert (1968)]. This specification is, however, not a integral feature of the
neoclassical theory, but it is only essential for econometric analysis.
This Cobb-Douglas specification of the production function has been disputed
by other economists [Eisner and Nadiri (1968), (1970), Bischoff (1969), (1971), and
Klein (1974)]. They have argued that the use of the Cobb-Douglas specification
overemphasises the role of relative prices because of the equal and unit elasticities of
the desired capital stock with respect to output and relative prices. Alternatively, the
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) form of the production function has been
suggested by some [such as Rowley (1970), Eisner and Nadiri (1968), Eisner (1974)].
Based on the empirical results of his application of the neoclassical model to the
U.K., Rowley, for example, suggested that the most suitable specification for the
production function be the CES with constant return to scale, and that the Cobb-
Douglas function leads directly to an exaggerated importance of relative prices.
Another criticism is that the relative price term and the output variable enter
the function together as a result of the specification of desired capital stock, and it is
impossible to distinguish the influence of both variables. In this sense, however, for a
test of Jorgenson's results on the importance of the price variable affecting
investment, Eisner and Nadiri (1968) reported some results on the double-log version
of Jorgenson's model and separated out the relative effects of price and output [see
also Chirinko (1986)].
2. 3. Ex ante and Ex post Substitutability of Capital and Labour:
Different investment theories have been trying to answer two central questions: What
are the determinants of investment, and how responsive are the different components
of investment to these determinants? We have already seen that there are two key
variables put forward by these theories, namely relative prices and output or demand.
The main controversy occurs when the answer to the second question is considered.
The main reason for this controversy lies in the production technology assumption
that distinguishes different theories.
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The production technology here means the assumption on the ex post and ex
ante elasticities of substitution of capital for labour, and on the malleability of capital.
In the mostly used terminology of the investment literature, tlexible substitutability of
capital for labour is, in general, called "putty" while zero substitutability is known as
"clay". In the fixed-coefficient technology of the naive accelerator model, the zero
substitutability of capital for labour ex post and ex ante is, in general, named as "clay-
clay". Given this, relative prices have no explicit direct role on investment.
The neoclassical approach discussed above assumes a putty-putty production
technology, and allows that the factor substitution is non-zero and equal, both ex post
and ex ante. By this technology assumption it is never optimal to produce with
having idle capital because the firm always has a chance to replace idle capital with
labour in response to changes in relative prices. In a more realistic case, the
production technology can be defined as putty-clay, and this technology differs from
others in the sense that the ex ante and ex post elasticity of substitution are no longer
equal. In the putty-clay technology, once capital is installed in place, the capital-
labour ratio is far less flexible ex post. The putty-clay assumption also allows the
firm to have idle capital in the optimum, and implies that the capital stock responds
more quickly to an increase in output or demand than to a decrease in the cost of
capital services. This is because the change in factor proportion must wait either until
the latest vintage capital is retired or until total capacity is increased in response to
growth in desired output.
Considering this distinction between production technologies, Bischoff (1971)
suggested a putty-clay version of the neoclassical approach to investment modelling
as a more plausible case in reality, and allowed different responses of investment
expenditure to changes in output and relative prices. An important implication of
Bischoffs putty-clay framework is then that the response of investment to an increase
in output should be shorter and more rapid than the response to a decrease in the user
cost of capital. His well-known formulation of putty-clay investment demand
function can be written as follows,
~n-I (p) ~n-I (p)
11K, = a L..Ji=1I<Pi -c .Q,-i + a L..Ji=1IIf'i -;: .Q,-i-I
1-/ (-I
(7)
where
Ln-I Ln-II/Ji = I" . (j'i = I;=0 ,=0
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Note that different lag structures of output and relative price variables allow different
responses of these variables arising from the putty-clay technology assumption of the
production function. To capture the effect of replacement investment, i5K'_1 is added
to both sides of equation (7). In his empirical research, Bischoff found that price and
output variables act with different lag distributions [Bischoff ( 1971)].
3. Jorgenson's Neoclassical Theory of Investment:
Unlike previous studies, Jorgenson's neoclassical theory provided the first rigorous
theoretical framework to investigate the effectiveness of interest rate and tax policies
in stimulating investment. The literature on the earlier neoclassical theory of
investment is extensively dominated by Jorgenson's own studies and those with his
various collaborators [e.g. see Jorgenson (1963), (1967), (1971), Jorgenson and
Stephenson (1967a) and (l967b), Jorgenson and Siebert (1968), Hall and Jorgenson
( 1971)]. Two essential components of Jorgenson's approach underline the entire
neoclassical theory of investment;
i.) the determination of the demand for optimal (or desired) capital stock,
ii.) an adjustment process over time whereby investment moves the existing capital
stock towards its desired level.
The demand for capital is derived from standard economic principles, and is
determined by the equality between expected marginal benefits and marginal costs
from an additional unit of capital, which can be obtained from a simple cash flow
maximisation of a representative firm. If price or output shocks disturb this equality,
then the firm will continue to invest until the equality is re-established. In Jorgenson's
neoclassical model, this equilibrium between the expected marginal benefits and the
expected marginal cost always holds. Given this equality, the optimal demand for
capital is obtained as a function of price variables and quantity variables such as
output or demand; i.e. K; = f(pt' c., Q,) where K; is the optimal capital stock, Pt and Ct
are the price of output and the user cost of capital respectively.
Regarding the effectiveness of tax policies, the key concept in Jorgenson's
model is the definition of the cost of capital services. In many investment studies, the
cost of capital services has been based on a measure derived by Jorgenson
[Jorgenson(l965), Hall and Jorgenson (1967), Eisner and Nadiri (1968), Bischoff
(1969), Artus et. al. (1981), Artus and Muet (1990), Auerbach (1990), and Dailami
(1992) etc.]. This measure is sometimes referred to as the "user cost of capital", and
sometimes as the "implicit rental price of capital services". The correct definition of
the user cost of capital is the central issue in accurate estimation and for accurate
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policy implications. Unlike labour input, capital is a quasi-fixed input of production,
which is neither completely fixed nor definitely variable, but rather is adjustable at
some adjustment costs. If capital goods could be bought and sold in a perfect market
without any delay and without any transaction and adjustment costs, then only the
current cost of capital goods would be relevant, and the firm would be indifferent
between buying and renting capital goods. But because of delays, adjustment costs
and the absence of a perfect capital goods market, the user cost of capital services
diverges from the current market price, and becomes a combination of various cost
factors and market conditions, which are likely to affect the cost of owning capital
goods over the physical lifetime of the capital goods.
Four main components of the user cost variable can particularly be
emphasised. One is the term representing the opportunity cost of the financial capital
committed to capital goods, which is proxied by the short-run interest rates. The
second one is the depreciation rate at which the physical capital goods in place decays
by use, deterioration etc.. The third component is capital gains or losses due to
changes in the market price of capital goods. And finally, the fourth one is the effect
of various tax variables. Ignoring any component based on expected capital gains for
the time being, this measure can be defined as follows
I( I:')(l-k)(l-uz)
c=q r+u (I - u) (8)
[see Hall and Jorgenson (1967)], where c : the user cost of capital; q/: the price of
capital goods; u : the tax rate; k : a tax credit rate allowed on investment expenditure;
z : the present value of the depreciation deduction on one pound investment; r : the
discount rate; 8 : the depreciation rate. The effects of tax parameters and interest rates
that can be altered by policy makers, enter Jorgenson's investment model through the
user cost of capital. The relatively significant effects of relative price variables in an
empirical investment demand equation, in comparison with the output effect,
therefore, can be interpreted as highlighting the importance of fiscal and interest rates
policies in inducing investment. However, the effectiveness of various taxes on
investment spending requires an implicit assumption that firms are unable to shift
taxes forward to consumers. Different formulations from those of Jorgenson and
associates are also possible. This so would lead to different estimates of the partial
effects of tax rates, interest rates etc.. For example if one wants to see the effects of
indirect taxes, tariffs, dual exchange rates, imperfect competition, and quantity
controls then the cost of capital should be defined to embody these variables as in
Auerbach (1990).
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Investment is essentially a dynamic process, and dependent upon past as well
as future economic and technological conditions. Jorgenson, however, dealt with this
problem in an ad hoc fashion. The dynamic element of the model does not follow
explicitly from the firm's optimisation problem. The specification of dynamics in
Jorgenson's version of neoclassical model can be attributed to so-called maintained
assumptions about delivery lags, adjustment costs and technology (i.e. vintage effects
such as putty-putty and putty-clay production technology). Having derived the
optimal capital stock at which the marginal benefits equal the marginal costs, gross
investment is taken as the sum of net change in the current capital stock and
replacement investment; I, = I;' + 1;, where I; and l,n stand for replacement investment
and investment for expansion respectively. For simplicity, in many studies
replacement investment is assumed to be a constant proportion of the capital stock;
I; = OK,_, where 8 is the constant depreciation rate. Net investment, on the other hand,
is given by an implicit stock adjustment mechanism. The flexible accelerator model
is the one suggested in many earlier neoclassical models by Jorgenson and his
collaborators. Although his theory was based on instantaneous adjustment in the
determination of the optimal capital stock, Jorgenson specified a gradual adjustment
mechanism to derive net investment, such as in equation (4') in which the actual
capital stock moves towards its desired level gradually,
I" = ~~ rhI1K·.
, £..J ;;0 'rI I-I (9)
where ¢i represents the proportion of all orders that takes i period to be delivered.
Assuming instantaneous adjustment in the derivation of the optimal capital stock,
Jorgenson and his associates consistently assumed gradual adjustment in the
derivation of equation (9). This can be considered as an important inconsistency of
Jorgenson's derivation of net investment. One justification for this put forward by
Jorgenson is that the firm, in fact, wishes to adjust the capital stock instantaneously,
but is unable to do so because of some unexpected delays in delivery of capital goods.
Adding replacement investment to this yields the Jorgenson's neoclassical investment
model,
( 10)
To implement this equation econometrically, we must make an assumption on the
function specification of the production technology. Following Jorgenson and
Stephenson (1967) for example, a simple Cobb-Douglas production function with
decreasing returns to scale can be assumed, so that
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(II)
where a is the share of capital in the production process; Q is the given level of
output. This implicit dynamics, and rather ad hoc adjustment mechanism has been
the main subject of many criticisms on the theoretical consistency of the neoclassical
theory for many years [e.g. see Bischoff (1969) Takayama (1991), Chirinko (1993)].
One issue was the choice of the production function. As noted earlier, Jorgenson's
model differs from the flexible accelerator models with the explicit assumption about
the aggregate production function. With this respect, choosing the correct
specification is important because the partial effects of output and the cost of capital
variables are a product of this specification. Jorgenson's choice of Cobb-Douglas
technology has been debated by others because of the fact that an investment function
built on such an assumption may have major implications for monetary and fiscal
policies. For example, the unit elasticity assumption that leads to relatively modest
changes in interest rates or certain tax parameters may have substantial effects on
investment. As argued earlier, instead of the Cobb-Douglas unit elasticity production
function, some have used the Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) form of the
production function, and derived an investment function which was similar to
(12)
These two equations (II) and (12) highlight the dependence of investment on a
quantity variable and a set of price variables.
In addition to the choice of the right specification of the production function,
there are two more criticisms of the neoclassical investment model such as in (12).
First, although investment is essentially forward-looking, and dependent on both the
current situation and expectations of future conditions, the treatment of unobservable
expectations in the neoclassical model, particularly in Jorgenson's, poses a serious
problem. The unobservability of expectations is solved by assuming that firms form
their expectations based on an extrapolation from historical data for a particular
variable. This rather backward-looking expectation is represented as a distributed lag
of past values of variables.
Second, Thurow (1969) considered the neoclassical model as an equilibrium
theory, and alternatively suggested a more appropriate model for the disequilibrium
situation where the equality between the actual cost of capital and the marginal
product of capital does not hold. He argued that the presence of a delayed response of
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capital stock to any kind of shock creates this disequilibrium. Although Jorgenson
derived the optimal capital stock in equilibrium, the derivation of investment flow
utilised the disequilibrium between the cost of capital and its marginal product. Profit
maximising firms eliminate this disequilibrium by investing (or disinvesting). For
this, Thurow ( 1969) defined the desired net investment as a function that is dependent
on the elasticity of output with respect to capital, marginal product of capital, the cost
of capital, and the existing size of the capital stock,
where FK : the marginal product of capital, fK : elasticity of output with respect to
capital. This specification of net investment is different from that of the flexible
accelerator model (see equation (2». According to this specification, a firm will
invest until the marginal product of capital equals the cost of capital. As a result of
such a specification under the Cobb-Douglas Production technology assumption,
Thurow obtained estimates of elasticity of substitution less than unity. Besides,
"When the cost of capital variable was held constant at its median-value, turning the
model into a simple accelerator model, then the model worked slightly better."
[Thurow (1969): 432].
Two features of the neoclassical theory of investment should be further
emphasised. First, it is the first theory rigorously derived from a firm's optimisation
problem. Second, the first-order condition for the optimal capital stock is myopic.
Despite the intertemporal set-up of the firm's optimisation problem, the first-order
condition describing the optimal behaviour of the capital stock includes only the
current variables. This is because of the instantaneous and costless adjustment
assumption. Any information about the future level of output and input prices is,
therefore, irrelevant for the determination of the current optimal decision. In what
follows, the main assumptions on which Jorgenson's microeconomic foundation of
the derivation of the desired capital stock and the myopic result are based, are
presented.
3.1. Main Assumptions:
As occasionally noted in the literature, Jorgenson's theory is actually a theory of
optimal demand for capital stock. Jorgenson himself stimulated this debate by noting
that a firm invests in fixed capital stock to provide capital services; therefore the
firm's investment decisions are clearly related to its demand for capital services. The
neoclassical theory became one of the most controversial theories due to the initial
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assumptions on which the theory is based. Here in this section, some critical
assumptions connected with Jorgenson's type of neoclassical model are first stated
and then the derivation of the optimal capital stock is discussed, together with their
relevance and importance for Jorgenson's results.
Assumption I: The firm employs only m'o production factors (lahour and capital).
and uses them to produce a single output; the firm's production
technology is described a twice d~fferentiahle neoclassical production
function with strictly diminishing returns to scale.
Assumption 2: The capital input decays at a constant geometric declining rate 8.
Assumption 3: There are no taxes and investment allowances.
Assumption 4: All markets in which thefirm operates are clear.
Assumption 5: There is no adjustment cost involved either in purchasing or in selling
capital goods.
Assumption 6: Thefirm operates in a perfect certainty world concerning the future.
Among these assumptions, the last three deserve special attention because of their
important role in the derivation of Jorgenson's result. Assumption (4) involves three
markets to which the firm's decisions are related, namely output market, input
markets, and financial capital markets. Regarding the output market, the perfect
competition means that the firm acts as a price-taker in that market. The extension of
assumption (4) to the capital goods market allows the firm to sell or purchase capital
goods easily at the same price (without any depreciation in the first-hand price). As a
consequence of this assumption, the first and second hand capital goods markets
become identical. Other implications of this assumption in Jorgenson's derivation of
the neoclassical optimal capital decision are the eliminations both of the opportunity
cost of already committed funds on fixed capital investment, and of the irreversible
nature of fixed capital expenditures. As far as the firm is concerned, there is,
therefore, no difference between different investment opportunities.
In connection with financial capital markets, Jorgenson isolated the interaction
between financial decisions and real capital investment decisions by introducing the
perfect financial capital market assumption. By this extension of the assumption, the
different sources of investment financing (such as equity, borrowing and retained
earnings) are perfect substitutes, and the firm is indifferent between these financing
options [see Modigliani and Miller, (1958)].
Assumption 6, the instantaneous and costless adjustment assumption,
ensures that there are no costs of adjustment involved either in the sale or in the
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purchase of capital goods, and that delivery lags which cause a gradual adjustment do
not exist. This assumption is also a natural extension of the perfect market
assumption in output and input markets. Changes in the optimal capital stock are
assumed to be instantaneous in response to various price and quantity shocks.
Assumption 5 implies stationary expectations concerning the values of all
exogenous variables. In other words, the firm holds the same certain expectations
about the future. One implication of this assumption together with assumption 5 is
the so-called myopic capital decision rule, in which present capital demand decision
is taken independently of all past and future decisions.
3.2. The Derivation of The Optimal Capital Stock and Myopic Rule:
The demand for the optimal capital stock is derived by maximising the discounted net
present value of cash inflows of a representative firm over a time interval [o,t]. The
firm is assumed to employ only two factors of production, capita) and labour, and to
produce a single output. Fiscal variables such as taxes and capital allowances, that
take important place in Jorgenson's own analysis, are excluded for simplicity and
tractability of the model. In this simple version of Jorgenson's model, let Vet) stand
for net cash flows over time, and define it as follows [see Jorgenson (1963), (1967)],
V(t) = p(t)Q(t) - w(t)L(t)-q' (t}/{t) ( 13)
where pet) : the price of output; wet) : wage; q' (t) : the price of capital goods; Q(t) :
output; Ltt) : labour; I(t) : investment expenditures. Since prices are assumed to be
constant over time, the time indices of price variables can be ignored from now on. A
general discount factor may be written as an average of all future short term interest
rate, ret), over the discount period [0, t], and can be represented by
(14)
where R(t) : the discount factor. It is also easy to derive ret) in terms of R(t) by
differentiating equation (14) with respect to time,
r{t)=- R{t)
R{t) ( 15)
where R(t) is the rate of change in the value of the discount factor R(f) over time; i.e.
R(f)={dR/R}/dt. To provide consistency with the Jorgenson's derivation, I keep the
static expectation assumption on interest rate as well. Then, using the short-term
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interest rate as a constant discount factor, the net worth of the firm can be written in
the following form,
~
W= J exp(-rt)V(t)dt
II
( 16)
where R(t)=exp(-rt). The firm basically maximises W, the discounted present value
of future cash flows, subject to two fundamental constraints. The first one is a
simple concave neoclassical production function I,
Q( t) = F[ K (t ), L( t )]
(17)
Given that the problem is a profit maximisation, its second-order condition is satisfied
with the decreasing returns to scale assumption in order to define the optimal capital
stock,
( 18)
which ensures the strict concavity of F(.) around some relevant neighbourhood of
(K,. L,). The second constraint is the capital accumulation constraint, indicating that
the rate of net changes in the capital stock is the sum of gross investment minus
depreciation,
k(t) = 1(1)- 8K(t) (19)
where 8 is the constant depreciation rate; K(t)is the rate of change in the capital stock;
in other words, net investment. It is supposed that the firm chooses the optimal paths
of Q(t), Lit), K(t) and I(t) so as to maximise the present value of all future cash
flows, subject to these two constraints (17) and (19). The mathematical technique
used here is a continuous time dynamic programming, which is also known as the
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle. An explanation about the technique in detail is
I The decreasing return to scale assumption is the necessary and sufficient condition of the profit
maximisation. In general, the positivity of the determinant of the Hessian matrix of second-order
derivatives of the production function with respect to capital and labour ensures the optimum for a
profit maximising firm; that is
r.. FLK
DetlHI= >0
FKL FKK
implying FuF KK - F~L> O. In the case of constant returns to scale, there is no unique solution of the
production function [see Brechling (1975), Chirinko (1993)].
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provided in the appendix. According to this technique, the following current value
Hamiltonian of the above problem can be written
H = V(t) + p(t)[ I{t) - 8K{t)] (20)
where !let) is called a co-state variable which is adjoined to the state variable K(t).
!l(t) can be explained in such a way that a marginal increase in the capital stock is
expected to contribute to the total benefit of the firm by !let). This is also known as
the shadow or demand price of capital.? The control variable here is I(t) of the present
problem. The following conditions are necessary for an optimum.
Labour:
PF =wI. (21 )
where FL = dF/JL. Assuming an interior solution, labour is employed according to its
marginal productivity. The firm is also assumed to be a price-taker in the labour
market, and never faces any shortage of labour [equation (21) holds at every point of
time over indefinite future]; to be more precise, L(t) > o. The optimal investment rule
and the dynamics of the neoclassical model are given by the following first-order
conditions of the Pontryagin's Maximum Principle,
0= JHjJI ~ p(t) = ql (22)
kef) = I(t)- 8K(f) (23)
pet) = (r+ 8)p(t)- pFK (24)
According to the first condition (22), the optimality requires that the expected benefit
from a unit addition to the capital stock must equal its supply price. Equation (23),
giving the dynamics of the capital accumulation, is the same accounting identity as
equation (19). The third condition (24) represents the motion of the value of the
shadow price of capital over time, which depends on the marginal productivity of
capital and the sum of the discount rate and depreciation rate. The sufficiency
2 l1(t) is a critical variable influencing the willingness of the firm to sacrifice current revenue for capital
accumulation. This is the value that the firm assigns to an increment of capital. l1(t) is thereby defined
as "the expected present discounted value of the stream of returns which the firm believes that an
additional unit of capital would enable it to earn" [Mussa (1977: 167]. This can formally be written as
!l(t)= r~xp[_,.(.\·-t)]pF dsJO K
where F K is the marginal productivity of capital. The RHS of the equation indicates the expected
discounted benefit from one unit investment over the time interval [0, t].
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condition here is given by the following transversality condition [see Arrow and Kurz
( 1970)]
limexp(-rt),u(t)K(t) = 0
t----)"'",
(25)
These are the main optimality conditions to derive the desired capital stock. Using
the equality of the demand for and supply price of capital goods (22), one may re-
write the dynamic equation of the shadow price of capital (24), and obtain
(24a)
Rearrangement of (24a) yields the wel1-known neoclassical marginal capital demand
condition,
(26)
Let
ql[(r+8)-ql]=C (26a)
where l/ = q' [q", which is also called capital gain (or loss) when the price of capital
goods increases (or decreases). In the steady-state equilibrium of the system, i/
becomes equal to zero. The right-hand side of the equality is known as the
instantaneous rental cost of capital stock, and it is denoted by c(t). The left-hand side
is the marginal instantaneous profitability of capital, denoted by nK(t), which
depends on the given current price of output, and the current production technology.
The term instantaneous profitability was used to highlight the main characteristic of
the neoclassical optimal capital stock rule, namely its independence of the future.
The firm's operating profit at any moment of time t is to be a function of current
prices and costs, such as labour, and is not influenced by technological progress and
the changes in the prices of output and inputs. This is a very simple marginal
productivity condition of capital which is not affected by future expectations. This is
commonly known as the myopic decision rule of the optimal capital stock [see Arrow
(1964 )]. Therefore the first neoclassical proposition of Jorgenson's model can be
stated as follows.
Proposition-I: If the investor is certain about the future economic conditions,
and the adjustment of the capital stock in response to any exogenous
shock is instantaneous; i.e. -00::; I(t)::; +00, then the optimal capital
stock is determined by the well-known myopic rule, in which
nx(t) = c(t), where c = ql[(r+ 8) -tiT
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where -00::; I(t)::; +00 represents the assumption of boundless and instantaneous
adjustment. Arrow (1964) made three remarks on this result. The first one is that in
the myopic decision the future profit, as a function of all future values of prices and
technological progress, does not play any role in the determination of today's optimal
capital stock, and current investment. The rule requires equating the instantaneous
marginal profitability to the instantaneous cost. The second one is that the rate of
interest is the instantaneous or short-run rate, but not the long-run rate ', which may be
considered as an average of short-run rates. The last one is the failure to allow for
any upper and/or lower bound on the quantity of investment that the firm can make.
These constraints can be imposed on the firm by two means. First, an upper
constraint, for example, may be given exogenously by some market conditions such
as imperfections in financial capital markets and binding borrowing constraints.
Second, the maximum amount of investment that the firm can undertake can be
determined endogeneously subject to some adjustment costs of capital. Particularly
in the second one, the upper constraint is set in such a way that a rapid adjustment to
the new desired level of capital is more expansive. Every cases and its effects on
Jorgenson's optimality condition (26) is investigated respectively in the following
sections. But first, some formal criticisms of Jorgenson's result are presented in the
following section.
3.3. Takayama's Criticism:
The controversies around Jorgenson's neoclassical theory of investment arise from
two critical assumptions, namely those of instantaneous and costless adjustment, and
of static expectations. Takayama (1991) and (1994) particularly emphasised the
instantaneous and costless adjustment assumption which implies that investment is
boundless; i.e. -00::; I(t)::; +00. With static expectations, the capital stock stays
constant at its steady state level over time, and varies once-for-all only in response to
changes in the price of inputs and output, if, and only if, prices are allowed to change.
Otherwise, the only investment expenditures will be depreciation and maintenance
investment. Net investment (or disinvestment) will then take place instantaneously
only when any change in prices occurs. Supporting the view of Haavelmo (1960),
Takayama shows the implication of the boundless investment assumption by re-
writing the current value Hamiltonian function of the earlier section [equation (20)] as
follows
3 e.g. see the definition of Rtt) in (14). Writing the discount factor R(t) as an average of all future
short-run interest rates yields an optimal capital decision rule, where the rental cost of capital becomes
a function of all future short-tern interest rates. In such a case, the decision rule will not be myopic.
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H = pQ(t) - wL(t) - Df1(t)K(t) + [f1(t) - q' ]/(() (27)
The optimality conditions of H with respect to K and u remain the same as in
equations (23) and (24) respectively. However, the implication of the boundless
investment assumption becomes evident when the optimality condition of H with
respect to investment is re-written as a Kuhn-Tucker condition associated with the
boundlessness of investment in Jorgenson's model as follows
f1(t)(aH/an = 0, l(t)[f1(t)- q'] = 0 (28)
(28) implies that Jorgenson's results (derived in the earlier section) can be obtained
only when l1{t) = q", then -00 < I{t) < +00. But (28) also implies two alternative cases
that Jorgenson has ignored. They are
(i)
(ii)
I(t) ~ +00,
I(t) ~ -00,
if f1(t»q'
if f1(t)<ql
(29a)
(29b)
Given the boundless investment assumption, the firm is able to purchase (sell)
infinitely, when the expected benefit from an additional capital good is higher (lower)
than its supply price (or cost). There will not be any finite amount of investment.
Without costs of adjustment or any bound upon investment expenditure in the model,
the optimal investment level will be indeterminate.
3.4. The Neoclassical Investment Demand Schedule:
Given the assumption of Jorgenson's model, we found that the capital stock is
adjusted instantaneously and kept constant over time. The important disagreement on
the earlier neoclassical theory was whether or not the theory yields an investment
demand schedule as a function of interest rates and other prices [see Haavelmo
( 1960)Jorgenson (1967), and Sandmo (197 I)]. Haavelmo, in this sense, argues that
"If the producer is able to find the accurate Ko at to and (f all prices and
the interest rate are going to stay constant, he will obviously not want to
acquire any finite amount of additional capital after to (except, of course,
necessary replacement to keep K constant). Therefore, for all practical
purposes, the conditions above determine a zero rate of net investment
for this procedure. " (Haavelmo, 1960: 164).
In the neoclassical theory, investment can be represented as a rather passive decision.
Given instantaneous and static expectations assumptions, the capital adjustment in
response to any change in the interest rate and prices takes place as a once-for-all
increase in the capital stock. This response, on the other hand, is temporary, and
vanishes when the adjustment of the capital stock to its new level is over. Jorgenson
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himself -who was disappointed with Haavelmo's criticism- however advocated his
model by simply allowing the price of capital goods to change, then derived an
investment demand schedule despite the stationary expectation assumption in his
model [Jorgenson, (1967)]. Assume that the capital stock, Ktt), is continuous at any
time over a time period (see Figure 2.2). Consider again that the static price
expectation assumption holds, and that at time to the price of capital goods falls,
moving the marginal cost of capital from MC to MC' (see Figure 2.1). The marginal
cost curves are horizontal because of the static expectation assumption. The marginal
revenue curve of capital, on the other hand, is a downward sloping function of the
capital stock due to the concavity assumption of the production function
CFK >O,FKK <0.) Given the new marginal cost of capital MC', the firm must add
(K**-K*) to its initial capital stock at a rate which is equal to the net investment, over
some time interval. But the instantaneous and costless adjustment assumption,
however, allows the firm to reach the new optimal level by investing (K**-K*) at
once. This temporary change in the price of capital goods causes a jump in the capital
stock at time to (see Figure 2.2). Given the new level of prices, the firm will reach
the new optimal capital stock, K**, by investing by I(to) once, and then remains at
this new level of capital stock. Despite Jorgenson's attempts, as long as one keeps the
stationary expectation assumption and therefore assumes horizontal marginal
adjustment cost function (which is unresponsive to the rate of investment), the
derivation of a continuous investment demand schedule is not possible in Jorgenson's
capital demand model.
In this and earlier sections, I have reproduced Jorgenson's results, and have
summarised the main criticism arising from the assumptions of the model. In
particular, for the benefit of the argument of investment demand behaviour under a
binding constraint to be developed in Chapter 3 and Chapter 8, I have given special
attention to the boundless investment assumption. In what follows Jorgenson's model
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is improved in two possible ways to derive a stable investment demand schedule for
which such a schedule is to be the subject of an empirical testing for a developing
country later in this thesis. These modifications namely are i.) imposing exogenous
upper and lower constraints on the rate of investment, ii.) assuming that capital
adjustment is subject to some costs.
4. Investment Behaviour Under Exogenous Constraints
In addition to the boundlessness of investment as a consequence of instantaneous and
costless capital adjustment assumption of Jorgenson's model, the perfect capital goods
market assumption can also be questioned. The immediate implication of this
assumption is that at the microeconomic level, there is a fixed price of capital at
which the firm is able to purchase and sell capital goods in any quantity. But in
reality, the prices at which capital goods are purchased differ from the prices at which
the firm sells capital goods. Besides, there may be some additional costs arising from
installing capital goods that cannot be recovered from their sell. Therefore capital
goods markets in reality are not perfect, and Jorgenson's model requires another
modification. Arrow (1968), in this regard, suggests an extreme case, a zero lower
bound on investment, indicating that there exists no secondary capital goods market.
In other words, he assumes that the firm is unable to sell capital goods which are
already being used in the production. This characteristic of investment is known as
irreversibility. The implication of imposing the irreversibility constraint is analysed
in Chapter 3.
Consider now that the firm is unable to invest at an infinite rate due to the
presence of installation costs that are sunk in nature. Because of these costs and
maybe because of delivery lags, the marginal cost of capital may be an increasing
function of investment, and the firm can accomplish the capital adjustment not
instantaneously, but rather gradually, and can invest only by a certain amount for each
t over the overall adjustment period. This gradual, or intertemporal, adjustment to the
optimal capital stock may impose an upper bound on the investment expenditure, and
result in the derivation of a finite level of investment.
Nevertheless, the capital stock adjustment costs are not the only way of
justification of an upper bound on investment. Financial constraints, such as limited
access to financial resources, various imperfections and direct borrowing constraints
in credit markets, where the firm borrows to finance a fraction of its investment
expenditure, are other well-known sources of an upper constraint on investment
expenditures.
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In what follows, I shall analyse the effects of such upper and lower bounds on
investment, and present a gradual pattern of the adjustment process, arising from the
fact that the firm cannot adjust itself instantaneously. For this I shall hold rather ad
hoc, but general, exogenous investment constraints [see Takayama (1994) for
example] such as
t= < I(t) < Imaxt - - I (30)
The upper and lower limits on investment are assumed to be constant. This is known
as a "bang-bang" solution." Accordingly, the firm is assumed to invest (01' disinvest)
by a constant amount until it reaches its steady-state equilibrium. In this chapter,
only the effects on the myopic rule of such constraints are considered. In Chapter 3,
the economic justification for the presence of an upper and a lower constraint arising
from imperfections in financial capital market are provided. The solution to the
neoclassical cash flow maximisation subject to those described earlier and this
additional constraint is quite straightforward. The following Lagrange function,
including the previous Hamiltonian function (20) and the above constraint (30), can
be written as follows
L = H + A. (/max - I )+ A. (I _ I mill )I, I 2, t (31 )
where AI and A2 are two Lagrange multipliers associated with the upper and lower
bounds of investment. While the first-order conditions with respect to K and ~
remain exactly the same as in (23) and (24) respectively, only the optimality
conditions of investment changes subject to the new constraint (30), and is obtained
as follows
aL = JH _ A. + A. = 0
al al I 2, ,
(32)
or
(32')
Note that if I, = I,min then A2 > 0; in other words, the lower bound is binding, but the
upper one is not (AI = 0). Therefore, the optimality condition (32') can be re-written
as
4 In the optimum control literature, the solution of any control problem requires that the state, co-state
and control variables as well as the Hamiltonian function itself be piecewise continuous functions of
time. Any discontinuity in these variables involves a finite jump. For example, discontinuity in
Investment here leads to corners in the state variable K. Therefore, if (aH/ar) cannot be sustained over
~n in~erval of time then the control problem is called "bang-bang". The state variable, the multiplier
function, and the Hamiltonian must still be continuous, regardless of discontinuity in investment [see
Leonard and Long (1992), Kamien and Schwartz (1991)].
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f1{t)-q' +A2 =0 (33)
Since A2 > 0, the following inequality is also true
p{t)-q' <0 (33a)
where the marginal benefit from a unit addition to the capital stock is expected to be
less than the supply price of capital goods. The firm then starts to invest (or
disinvest) at the constant minimum rate, because otherwise it would not be profitable.
By investing at the lowest level (or disinvesting), the firm would wait for the excess
capital stock to depreciate to the new lower optimum level. If the secondary capital
goods were allowed in the model, the firm would sell the excess capital stock it holds.
But this would not be possible in the case of the zero lower constraint on
disinvestment.
If one assumes that 1, = ',max. therefore AI > () and ,1,2 = 0, then the optimality
condition (32') implies that
p(t)-q'>O (34)
Where the expected marginal benefit from each additional fixed capital investment is
higher than its supply price, and the firm is expected to invest at the higher rate to
exploit this profit opportunity.
In the case where neither constraint is binding (AI = o and ,1,2 = o), the
optimality condition for investment is the same as that of Jorgenson
J1(t)-q'=O (35)
and the optimal investment level will be at a level between the upper and lower
investment levels, and is bounded by neither of them. These optimality conditions
altogether can hence be summarised, with an additional assumption that the capital
goods market is imperfect (in the sense that the purchasing and selling price of capital
goods are not the same, as follows
Proposition-2: If the firm operates in perfect input and output markets with stationary
expectations about the future, and the actual investment that it can
undertake is restricted by the condition that I,m", ~ 1, s I,,,,a,, then the
optimal investment is determined by the following rules:
1, = I,ma. if J1 ( t) > q'
1, = I,m'n if f.1{t) < q'
1, E (I,min ,l,ma.) if f.1(t) = q'.
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Figure 2.3
According to the first two results above, the Myopic decision rule of Jorgenson's
model no longer holds on the time interval where either J.1(t) < q or J.1(t) > q. The
capital stock adjustment to the optimal level is not instantaneous, but gradual due to
the existence of the upper and lower constraints on investment. Using (19), the net
contributions to the existing capital stock each time during the adjustment to the new
optimal capital stock (that is constant in the first two cases) in three cases in
proposition 2 are given by
K = linin -8K
" ,
K, = I, - oK,
( 19a)
(l9b)
( J9c)
K = Imax - oK
" ,
Before going further, I draw a phase diagram describing the overall dynamic
equilibrium of the neoclassical model in a (Jl-K) co-ordinate system, where the
myopic feature of Jorgenson's model disappears for some intervals where J.1, *- q".
Using this phase diagram, one can then analyse the dynamic properties of the model.
The dynamics of the system are given by a pair of differential equations, namely
equation (23) and equation (24). These two differential equations must both be
satisfied to give steady-state equilibrium of the model in the long run. Each
differential equation associated with either the state or the co-state variable
corresponds to a locus along which changes in the value of that state or co-state
variable are zero; i.e. i< = 0 and jJ = O. The long-run equilibrium can then be defined
as a situation where both differential equations of the state and the co-state variable
are constant, and then at the intersection of the jJ = 0 and i< = 0 loci [see Begg (1982)
for detail].
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Using (23) and (24), we can draw a phase diagram describing the optimal path
of 11 and K along which both differential equations are satisfied. The locus applying
to the capital stock is derived from the capital accumulation equations (19). Three
loci corresponding to the same assumption that i< = 0 can be derived from (19), that
are
K,mlll = I,"lln / s = constant,
K,ma, = I,ma< / s = constant,
K, = 1,/8 ,
(36a)
(36b)
36c)
The locus of i< is indeed a combination of these three equations. Since 1,01111 and I,m",
are exogenously given, the capital stocks, to which they correspond, are also constant
(remember that there are no net changes in the existing capital stock in steady state),
and the loci of i< [given by (36a) and (36b)] are drawn as vertical lines. The slope of
(35c) is, however, infinite with respect to 11, and can be drawn as a horizontal line as
in Figure 2.3.
How does K move at any point of time in the figure? Along the bold line in
Figure 2.3, the net changes in capital stock are assumed to be zero; i< = o. Anywhere
on the locus K, at point A for example, the optimality condition of investment holds
( f.1(t) = q' ), in the sense that the shadow (or demand) price of capital is equal to its
supply price (this is the standard myopic rule). The amount of investment being
required by the firm at point A (this is only replacement investment) may not exceed
I,ma" but may also be less than 1,l11a,. At any point above the horizontal and the left of
the vertical locus (such as at point B), the equality of the demand price of capital
goods with its supply price does not hold, the firm's expected demand price of capital
exceeds its supply price (i.e. f.1(t) > q }, and a higher shadow price above the point A
induces the firm to increase its ex ante demand for capital. However, the presence of
an upper constraint on the amount of investment that the firm can undertake at once,
prevents it from increasing the capital stock instantaneously to attain the new steady-
state equilibrium, but rather allows for a gradual adjustment, investing each time by
r», This movement of the capital stock is given by the arror pointing right in Figure
2.3. Similarly, at any point towards the right of the vertical locus and the below the
horizontal one (such as at point C), the firm expects a lower shadow price (i.e
f.1(t) < q) decreases its ex ante demand for capital. However, the firm is not able to
adjust itself to this new equilibrium instantaneously because of the presence of an
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imperfect secondary capital goods market (therefore the lower bound on investment
I;nn'). This movement of the capital stock is represented by the arrow pointing left in
Figure 2.3. The firm is then allowed for a gradual adjustment through investing or
disinvesting by the amount of ·1,""" or ·I,mi" each time.
The locus associated with the dynamic equation of J..lcan also be derived in a
similar way. Assume that .jl = 0 in (24), and write the following relationship between
KandJ..l.
.J1(/) = pFK
(r+ 8) (37)
The slope of the locus is given by (dp/dK), which equals [pFKK/(r+ 8)]. Since FKK < 0
due to the concavity of the production function, (d/1/dK) will be negative, indicating a
downward sloping locus of J..las in Figure 2.4.
Starting at a point A on the locus of Ji = 0, consider an increase in capital stock
towards the right in Figure 2.4. Since dFK/dK is negative, Ji = (r+ 8)/1- pFK will be
positive; an increase in capital stock will then push the value of jl upwards.
Therefore, at any point above the locus of t1 = 0, the direction of the movement of J..l is
upwards, whereas by a similar argument, it is downwards at any point below the
locus.
We can combine these two separate figures so as to show how J..land K move
together (see Figure 2.5). In Figure 2.5, A is the only unique point of equilibrium that
Ji = K = 0 hold together. Note that the model has a saddlepoint solution which means
that there is only one stable convergence path that leads the system to the steady-state
equilibrium point A. SS in Figure 2.5 represents this stable convergence path that is
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unique in a saddlepoint solution. Any path, like S'S' passing through quadrants (I)
and (3), is unstable, because the direction of a movement on S'S' is away from the
steady state. At any point on the stable path SS the firm moves towards the steady
state equilibrium A. Consider point B on the left-hand side of A, for example. The
actual amount of capital stock that the firm has (Ko), is less than its optimal level
(K*). As a result, the shadow price of capital will be expected to be higher than its
optimal level, p'(t). Therefore, the firm experiences capital deficiency according to
this new situation, and is induced to demand more capital goods ex ante, and fills the
gap between actual and desired level of capital stock gradually by investing lilia, for
each t, but not instantaneously. At any point on the right hand side of A, the
adjustment takes place by selling the excess capital stock (by the amount of 1'";11), and
by moving towards the point A.
This adjustment, according to the neoclassical theory of investment, would be
instantaneous in the absence of any constraint on the amount of investment being
requested by the firm. Since there exist upper and lower bounds on the rate of
investment which the firm can undertake, the adjustment becomes rather gradual.
The path of this adjustment can be depicted as in Figure 2.6b.
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In Figure 2.6, two different cases (namely the boundless capital adjustment
and the adjustment with an upper bound) are depicted. The initial assumption is that
the actual level of capital is less than its new optimal level. Assume that Ko is the
optimal capital stock of an initial steady-state equilibrium (that is not shown in Figure
2.5), but is the actual level of the capital stock in the new situation that moves the
level of the optimal capital stock to K *. Note that the capital deficiency of the firm is
(K*-Kn). This describes point B in Figure 2.5. However, the adjustment of the
capital stock to this new optimal level would not be instantaneous as in the boundless
adjustment in panel (a) of Figure 2.6. Due to the existence of an upper constraint on
investment, the firm adjusts its actual capital stock to K* gradually by investing only c
constant amount F" for each t as illustrated in panel (b).
5. Comparative Statics:
In this section the effects of changes in some exogenous variables on the steady-state
equilibrium and the optimal convergence path of the model described in the previous
section are analysed by using the phase diagram. For the present purpose, two
possible different cases must be distinguished, namely the case where the steady-state
equilibrium is established on the horizontal part of the locus i ,and the case where
the same equilibrium is established on the vertical part of i<. I start with the first
case, and then analyse the effects of an unexpected exogenous shock arising from
changes either in interest rates or in the price of output on the capital adjustment path.
The firm perceives the shock as permanent in the sense that the new equilibrium is
established at a higher level of the steady-state capital stock, and never returns to its
old level unless a contrary shock occurs.
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In the steady-state equilibrium, the firm is assumed to invest only to maintain
the existing level of the desired capital stock. The presence of the upper and lower
bound on investment imposes an upper and a lower constraint on the optimal capital
stock that the firm is able to maintain. According to Section 4, the upper and the
lower bound on the capital stock are ·Km", = Im"18 and Kmin = IItlin/8 respectively. In
this respect, two cases are analysed depending on whether or not either the upper or
the lower bound on investment is binding in the new steady-state equilibrium. The
first one is called an unconstrained case in the sense that having reached the new
steady state equilibrium, investment for replacement purpose is more than the lower
bound (or less than the upper bound) on investment (i.e. the optimal capital stock is
less (more) than its lower (upper) bound on the capital stock). The second case is a
constrained one in the sense that the firm in the new steady-state equilibrium wishes
to extend the desired level of the capital stock to a new level by investing a constant
amount for each t over the adjustment period, but constrained by either the upper or
the lower bound on the capital stock. Therefore, the new steady-state equilibrium is
established at a constrained level of the optimal capital stock.
5.1. The Unconstrained Case:
Assume that the firm's disinvestment (or investment) requirement emerges as a result
of a rise (or decline) in the short-run interest rates. This disinvestment requirement
may be more than the lower constraint, but the presence of this constraint forces the
firm to disinvest only r- for each t over the adjustment period. This case of the
model involves the horizontal part of the locus i< = () and the locus jJ = 0 in Figure
2.S. As seen in the previous section, the locus i< = () is independent of interest rate,
and is not affected by a change in the interest rate. But the locus jJ = 0 is a function of
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the interest rate, the depreciation rate, the output price, and the marginal productivity
of capital. To see this functional relationship recall equation (37) from the previous
section
J.1(t) = pFK(r+8) (37)
Note that an increase in interest rates will reduce the locus given by (37). To see the
impact of this change on the adjustment path of the system to the new equilibrium,
assume that the firm is initially in the steady state equilibrium point A (see Figure
2.7). Following the increase in r ceteris paribus, the locus of P = 0 shifts from Po
evaluated at the old interest rate to PI evaluated at the new interest rate. The stable
convergence path SS also moves to the new level S'S' that is parallel to SS. At this
new level of interest rates, the firm instantaneously realises that it holds excess capital
stock (K; - Kc:) where x; and K; are the levels of the optimal capital stock before and
after the interest rate shock respectively. Since the firm perceives that this change in
the interest rate is permanent, the marginal benefits of holding an additional capital
stock drops to 111 at point B, and the firm wishes to disinvest the excess capital stock.
Remember from proposition 2, that the adjustment of the capital stock for the region
where ,I1(t) < q' (i.e. below the locus K in Figure 2.7) is given by equation (19a), that
IS
k =rin -8KI I
Therefore, as the firm disinvests (or invests) by Imin for each t and gradually adjusts
its capital stock to the new level, the marginal benefits from a unit capital stock
increase and reach their steady state equilibrium level at point C [see Figure 2.7].
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The time paths of investment and the actual capital stock can be drawn as in
Figure 2.8. In panel (a), the time path of investment is presented. Initially, the firm
undertakes only the replacement investment (I,; = OK,;) in the old steady state
equilibrium point A. Following the interest rate shock, the firm instantaneously starts
disinvesting (or decreases the level of investment to the minimum level), and the level
of disinvestment jumps to ·/mill• By investing (or disinvesting) a constant minimum
amount, the firm then returns to its new optimal level at point C with a new optimal
level of investment (which is equal to' ( = OK; where 'i= < I; < /"""). Panel (b), on the
other hand, illustrates the gradual adjustment of the actual capital stock to its new
optimal level in the new steady-state equilibrium.
Similarly, the impact of an increase in the price of output can also be shown
with the help of the phase diagram. According to equation (37), the increase in the
output price raises the marginal expected benefit from an additional capital stock, and
thereby shifts the locus 'Ji upwards from 'Jill to 'Jil' The firm (that has initially been at
point A) instantaneously jumps to point B on the new convergence path S'S' [see
Figure 2.9]. At B, the new value of the shadow price of capital is higher than its
previous level (p' <PI)' and the adjustment process of capital is given by ( 19b) for all
values of 'p(t) greater than the purchasing price of capital goods 'if', (i.e. above the
locus k = 0), that is
k =r'" -s«I I
Following the initial jump in J,l, its value falls thereafter at a diminishing rate C FK < 0)
as the firm increases the capital stock by investing a constant rate ·/m",. And finally
the new steady-state equilibrium is established at C where 'Ji = k = o.
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Panel (a) in Figure 2.10 illustrates the time path of investment. In response to
the increase in the output prices, the firm jumps to the investment level I?"; and
remains at this investment level until the firm reaches the new optimal stock where
p(t) = q' at t j • Having attained the new desired level of capital stock, the rate of
investment then jumps again to I;, the new level in the new steady-state equilibrium
C. At point C, the firm invests only for replacement purpose (i.e. I; = ~K; where
tHin < I: < Imax). The time path of actual capital stock is also given in panel (b).
5.2. The Constrained Case:
In this section the upper bound on investment is binding in the new steady-state
equilibrium, and determines the maximum level of the capital stock that the firm is
able to maintain in a new steady state (i.e. K'"' = lmax/~). Again, I assume an
unexpected and permanent exogenous increase in the price of output. The same
argument is also applicable to a case with a binding lower constraint on investment.
* Moving from a steady-state equilibrium on the horizontal part of the locus K = Oto
a new steady-state equilibrium on the vertical part of the locus K= o.
Now consider a case in which the steady-state equilibrium of the firm is
initially at point A on the horizontal part of the locus K = 0 in Figure 2.11. The firm
in the stead-state equilibrium is assumed to invest only to maintain the existing capital
stock. The implication of being on this line is that replacement (as well as the optimal
level of the capital stock) is not bounded by the upper bound. Following an increase
in the price of output, assume that the locus Ji shifts to PI parallel to Po. The new
steady-state convergence path also moves parallel to S'S'. In response to the new
Chapter 2 The Neoclassical Theory of Investment 44
S'
III :::.:::::~..r.,.
1 <,, ....
: .
III* ·..·· · ·..····..················.. ·i..··..··..··· .
t
i
~*~J ,~
~----------------~------~----------~----------K
K=O
maxKJ*
,..
K •I
Figure 2.1 I
level of output price, the firm wishes to adjust to the new desired level of the capital
stock at D, ·k:. However, the feature of this new convergence path is that because the
firm is able to invest only 'I'na, for each t over the adjustment period and because the
upper bound on investment establishes an upper constraint on the optimal capital
stock 'ma'K;, the firm is unable to extend its capital stock further than that limit, and
cannot reach the unconstrained level of the capital stock 'k; at D.
The overall adjustment process takes place as follows. The firm, first, jumps
from A to B in response to the increase in the output price shock. Then it follows the
path S'S'. Since in the region above the locus 'k = 0, the capital stock adjustment is
given by (l9b) for all values of ',u(t) greater than the purchasing price of capital goods
'ql, the firm is able to invest only '/"1:" for each t over the adjustment period. As the
capital stock increases gradually, the value of ·f.J(t) falls. However, as soon as the
firm attains =«; the amount of investment that the firm can undertake (lOla,)
becomes insufficient to extend the capital stock further, and remains at the level by
investing only for replacement that 'r- = I; =8ma'K;. And the new steady-state
equilibrium is set at point C, instead of point D. Note that the new steady-state
equilibrium at C is established in the region where ·f.J(t) = f.J:(t) > ql. Unless the
exogenous upper constraint is relaxed to allow the firm to expand its capital stock to
its unconstrained level, the Jorgenson's myopic rule (26) does not hold.
In Figure 2.12, the time path of investment is illustrated. In the figure, two
different adjustments of an constrained and unconstrained firms are shown. By
assumption, the unconstrained firm differs from its constrained counterpart hecause
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the maximum level of the capital stock of the former is higher than that of the latter.
Both firms are assumed to follow the same optimal investment path I,; = OK,; until to
when the output price shock occurs, and both jump to a maximum available
investment path Imax • They then continue to adjust their capital stock according to
(19b) by investing I?" for each t. At point C (at time t I) the constrained firm stops
extending its capital stock because of the upper bound on the capital stock, 1"""/0.
Since the maximum level of investment I max allows this firm to maintain the
existence level of capital stock, the constrained firm thereafter continues to stay on
the path CDE. Having jumped to B, the unconstrained firm, on the other hand,
follows the path BCD' until t2 when it completes the adjustment of its capital stock to
the new optimal level. Because by assumption, the level of the new optimal capital
stock of the unconstrained firm is less than its upper bound on the capital stock, it
jumps to a lower optimal investment path, I; (at D') than I""", and stays at this level
thereafter.
Panel (b) of Figure 2.12 shows the optimal capital adjustment paths of both
the constrained and unconstrained firms. From the figure, having reached point C,
both firms start following different adjustment paths. While the constrained one
remains at the level =x', the unconstrained firm continues to expand its capital stock
until it reaches k; in t2.
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6. Adjustment Costs:
As presented in Section 3, Jorgenson's theory of investment was based on the
instantaneous and cost less capital adjustment assumption. The particular results of
this assumption were that the firm was able to invest any amount in response to
instantaneous changes in the demand for the optimal capital stock without affecting
the price of capital goods. A further consequence was that the firm could not have a
stable investment demand schedule showing a relationship between the rate of and the
cost of investment. Keeping the costless capital assumption in Section 4, the
instantaneous adjustment assumption was relaxed by imposing exogenous constant
upper and lower constraints on the rate of investment for each t over time. As a
consequence of these constraints, the adjustment process of the actual capital stock
became gradual. But an unappealing nature of this modification was the imposition
of exogenous constraints in an ad hoc fashion without depending on the firm's
investment requirement for each t. By removing the costless capital adjustment
assumption in this section, a more general case of the derivation of the rate of
investment is analysed. By the cost of adjustment assumption, the cost of investment
becomes related to the rate of investment, and the upper (or lower) limit on the rate of
investment that the firm can undertake for each t over time is determined
endogenously by the adjustment cost function.
The literature, in general, assumes an increasing (convex) cost function of
capital adjustment. Accordingly, the costs of capital rise at an increasing rate as
investment (or disinvestment) increases. Therefore, it is rational for the firm to make
the adjustment gradually, but not instantaneously because of high cost. Also
expectations playa direct role in this gradual adjustment. Due to the high acquiring
cost of investment, firms start adjusting capital stocks in advance of, for example, any
expected changes in output that might actually happen in the future. Hence,
anticipating future changes, firms expect to reduce total adjustment cost by spreading
capital adjustment over time [see Soderstrom (1976), and Abel (1980)].
The idea of adjustment costs was first introduced by Eisner and Strotz (1963),
and later developed by Lucas (1967a), (l967b), Gould (1968), and Treadway (1969),
to make Jorgenson's analysis fully dynamic. As explained in earlier sections,
Jorgenson's neoclassical theory is, in fact, a theory of optimum demand for capital,
but not an investment theory. The rate of investment is rather derived using an ad hoc
capital adjustment mechanism under the delivery lags assumption. Despite the
intertemporal nature of investment, expectations were not dealt with by Jorgenson
(explicitly assuming static expectations) in the derivation of the optimal capital stock;
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but they are implicitly included in the derivation of the rate of investment through the
distributed lags.
The crucial feature of the adjustment cost literature is that the rate of
investment can directly be derived from the firm's optimisation problem, and does not
require any given stock adjustment mechanism in the derivation. Instead, the capital
adjustment mechanism is endogenised by deriving the speed of adjustment dependent
on some variables such as interest rates, cash flows, and on the parameters
characterising the firm's technology [see Lucas (1967b), Coen ( 1971), Nickell (1978),
and Ga1eotti (1990)].
The cost of adjustment has become the important component of today's most
popular investment models. Abel (1979) and (1980) incorporated an adjustment cost
function into Tobin's q theory of investment. More recently, the Euler Equation
approach has also been based on an adjustment cost technology [e.g. see Bond and
Meghir (1994), and Galeotti, Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1994)]. The difference
between these alternative theories arises from the different treatments of expectations.
A more detailed survey of these issues and the applications of a quadratic adjustment
cost function in the derivation of an estimateable investment function to investigate
the determinants of Turkish private investment expenditure are also presented in
subsequent chapters.
Tvpes ofAd;ustment Cost Functions
Adjustment costs are divided into two main groups according to their sources, namely
external and internal costs of adjustment. External adjustment costs mean that the
cost of adjustment does not affect the firm's production activities, and is independent
of output and input prices. Perhaps the most popular explanation of external
adjustment cost introduced in the literature is the monopsonistic capital goods market,
so that the supply price of capital goods is an increasing function of quantity
demanded by the firm; i.e. q' (I), and dq'Ldl > o.
Most of the studies in the adjustment cost literature have focused on internal
adjustment costs [Abel (1980), EI-Hodiri and Takayama (1981), Abel and Blanchard
(1983), Blanchard (1983), and Chirinko (1993)]. Internal costs, which represent
output foregone in the process of adjustment, mean that the resources devoted to
adjustment are firm-specific, and that there is a direct relationship between production
and adjustment. The production function is represented as a function of capital and
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labour, as well as services of adjustment. The more general case incorporates
adjustment services within the non-separable production function [see Lucas (I 967a)]
Q= Q(K"L"I,) (38)
where Q, < o. Given that the production function is linearly homogenous in capital
and labour, non-separability indicates that the marginal productivities of capital and
labour are both affected by the extent of adjustment; i.e. a higher rate of investment
changes the capital-labour ratio in current production and affects the marginal
productivities of capital and labour. As a special case of (39), if the marginal
productivity is independent of adjustment services (i.e. QK1 = Qu = 0), then the
production function becomes additively separable [see Treadway (1969) and (1970)],
Q = Q(K, ' L, )+ C( I, ) (39)
As explained in the following sections, this specification of internal adjustment costs
has been more commonly used in the q-theory literature [e.g. see Summers (1981),
Hayashi (1982), Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), Galeotti et al. (1994)].
Regarding the curvature of the adjustment cost function, there exist mainly
three types of cost function as given in Figure 2.13. All three cases in Figure 2.13 are
plotted for the positive marginal cost of investment, C(!,»O. The share of the
adjustment cost curve is given by the second-order derivative of the function. In the
linear adjustment cost case (case I), the first-derivative of the adjustment cost function
is positive, but the second-order derivative is zero. The only component of the capital
adjustment is the price of capital goods, and is not dependent on the rate of
investment. In this case, corresponding to Jorgenson's costless capital adjustment
assumption, adjustment is always instantaneous, because there is no gain from
postponing investment until the next periods. In the case of increasing cost (case II),
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the second-order derivative of the function is positive. In other words, the costs rises
at an increasing rate as investment increases [C(!,) > () and C"( I,) > ()]. Case III
represents a decreasing marginal cost of capital [C(!,) > 0 and c"( I,) < 0], and
relevant, at least for low rates of investment.
6.1. Introducing an Adjustment Cost Function into The Firm's Maximisation
Problem
In this section, I introduce adjustment costs associated with the sale and purchase of
capital goods over a principal price. An assumption of external adjustment costs is
held in the present section for the empirical consideration of the issue in Chapter 8.
Such costs can be justified by the rising supply price of capital goods in a
monopsonistic capital goods market [see Mussa (1977)]. For this purpose, I remove
assumption 5 in Section 3.1, and replace by the following assumption,
Assumption 5': There are some adjustment costs associated with changing the capital
stock. These costs are a function of the rate of investment, and
comprise two components, namely a linear component (purchasing
price of capital goods), and a convex component that indicates rising
costs at a higher rate of investment; c(!,) = q' [ I, + 'fl(!, )1 where C( I,) > 0,
and C"( I,) > o. I] the rate of investment is zero, these costs are also
zero.
The question now is how the addition of adjustment costs affects the optimality
conditions (22), (23), and (24) of Jorgenson's representative firm. Here, the
optimising behaviour of Jorgenson's representative firm will be modified subject to
costs of adjustment. The firm's objective function becomes identical to
v, = p(t)Q(t)-w(t)L(t)-C(I) ( 13')
where c(I) is the convex adjustment costs function form assumption 5' with
("(i,) > 0, C"( I,) > 0, C(O)= o. The optimisation (13') subject to (17) and (19) yields
aF (21 )p-=w
aL
p(t) = C'(J) (22')
and
f1(t) = (r+ o)p(t)- pFK (24)
where C'(J) = dC,/dl" (22') simply says that the firm equates the marginal cost of an
additional unit of capital stock to the expected marginal benefits from an extra unit
increase in the capital stock. The marginal benefits are measured by the shadow
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price of capital, )1(t). Due to capital's durability, this benefit is the discounted sum of
the present and future's marginal revenue product; i.e. )l(t)= (cxr[(r+8)(.\o-t)]pFKdt.
Using (24), the dynamic equation (22') can also be written as follows
i~ JFC( I,) = exp[(r+ o)(s - t) lp-lisCl JK (40)
The left-hand side of (40) is a function of the time path of capital stock from time t
into infinite future, while the right-hand side is a function of the current rate of
investment. (40) implies that the time path of capital stock depends on the current
rate of investment, but does not give a decision rule for determining the current level
of investment. However, if I assume that the production function has a constant
returns to scale property, then (40) reduces a particular special case in which the
marginal products of both labour and capital become a function of both the capital-
labour ratio. This ratio is then determined in terms of constant exogenous prices by
condition (21) above. Therefore, the marginal product of capital becomes a function
of current and future levels of prices along the optimal path [JF(K, L)/JK = f'(k) where
k = K/L and k = k(q', w,p) form the optimality condition for labour in (21 )]. Condition
(40) then determines the level of investment in terms of prices [see Treadway (1969)
and Gould (1968)].
Differentiating (22') with respect to time and using the dynamic equation (24),
the following can be written,
(41 )
Equation (41) is used to solve for the optimal rate of investment with the constant
returns to scale assumption. Following the discussion above, it can easily be seen that
the optimal rate of investment will depend on the current and future prices and the
parameters of the adjustment cost function. Now, if we assume that the firm is in the
steady state equilibrium (i.e. j1 = 0) and all prices remain constant, then equation (41)
indicates the following equality between the marginal revenue of investment and the
marginal cost of investment,
(42)
Due to the constant returns to scale assumption, the marginal product of capital will
be a function of the capital-labour ratio which is itself determined by the prices, and
then is independent of the rate of investment. Therefore, the MR curve is drawn as a
declining line as in Figure 2.14. On the other hand, because of the convexity
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assumption of the adjustment cost function, the marginal cost curve is drawn with a
rising slope with respect to the rate of investment. Unlike the Jorgenson's model, the
investment demand can then be determined at the intersection of the marginal revenue
of investment and the marginal cost of investment. In Figure 2.14, this condition is
also illustrated under the quadratic adjustment cost assumption. The steady state
investment demand is determined at 1*. The addition of the adjustment costs function
into the firm's maximisation problem finally yields a well-defined investment demand
function. The explicit definition of 1* is obtained by inverting (42), and writing an
investment demand schedule as a function of the marginal revenue of capital. Using
the convex adjustment costs assumption, we therefore derive the steady state
investment demand schedule depending on interest rate, input and output prices, and
the parameters of the cost of adjustment function,
·1, = G(p,w,r,a) (43)
where a is the parameter of the adjustment cost function. The signs of each variable
can easily be seen from their derivatives.
JJ/Jr = (JJ/Jp )(Jp/Jr) < 0
JJ/dw = (JJ/Jp )(Jp/Jw) < 0
JJ/ap = (aJ/Jp )(ap/Jp) > 0
(44a)
(44b)
(44c)
where dl/op > 0, op/or < 0, op/ow < 0 and op/Jp > 0 [see also Treadway (1969)].
Now assume that the production function is decreasing returns to scale. Using
(24) and the equation of the motion of the capital stock jointly with (22'), the
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following system of two non-linear differential equations can be written
K, = I, - 8K, = C-1 (/1,) - 8K, (45)
p, = (r+ 8)/1, - pFK (24)
where C(.) is assumed to have an inverse function of investment. The behaviour of
this system and its difference from the hang-bang system in Section 4 can
conveniently be analysed in the (fJ,. K,) space. Following the explanation in Section
4, the graphical solution of the system can be derived as follows. For the locus fi, = 0,
(24) can be solved, and the following curve can be derived
This is the same curve as (37) in Section 4. The slope of this curve is
(46)
since FKK under the decreasing returns to scale assumption. Therefore, the slope of
the locus fi, = 0 is downwards. The locus 1<, = 0 can be solved from (45). This gives
K, = (lj8)C-1(/1,) (47)
The locus (47) differs from its counterpart in Section 4 where the locus 1<, = 0 is
horizontal and independent on Jlt. for some values of investment and vertical for the
upper and lower bounds on investment. The slope of (47) is given
dK, =(1/8)~C"-I(/1,)
au, d/1,
(48)
The convexity of the adjustment cost function provides that C"(.) >0. It is obvious
that if the expected benefits from a unit capital instalment are positive, then the firm
continues to invest. An increase in Jlt also raises the amount of capital that the firm
wishes to invest; i.e. dl,/d u, > o. Therefore, the slope of the locus 1<, = 0 is upwards.
Figure 2.15 illustrates the behaviour of this system. The movement of Jlt below and
above the locus remains the same as before. Anywhere below the locus, a downwards
movement of the capital stock results in a decline in the capital stock (shown by a
downward arrows). Similarly, an increase in the capital stock above the locus u, = 0
causes an increase in the value of Jlt (shown by a upward arrows). Using the same
argument, the movement of the capital stock can also be determined. At any point
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Figure 2.15
above the locus Kt = 0 any upwards movement of Jll leads to an increase in the capital
stock according to (48). This is illustrated by arrows pointing right. The movement
of the capital stock will be decreasing on the below the locus (shown by arrows
pointing left).
The difference of the system with the cost of capital adjustment from the one
with bang-bang condition (30) is as follows. In the earlier system, the rate of
investment over the interval where u, > q' is determined independently of the value of
u., and is constant In];", vice versa. However, in the present system, the rate of
investment is dependent on the value of u, Accordingly, if the value of u, is higher
than the total cost of increasing the capital stock one unit (i.e. u ;» C'(lt)) anywhere
above the locus Kt = 0, the rate of investment will no longer be constant, but will
change at a decreasing rate until u, becomes equal to the total cost of owning a unit
capital stock. On the locus Kt = 0 however, the condition that u, = C'( I,) holds. Given
this feature of the new system, the rate of investment above and below the locus
Kt = 0 takes any value, other than Imax and r- respectively. Therefore the
optimisation problem with the cost of capital adjustment no longer has a bang-bang
solution, but it is more general than the bang-bang problem.
Figure 2.15 illustrates the time path of investment. Assume that the firm is at
point A on the steady-state convergence path SS, and gradually adjusts towards its
optimal level of the capital stock K' at point B. Note that the optimal investment
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level in the steady-state equilibrium point B is replacement investment. Because of
the presence of adjustment costs, the time path of investment follows a declining path
rather than a constant one as in the bang-bang problem.
6.2. The Speed of Adjustment and Flexible Accelerator Model:
The standard approach to modelling dynamics of investment by Jorgenson is to
determine the desired capital stock from the cash-flow optimisation, and to use it as a
long-run desired capital stock in an ad hoc adjustment mechanism to determine the
firm's optimal investment path. The assumption behind the adjustment mechanism is
the proposition that the actual capital stock cannot adjust to the desired level
instantaneously and frictionlessly, but rather gradually due to the presence of delivery
lags. Such an adjustment mechanism, which was accommodated by Jorgenson and
his various collaborators, can be stated with the continuous form of the geometrically
declining distributed lag function (2)
(2a)
However, the presence of adjustment costs in the model leads us to the derivation of
the flexible accelerator mechanism (2a) directly from the optimisation problem (13')
above. Under static expectations and the constant returns to scale assumption of the
production function, Gould (1968) derived a version of (2a) where 8=0. To see this
result, assume that (42) in steady-state equilibrium holds. In such situation, to
maintain desired capital stock requires a certain level of replacement investment
which satisfies
(45)
I(t) = oK (45a)
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From the capital account identity (23), the actual the rate of investment is given
I{t)= K{t)+8K{t) (23)
Substituting the equality II = 8K; into (23) then yields
(2b)
where 6 is a constant rate of depreciation. (2b) is the flexible accelerator mechanism
that is derived from the optimisation problem under the cost of adjustment and
constant returns to scale assumptions. Gould (1968) noted that the shortcoming of
use of (2a) resulted largely in the implicit assumption that desired capital stock is
determined independently of the determination of the rate of capital accumulation.
He emphasised that some variables used to define desired capital stock (such as the
level of output, internal funds) were, in fact, affected by the amount of investment
expenditures (i.e. (Zaj). Therefore, the determinants of desired capital stock and the
rate of capital accumulation by (2a) are interrelated. But. the fixity of the speed of
adjustment coefficient, e, in (2a) does not allow the recognition of the impacts of
some economic constraints and variables on the optimal adjustment path.
Lucas (1967a) and Treadway (1970), on the other hand, introduced time-
varying adjustment paths for multiple inputs cases. Using dynamic optimisation
techniques, they solved for the optimal paths of investment under the assumption of a
strictly quadratic adjustment cost function. Lucas (1967a) particularly illustrated this
result for a single capital input case. The similar result to Lucas (1967a) can also be
derived from the solution of the dynamic system of two differential equations (45)
and (24)
(45)
(24)
Linearising this differential system around its steady state yields
KI = C"-I (J.11)(J.11- J.1:) - 8(KI - K;)
fil = (r+ 8)(J.11 - J.1;)- pFKK(KI - K:)
(50)
(51 )
(50) and (51) can be written in a matrix form as
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(52)
The characteristic roots of this system are real and opposite in sign, but only the
negative root provides the system to approach its steady state point. Then the solution
of (52) gives a saddle point as in Figure 2.15. The stable solution to (52) is
asymptotically approximated by
(53)
where e is the negative root of the characteristic functions of (52). Differentiating
(53) with respect to time, we derive the flexible accelerator model
(54)
where
(55)
[also see Lucas (l967a) for a multiple input case]. There are two separate important
implications of the specification of e in (55) regarding the rate of interest. First,
increases in interest rates raise the user cost of capital, and then reduce the optimal
capital stock. Second, increases in interest rates also reduce the optimal speed of
adjustment.
In order to investigate the effects of cash flows, or some measure of internal
funds available for investment, a relatively more ad hoc version of (2a) was defined
by Coen (1971). Coen argued that due to imperfections in capital markets, lenders of
firms would impose a risk premium over borrowing rates on high leverage firms, and
cause a divergence between borrowing and lending rates. He assumed that firms
would in general prefer an internal finance option because its cost would be less than
that of external finance. However, when internal finance possibilities are exhausted
and the anticipated returns to investment are higher than the cost of borrowing, firms
may start using external finance. Having discussed the importance of internal finance
constraint in the determination of investment expenditures, he defined the adjustment
coefficient as a function of internal finance, and wrote the investment function as
where
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()= ct>(!F,) (56)
where IF, is the level of internal finance. The similar ad hoc specification has also
been used by many others to test the effects of some other constraint at a
macroeconomic level in developing countries as I discuss in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6;
for a more complex form of (56) see Inselbag (1973). The following chapter
endogenises financial decisions as a result of imperfections in financial capital
market, and derive a similar but explicit formulation of (56).
7. Conclusion
The chapter has reviewed the neoclassical theory of investment. The neoclassical
theory reveals two main determinants of investment, namely the user cost of capital
and output. The question of how responsive investment is to these two variables
remains dependent on technology assumptions on the production function. Empirical
studies have suggested that fixed capital investment is more responsive to net
changes in output than changes in the relative prices with the putty-clay technology
assumption.
This chapter has also reviewed Jorgenson's innovative representation of
neoclassical theory of investment. In doing so, two crucial assumptions of his model,
namely instantaneous and costless capital adjustment assumption and their
implications in the derivation of a finite investment level have been investigated. It
has also shown that Jorgenson's model as it is, is inappropriate to derive an
investment demand schedule which is needed for an empirical purposes. To derive a
finite level of investment, two possible modifications of his model have been
considered. First, an upper and lower bound on investment that a representative can
undertake for each t over the capital adjustment process. According to this
modification, it has been shown that the optimal investment of the firm follows a
constant time path, and that the capital adjustment becomes gradual in contrast to
Jorgenson's model. Second, the adjustment of the capital stock is assumed to be
subject to some cost other than the purchasing price of capital goods. Particularly,
this adjustment cost has been assumed to be convex in the solution of the firm's
optimisation problem, and a finite level of investment has been derived as a relatively
general case rather than imposing a constraint on investment. The difference of these
two modifications of Jorgenson's model is that in the second one, investment is not
constant, but changes at a decreasing rate, and the firm's optimal investment level for
each t over the adjustment process adjusts gradually. However, under constant
returns to scale and constant prices assumptions, the adjustment cost model yields a
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constant amount of investment for each t which can be regarded as an upper bound on
investment.
And lastly, the ad hoc partial adjustment mechanism of earlier neoclassical
theory and Jorgenson's has been endogenised under the adjustment cost of capital
assumption. Also, a particular emphasis has been put on the financial factors that
may influence the speed of adjustment through their impacts on the coefficient of the
partial adjustment.
In connection with subsequent chapters, this chapter was a theoretical
introduction to the neoclassical accelerator model of investment. The importance of
two main determinants of the model (the cost of capital and the accelerator) will be
the aims of Chapter 6 and Chapter 7. The importance of the adjustment cost
assumption will be recognised in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8, and theoretically
consistent models of investment will be derived using the cost of capital adjustment.
The consequences of upper financial constraint arising from imperfections in financial
capital markets is analysed in the next chapter.
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Appendix
Maximum Principle of Optimum Control
The Maximum Principle for optimum control, developed by Pontryagin, et. al., is the
method used in this chapter. In a simple optimum control problem, two kinds of
variables, namely state and control variables, exist. The movement of a state variable
is given by a first-order differential equation. A typical continuous time optimum
control problem can be presented as follows,
Maximise r:.\p{ -rt){ n]K{t), p{t), w{t)] - q{t )/{t) }dtJo
subject to k{t)= l{t)-8K{t)
K{O) = K;
(A. I)
(A.2)
(A.3)
(A. I) represents the discounted value of net future cash flows. (A.2) is a first-order
differential equation giving the net increase in the capital stock. (A.3) is an initial
condition, which is usually given. Functions (A. I) and (A.2) are assumed to be
continuously differentiable functions. The control variable I(t) and the state variable
Ktt) are piecewise continuous functions of time. The control variable influences the
maximand (A. I)both directly through its own value in the maximand and indirectly
through its effect on the state variable K(t) as in (A.2). The solution of the problem
yields the optimal investment path t: (1), where * indicates the optimality of
investment. Having substituted t' (t) into (A.2), the solution of the optimal capital
stock K' (t) can be derived, given the initial value of capital Ko.
The problem can be solved by using a simple Lagrangean approach. Let L(t)
denote the Lagrange function, and define as
Chapter 2 The Neoclassical Theory ofInvestment 60
-
L(t) = f exp( -rt){{ D[K(t), p{t), w{t)] - q{t )/{t)} - p{t)[ K(t) -/(t) + 8K{t) ]}dt (AA)
where in the optimal control terminology, the Lagrange multiplier f.1{t) is called a co-
state variable. The standard Lagrange optimisation technique cannot directly be
applied to (AA) due to the termK(t). Instead, the relevant part of (AA) can be
characterised by integrating f.1{t)K{t) by parts,
- -f exp(-rt)p(t)K(t)dt=exp(-rt)p{t)K(t)[ - f exp(-rt)K(t)[,u(t)-rp(t)]dt
(I Cl
-
= p (0)K( 0) - f exp(-rt)K(t )[,u(t) - ru (r) ]dt
II
assuming that
limexp(-rt),u{t}K{t}= 0
t-->-
(A.5)
which is known as a transversality condition. Substituting all these into (AA) gives
~
L{t) = f exp(-rt){{ D[K(t), p(t), w{t)] - q(t )/(t)} + ,u (t)[ I{t) - 8K{t)]
II
+,u (t }K{t) - r,u{t }K(t )}dt - p( 0 )K(O) (A.Sa)
Define the terms on the first line on the right hand side by
H( K,/,,u,t) = {D[K{t), p(t), w(t)] - q(t}/(t}} + ,u(t)[ I(t) - 8K{t}] (A.6)
The function H is known as the Hamiltonian function. Therefore
-
L{t) = J exp(-rt){ H( K, I.u, t) + ,u(t}K{t) - r,u(t)K{t )}dt - ,u{O)K(O) (AAb)
II
The optimality condition of the Lagrangean function ensure that the first derivatives
of L(t) with respect to let), Kit) and J..l(t)will be zero;
dL/dl = 0 <=> dH/dl = 0
dL/dK = 0 <=> dH/dK +,u = 0
One more condition can be derived from (AA) by differentiating Lit) with respect to
J..l(t),
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aLlap = °~ aH/ap- k = °
Therefore, the following first-order conditions can be written so as to give the optimal
investment flow and capital stock
aHla! =0,
-aHlaK = fl,
aHlap = k
(A.7)
(A.8)
(A.9).
Chapter 3
The Theory of Investment and Finance
1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, the neoclassical model of the firm's investment behaviour was
analysed in a framework characterised by a perfect financial capital market. This
assumption implies that the firm is indifferent between different financing options (such
as borrowing, issuing equity and retained earnings) of investment, since their costs to
the firm are the same and given. As a result of such an assumption, the firm has free
access to financial markets whenever it wishes to finance its investment expenditure
through external resources. In this framework, the financial policy of the firm is
exogenous, and there is no interdependence between investment and financial
decisions.
As Jorgenson and his associates excluded financial factors from their empirical
models, they basically relied on the Modigliani and Miller theorem. According to this
theorem, financial policy is of no relevance to the value of the firm, and investment is,
therefore, not affected by financial decisions.
The primary aim of this chapter is to show the interdependence of financial
policies and investment plans. In this regard, I assume that financial capital markets in
which the firm borrows are imperfect, and define two forms of imperfections in these
markets. According to the first one, a representative firm faces a quantitative constraint
on its borrowing requirement, and becomes dependent on its internal financial funds
(such as profits and retained earnings). The second form of imperfection is
characterised by an increasing convex cost of borrowing. Assuming that there are no
binding quantitative constraints, the firm's cost schedule of borrowing is considered as
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an increasing function of the firm's debt-equity ratio at the margin. Also, the effects of
such imperfect capital market assumption on the optimal adjustment path of the capital
stock are taken into consideration in this chapter. However, for the empirical
implementation of these two different forms of imperfect capital market assumptions,
Chapter 8 suggests a model and tests it with Turkish data.
Regarding the specification of upper and lower constraints on investment,
Chapter 2 has treated them as exogenous. One possible explanation of the presence of
such a constant upper constraint on investment may be the costs of capital adjustment as
noted in Chapter 2. Particularly, if we assume that the production function possesses
constant returns to scale, and all prices are constant over time, then the amount of
investment required for each t during the adjustment process of the capital stock
becomes constant. Unlike Chapter 2, the present chapter justifies the presence of such
an upper constraint on investment by assuming a specific form of imperfection in
financial capital markets. In Section 3, this upper constraint takes special forms such as
the level of current profits and retained earnings. Concerning the specification of the
lower bound, I follow Arrow (1968), and assume that there exists no secondary capital
goods market in which the firm can sell its excess capital stock instantaneously. This
condition is widely known as irreversibility of capital spending.
Even long before Jorgenson's studies on investment, the interdependence
between financial factors and investment decisions had been recognised by a number of
studies [Keynes (1936), Kalecki (1954), Duesenberry (1958), Gruendfeld (1960), and
Kuh (1963)]. Keynes in his influential book took into consideration an additional cost
element over the principle level of the cost of borrowing, and defined it as the cost
arising out of lender's risk [Keynes (1936): 144]. The reason of such costs has been
discussed in the recent macroeconomics, and has closely been related to imperfections
in financial markets, and the agency problem associated with these imperfections [e.g.
Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)]. The modern interpretation of
Keynes in this new macroeconomic framework is built upon the concept of imperfect
information. The basic argument of imperfect information is that firms may have more
information about the nature and the prospective yields of their investment plans than
their lenders. Such imperfection in the form of "asymmetric information" is particularly
important for the lenders in a situation where there is a possibility that the firm may go
bankrupt. Thus asymmetric information can lead the lenders to search for more
information about the real nature of the investment plans, and to spend more on
monitoring the firm's activities. However, all this imposes additional costs on
borrowing according to the riskness of the investment plans (such costs can be called
'risk premium' because of their nature). if the default risk of lending is high, then the
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risk premium to be charged will be high as well. Keynes also noted that if the
borrower and lender were the same person, then such cost would not exist [see Keynes
(1936): 144].
Kalecki (1954) considered gross savings out of current profits (i.e. retained
earnings) and changes in profits as the main determinants of investment. In connection
with imperfections in financial markets, Kalecki particularly noted that "gross savings
offirms, ..., extend the boundaries set to investment plans by limited capital market and
the factor of 'increasing risk'." [Kalecki (1954): 97]. Grundfeld (1960), on the other
hand, accommodated the market value approach defined in the previous chapter, and
specified the desired capital stock in terms of the outstanding securities of the firm.
Kuh (1963) in this regard included internal funds available for investment (mainly in
line of Ka1ecki (1954», using the liquidity approach described in the previous chapter
[see Section 2.2 of Chapter 2].
The importance of the role assigned to financial factor in modelling investment
behaviour has also been the subject of a long historical debate starting with Jorgenson
(1971) and Elliot (1973). However, on the theoretical front, the last two decades
witnessed major breakthroughs in modelling capital market imperfections [e.g. see
Gertler (1988) for a survey]. Steigum (1983), for example, suggested an alternative
'financial theory' of investment in which some specific capital market imperfections are
considered. He criticised the use of strictly convex adjustment costs in the derivation of
stable and continuous investment demand schedule. He noted that many adjustment
costs (such as transaction, search, and information costs) are, in fact, concave. Instead
of using a convex adjustment cost function, he suggested that some imperfections in
capital markets rule out instantaneous adjustment of the capital stock to its optimal level,
and demonstrated that the optimal adjustment path can be approximated by a flexible
accelerator model even without using the convex adjustment cost function. The
important part of his model is the assumption that the cost of borrowing comprises of
two components, the risk free interest rate and a default risk premium arising from the
agency problem. He postulated that the default risk premium is an increasing function
of the firm's debt-equity ratio. Unlike Jorgenson's cash flow maximisation, Steigum
proposed that the firm behaves as if it maximises the entrepreneur's intertemporal
utility.
The most influential theoretical breakthrough in macroeconomics in the late
1970s and 1980s emphasised the direct interrelationship between financial markets and
investment plans through borrowing constraints. As will be discussed later in this
chapter, firms may face non-price credit rationing in financial capital markets either
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because of the absence of a well-developed capital market (as is the case in many
developing countries) or due to imperfections in existing capital markets (such as
asymmetric information). In particular, in developing countries the rate of interest on
loan may be kept lower than its equilibrium level by governments for various reasons.
The rate of returns on investment in these countries, on the other hand, may be quite
high, leading to excess demand for bank credit. In such a situation, the price
mechanism is replaced by qualitative restrictions on credit to adjust the supply of and
demand for credit. However in some cases, some firms' demand for credit may be
restricted by lenders even if they are willing to pay the prevailing rate of interest. The
reason for this behaviour of lenders is as follows. As lenders increase the rate of
interest according to the riskness of investment plans (due to the agency problem), the
lenders' expected returns decrease with rising risk premium component of the interest
rate. Besides, increasing interest rates cause the lenders to face fewer and fewer risk-
averse firms (with increasing default risk of loan). To avoid the consequences of high
monitoring cost, the lenders may also ration some firms depending on some firm
specific measures (such as reputation, size) [see Chapter 8].
No matter what the reason is, such imperfections in financial capital markets
impose an upper bound on the investment paths of some firms, and leave them totally
dependent on their own internally generated funds. The limited access to capital
markets by some small firms operating in such a capital market, particularly, is an
example of the dependence of these firms' investment plans on internal financial funds,
not because the lenders are not able to distinguish the riskness of such small firms, but
also because of the high cost of obtaining and monitoring information about these
firms.
The main concern of the chapter is the relevance of financial decisions for
investment plans. In this respect, Section 2 re-generates a simple presentation of the
Modigliani and Miller irrelevance theorem. This section also shows under which
assumptions the Modigliani and Miller theorem is relevant. Section 3 examines the
dynamic effects of irreversibility and liquidity constraints on the optimal capital
accumulation and investment plans of the firm. In the same section, borrowing is
included in Jorgenson's cash flow model with a rising cost schedule of borrowing, and
its impact on the optimal adjustment path of the capital stock is analysed. Section 4
examines the main elements of the Keynesian theory of investment and the role of
financial factors in this theory. As an extension of both Jorgenson's neoclassical and
the Keynesian theory of investment, Tobin's q theory of investment is discussed in
Section 5. The last section of the chapter is devoted to some conclusions.
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2. Modigliani and Miller Theorem
Starting from the mid- I960s, empirical studies on the theory of neoclassical investment
have excluded purely financial factors from investment decisions. Modigliani and
Miller (1958) provided the formal theoretical justification for the irrelevance of financial
structure and decisions of a firm for real investment. In particular, the Modigliani and
Miller theorem implies that in the absence of income tax, the firm's cost of financial
capital is independent of the way that the firm finances its investment expenditure (it
may be through retained earnings, or through issuing bond or equity). Therefore the
firm is indifferent between different financing options.
There are many versions of the Modigliani and Miller theorem. Here in this
section, a simplified version of the formal model is set out, by following Fama (1978),
Hoover (1992). Before presenting the model, some important assumptions of the
extreme form of the theorem can be noted as follows [see Fama (1978)].
Assumption I: Financial capital markets are perfect; there are no transaction costs to
invest or any danger of bankruptcy, and no taxes.
Assumption 2: Agents have equal access to financial capital markets. Then no firms
enjoy any special advantage over individuals infinancial markets. This
means that the types of securities that can be issued byfirms can also
be issued by investors. Its important implicationsfor the model here is
that the prices of securities are determined hy the characteristics of their
payoff streams and not by whether they are issued hy firms or
investors.
Assumption 3: There is complete agreement of homogeneous expectations (or rational
expectations). All information is costlessly available to all market
agents, and all agents assess the implications of information for the
future prospects offirms and securities to correct their error.
Assumption 4: Agents are concerned only about the pattern of returns oftheirfinancial
assets under different states of the world, hut not ahout a test for
particular portfolio combinations independently of their effects on risk
and return.
Assumption 5: Finns' investment decisions are made according to given strategies; i.e.
they are made independently of how investment is financed, but
according to calculations of the present value affirms' assets.
The formal model re-produced here is a simple, and standard one. Assume that, for a
given time period, the following arbitrage equation I for a representative firm in
equilibrium holds,
I The similar arbitrage equation in a dynamic form is also going to be accommodated in Chapter 8 hy
assuming that the firm does not issue equity.
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V= p'E+B (1)
where V is the value of the firm's real capital stock; B is the value of its debt to banks
and bondholders; E is the number of total shares outstanding; and pC is the price of each
share. Let v be the firm's rate of return on its real capital in different states of the
world. The net rate of return per real capital is the difference between v and the rate of
return on debt, r, that the firm promises to pay to banks and to its bondholders.
Therefore total return on real capital net of borrowing cost can be
vV -rB= v(p''E + B)- rB (2)
Given (2), the return per pound invested in the firm's shares, h, can be calculated as
h= v(p'E+B)-rB =(v-r B )(prE+B)
p'E p"E+B p"E
(3)
The total cost of financial capital (comprising of debt and equity financing) to the firm,
TC, is then written as the sum of the total cost of shares, hp" E, and the total cost of
bonds, rB; that is
TC = hp'E + rB (4)
The average cost AC is therefore
( 'E) ( B )AC=h P +r ---p''E+B p"E+B (5)
Substituting (3) in (5)
(6)
or
AC=v (6')
This says that the average cost of financial capital (from borrowing and equity
financing) to the firm is equal to the rate of return on the firm's real capital, and this
cost is not affected by the firm's 'debt-capital' (or debt-equity) ratio. Therefore the
firm's financial and real decisions (such as investment) are separable, and determined
independently of each other, as long as v is itself is independent of the means of finance
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(see assumption 5). This is a simple representation of the Modigliani and Miller
theorem.
The interdependence of investment and financial decisions is recognised in the
present chapter. It is considered that this interdependence arises due to the imperfect
nature of financial markets. In this regard, two possible approaches are taken into
consideration to make financial decisions relevant for investment in this chapter. The
first one is the assumption that self-financing is the marginal source of financing
investment. This situation may arise for the reason that the firm is unable to borrow
from capital markets by any desired level, then face a binding quantitative constraint in
this imperfect financial capital market. Therefore the firm has to rely on its internal
financial resources to finance its marginal investment. In such a situation, there will be
an upper bound on the amount of investment that the firm can make for each t.
The second one is the assumption of a rising convex cost function of borrowing
[see Hochman et al. (1973), and Steigum (1983)]. According to assumptions of
Jorgenson's model in Chapter 2 (as well as of the Modigliani and Miller theorem
above), a firm faces a given cost of financing capital, and it is able to borrow at this
cost as much as it wishes. Our second justification of imperfect financial capital
markets involves the fact that the firm cannot borrow boundlessly. Due to asymmetric
information and agency problem between the firm and bondholders of the firm, the cost
of financial capital may be positively related to the firm's debt-equity ratio. While
showing the interdependence of financial and investment decisions, this approach also
provides a theoretical back up for a mostly used modelling strategy of financial variable
in empirical private investment models in developing countries [see Sundurarajan and
Thakur (1980), and Blejer and Khan (1984)].2 Many studies in developing countries
have considered the importance of financial factors in the determination of private
investment behaviour, and modelled the effects of these factors generally by specifying
a variable adjustment coefficient in terms of financial variables. Section 6.2 in Chapter
2 briefly draws attention to this issue, but leaves the more detailed theoretical
discussion to this chapter. In section 3 here, the adjustment coefficient of the partial
adjustment mechanism is theoretically derived as a function of financial factor.
2 A detailed review of this modelling strategy is presented in Chapter 4.
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3. Financial Market Imperfections and Investment Behaviour
3.1. Capital Market Imperfections in the Form of Quantitative Constraints on
Investment
Financial constraints here are modelled both by the level of current profits and by
retained earnings. Depending on the specification of the financial constraint in the
theoretical model, optimal capital accumulation rules and investment plans show some
differences. A simple theoretical model is presented to investigate this role of financial
constraints in the optimal capital and investment plans in this chapter. Their empirical
significance for the Turkish economy is presented in Chapter 8 with the help of a
simple empirical model.
In some respects, the model in this chapter shows a similarity to the one in
Chapter 2. However, the model in the previous chapter assumes that an upper
constraint (as well as a lower constraint) is exogenously imposed.I and is permanently
binding over the adjustment process. The model in the present chapter, on the other
hand, considers the dynamic effects of a temporary upper constraint on investment.
For this purpose, it is assumed that the upper (or lower) bound is binding only over a
certain time interval. Therefore, the behaviour of a rational firm with perfect foresight
before and after this interval becomes the central issue to be discussed in this chapter.
Another essential part of the model here is the assumption of an imperfect
secondary capital goods market. According to this assumption, the selling price of
already used capital goods is lower than their purchasing price mainly because of
unrecoverable sunk costs. Such costs may create a wedge between the purchasing
price and the selling price of capital particularly if the adjustment of the capital stock is
subject to costs. But in the following model, I make a very restrictive assumption that
the secondary capital goods market does not exist, and reselling capital is not possible.
This assumption is known as the irreversibility assumption of capital. This also
corresponds to the "putty-clay" technology assumption as discussed in the previous
chapter, in the sense that once capital is installed in place with a specific production
technology, it cannot be sold or re-used in a different production process.
Consequently, the firm that wishes to disinvest, must wait until the capital stock dies
out at a constant geometric rate (by assumption). As an immediate implication of this
assumption, Jorgenson's myopic investment decision rule turns out to be a forward-
3 As discussed in the introduction, one possibility of the presence of such an upper hound on the
amount of investment can be justified by the adjustment costs of capital. In particular, the constant
returns to scale and constant prices assumptions may yield a constant upper hound on investment.
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looking one in the sense that the firm becomes aware of the fact that holding excess
capital stock may be costly if economic conditions worsen (e.g. demand for this firm's
output may fail). So it tries to foresee what the economic conditions would be in the
near future. If it anticipates, for example, that disinvestment would be necessary in the
future as a result of, say, a fall in demand, then it calls off or reduces current
investment plans to avoid having the cost of possessing excess capital stock in the
future. The assumption of the absence of secondary capital market goods market is not
new in the literature, and has been used in different theoretical analysis by Arrow
(1968), Appelbaum and Harris (1978), Nickell (1978), Schworm (1980), and Niho
and Musacchio (1983).
The model assesses the impact on the optimal capital accumulation rule of the
availability of internally generated financial funds acting as an upper bound, and the
irreversibility constraint acting as a lower bound on investment spending. Similar to
the assumptions in Chapter 2, these constraints are also accompanied by the following
simplifying additional assumption of the model
Assumption I: There is one capital good, Kt, which is assumed to he a "quasi-fixed"
input which means it is neither completly variable nor definitely fixed.
And labour, Lt, is the only variable input.
Assumption 2: All markets in which the firm buys production factors and sells goods
are petfectly competitive.
Assumption 3: There are no installation (or adjustment) costs ofcapital.
Assumption 4: Thefirm canforesee thefuture perfectly; i.e. there is no uncertainty
Assumption 5: Capital markets are imperfect in theform of quantitative constraints on
investment. As a result, the firm must rely on any kind of internally
generated funds. There is no debt financing and no equity issued,
therefore the only finance option is to be either current profits or retained
earnings that can be transferable over time.
Assumption 6: The profit function is positive, non-decreasing, convex and linear
homogenous in wage, and concave and increasing in the capital stock.
Assumption 6 suggests the following
it( w(t), p(t ),qi (t), K(t)) = max{p(t )Q(t )I(K(t), Q(t)) ET}
(1(,)
(7)
where n(.): the restricted profit function, w(.): wage rate, p(.): the price of output, (/(.):
the price of capital goods, Q(.): the level of output, K(.): the capital stock, T: the
production possibilities set.
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The technological change and changes in prices are assumed to be continuous
so that n(.) is also continuous in time. Let ir(K,.t) = ir(w.l'.ql .K) suppressing all indices
of prices. (7) is strictly concave, increasing, twice differentiable function of the capital
stock; i.e. nK >0, nKK <0 (where TcK=dTc/dK, and nKK =d2n/dK,2).
With respect to assumption 5, the theory suggests two different internal
financial constraints, namely the current profits constraint [see Appelbaum and Harris
(1978)], and the retained earning constraint [see Schworm (1980)]. The optimal capital
accumulation rules and optimal investment decisions differ depending on which
financial constraint is effective in the model. In this section, both constraints and their
effects on the optimal policy of the firm are analysed separately. The model, which is
similar to the one in the previous chapter, specifies the forms of the upper and lower
constraints on investment (namely the internal financial constraint and the irreversibility
constraint respectively). Unlike Arrow (1968), and Appelbaume and Harris (1978),
the following model is more general in the sense that the replacement investment and
the price of capital goods are also included in the solution.
The firm is assumed to maximise the sum of discounted cash flow over a time
interval (0, +00) by choosing the optimal time paths of investment I(t), and labour, Lit),
subject to i.) the equation describing capital accumulation (i.e. capital account
equation), ii.) the irreversibility constraint, iii.) an internal finance constraint on
investment; that is
Maximise iMR(t)[ ii"( K"t) - q: I,]dt() (8)
subject to
K, = I,-oK, (9)
( 10)
(I I)
(12)
lim R(T)Kr = 0
'--+M
(13)
where i, the upper limit of investment spending which is specified by accommodating
either current profits or retained earnings,
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r(r) = _ R(t)
R{t) ( 14)
(10) and (II) represent the irreversibility and internal finance constraints respectively.
These constraints influence decision rules for the optimal capital accumulation and
investment.
To assess the dynamic effects of quantitative constraints, we take into
consideration two different criteria. I call the first one "the purchasing criterion" that
involves the comparison of the shadow price of capital (11,) with its purchasing price
(q'). This is also the rule we have discussed in the previous chapter. Accordingly, if
the shadow price of capital is higher than its purchasing price, then the firm considers
that purchasing capital stock leaves net profit to it. Hence the firm decides to invest
until this net profit disappears as the value of the shadow price of capital declines, and
vice versa. I call the second one "the renting criterion" that involves the comparison of
the discounted marginal product of a unit capital investment (i.e. the shadow price of
capital) with its implicit rental price. The rental cost will be defined as the discounted
value of expected rental payments for a unit of capital goods over a time interval that the
firm could pay if renting, instead of purchasing, was an option. Now, assume a time
interval where the shadow price of capital is less than its purchasing price, but higher
than its rental price. According to the purchasing criterion, purchasing capital goods
over this interval is not profitable for the firm. However, if renting capital is allowed,
then the firm, according to the renting criterion, prefers to rent capital goods in the
beginning of the interval, and returns them at the end of the interval. In Jorgenson's
model, these two decision criteria are identical, and the firm is indifferent between
renting and purchasing capital goods, since there are no binding constraints on
investment. The immediate effects of the presence of constraint either (4) or (5) will be
to make these two decision criteria different. Needless to say, one can easily realise
from the discussion above that the imposition of constraints on investment turns the
problem into a forward-looking one by invoking the firm to foresee the near future.
Before starting the formulation of the model, it is necessary to note that the
optimal capital accumulation and investment decisions differ according to the interval
over which the firm makes decisions. Following Arrow (1968)'s and Appelbaum and
Harris (1978)'s terminology, three different intervals can be mentioned. They are i.) a
free interval where neither the upper constraint nor the lower constraint proposed here
is effective, ii.) a blocked interval where only the irreversibility constraint is effective,
and finally iii.) a bounded interval where the internal finance constraint is binding. In
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Chapter 2, a case with a binding lower constraint on investment corresponds to a
blocked interval, while a binding upper constraint refers to a bounded interval. Unlike
the model in the present chapter, the constraints in Chapter 2 are assumed to be
permanent. The model, whose solution is presented below subject to different binding
constraints, considers the dynamic effects of any temporary constraint that are effective
over a certain time interval, and takes into account expected marginal net changes in the
shadow price of a capital good over that interval. Depending on these changes in the
shadow price, the firm's renting and purchasing criteria differs.
3.1.1. The Irreversibility Constraint
Here I postpone imposing the internal finance restriction (II) for a while, and
investigate the likely impact of the irreversibility constraint on optimal investment
policies. The results to be derived shortly are no different from a re-formulation of
those of Arrow (1968). Two different optimal decision rules regarding the constraint
( 10) can be stated through the following two propositions.
Proposition 1: If I, > O on an interval where the lower constraint is not binding, then the
optimal capital policy is described by the well-known myopic rule. The
firm chooses the capital stock, Kt, so that both decision criteria are
satisfied simultaneously. In other words, the shadow price of capital
becomes equal to its purchasing price (p, = ql) while the marginal
productivity of capital equals its rental cost (that is icK ( K, .t) = c, where
e, =q:(r,+8-q:), and q: =q:/q:).
According to proposition I, if the firm is not bounded by the irreversibility condition,
then Jorgenson's myopic rule produced in the previous chapter holds, and the firm
becomes indifferent between the purchasing criterion and the renting criterion over a
free interval.
Proposition 2: On a blocked interval (to, ti). beginning at some to >0 on afree interval
and ending at some tf <+ 00 on a free interval, the following decision
rules holdsfor all t, to < t <t j.
(a) J'~-cn[e, - lrK( K"t )]dt = o
'n
(b) f.e-m[e, - lrK(K"t)]dt < 0 for to < t < tl
(c) r~-cn[e,-lrK(K"t)]dt>O for tn-c t c tj
where (j= (r+ 8).
Simple interpretations of proposition 2 are as follows. Remember that a block interval
is mainly characterised by the fact that the firm wishes to sell its excess capital stock,
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but it is unable to do so because of the irreversibility constraint. The reason why the
finn wishes to sell capital is that the marginal benefit from a capital good is less than its
purchasing price, 11, < q', Relations (a-c) in proposition 2 define three different renting
criteria. Bearing this in mind, (a) describes a situation where the blocked interval starts
at a free interval and ends at another free interval. Equation (a) says that at the margin,
the discounted rental cost of capital (c, is the instantaneous rental cost of capital) and its
discounted marginal benefit are equal, and the firm becomes indifferent between renting
and not renting for the entire period. (b) indicates a blocked interval starting at a free
interval and ending at some time on the blocked interval. With respect to (b), the
marginal expected rental cost of a capital good is less than its expected discounted
marginal benefit. In such situation, renting a capital good at to and returning it at t
(rather than purchasing a capital good at to and holding it) would be profitable for the
firm if renting was an option in the model. Since the only option is purchasing, and the
purchasing criterion indicates that 11, < «', then the firm does not wish to buy a capital
good. (c) is, on the other hand, a situation starting at the blocked interval and ending at
a free interval. Relation (c) assures that the expected discounted marginal cost of
renting is higher than its discounted marginal benefit, and therefore, the firm would not
wish to rent a capital good in such an interval.
Proof: The optimal strategies are given by the solution of the maximisation of cash
flows over [0, +00] subject to (9), (10), (12), and (13). The optimal policy of the firm,
denoted by (K;./;), also means the maximisation of the following current value
Hamiltonian
H, = [k(K" t) - q: I, ]+11,(I, - s«, ) ( 15)
where 11,: the shadow price of a unit of capital goods, a function of time (,u,>0); q:: the
purchasing price of capital goods. The Lagrangean function associated with H(t) and
the irreversibility constraint can be formulated as,
L, = H, +A,q: I, ( 16)
where A,: the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint (10) (A,~O). The optimal
investment strategy, r, is however given by the following Kuhn-Tucker necessary
condition,
(~~:)~ 0, ([11, +q:(A, -I)] = 0, ( 17)
There are two possible cases associated with this Kuhn-Tucker condition:
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(i)
(ii)
if ( >0 (=>A, =0), then J1, =a'
if I; = 0 (=> A, > 0), then J1, < q:
( 18)
( 19)
(i) describes a free interval over which the optimal investment undertaken by the firm is
positive. This is given by the purchasing criterion J1' = q' . On the other hand,
condition (ii) indicates the purchasing criterion on the blocked interval. Since J1, < q'
over the blocked interval, the optimal investment strategy for the firm is to be zero
investment. The dynamics of the system are given by the constraint (3) and the motion
of the shadow value of a unit of capital goods+, J1, , that is
K, = I, -oK, (20)
(21 )
where TcK is the marginal product of capital. For a while, assume that I; > 0 and
J1, = q: , then (21) becomes identical to
- ( s.') I .I7rK = r+u q, -q, (22)
or
(22a)
where q: = 4:Iq:. From the discussion in chapter 1, the right-hand side of (22a) can be
called the "implicit rental cost of capital"> and denoted by c, . Hence
(23)
Therefore, proposition I holds. This rule is merely the myopic decision rule that has
been discussed in Chapter 2. The optimal capital accumulation on a free interval is
determined by the myopic rule which is independent of the future values of the price of
capital goods, interest rate, and technology.
Consider now the optimal investment decision of the firm over a time interval
(to, t.). From condition (18), let f3, =J1, -q:; i.e. the net expected marginal benefits
from a unit capital investment. Provided that to and tl are both located on a free
interval, the net expected marginal benefit from a unit capital investment at to and tl will
be zero from proposition 1; that is f3(tu) = f3(tl) = o.
4 The technical derivation of a similar problem has extensively been discussed in the previous chapter
5 The user cost of capital and the rental cost of capital are two terms that have generally heen used to
describe Ct in the literature.
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In relation to proposition 2, three possible cases are to be considered here; (a)
the firm is assumed to be initially at to and gives up some capital stock at t I, (b) the case
where the firm installs a unit capital good at to and wishes to disinvest at t on a blocked
interval, and finally (c) the firm which is initially at t on the blocked interval, invests
and wishes to sell capital goods at tl on the free interval.
(a) The optimal capital accumulation rule for an interval of time (to, tj ), where
{3(to) = {3(tl) = O. According to condition (19), the optimal investment policy is that
J,' = o. To see the optimal capital accumulation rule, using (21), define the following
(24)
or
/3, = (r+ o)f3, +(c, - irK) (25)
The change in the value of the net marginal benefit of a unit of capital goods instalment
is given by the integral of (25) over the period (to, td;
(26)
where f3(to) = f3(tl) = O. SOit is also true that
(27)
where (J = (r + 0). Therefore proposition 2a holds over an interval (to, t I)·
(b) Now consider the optimal capital accumulation rule for the interval (t{),t) beginning
at to on a free interval (f3(tn) = 0) and ending at t on the blocked interval. Needless to
say that at any point on the entire blocked interval to<t<t I, f3(t) = u, - q: < 0 according to
condition (19). Using (25), the following can be defined over the interval (to, t),
f3(t) - f3(tn) = f.exp[-(r+ o)(s - r)]( er - irK (r) )dr < 0 (28)
where f3( r)< 0, and f3( to} = 0 due to the assumption that to is on the free interval and so
p(tn) = q'(to}. Hence
(29)
where (J = (r +0). It follows that
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i' -<1(,'-r) • d i' -<1(,,-r) - de er!'< e 7rK!,
'0 '0
(30)
The left-hand side of (23) stands for the term that describes the expected present value
of implicit rental cost of a unit capital good over the time interval (to, t). The right-hand
side is the expected marginal product from this capital instalment over the same time
period.
According to (30), if renting a capital good was an option together with
purchasing, then the finn would prefer to rent because its discounted marginal benefit
from that capital good is higher than its marginal discounted rental cost. However,
since renting is, in fact, not allowed in the model, the firm must take into consideration
the purchasing criterion. According to the condition in (19), the purchasing criterion
over a block interval (such as the one starting at to on a free interval and ending at ton
the blocked interval) implies that the shadow price of a capital good is less than its
purchasing price (i.e. 11, < q:). For the firm whose investment (or disinvestment) is
constrained by a zero lower constraint, this means not to invest over this blocked
interval (i.e. I; = 0). Therefore, proposition 2b also holds.
(c) Consider the optimal capital accumulation rule for an interval of time starting at t on
the blocked interval and ending at tJ on a free interval where f3(t)<o, f3(tl)=o
respectively. Given the condition in (19), ft(t) in (25) becomes identical to the
following condition,
(31 )
then
(32)
since f3(tl) = 0 and -f3(t) < o. (32) implies that the discounted marginal rental cost of a
capital good is higher than its discounted marginal benefit. Therefore the firm would
not wish to rent beginning at any point in the blocked interval and ending at tj ,
However, since the optimal investment strategy is given by the purchasing criterion
11, < q:, the firm does not invest at all. This completes the proof of proposition 2.
In Figure 3.1, the optimal capital adjustment process is illustrated. For this
purpose, assume that the capital stock changes according to a monotonically increasing
function. Over a free interval on which the optimal investment is finite. and positive
(r > 0), the finn is able to increase its capital stock. At point A, assume that having
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A
Figure 3.1
reached Kt:, the firm wishes to disinvest for some reasons (e.g. because of an increase
in the interest rate), and adjust its optimal capital stock to a new level, K:. However,
because of the binding irreversibility constraint becoming effective after to, the firm is
unable to disinvest. Instead, it invests nothing, and waits until the excess capital stock
depreciates by a constant rate. Therefore, after point A, the capital stock approaches to
the new level by geometrically declining.
So far, the presence of any financial constraints that may bind investment
expenditure of a firm above has been ignored. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the
effects of a financial constraint on the optimal capital accumulation are closely related to
the choice of a specification of such a constraint. In this regard, two different
specifications have been adopted here. The first one assumes that investment at any
moment of time is limited by the firm's current profits [Appelbaum and Harris (1978)].
The second one introduces the stock of accumulated retained earnings as a financial
constraint [Schworm (1980)].
3.1.2. Current Profits as a Financial Constraint
In this section, the optimal capital policy of the firm with an upper investment constraint
is examined under the assumption that self-financing is the marginal source of finance.
The upper bound is such that the amount of investment made by the firm is limited by
current profits. Such constraints may arise from a number of capital market
imperfections. Particularly, in the case of the absence of a capital market on which the
firm can borrow, the firm must rely on its internally generated funds to finance its
investment. As explained earlier in the introduction of this chapter, non-price credit
rationing also leads the firm to finance its investment through internally generated funds
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(profits in this section by assumption) mainly due to asymmetric information and
agency problem. Capital market imperfection as such are not at all unusual in practice.
Appelbaum and Harris (1978) examined capital accumulation under the
assumption that investment is financed by current profits at the margin. In their model,
the financial constraint is a consequence of a number of assumptions, i.) no borrowing
is possible, ii.) no retained earnings are held (i.e. all cash flow must be distributed to
shareholders). During bounded intervals in which the firm is constrained, the general
expectation is that the firm with bounded investment plans has a lower capital stock
relative to a firm which is not constrained by such a constraint. As noted in Chapter 2,
this is also the case with a permanently binding upper constraint on investment. The
main conclusion of their model, however, differs from this expectation. Due to the
intertemporal nature of the model, the firm anticipates future profit constraints, and
increases its investment over some interval in order to increase future profits. By
increasing the capital stock over some intervals, the firm will then be able to generate
more profits and also to decrease the demand for capital in the future. Therefore, this
behaviour of the firm reduces the stringency of future financial constraints [for a similar
result also see Blanchard and Sarch (1982) and Precious (1987)].
Appelbaum and Harris (1978) analysed the optimal capital policy of a
constrained firm by comparing it with that of a reference firm which is not constrained,
but is identical in all other respects. For this, they examined the discounted marginal
present values of an additional unit of capital services of each firm over a certain time
interval. They defined a time interval starting on a free interval at to and ending on the
bounded interval at t>1o. They proved that during such a bounded interval (to, t), the
constrained firm expects more marginal contribution from a unit capital service than the
unconstrained does. Despite the fact that one might expect the constrained firm to
assign more marginal value from an additional capital service, according to the counter
intuitive results of Appelbaum and Harris, the constrained firm increases the capital
stock to its limit, before it enters the bounded interval, in order to ensure that it is not
constrained in the future. This is because more investment (and accumulating more
capital) today would mean a higher profit level in the future due to the intertemporal
nature of the decision. Therefore, excess capital stock today would also increase
profits in the future, relaxing the stringency of the future profit constraint. In addition
to Arrow (1968)'s propositions, Appelbaum and Harris (1978), then, formulate the
following proposition.v
6 This proposition holds only if the constrained finn starts from a free interval, and has a change to
accumulate excess capital stock. If the finn starts the optimal policy with capital deficiency. then it
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Proposition 3: Over an time interval (to. ti) in which the upper constraint Oil illvestment
is effective, excluding intervals beginning at to=O, hut including
intervals which mayor may not end infinite time, the marginal value of
a unit of capital services for use in any sub-period [to' t J c [to' t, J is less
for the constrained firm in the imperfect capital market than for the
unconstrained counterpart in the perfect capital market. Therefore, in
some sub-period [to,t) c [to' tl], the former possesses more capital stock
then the latter.
Proof: The optimal strategy is given by the solution of the maximisation of the cash
flow problem in the previous section. However, the problem can be extended by
noting that investment expenditure cannot be higher than the firm's current level of
profits, that is
(33)
With this additional constraint, the solution can be derived from the optimisation of the
following extended Lagrangean function,
L, = [ir(K"t)- q: 1,]+ P,(!, - 8K,)+ A,q: I, + 17,[ir(K"t)- q: I,] (34)
where 1],: the Lagrange multiplier associated with the profit constraint (33) (TJ,;::::O). The
Kuhn-Tucker necessary condition for the optimal investment policy can, then, be re-
written as
(aL, )~Odl '
I
I: ~O, ([p, +q: (A, -I) -17,] = 0, (35)
In addition to conditions (18) and (19) in the previous section, a new condition
associated with the profit constraint can be written as follows 7
(iii) if q: I; = ir(K"t) (=> TJ, > 0 and A,= 0), then )1, > 4: (36)
The dynamics of the model are given by the similar equations as before
/<, = I, - SK, (10)
(37)
never accumulates excess capital stock. In the case where the optimal policy starting at to requires an
initial jump into the bounded interval, the result would be similar to capital deficiency.
7 Note that the irreversibility constraint is not binding, therefore the Lagrange multiplier associated
with that constraint, A" will be zero.
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where f3, =Ji, -q:, and c, =q:(r+ t5-q:), q: =q:/q:. Note that f3, >0 at any moment of
time t on the bounded interval from (36). Because u, is a continuous function of time,
f3, will also be a continuous function of time for t >0.
Assume now that the firm starts to be constrained over an interval (to, t I), being
to and t) on a free interval (so that f3(to) = f3(t,} = 0). Over an interval ['0"] C [10,t,] where
f3(t) > 0, changes in the value of the net marginal benefits from a unit of capital services
is given by the integral of (37),
for V't E (111't,), with equality if t =tl. Remember that f3(1,} = 0 because tl is on the free
interval, and f3(t) is strictly positive because t is on the bounded interval. Using (36),
we can also write
where (r+ t5). Since it is already known from the Kuhn-Tucker condition (36) that
17, > o,the following is also true
L exp] -o-{s - 1")][er - irK (Kr' -r)]d-r ~ L exp] -o-{s - r) ]17rirA K r' -r)d-r > 0 (40)
for all t, to < t < I, .
Let s(K"t}= TrK(K"t) where s(K"t) is the efficiency price of capital services.
Using proposition 1 in the previous section, we can write that c, = .1'''( K;' ,t) where .1""(.)
is the efficiency price of a unit of capital services for the unconstrained firm. The same
can also be written for the bounded case, s'(K;,t)=Tr,(K;,t) where .1",(.) is the
efficiency price of a unit capital service for the constrained firm Hence (40) becomes
identical to
L exp] -0-(.1' - 1")](SU{ r) - s' (r) )d-r > 0 (41 )
L exp] -0-(.1' - r) ~u (r)d-r > L exp] -0-(.1' - r) V (r)d-r (42)
The left-hand side of (42) corresponds to the marginal value of an additional unit of
capital services expected by the unconstrained firm. The term on the right-hand side of
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Ke(t) .
KU(t)
r
Figure 3.2
inequality (42) is the marginal value of a unit capital expected by the constrained firm.
According to (42), the unconstrained firm expects more marginal benefits from a unit
capital than its constrained counterpart does over some certain intervals over some time
interval between (to, t.). Given the diminishing marginal profitability assumption, if
the constrained firm relatively expects a lower marginal value of a unit capital good than
that of the unconstrained firm in the future, then it means that the constrained firm has
more capital stock today, so that the instalment of a capital good in the future would add
less marginal value to the firm's total value. Therefore, bounded intervals which start
at to>O (to is on a free interval) are intervals characterised by "capital excess". Let
K" and KC be the levels of capital stock of the unconstrained and constrained firm
respectively, then K" < KC over bounded intervals for at least some t E (Io,tl)' Hence,
proposition 3 holds.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the adjustment paths of both the constrained and the
unconstrained firm after, say, a decline in the rate of interest. As a result, both firms
wish to accumulate capital stock starting at point A. As the unconstrained firm
continues to follow its unconstrained path of adjustment KU, the constrained one
foresees the upper constraint which is going to be effective on it over a time interval (to,
t I). Therefore it accumulates excess capital stock (compared to its unconstrained
counterpart) over the period between t and to in order to reduce the stringency of the
future constraint, and enters the bounded interval (to, tl) with excess capital stock
( K" < KC at to). Then at the end of the period (at point B), the constrained firm may
return to its unconstrained adjustment path. In this example, the implicit assumption is
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that the firm is able to accumulate sufficient excess capital stock not to face any capital
deficiency at any time over the bounded interval.
3.1.3. Retained Earnings as a Financial Constraint
Relaxing the assumption that all cash flows must be distributed to shareholders as made
in Appelbaum and Harris (1978), Schworm (1980) assumed that firms can always
retain current earnings to finance the optimal capital accumulation in the future. In his
model, there are two ways of transferring current funds into the future. The firm can
either purchase capital or accumulate retained earnings. The allocation of financial funds
between purchasing capital and retained earnings depends on their relative rate of
returns to the firm. If the rate of return on purchasing capital is higher than or equal to
the rate of return on accumulating retained earnings, then the firm always purchases
capital goods.
A representative firm in Schworm's model can either retain earnings or
distribute them to shareholders. Investment decisions are made subject to the financial
constraint imposed by the stock of accumulated retained earnings, E" He analysed the
dynamic effects of a binding temporary financial constraint over some intervals, and
added a new state variable, E, ' to Appelbaum and Harris's model. The accumulation
of retained earnings was modelled by the following differential equation,
E, = rIEl + [ir( K{,t)- q: I{] (43)
The addition to accumulated retained earnings at any moment of time is the current
interest rate earned on the already exist stock of retained earnings plus the cash flow in
the current period. By assumption, the inability of borrowing implies that the
investment path is constrained by the availability of accumulated retained earnings. The
upper bound on investment in Schwarm's model is imposed on the firm by
E{~O. (44)
This inequality constraint implies that as long as internal funds available for investment
are sufficient, the firm follows the optimal investment path of a unconstrained firm.
Once these funds are exhausted, the firm starts to spend all current profits to finance its
investment for some bounded interval, so that E, = E{ = o. This implies the following
q: I{ s n(K{, r], with equality if E, = 0 (45)
He proved that unlike Appealbaum and Harris, the marginal value of a unit addition of
capital services firm is not less for a constraint than for a unconstrained firm. This
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implies that the capital stock of the constrained firm is not greater than that of the
unconstrained firm (i.e. the constrained firm does not have capital excess). The reason
for such a counter intuitive result is that the retained earnings constraint h.as no
anticipatory effect on capital accumulation as in Appelbaum and Harris (1978). In
Schworm's model, the anticipation of a financial constraint in the future induces the
firm only to accumulate retained earnings, and to reduce current investment in order to
postpone the exhaustion of internal funds in the future. This argument, however,
ignores the fact that current investment increases the funds available in the future by
increasing future profits.
3.2. Capital Market Imperfections III the Form of Increasing Cost of
Borrowing
In this section, I specify capital market imperfections by a rising convex cost function
of borrowing. By such a function, it is assumed that lenders charge a default risk
premium over the risk-free interest rate due to agency problems arising from
asymmetric information in imperfect capital markets. I also assume that there is no
quantitative constraint imposed on the firm's optimal investment path as was the case in
the previous section.
Two separate modifications of Jorgenson cash flow maximisation problem are
accommodated in this section. The first one is that the cost of borrowing, z, is
assumed to be an increasing function of the debt-equity ratio, y, of the firm. In this
respect, the proposed model below is an extension of Steigum (1983) in which the firm
maximises the entrepreneur's intertemporal utility, but not the discounted future cash
flows. The second modification is the inclusion of borrowing into the model by
proposing an additional stock accumulation equation, together with capital stock
adjustment equation (19) in Chapter 2. The specifications of this new debt-stock
accumulation equation is in line with Dailami (1992), (1990) and Sundararajan (1985).
The Model
Assume a representative firm which invests in physical capital (K) without capital
adjustment costs, borrows or holds financial assets. I assume that the firm is not
strictly bounded by any quantitative constraint on investment, but the cost of
borrowing, Z, is a rising function of the debt-equity ratio, y, for all y greater than some
numbers y ~ O. For y:5 y, Z is a positive constant, i (the riskless interest rate). More
formally, the cost of borrowing function can be written as
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{
i for - I< y < y
z(y) =
i+ i(y- y)for y>v
(46)
where y=BI£, and £=qIK-B [see Steigum (1983)]. Following Steigum (1983), I
assume that the function r{y -.n is an strictly increasing convex function; i.e. r'C) > 0,
and r"C) > 0 [for a similar specification of the cost of borrowing function, see
Hochman et al. (1973)]. The convexity of the function with respect to debt stock, B,
provides an increasing risk premium at the margin due to agency problems. The total
cost of borrowing for the value of the outstanding debt stock is z(y)B. The marginal
cost of borrowing, m(y), is then given by
a[z(B/E)]B
m(y) = aB = z(y) + yz'(y) (47)
Its derivative for all y:;:. Si is then
m'(Y) = 2z'(Y) +yZ"(y) (48)
and zero for y < y. z(y) is also a decreasing function of the capital stock; i.e.
o{ z[ B/( c/ K - B)]}B 10K = _ql/Z'(Y).
So far, the model has closely followed Steigum (1983). J now introduce the
debt stock accumulation equation borrowed from Dailami (1992), (1990) and
Sundararajan (1985).
8, = b, - rE, (49)
where b, is the amount of borrowing for each t, r being the constant amortisation rate
on the outstanding debt stock. The cash flow equation (13) in Chapter 2 can then be
modified by allowing for borrowing as follows.
v, = pQ, - wL, - q' I, - z(y)B, + 8, (50)
Substituting (49) into (50) yields
v, = pQ, - wL, -s' I, -z(y)B, + b, - rE, (50a)
The aim of the firm is, as before, to maximise (50a) subject to the capital account
identity and the debt stock accumulation equation (49); that is
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~
Maximise J exp( -rt )V,dt
0
subject to (51 )
(i) K, =1, -oK,
(ii) R, = b, - yE,
«; n; are given
In (51), in addition to investment, the amount of borrowing, b, is also a control
variable. To solve the optimisation problem (51), write the following current value
Hamiltonian function
H, = [pQ, - wL, - qll, - z(y)B, + b, - yE,] + J1,(I, - oK,) + 17,(h, - rB,) (52)
where /1, and 17,are co-state variables associated with K, and R, respectively. The
following conditions are necessary for an optimum
pFL =w (53)
0= aH/al ~ /1, =q' (54)
O=aH/aB ~ 17, =-1 (55)
iI, = (r + 8)J1, - pFK - e'v' z'(y) (56)
iJ, = (r+ r)17, +m(y)+ r (57)
Unlike the model in Chapter 2, the present model yields two different equilibrium
conditions for the firm. The first one is for the financial market from which the firm
borrows. Substituting (55) in (57) gives the decision rule for borrowing for the firm,
that is
m(y)= r (58)
(58) implies that the firm borrows from imperfect capital markets until its marginal cost
of borrowing becomes equal to the constant discount rate. This also indicates an
instantaneous adjustment of the firm's optimal debt stock to any exogenous change in
the discount rate. From the optimality condition (58), the firm is able to determine the
optimal debt-equity ratio, y'. Using the identity a' K = B+ E, and letting k' be the
optimal debt-capital ratio, (58) also yields a constant debt-capital ratio since
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k' = //(1+ y'). Given these optimal levels of the debt-equity and the debt-capital ratios,
the firm, then, determines the optimal capital stock corresponding to these ratios. This
is given by the second equilibrium condition in capital goods market from (56), that is
pFK = q'[(r+8)-lz'(Y)] (59)
(59) is basically the similar optimality condition for the capital stock in Jorgenson's
model, except the user cost of capital on the right-hand side including an additional term
/z'(y). If the cost of borrowing is a given constant (i.e. z'(y)=O) as in the model in
Chapter 2, the optimality condition reduces to the myopic rule of Jorgenson's model in
equilibrium. According to (59), an increase in the marginal return on capital increases
the demand for the capital stock. Because of the interdependence of financing decisions
and investment decisions, the firm must finance this increase in the capital stock in a
way that the optimal debt-equity ratio, which is determined according to the equilibrium
condition in the financial capital market, remains constant (i.e. debt and equity must
increase equally).
Many studies for developing countries have incorporated financial variables into
private investment models. Following Coen (1971), Sundararajan and Thakur ( 1980),
Tun Wai and Wong (1982), Blejer and Kahn (1984) and Sundararajan (1985), for
example, assumed that the availability of finance for investment influences the
adjustment process of the capital stock through the adjustment coefficient of the partial
adjustment mechanism. To see this effect theoretically, I now accommodate
assumption (5') in Section 6.1 of Chapter 2 regarding the presence of strictly convex
adjustment costs. The set up of the model is the same as before, but only the optimality
condition (54) differs in the following way,
/1, = C'(I,) (54')
As it is usually the case in the adjustment cost model, (54') implies that investment is an
increasing function of the shadow value of the capital stock, assuming that C(.) is an
invertable function. As explained in Chapter 2, J.l indicates the marginal benefit from a
unit of installed capital stock which declines as the rate of investment increases. Its
explicit definition with the presence of a rising cost of borrowing can then be obtained
from (56) as
~
/1, = f exp[-(r+8)(s-t)][pFK +q'lz'(y)]ds
II
(60)
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According to (60), the value of the shadow price of capital comprises two components
in the presence of a rising cost of borrowing. The first one is the present value of
marginal productivity of a unit capital over its life period. The increase in the capital
stock also contributes to the value of Jl through the cost of borrowing. the second
component of (6). Given a{Z[B/(q'K-B)]}B/aK=-q''/z'(Y), an increase in the capital
stock will also decrease the marginal cost of borrowing, and increase the value of Jl by
q'y2Z/(y) .
Two different differential equations give the dynamics of the system, namely
equation (51-i) and (56). The linearised form of this system can be obtained around the
steady-state values of J.1 and K as follows
K, = C-I (Ji, )(Ji, - Ji,') - 8(K, - K;) (61 )
(62)
In a matrix form,
C"-I (Ji, )][K, - K; 1
(r+8) Ji, -/1;
(63)
The characteristic roots of this system are real and opposite in sign, and the solution
gives a saddle point. The stability of the system is provided only by the negative root.
As shown in chapter 2 , this negative root is also the adjustment coefficient of the
partial adjustment mechanism that governs the movement of capital towards its desired
level. The speed of adjustment can be given by this negative root from the solution of
the system of two differential equations in (63); that is
(64)
With the definition of the adjustment coefficient in (64), the speed of adjustment
becomes an endogenous choice variable as indicated in Sundararajan and Thakur
(1980) and Blejer and Khan (1984). Its value, however, is determined by the
properties of both the production function and financial capital markets. If the
production function exhibits constant returns to scale, and financial capital markets are
perfect (i.e. m' = 0), then the adjustment coefficient 8 becomes equal to the constant rate
of depreciation 0 as in Gould (1968). The same result can be derived with both the
constant returns to scale and constant debt-equity (YK = 0) assumption.
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The general conclusion from this section is that once we include borrowing and
assume that the cost of borrowing is an increasing function of the debt-equity ratio,
financial and investment decisions become interrelated. In connection with a number of
studies for developing countries, the nature of capital markets in these countries
intluences the adjustment path of the capital stock. The firm's optimal strategy needs to
satisfy two equilibrium conditions simultaneously. First, the firm in the financial
market attains the equilibrium at the point where the marginal cost of borrowing equals
the constant discount rate. This equilibrium condition determines the firm's optimal
debt-equity composition to finance investment expenditure obtained from the second
equilibrium condition in the capital goods market.
4. Keynesian Theory of Investment and Financial Factors
In his influential book in which he sets forth the main elements of investment theory,
Keynes differs from his neoclassical counterparts in two respects [Keynes ( 1936): 136-
146]. First, and most importantly, Keynes emphasises the potential role of the
behaviour of the capital-good-producer industry that is largely ignored in Jorgenson's
version of the neoclassical theory of investment. Second, Keynes recognises the
significant role of financial factors in investment decisions. Analysing the Keynesian
theory of investment is also important because one of the major competitors to
Jorgenson's investment theory, namely Tobin's q theory, finds its origin in the General
Theory.
The main components of the Keynesian theory of investment are explained in
Chapter II of the General Theory. In this chapter, Keynes referred to the investment
function as the marginal efficiency of capital (m.e.c.) schedule. The mec is the rate of
return by which all future expected benefits from a unit capital good during its
economic life are discounted. Keynes suggested a negative relationship between the
marginal efficiency of a particular type of capital and the investment in that capital good,
and notified two reasons to justify it. First, the prospective yield from an additional
capital good diminishes as the capital stock expands. Second, an increase in demand
for capital goods would create excess demand pressure on the supply of such capital
goods and cause its supply price to rise. In some respects, this is a relaxation of
Jorgenson's perfect market assumption for the capital good market in the sense that the
instantaneous adjustment of the capital good demanding firm disappears because the
manufacturers of capital goods are only able to adjust their supplies to changes in
demand conditions gradually, not instantaneously. To induce the capital-good-
producing firms to adjust their capacity to the new demand conditions, the supply price
of capital goods must rise. By supply price of capital, Keynes defined" ... not the
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market price at which an asset of the type in question can actually be purchased in the
market, but the price which would just induce a manufacturer newly to produce an
additional unit of such asset, i.e. what is sometimes called its replacement costs."
[Keynes (1936): 135].
The first justification of the negative relationship is closely related to the concept
of the demand for the optimal capital stock in Jorgenson's model. As explained earlier
in Chapter 2, the demand for an additional capital stock of a firm is determined
according to the expected marginal benefits from that additional capital good discounted
by the rate of interest. In the Keynesian tradition, this is called "the demand price of
capital", which has been named as the shadow price of capital in the previous chapter.
Following the derivation of the shadow price of capital in Chapter 2. the demand price
of the same capital good can be written as follows.
T
qd = f exp(-rt )7r~dt
II
(65)
where q"; the demand price of a unit capital good, T: the economic life of unit capital
good, 1r~: the expected marginal profit from a unit capital which is a function of a
neoclassical production function and the price of output; i.e. 1r~ = pFK• Since the
production function is concave in K, the expected profit from an additional capital good
diminishes as the capital stock increases [see Mussa (1977), Abel (1980), Precious
(1987), and Chirinko (1993)]. Any fall in the rate of interest would increase the
expected marginal profit from a unit capital good, and induce the firm to increase its
capital stock. In Jorgenson's model, the adjustment would be instantaneous without
any bound on the amount of investment. However, in the Keynesian model, the
supply-side condition enters the model to determine the speed of the gradual capital
adjustment because the capital-good supplying firms require an increase in the supply
price of capital goods to produce more capital goods to meet each extra demand for
capital goods in the market. Therefore, the capital good demanding firm adjusts its
capital stock to new levels by demanding at a decreasing rate because a larger amount of
demand for capital requires a higher rise in the supply price of capital goods to induce
the manufacturers of those goods to supply.
The question of the capital demanding firm is at which rate it should invest for
each t over the adjustment period. In the Keynesian model, this is determined by
another equilibrium condition in the capital good market. From the capital good
demanding firm's point of view, the total marginal present value of a capital good
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Figure 3.3
discounted by the marginal efficiency of capital must be equal to its supply price. To be
more precise, let .q' be the supply price of capital. Then the second equilibrium
condition is given in the Keynesian model as follows.
Tf exp(-mt )n~dt = q'
o
(66)
where m: the marginal efficiency of capital. The firm which wishes to expand its
capital stock continues to invest until the equilibrium condition in (66) hold. Keynes
indicates that "...the actual rate of current investment will be pushed to the point where
there is no longer any class of capital-asset of whicli the marginal efficiency exceeds the
current rate of interest. In other words, the rate of investment will be pushed to the
point on the investment demand-schedule where the marginal efficiency o] capital in
general is equal to the market rate of interest. " [Keynes (1936): 136]. This implies that
the demand and supply prices of capital goods must be equal in equilibrium,
.:=}
·m=r wherer e n
The gradual adjustment of the capital stock in the Keynesian model can be seen
in Figure 3.3 which is borrowed from Precious (1987). Now assume that a firm in
equilibrium faces a fall in the rate of interest. The immediate effects of such a fall on the
demand price of capital in (65) cause an increase in the marginal profits from a unit
capital good discounted by the rate of interest. So the firm realises a capital deficiency
in the new situation, and wishes to expand its new level of the optimal capital stock K' .
In Figure 3.3, the demand price of capital is drawn with a declining slope because of
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the diminishing returns to scale assumption of the production function. The supply
curve of capital goods is, on the other hand, upward-sloping because a rise in the
supply price of capital goods increases the supply of these goods. In Jorgenson's
perfect capital goods market assumption provides this curve to be horizontal as seen in
the figure. The fall in the interest rate is illustrated by an upward shift in q": In
Jorgenson's model, such a decline induces the firm to adjust its capital stock to K'
instantaneously. With a rising supply curve, the firm first increases its capital stock to
K 1 at B by investing (KI-Ko). However, this increase in the capital stock has two
different effects. First of all, it declines the marginal productivity of an additional
capital good at the margin. Secondly, each addition to the capital stock also leads to a
decline in the marginal efficiency of capital because of its negative relationship with the
investment in that capital good. But eventually, excess demand for capital goods
increases the supply price of capital goods, and induces the capital-goad-producing
industry to supply more, shifting the supply curve from So to S I. Then the firm
reaches point C by investing (Kz-K)). Then gradually the firm attains the new
equilibrium level at a lower level of the rate of interest and the marginal efficiency of
capital and at higher capital stock than the initial level.
In the light of this discussion, the marginal efficiency of capital can be regarded
as a function of the rate of investment, the supply price of capital goods, and finally the
expected level of demand in the output market, that is
m.e.c.= mec( /,q" ,Q') (67)
where Q": the expected level of output. Q' is the accelerator variable, and is included to
take into account the effects of demand for output.
4.1. The Marginal Cost of Finance
The implicit assumption in the previous section was that the interest rate was the only
cost factor in the model, and the marginal efficiency of capital schedule was infinitely
elastic at the market rate of interest. According to this assumption, the firm can
undertake all investment at a fixed rate regardless of its riskiness. In this respect,
Keynes, however, mentioned two types of risk involving in investment decisions;
borrower's risk which arises from the borrower's own risk perception about the
investment project, and lender's risk which" ... may be due either to moral hazard ... or
to the possible insufficiency of the marginal security." [Keynes (1936): 144]. Keynes
defined the second type of risk as "... a pure addition to the cost of investment which
would not exist if the borrower and lender were the same person." [Keynes (1936):
144]. By that he recognised the fact that there exists a differential between the cost of
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Figure 3.4
internal and external finance in contrast to the Modigliani and Miller proposition. The
issue has recently drawn more attention in the Post Keynesian literature [Davidson
(1993), Vickers (1987), and Fazzari and Matt (1986)], and led to many studies in this
tradition that sought evidence in favour of finance constraints affecting investment
decisions.
The argument of the marginal cost of financial funds was advanced by
Duesenberry (1958) by taking into account four different sources of finance
(depreciation allowances, retained earnings, borrowing, and equity issuing). The first
two are taken as internal, and involve an opportunity cost to the firm. The last two
sources are external, and their costs to the firm are represented as an increasing function
of the balance sheet structure of assets and liabilities of the firm. The justification of the
cost of external funds is similar to that in Section 3.2 where the interest rate cost to the
firm is considered as an increasing function of the debt-equity ratio. The marginal cost
of fund schedule is illustrated in Figure 3.4. The marginal cost of financial funds is
perfectly elastic at a relatively lower interest rate (in region A). As the level of
investment exhausts internal funds and requires an increasing amount of borrowing and
equity financing, it then rises at first slowly and then steeply at higher levels of external
funds (in region B). The more such external funds are used, the greater the
deterioration in the balance sheet of the firm, and the higher their costs. The cost of
external funds including a certain amount of risk premium depending on the balance
sheet account are then involved in the monotonically increasing marginal cost of fund
schedule. Therefore the marginal cost of fund schedule is written as a function of the
availability of internal funds, the balance sheet structure of assets and liabilities (i.e. the
debt-equity ratio), the current level of interest rates, and the rate of return to equity,
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m.c.f.= mcf i], F,y, v) (68)
where F: the availability of internal funds, y: the debt-equity ratio as a measure of the
balance sheet structure, v: the rate of return on equity.
Finally, we have a simultaneous-two-equation system, comprising equations
(67) and (68), which can be solved for the rate of investment to obtain a single reduced
form, such as
1= I( q', Q', F, r, y, v) (69)
4.2. Keynes and Stock Market Prices
Keynes attached particular importance to the level of stock market prices as a
determinant of investment because the stock exchange gives the market's judgement
about commitments that an individual makes every day, and facilitates an opportunity to
the individual to revise his investment decisions. In his best-known statement in
General Theory, he noted that "...the daily revelations ofthe Stock Exchange, though
they are primarily made to facilitate transfers of old investments between one individual
and another, inevitably exert a decisive influence on the rate of current investment. For
there is no sense in building up a new enterprise at a cost greater than that at which a
similar existing enterprise can be purchased; whilst there is an inducement to spend on a
new project what may seem an extravagant sum, if it can be floated (~ff on the Stock
Exchange at an immediate profit." [Keynes (1936): 151]. According to this, when
stock prices are low, a potential investor finds it cheaper to acquire capital assets by
purchasing control of existing firms rather than by ordering new capital assets to be
produced. If the stock prices are high, it may be cheaper to invest directly in the new
capital assets. By that, Keynes noted that" ...certain class of investment are governed
by the average expectation of those who deal on the Stock Exchange ... " [Keynes
(1936): 151]. James Tobin picked up this idea about the importance of stock market
price, and developed a new theory that makes the aggregate investment depend on the
so-called Tobin-q, a ratio of the aggregate market value of the outstanding equities plus
bonds to the replacement cost of the aggregate stock of capital assets [see Tobin
(1969)]. This is a very crucial variable connecting real investment decisions to financial
sectors of the economy.
5. Tobin's q Theory of Investment
According to Hall (1977), the major competitor to Jorgenson's theoretical framework
for investment has been Tobin's q theory of investment. The popularity of Tobin's q
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model is particularly related to the fact that it allows for the investigation of the
interaction between real investment and financial decisions. The idea is that the rate of
investment is an increasing function of q, a ratio of the market value of the existing
capital stock to its replacement cost [Brainard and Tobin (1968), Tobin (1969)].
Theory argues that q will be unity when the market value and the reproducing cost of
capital assets are equal. If q is higher than unity (i.e. the market value is higher than the
replacement cost), then there will be an incentive for firms to invest, vice versa. For
Tobin's q is the variable providing the connection between real and financial sectors, in
a way that monetary policies influence the stock exchange, thereby the market value of
real capital assets. For example, a high interest rate policy may reduce the price index
of the stock exchange and then the market value of capital. A fall in the market value of
the existing capital stock, on the other hand, may generate a situation where the wedge
between the market value and the replacement cost is zero, or even negative, so that the
firm would never invest.
The present literature has been dominated by various extensions of Tobin's q.
This literature considers lags in delivery as a reason for q to depart from unity. This
explanation has been very popular in deriving Tobin's q variable within the neoclassical
framework of a firm's optimisation problem. Abel (1979), for example, showed that
with a simple modification by including adjustment costs, Tobin's q theory of
investment can be derived from Jorgenson's neoclassical model [see also Yoshikawa
(1980)]. All these considerations in the end lead us to the following very simple
implicit Tobin's q investment model for empirical studies,
I
K = G(q), G'{.) > 0 (70)
where q == vt K, V is the market value of capital assets [e.g. see Summers (1981),
Hayashi (1982)]. G(.) is, in many studies, assumed to be a linear function in q [e.g.
see Cuthbertson and Gasparro (1995), Alonso-Borrego and Bentolila (1994), and
Hoshi et al. (1991)]. As will be argued latter, the functional form of (70) depends
entirely on the adjustment costs function.
Despite the theoretical appeal of the q theory, its empirical performance has been
disappointing. There have been several attempts to extend the simple framework of the
model to improve its empirical performance. Even though the q variable has appeared
to be significant in the empirical investment model, the proportion of investment
explained by q has been quite small, and the unexplained portion has usually been
highly serially correlated (this might be an indication of misspecified functional form).
The estimated adjustment cost parameters are generally so high (therefore the speed of
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adjustment is too slow) that they seem economically implausible. In relation to the
autocorrelation in disturbances and misspecification problem, empirical q models have
generally ignored some crucial variables that seem to significantly influence investment,
such as profit, output and the cost of capital [see Chirinko and Schaller (1994)].
Tobin's q theory is derived from an explicit optimisation of a firm's market
value, and rationalised how expectations about the future play a crucial role. If
adjustment costs arising from delivery lags are the only reasons for the inequality
between the market value of capital and its replacement cost, then q departs from unity
by the amount of adjustment costs. The argument is quite straightforward, and was
advanced by Abel (1979) as follows.
5.1. Tobin's q and The Neoclassical Theory of Investment:
Incorporating the cost of capital adjustment into Jorgenson's optimisation problem,
Abel obtained the market value of an additional unit of capital stock, that is marginal q.
Assume that an equity holder requires a rate of return on capital to induce him to hold
capital assets, and that there are no retained earnings. The expected total return from
holding capital assets will be the sum of dividend payments to equity holders and the
expected capital gains (or losses) arising from changes in the market value of capital
assets that the equity holder holds. This relation can be formulated by the following
arbitrage equation,
rKV, = D, + V, (71 )
where rK= the rate of return on capital, v,= the stock market value of total capital
assets, D,= dividends to be paid. The left-hand side of (71) shows the total expected
return from holding capital assets. As can be easily noticed, equation (71) is a simple
first-order differential equation. and its solution forward yields the following
(72)
'u
In other words, the expected market value of capital assets equals the sum of the
discounted value of all expected future dividend payments to the equity holders.
Dividends can also be defined using the firm's revenue-expenditure identity, that is
D, = p,Q(K" L,)- w,L,-q: I. - r(/,) (73)
where r(.) is a strictly convex adjustment cost function with r'(.) > 0, rU(.)> o. The
crucial element of q-theory is the presence of the adjustment cost function in (73). For
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the sake of expositional simplicity, I assume that there is no tax levied on profits and
capital allowances, and that the future paths of output and input prices are perfectly
known. By maximising (71) subject to the capital account identity ( K, = I, - oK,), the
optimal demand for capital (along with labour) and investment, that also maximise the
market value of the firm, can be found by solving the following current value
Hamiltonian function,
H = [p,Q(K" L,)- w,L, -q: I, - r(/, )]+ 11,( I, - oK,) (74)
The first-order conditions for investment and capital are given by
q: + r'( I,) = 11, (75)
(76)
Suppose that the transversality condition, limexp(rKt)K, = 0, holds, then (76) can be
,....~
written as
- f h:+8)(t-I) Q d11, - e P K 'r (77)
In a neoclassical world, this is called the demand price of capital which depends upon
all future expected marginal returns from a unit of capital at time 'to Abel (1979)
regarded this as the marginal market value of an addition to the capital stock. Marginal
q will, then, be the ratio of (77) to the supply price of capital goods. Assuming that the
price of capital goods is the numeraire (q: = I), the shadow value of capital in (77) also
defines the marginal-q [see Precious (1987)]. In general, the investment function can
be derived from the first-order optimality condition of investment (equation (75)) by
inverting it for investment as follows
(75a)
where qlll is the marginal q; G(-)=r'-'O assuming invertibility. In a neoclassical
world, the optimality of investment is ensured by the equality between the demand price
of capital and its supply price. Including adjustment costs into Jorgenson's
intertemporal framework, Abel brought in a wedge between demand and supply price
(arising from the presence of adjustment costs), and then related this wedge positively
to investment. However, because marginal q is not observable, many empirical works
have relied on average-q, an observable market value of the firm, to summarise all
information about the future. But the empirical performance of these studies has been
very poor as explained earlier. Alternatively, a new method to test Tobin q theory of
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investment has been developed in Abel (1980) and Abel and Blanchard (1986), in
which a series of marginal q has been constructed using equation (77). They define an
auxiliary equation -along with the original investment demand equation- and then use it
to forecast the future value of the marginal revenue product of capital. However,
although marginal q is quite significant as an explanatory variable for investment, this
new rnethodf was also subject to the same problems as the previous one (including low
explanatory power, and serially correlated error term etc.).
5.2. Adjustment Cost Function in Tobin's q Theory:
Empirical testing of q-theory of investment requires the parameterisation of the
adjustment cost function C(.). Unlike Lucas (1967), Gould (1968) and Treadway
(1969), Uzawa, in a number of papers, developed a new modified adjustment costs
function, and took into account the managerial and administrative efforts of increasing
the existing capital stock [Uzawa (1968) and (1969)]. The crucial feature of managerial
and administrative efforts devoted to capital stock expansion is that they are not usually
bought and sold in the market. Thus their prices practically do not exist. This feature
hence brought about the problem of how to measure them. Taking such efforts as
another factor of production, he directly related them to the existing capital stock.
Instead of relating net investment, K" to gross investment, I, -as in the traditional
capital accumulation identity-, Uzawa modified the capital accumulation equation as
follows:
K, = lI'( I" K,) - oK,
where "'(.) is increasing and concave in gross investment [Hayashi (1982) and
Blanchard and Fischer (1989)]. In this formulation, I, units of gross investment do not
necessarily turn into capital; only 'II x 100 per cent of investment does.
In order to obtain an equation for investment, the parameterisation of the
adjustment cost function becomes necessary. There are different plausible
specifications of adjustment cost functions in empirical models. Following Lucas
(1967), Gould (1968) and Treadway (1969), Abel (1983) discussed Hayashi's results
8 This approach is quite significant particularly for developing countries where stock markets arc not
well developed and thereby the market value of firms cannot be found. Using the similar approach to
Abel (1980) and Abel and Blanchard (1986), one can construct the series of marginal q as described in
equation (52). Solimano (1992) adopted the similar approach to investigate the reaction of the Chilean
economy to changes in macroeconomic conditions. In his simultaneous equation system, he related
Tobin's q (or, as he denoted, aggregate profitability index of investment) to some macroeconomic
variables such as the expected level of demand in the goods market exchange, interest rate etc. then he
estimated the investment equation together with Tobin's q simultaneously.
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by introducing a quadratic convex adjustment cost function (e.g. r(I,) = al,z) and
writing the capital accumulation equation as usual.
However, the most commonly used specification has been introduced by
Summer (1981), and adopted by Poterba and Summer (1983), Whited (1992),
Hubbard and Kashyap (1992), Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1993), and Galeotti,
Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1994). It is assumed that the firm faces convex adjustment
costs which are proportional to the square of the ratio of gross investment to the capital
stock as follows:
G(!"K,)=5_(.l._e)2 K,
2 K,
G(!"K,)=O
where c > 0, and e can be interpreted as a required minimum level of investment.
5.3. Marginal-q and Average-q:
While Jorgenson's model is basically concerned with the long-run demand for capital
stock, the q-theory deals with the short-run disequilibrium resulting from the
divergence between the market value of existing capital stock and its replacement cost.
As is well known, the relevant q is the marginal one, that is the ratio of the stock market
value of an additional unit of capital to its replacement cost. However, because the
marginal q is not readily observable, empirical studies have used average q, that is the
ratio of the market value of capital assets to its replacement costs, being based on the
assumption that the average q is a good approximation of marginal one [see Abel and
Blanchard (1986): 250 for a support of this assumption]. Tobin's intuitive framework
has been extended by Abel (1979) and (1980), Yoshikawa (1980), Hayashi (1982),
Precious (1987), Chirinko (1987), Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1991) in order to obtain
good approximation of average q to the marginal one by defining some necessary
assumptions. However, the equality of average and marginal q is plausible only in
certain circumstances, that have been demonstrated by some studies (Hayashi, 1982,
Chirinko, 1987, Precious, 1987). Hayashi proved that instead of marginal q, average
q can be used in special yet important cases where the firm is a price-taker and the
production function and adjustment costs are homogeneous. He then formulated the
following proposition;
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Proposition: Assume that the finn is a price-maker in the output market, and a price-
taker in Jactor markets. If the production Junction and adjustment
Junction are hath linearly homogeneous, then the relationship hetween
marginal-q and average-q is given by
(78)
where q": marginal-q, q;': average-q, 1]: the inverse of the elasticity of
demand Jar the output the firm produces, and Q, (K,. L,'/,) is net output,
which Q,(K"L"I,)=Q(K"L,)-G(!"K,) where G,(/,.K,) is the internal
adjustment cost.
Proof: see the appendix.
In addition to homogeneous production and adjustment functions and a price-
taker-firm assumption, Precious (1987) extended Hayashi's attempt to analyse the
implications of rationing in both output and production factor markets. He
demonstrated that when the firm is rationed by demand and/or the supply of any
production factor, marginal and average q are not equal, and the response of investment
to an increase in demand would always be positive in the long-run. His model includes
rationing in output, labour and investment goods markets, and each introduces one
Lagrange multiplier in association with each constraint, then the relationship between
marginal and average qs becomes as follows:
I - I -
-'K JA~L,exp[-rK(s-t)]ds-'K J ,1.:/, exp[-rAs- t)]ds (79)
q, " q, "
where A; is the Lagrange multiplier reflecting the fact that the firm may be demand
constrained; A~is the multiplier for the labour supply constraint; A; reflects only an
upper constraint on investment (for proof, see Precious, 1987: 65-66).
In addition to the conditions presented in Hayashi (1982) and Precious (1987),
Chirinko (1987) argues that only when financial policy is exogenous (that is, when
borrowing does not explicitly depend on investment), average q is equal to marginal q.
If investment decisions are not separable from other financial decisions, then average-q
may be a misleading proxy for marginal-q, which serves as the signal for alteration in
the capital stock. He introduced a debt financing into the model along with agency
costs of having debt, which is an addition to the usual riskless interest costs. This
additional cost factor leads to a wedge between marginal and average-q, such that
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(80)
where Dr is the existing debt stock, and u, is the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the debt accumulation equation.
6. Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed the literature about the influence of financial factors on the
optimal capital and investment decisions, and then summarised the theories that take
account of these factors. It has been noted that the Jorgenson type of neoclassical
models fail to take into account the financial considerations in empirical modelling. I
have indicated that the perfect capital market assumption (that had also led Modigliani
and Miller to their irrelevance theorem of finance in real decisions) provided the
theoretical back-up for this research. It is also shown that the recognition of
imperfections in capital markets ruled out the Modigliani and Miller theorem, and
introduced the substantial influence of financial factors on the optimal decisions of a
firm. In this regard, I have specified financial market imperfections in two different
forms. According to the first one, a representative firm faces a quantitative financial
constraint on borrowing, and becomes dependent on its internally generated funds
(current profits and retained earnings). The second form of imperfection is
characterised by an increasing cost of borrowing. Assuming that there are no
quantitative constraints, the firm's cost schedule of borrowing is considered as an
increasing function of the debt-equity ratio at the margin. To provide a theoretical
justification for the most recognised way of modelling the effects of financial factors in
developing countries, I have also shown that such a form of imperfect capital market
assumption directly influences the optimal adjustment path of the capital stock through
the speed of adjustment (see Chapter 4 for details). This modelling approach does not
take into account binding borrowing constraints.
In connection with Chapter 2, the present chapter has imposed a specific form
of upper and lower constraints. The main distinction between the two chapters is that
constraints in the previous chapter were permanently binding, and did not give rise to
dynamic effects of these constraints. However, the present chapter considered that
either the upper or the lower constraint is binding over a certain interval of time; i.e.
they are temporary. As an essential part of the model in this chapter, the lower bound
on investment has been assumed to be zero. This is widely known as the irreversibility
constraint on investment. According to the upper constraint, it was considered that
capital market imperfections force firms to rely on internally generated funds. In the
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absence of external borrowing, it has been assumed that the firm might be constrained
by two types of internal funds, namely current period profits, and retained earnings
accumulated in previous periods. The results of a binding financial constraint,
described by either of them, varied according to the choice of one of these constraints.
It has been shown that a binding profit constraint caused the firm to accumulate excess
capital stock before the constraint became binding, whereas the retained earning
constraint led the firm to follow the same optimal path of investment as any
unconstrained firm until the previously accumulated retained earnings is exhausted.
This opposite conclusion was a result of different anticipation effects of any future
financial constraint. In the profit-constrained model, the anticipation effect causes the
firm to accumulate excess capital stock before the constraint. On the other hand, in the
retained earnings model, the anticipation of future constraint leads the firm to retain
more earning from present profit. Therefore, retained earnings in this model act as a
buffer stock to smooth the level of investment. Later, the Keynesian theory of
investment and Tobin-q theory, as a extension of the Keynesian theory, have been
presented.
The significance of financial factors in the determination of private investment
behaviour is the subject of three empirical chapters of the thesis (Chapter 6, Chapter 7,
and Chapter 8). However, both the increasing convex function of cost of borrowing
and liquidity constraint on bank borrowing are modelled in Chapter 8, and tested with
Turkish data.
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Appendix
The Relationship Between Marginal q and Average q under
Hayashi's Assumptions
In this appendix, Hayashi's result is re-produced. However, I show that the same
result holds with the different assumption on the form of adjustment cost. Unlike
Hayashi, I explicitly include the adjustment cost function in the firm's cash flow
equation, but not in the equation for capital accumulation. Perfect output market
assumption of Hayashi's model is also relaxed in this appendix.
Proposition: Assume that thefirm is a price-taker infactor markets. If the production
function and adjustment function are both linearly homogeneous, then the
relationship between marginal-q and average-q is given by
q,m = q;' __ I_jexp[-rK(s -t)]17P,Q,(K" L" I, )ds
v,K, ,
where q": marginal-q, q": average-q, 17: the inverse of the elasticity of
demand for the output the firm produces. and Q, (K" L" I,) is net output,
which Q"(K"L"I,)=Q(K"L,)-G(!,,K,) where G,(/"K,) is the internal
adjustment cost.
Proof: Assume that the manager of the firm wishes to maximise dividends, which is
net of all production costs and internal adjustment costs for instalment of new capital
goods. The problem can be described in a rather simple form in which all taxes are
assumed to be non-existent. Let the output market be imperfect and adjustment costs
be internal. Unlike Hayashi (1982), I assume an adjustment cost function as described
in Lucas (1967), Gould (J968), Treadway (1969), and Abel (1980). The formulation
of the problem is the usual one, except for the inclusion of imperfect output market and
internal adjustment cost:
Max.
~
v, = Jexp] -r Kt)[P(Q,)Q,( K" L,,!,) - w.L, - v.l,]dt
I)
(A. I)
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s. t. K, = I, -OK, (A.2)
where o. (K" L" I,) is net output, and defined as
12,( K" L" I,) = Q,(K" L,)- G(/"K,) (A.3)
where C(!" K,) is a convex internal adjustment cost function. The current value
Hamiltonian can then be written as follows:
H, = {p(Q,)[ Q,(K,. L,) - G(!,. K, )]- w,L, - q: I,} +,u, (I, - OK,) (A.4)
where !-l is the Lagrange multiplier. The first order conditions therefore are.
p(I-7J)QL = w
,u,-q'-p(I-7J)G, =0
p, = (rK + o),u, - p(I-7J)QK + p(l-lJ)GK
(A.5)
(A.6)
(A.7)
Multiply (A.6) by I, and (A.7) by K" and add altogether
Assume that the adjustment cost and production functions are both homogeneous, so
G(!" K,) = GKK, +G/
Q,(K,.L,) = QKK,+QLL,
(A.9)
(A.IO)
Using (A.5), (A.lO) becomes
QKK, = wL,/ p(l-7J)-Q,(K,. L,)
Substituting this into (A.8) along with (A.9) yields
,u,l, + iI,K, - ,u,rKK, - o/l,K, = p(l- 7J)[G(!" K,)-Q,(K,. L,)] + wL, + vI
Make use of (A.2) for I, and re-arrange the right hand side of the above equation
u,«, +iI,K, - /l,rKK, = p[G{I" K, )-Q,{K,.L, )]+ wL, +e' I,
-P7J[G( I" K,)- Q,{ K,. L,)]
or
uK, + iI,K, - ,ulrKK, = -[pQ,(K,. L,.I,)- wL, -q'I,] +P7JQ,(K" L,. I,) (A. II )
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Recall the arbitrage equation in the text, which is
v, - r K V, = - D,
where
D, = p(Q,)Q,(K"L" 1,)- w.L, - q'l,
Therefore (A. 11) becomes
or
Following Hayashi (1982: 219), (A.13) can also be written as
_E_[ V, exp] -r Kt)] = -_E_[,u,K, expl -r Kt)] + p1JQ,(K" L, ,I,)
dt dt
Integrating both sides gives
~
V, =,u,K,+ JP1JQ,(K"L,'/Jls
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(A.12)
(A.13)
(A.14)
(A. J 5)
provided that the transversality condition, which limexp(-rKt).u,K, = 0, holds. Hence,
,-+~
Since m q, d" V,q, =1' an q, =-[-,
q q Kt
(A. J 6)
Chapter 4
Modelling Private Investment In Developing Countries
1. Introduction
Even though private investment has been studied in detail for industrial countries for
many years, private investment in developing countries (LDCs) has very recently
started receiving increasing attention mainly for two reasons. First, analysis of data
from a large sample of countries has repeatedly shown that the rate of accumulation of
physical capital is a crucial determinant of economic growth [see De Long and
Summers (1993), and Levine and Renelt (1992)]. For developing countries, there is
also some evidence that private investment has a greater impact on growth than public
investment [see Khan and Reinhart (1990)]. Second, despite its importance for
economic growth, the share of private investment in GDP has declined considerably in
many developing countries during the 1980s. The global shocks and the world debt
crisis in the form of lack of external financing, sharp increase in the world interest rate,
and restrictive demand management followed by developed countries have been seen as
the main causes of this decline. This disappointing performance of private investment
in developing countries has been the subject of numerous policy debates [e.g. see
Chhibber et. al. (1992) and Serven and Solimano (1993)], and stimulated research on
what determines private investment in a developing country. There is already a fast
growing literature on the determinants of private investment in LDCs that mainly
assesses the impacts of changes in demand and trade policies.
There has been a broad consensus on the significant role of the neoclassical
determinants of private investment (namely, the accelerator variable, and the cost of
capital). There has, however, been ambiguity about the role of financial factors in this
process. The debate over the interrelationship between financial and investment
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decisions has focused on the perfect capital market assumption of Jorgenson's version
of the neoclassical model, and the relevance of the Modigliani and Miller theorem. One
goal of recent research activities has been to take explicitly into account capital market
imperfections and their influences on the investment behaviour of a firm. It is,
accordingly, argued that the cost of capital to the firm is not exogenous, but depends on
the financial structure of the firm. Besides, the timing of investment expenditures is
dependent on the availability of financial funds (see Chapter 3 for details).
Regarding a departure from the traditional perfect capital market and full
information assumptions, the research agenda of the recent literature of empirical
investment models has emhasised mainly the imperfections in capital markets arising
from asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. The interdependence
arises because lenders impose an additional risk premium on the principle interest rate
(i.e. risk-free rates) according to the financial structure of the firm (that can be proxied
by the leverage ratio). The higher the debt-equity ratio, the greater the cost of capital of
the marginal financial funds to the firm. It is also argued at the theoretical level that the
interdependence of financial and investment decisions occurs if investment is limited by
quantitative constraints on debt financing. This may be not only because of the absence
of well developed capital markets, but also because of asymmetric information in the
markets.
Considering the capital markets in developing countries, a high degree of
segmentation, severe asymmetric information, lack of supervision, incomplete markets
and non-price credit rationing, and intensive government involvement in the capital
markets are not at all uncommon. The reliance on debt finance is substantial in many
developing countries partly because of the absence of equity markets, and partly
because interest rates on loans are kept below their equilibrium levels for various
reasons. Unlike developed economies, such imperfections in capital markets are
structural in developing countries, in the sense that they impose a higher degree of
stringency on the financing of private investment by the use of retained earnings and
bank credit, and have been the objective of financial liberalisation attempts by some
developing countries (including Turkey) [see McKinnon ( 1991), and Fry ( 1988)].
As explained earlier in two chapters, literature indicates two theories of
investment; the neoclassical theory in which capital markets are assumed perfect, and
the accelerator and the cost of capital turn out to be main determinants of investment,
and the financial theory of investment that takes into account the influences of financial
factors [e.g. see Steigum (1983)]. The question of which theory explains investment
better is, however, ambiguous, and requires more research in the context of different
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countries. Considering developing countries, testing these two different theoretical
approaches to the determination of investment behaviour becomes even more important
for two main reasons. First, the financial factors (such as asymmetric information,
borrowing constraints) in imperfect capital markets - giving rise to the financial theory
of investment - playa more important role in developing countries than in developed
countries. Second, the structural characteristics of these countries (such as high public
involvement in economic activities) introduce additional factors that should be
considered in modelling investment behaviour in developing countries. In this respect,
there is no unified theoretical approach to modelling investment that explains private
investment in all developing countries. Instead, the role of different determinants and
the form of the private investment function may vary from one country to another due
to the different structure of the economies of each developing country and the additional
constraints under which that economy operates. One of the most frequently used
modelling strategies is to adopt the neoclassical accelerator model subject to some
additional structural modifications.
In the last decade, the theory of investment has, in general, developed in two
directions. On the one hand, the theory has become more and more structural in the
sense that the derivation of the investment function is based on an intertemporal
optimisation of the value of a 'representative firm'. This then allowed researchers to
incorporate more interactions between financial and real decisions and to provide more
realistic assumptions about market conditions and about the dynamics of investment
behaviour that arise from both the formation of expectations and the adjustment
technology of capital.
On the other hand, empirical studies based upon this new theory have
concentrated on the aggregation problem, and begun to relax the assumption that the
behaviour of the representative firm is typical of the behaviour of all firms at the
aggregate level by employing panel data rather than time series [e.g. see Fazzari et al.
(1988)]. This theoretical development particularly paved the way for an analysis of the
effects of various variables on investment behaviour within an explicit theoretical
optimisation framework. The use of panel data in estimations, in particular, has given
us a better understanding of the impact of some crucial variables, such as financial
ones, on the investment behaviour of heterogeneous firms. This new approach, which
is increasingly popular nowadays, has been applied not only to industrial countries but
also to developing countries [see Athey and Laumas (1995), and Harris et al. (1994)].
Despite the fact that the theoretical literature on private investment is very rich,
the application of the theory for a developing country is usually limited by various
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difficulties associated with both the absence of data which is necessary to test a
particular theory, and with structural and institutional differences of that developing
country. Among others, lack of sufficiently long time series, measurement errors, and
the absence of reliable data on some crucial variables at the aggregate and disaggregate
level, can be considered as the most common data problems that one may encounter in
modelling investment for a developing country. Regarding structural and institutional
differences, the most remarkable economic differences arise from imperfections in
various markets and distortions in the price system. For instance, interest rates are
heavily regulated in many LDCs, and may not be allowed to fluctuate freely to reflect
the real cost of borrowing. It is also common to believe that there is a strong
relationship between public and private investment in developing countries [see Green
and Villanueva (1991), Blejer and Khan (1984), Sandurarajan and Thakur ( 1980)].
But the direction of the effects of public investment on private investment is subject to
uncertainty. High public investment may, in general, be required to create special
infrastructure facilities for transport, communication, energy and irrigation etc. which
can be complementary to private investment. Public investment of this kind can
stimulate private investment by possibly raising the productivity of private capital.
Governments also participate in production for the market in many developing
countries, sometimes along with the private sector (which has to compete with the state-
owned firms), sometimes alone (in some sectors whose production is essential but not
profitable enough to attract the private sector). In this sense, public investment could
crowd out private investment as it uses economic resources that would be available
otherwise to the private sector.
When modelling private investment for a developing country, one should
consider all these difficulties, and modify the assumptions underlying the neoclassical
theory. In adopting a standard investment model such as the neoclassical flexible
accelerator model, additional economic and technological constraints should be imposed
on the model. Most of such studies in the existing literature have emphasised a
particular feature(s) of countries in their samples and define investment functions by
imposing some constraints that define those features. In the view of this thesis. the
inclusion of capital market imperfections in the form of quantitative constraints and
using a structural model has been a novel development in the recent investment
literature for developing countries, and there have been a few attempts to apply an
approach based on an intertemporal optimisation of the value of a representative firm.
This chapter reviews the investment literature and discusses some well-known
modelling approaches to the private investment function in developing countries.
Section 2 discusses empirical modelling issues at the micro and macro level with a
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special reference to the accelerator and financial factors. Some additional factors
affecting private investment in developing countries are presented in Section 3.
Conclusions from this chapter are summarised in the last section.
2. Modelling Neoclassical and Financial Factors in Private Investment Models
There has been a considerable volume of theoretical and empirical studies on the
determinants of private investment in developing countries. The performance of
empirical models with different data sets has still been subject to the quality of data and
the modification of the theory in accordance with the different social and institutional
structure of these countries. Given the unsatisfactory empirical performance of the
neoclassical investment models in industrial countries [see Chirinko (1994)]. the
empirical specification of private investment has still remained 'art'. In the light of the
theoretical discussions above, the present section raises issues associated with
modelling the accelerator, the availability of financial funds and capital market
imperfections in investment models suggested for developing countries. Empirical
studies have not been concerned only with the neoclassical theory itself but rather with
the modifications necessary in applying it to developing countries.
Since there is no accepted theoretical framework of analysis for determining the
level of private investment in developing countries, most writers have used an eclectic
approach in the sense that there is no exclusive formal microeconomic modelling. This
type of study has used the neoclassical theory of investment with some modifications at
the micro and macro level. Although many of these studied have been 'eclectic', a few
have tried to test neoclassical theory by presenting an explicit microeconomic
foundation of the behaviour of firms leading to a specific demand for input function
which is applied at the micro or sectoral level [Tybout (1983) and Behrame (1972)]. At
the macro-level, various studies have examined the role of the accelerator effect, supply
factors (such as the availability of credit, foreign exchange availability) and the effects
of public investment without any explicit microeconomic modelling attempt. This
section reviews well-known investment models in accordance with the type of data and
the use of a microeconomic foundation through which an investment demand model is
derived as a function of its neoclassical determinants and additional constraints raised
from specific economic structure of developing countries. In the view of the theoretical
debate on the interrelationship between financial and investment decisions in the recent
theoretical literature, the structure of capital markets and the poor intermediation of the
banking system deserve special attention in modelling private investment in devloping
countries.
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2.1. Financial Repression
The relationship between interest rates and private investment in developing countries
has received considerable attention. Until the early 1970s, the conventional wisdom
had been that low interest rates would promote private investment and growth in
accordance with Keynesian and neoclassical theories. Since the seminal work of
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973), financial repression has. however. been
considered as one of the main factors influencing private investment by limiting the
amount of loanable funds available for investment. They raised the problem that poor
financial intermediation would drastically reduce the quantity and quality of capital
formation. On the other hand, they suggested that higher interest rates would raise
domestic savings, increase the volume of domestic credits extended by better
intermediation of the financial system and by reducing quantitative constraints on credit.
This is mostly as a result of two characteristics of financial markets in developing
countries. One is severe informational imperfections in financial markets because of
some characteristics of these markets, such as the lack of well-developed equity
markets, weak prudential supervision, and pervasive government interventions.
Second is the practice of administratively determined interest rates that set up the
deposit rate on monetary assets lower than the market equilibrium rate to provide cheap
credit to some firms or industries. With the ongoing high level of price intlation, lower
interest rate policies, amplified by poor financial intermediation and informational
imperfections, very often lead to negative real deposit rates on monetary assets, and
then to the reduction in the volume of savings which itself determines the level of total
investment at the macroeconomic level.
In addition to the financial repression literature, possible saving constraints on
the level of investment have been also examined by the 'two-gap' model [McKinnon
( 1964), Chenery and Strout (1966)]. According to this model, provided that domestic
saving, the world demand for exports and external financing are given, the sum of
domestic savings plus foreign financing sets up an upper constraint on total investment
that is considered as a saving gap, whereas the sum of exports and foreign financing
puts an upper bound on imports giving rise to a foreign gap.
Empirical studies of equilibrium models have placed the emphasis on two main
mechanisms through which the effects of credit availability are transmitted from the
financial to the real sector. One mechanism is the direct interest rate adjustment
mechanism. Where there exists a highly developed financial system and interest rates
are allowed to adjust freely to market conditions, the excess demand for credit will raise
the interest rate and then the cost of borrowing. The second mechanism relies directly
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on the quantity of credit as a link between the financial and the real sector. The second
seems to be more relevant in tightly regulated financial markets where interest rate
ceilings and controls limit interest rate movements towards the equilibrium level.
Freeing interest rates in the last case will increase the supply of credit to finance
investment. The following section assesses the role of neoclassical and financial
factors in detail with a reference to modelling issues of private investment in developing
countries.
2.2. Micro Level Studies:
How significant is the role of the accelerator and financial variables in determining the
level of investment in developing countries? Most studies use aggregate data, and in
the absence of data on relevant variables use a number of proxies [Blejer and Khan
(1983)]. In this section, some empirical works that use micro-level data are examined
with the special reference to their theoretical set-up. The micro level application of the
neoclassical theory to LDCs has appeared to borrow many elements of the theory with
minor modifications. Empirical works that investigate the link between internal funds,
the accelerator and investment using micro-level data are Athey and Lemmas (1994),
Leite and Vaez-Zadet (1986), Tybout (1983), Bilsborrow (1977) and Behrame (1972).
These studies report on attempts to estimate real physical capital investment function
from sectoral level time-series or cross-section data of a developing country. They
contribute to the existing controversy over the determinants of investment with evidence
from LDCs. They also suggest well-known investment models as an instrument to
understand the effects on investment of various economic constraints that may exist in a
typical developing country, and thereby on economic growth in LDCs.
Using an eclectic model, Bilsborrow (1977) analysed the significance of the
availability of internal and external financial funds and foreign exchange constraint in
Colombia. Bilsborrow (1977) assumed that investment is derived by the intersection of
marginal efficiency of investment curve with its marginal cost of funds [see Chapter 2].
Writing the former as a function of capital utilisation, real prices of capital goods and
investment spending, and the latter as a function of the volume of internal funds, some
measure of cost of external funds and balance sheet risk from obtaining external funds,
the cost and availability of foreign exchange and investment expenditure, he obtained a
single-reduced form investment function from the simultaneous system of marginal
efficiency of capital and marginal cost of funds including internal and external funds:
m.e.i.= f(S,q,!)
m.c.f ,= g(F,B,A, I)
(I)
(2)
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where m.e.i.: the marginal efficiency of investment; m.c.f.: the marginal cost of funds;
S: the expected rate of capital utilisation proxied by the rate of growth of deflated sales;
q: real prices of capital goods; F: the net internal funds available; B: some measure of
cost balance sheet risk from obtaining external funds; A: the availability of foreign
exchange. Assuming that the optimality condition of marginal efficiency of capital and
the marginal cost of financial funds holds, (I) and (2) can be solved for investment;
i=h(S,B,A,F) (3)
if
m.e.i.= m.c.], (4)
where q is incorporated in the deflator for investment [see Chapter 3]. Then he tested
the reduced form of investment equation (3) with a cross-section of 68 Colombian
firms. Data problems influenced the formulation of the model to be tested.
Particularly, the lack of adequate data on the capital stock variable made him unable to
examine either the accelerator model by means of a capital stock adjustment model or
the distributed lag formulation of the capital adjustment. However, strong evidence was
found for the accelerator effect: more output in general requires more of all inputs.
Having aggregated data across firms, cash flow and foreign exchange availability were
also found to be a slightly more important determinant of annual variations in
investment than the accelerator. The difference appeared when the model was applied
to foreign and domestic firms separately. The accelerator model functioned well for the
former in terms of high R2 and of the significance of both the accelerator and internal
funds flow variables. This performance of the naive accelerator model can be attributed
to the fact that the managers of foreign-owned firms in Colombia behave in accordance
with the expectations of the neoclassical model of the managers in industrialised
countries. However, Bilsborrow (1977) was unable to assess directly neoclassical
price variables due to unsatisfactory information on past level of output prices at the
level of the firm. The risk premium variable arising from the composition of the
balance sheet of an individual firm was found to be the best of the variables studied in
time-series regressions. As a result, Bilsborrow could not test the neoclassical price
variables mainly due to the lack of data, but he concluded that "[he] didfind persuasive
evidence in support of a more eclectic, less pure approach." [Bilsborrow (1977): 715].
Leite and Vaez-Zadet (1986), using firm level data, accommodated an eclectic
model to assess the effect of changes in the availability of credit to small and medium
size firms and foreign exchange earning industries. The paper seeks to answer whether
or not such a selective credit allocation has been effective in the case of the
manufacturing sectors in Korea. Their eclectic method is to regress the investment
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expenditure on interest rates (in order to test the existence of the interest rate
adjustment), value added (as an accelerator variable) and a change either in a single
financial variable or in different combinations of those variables. In addition to an
investment demand function, they also estimate functions for inventories and working
capital to assess the interactive influence of the selective credit policy implemented by
the Korean government. Having estimated all three equations, they suggested that if
the coefficient of bank borrowing is significant, then it would be concluded that
selective credit controls have an influence on investment spending decisions of Korean
firms. If the variable is found to be insignificant, then the conclusion would be either
1.) bank credit is not used to finance investment, or 2.) bank credit is used to finance
investment, but because of rationing, more and more additional sources of finance are
used to fill the gap created by the credit rationing, or 3.) there is no credit rationing so
that the bank credit variable should not appear in the investment equation. All of them
imply that selective credit policy will have no influence on investment expenditure. The
substitutability between different sources of credit (such as bank borrowing, nonbank
borrowing, foreign borrowing, trade credit and internal financing) is analysed through
changes in the statistical significance of the financial variables when either of the
financial variables noted above separately, or as a combination, are substituted for each
other. They reported the basic source of investment in small and medium size Korean
firms come out to be internal finance while others such as bank borrowing also a play
minor role. On the other hand, for large firms, the source of financing investment
expenditure becomes bank credit, foreign borrowing, and there is also significant
substitutability among those options. Consequently, a selective credit policy seems to
have had direct but rather insignificant impact on investment expenditure of small and
medium enterprises, whereas although its effects on the investment of larger firms are
direct and more significantly negative, these firms had been able to substitute another
financial source for bank credit.
Advances in panel data econometrics I have recently allowed empirical
researches to examine the link between internal funds and investment very accurately.
Due to the importance of this issue in development finance, empirical studies using
firm-level panel data have received considerable amount of attention in the literature.
Athey and Lauma (1994) very recently investigated this link between internal funds and
investment for India through an eclectic approach. They represented the accelerator
variable by current and lagged values of the changes in real net sales (.1S), and internal
1 see Hsiao (1986) and Baltagi (1995) for the further discussion on panel data econometrics. Blundell
et al. (1992) reviews the use of firm-level panel data in econometric models of company investment
with a reference to financial factors.
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funds variable by current net profit (NP). Investment is then expressed as a function of
the sale accelerator, internal funds, and replacement investment
(!IKL = a +Pi +A, + f(!!:S1 K)" + g( NPI K)" + h(depr] K)" + ell (5)
where (depr) is the current depreciation used for replacement investment; a is the mean
intercept; Pi represents the all omitted factors affecting the error term that are time
invariant and specific to each firm; A, reflects time-specific factors that affect all firms
equally over time; Ci, is independently identically distributed error term over i and t with
mean zero and variance af~. The model was estimated using a panel data set consisting
of 256 firms over the period of 1978-1986. Two important results emerged from this
empirical study. First, the accelerator variable, net profit, and depreciation are
important determinants of investment spending in Indian manufacturing firms. Second,
the internal funds variable is relatively more important for large firms. This rather
unexpected conclusion is a result of the objectives of the Indian government to promote
small industries through selective credit policies. Therefore, in India, small firms
should have relatively easier access to the limited investment funds.
So far, eclectic models have been presented without any reference to the micro
foundations of the behaviour of firms. The paper by Tybout (1983) attempts to suggest
a model examining Mckinnon's thesis using directly micro level data. The usual
empirical practice in the financial repression literature is that all firms in the economy,
more or less, suffer from market imperfections and credit rationing equally. However,
they ignore the micro process through which inefficient intermediation translates into
poor economic performance. This last argument requires more detailed examination at
the micro level. Tybout assumes that firms are constrained by the level of current
period profit, which itself determines the level of investment. The quite interesting
implication of adjustment costs led him to a micro theoretical interpretation of the effects
of credit constraints. He introduced a Jorgenson type of investment model with a
convex adjustment cost function by which he defined the optimal paths of investment of
constrained and unconstrained firms. Tybout theoretically specified two channels
through which credit rationing influences the optimal paths of investment; namely
liquidity and cost channels. The liquidity channel, which is more commonly
considered in the literature, becomes effective when a rationed firm has difficulty in
obtaining cash quickly when investment opportunities arise. As one borrows, optimal
investment behaviour requires an equality between the rate of return on investment
projects and borrowing and lending rates. In an Modigliani-Miller world, lending rates
and borrowing rates of funds would be equal. However, in an imperfect environment,
there always exists a wedge between the lending and borrowing rate of financial funds.
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From the point of view of firms' owners, the use of internally generated funds for
investment involves an opportunity cost which is considered to be the lending rate. As
the credit rationing becomes more and more binding, the owners of constrained firms
would require a higher rate of return investment in order to lend their money to their
firms. From the managers' point of view, credit rationing thus increases the
opportunity cost of internal funds at the margin. This cost effect was represented by
discounting the earnings on rationed firms' assets at a relatively higher rate.
Tybout (1983) introduced the flexible accelerator model of investment
expenditures:
(6)
Here K' satisfies the first-order condition TrK = rC'(O) and
(7)
where n: the profit function as described in earlier chapters; r: the discount rate; C(l):
the adjustment cost function": An increase in the cost of capital as a result of a rise in
the opportunity cost of using internal funds will increase the marginal product of the
rationed firm in the long run (see the first-order condition), then slows down the
adjustment process (dO/ dr < 0).
Tybout (1983) defined a general investment function covering rationed and non-
rationed firms. His investment model representing unconstrained firms is a simple
"putty-putty" model in which the level of output is the most dominant factor among
others, and the effect of relative prices does not appear in the equation directly. By a
simple accelerator model. the desired level of capital is assumed to be a constant
proportion of expected output level;
K' =}Q' (8)
where y is the constant capital-output ratio which is indirectly determined by relative
prices; Q': the expected output. The level of expected output is given as a linear
function of the actual levels of all past outputs. The flexible accelerator mechanism is
the common bridge connecting investment to capital stock; that is
(9)
2 For the formal derivation of the adjustment coefficient similar to (7). see Chapter 3.
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Alternatively, for the firm that faces a binding credit rationing, he suggested that
investment demand is determined by a distributed lag in earnings:
T
I, = I, T]/r,+I_;1
;=1
( 10)
The general model will thus be the sum of the investment functions of constrained and
unconstrained firms so that depending on the significance of either the accelerator or the
internal funds variable, we are able to determine whether or not the binding constraint is
effective;
(11 )
In order to avoid the need for data on the book value of the capital stock, he differenced
both sides to eliminate the capital stock variable on the right-hand side. Therefore the
general investment demand equation becomes identical to the following
T T
I, = 8I, YW;L1Q'+I_; + I, T];L17r,+I_;1 + (I- 8)/'_1 ( 12)
;:;:1 ;=1
where 11-1 = K'_I - K,_2. The very restrictive assumption of Tybout (1983) is that there is
no replacment investment in his model. This implicitly accommodates a putty-putty
technology assumption, in the sense that the technology is completely malleable both in
net investment and in replacement investment. This means that replacement investment
can also be represented by the same equation as net investment.
The excellent study by Behrman (1972) used a neoclassical investment model to
analyse sectoral investment behaviour in Chile. This study has been the only one
investigating sectoral investment functions under 'putty-putty' and putty-clay'
technology assumptions. He employed time series data for the period 1945-1965 of six
sectors (20 observations for each) including agriculture, mining, manufacturing,
transportation, housing, and utilities. Another novel aspect of the study is the
definition of the optimal capital stock term which is assumed to be a function of the
ratio of the output price to the price of capital goods (p/q), real output Q, the capacity
gap variable (Q/Q') where Q' is the capacity of real output, and the standard derivation
of the ratio of the output price to the GDP deflator SD(p/def.) (to capture the effect of
price volatility or of inflation in general);
K' = b( P )Qe :(<1-1), + c(~) + dSD(L)
q Q def .
( 13)
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where r: rate of Hicks neutral exponential technological change; a: elasticity of
substitution between capital and labour; b, c, d, are constant coefficients. if the effect
of capacity gap variable is significant in the estimation, the sign of (c) will be expected
to be positive. The sign of (d) will be negative if risk-aversion is predominant.
Under putty-putty assumptions, the gross investment is the sum of the
investment for expansion and investment for replacement; 1(; = IN + III. Behrman
examined three different functional specifications, two of which are basically putty-
putty models but classified as complete and partial putty-putty models. Recalling the
discussion in chapter I, the putty-putty technology assumption means the malleability
of capital. If capital is completely malleable, there would be no differences between the
determinants of investment for expansion purposes (i.e. net investment) and investment
for replacement. Therefore, the same function would be enough to describe both types
of investment. If the replacement option is limited because of the constant
characteristics of the existing capital stock, then replacement investment is determined
by the depreciation of the existing capital stock. In such a situation, the technology is
called partial putty-putty; i.e. putty-putty in net investment, but not in replacement
investment. On the other hand, if the assumption that capital is not malleable holds,
then the determinants of replacement investment differ from those of net investment.
The common practice is usually to assume that replacement investment is given by the
rate of depreciation of the fixed capital stock [Jorgenson (1963)]. Since this method
requires the value of the capital stock, which is in general difficult to obtain accurately
in developing countries, Behrman suggested that replacement investment is a
distributed lag function of past capacities of real output. This model is described as a
partial putty-putty model. Following Jorgenson and others, the net investment is
considered as
n
IN = ~ a.AK·.
~, t+t
( 14)
i=()
which corresponds to real gross investment covering both net investment and
replacement investment under the complete putty-putty technology assumption. The
real gross investment model with the partial putty-putty assumption will be the sum of
the net investment and replacement investment, which can described as
(15)
where
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( 16)
Under a putty-clay assumption, real gross investment is written as a non-
function of the price of output, the price of capital services, real output, the elasticity of
substitution between labour and capital and the rate of Hicks neutral exponential
technological change, and the rate of depreciation,
( 17)
where P = rl«. DQ-i = Q_i -(1- O)Q-i-I' and 8 is the rate of depreciation. A first-order
Taylor expansion of this expression around the lagged values of (P) and (DQ) gives a
very complicated investment demand function depending basically on relative prices
and real output [see Behrman (1972): 829]. Chilean investment expenditure was found
substantially to be consistent with the putty-putty type of investment model. Empirical
results confirmed the significance of the use of CES production function, as described
in (13), and price uncertainty, and to a lesser extent, of capacity utilisation. The
manufacturing sector, among others, was found to be very responsive to changes in the
price of output and in the relative price of capital services. The government's fiscal and
monetary policies that increase the degree of capacity utilisation and decrease price
uncertainty might lead to increases in investment in various sectors.
2.3. Macro Level Studies:
Macroeconometric investment studies attempt to examine the importance of poor
financial intermediation among the other determinants of private investment. As
explained earlier, financial repression and fragmented financial markets in developing
countries are regarded as the main reason for this poor intermediation. Like
microeconometric studies, there is no accepted general framework to analyse the
macroeconomic determinants of private investment. However, the present literature has
considered two different modelling approaches to study the extent to which financial
variables influence private investment and in turn economic growth. One closely
follows the financial liberalisation literature and considers the volume of private
investment spending to be determined by the volume of domestic saving. The second
approach has been in the line of neoclassical flexible accelerator models, and mostly
incorporates some additional variables in accordance with the different structural
characteristics of developing countries (other than the accelerator and the relative price
of capital goods), through the variable coefficient of the partial adjustment mechanism.
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This section reviews these macroeconometric models with special reference to
corresponding theories.
2.3.1. Macroeconomic Adjustment and The Role of Saving In the
Determination of Private Investment:
Economic stabilisation can be defined as an attempt to improve disequilibrium between
demand and supply, aiming to reduce inflationary pressures and correct the balance of
payment positions. Excess demand for domestic and foreign resources (as a result of
ambitious growth targets) and structural rigidities on the supply and demand side of
developing economies result in two types of disequilibrium, namely disequilibrium
between domestic savings and total investment, and disequilibria between imports and
total foreign earnings. These two main disequilibria, that impose additional constraints
on investment, have been considered by the two-gap model [Chenery and Strout
(1966), Weisskof (1972) and Gersovitz (1982)]. To see these disequilibria, consider
that the following national income identity holds ex post,
Y=C+I+(X-M) ( 18)
where Y: gross national product; C: aggregate consumption including public and private
sector; I: the sum of public and private investment; X: exports including factor income
from abroad); M: Imports including factor payments to foreigners. Assuming that
S=Y-C, the following also holds in equilibrium,
(J-S)+(X-M)=O ( 19)
In disequilibrium, the first term on the left-hand side gives the saving gap (I> S) while
the foreign exchange gap, (M> X), is given by the second.
Macroeconomic stabilisation and adjustment policies, in a broad sense, involve
eliminating these disequilibria by various means. Exogenous foreign capital intlows
(such as external borrowing, foreign investment, and aid) is one of them. Assume that
a country runs a trade deficit, (M> X), which is financed through external borrowing,
F; then (19) becomes
S+F=I (20)
The right hand side of the equality is a simple expenditure item described in the national
income identity; the left hand side represents the source of finance of that expenditure.
This is a simple ex post investment-saving identity which postulates that all commodity
markets are cleared at the equilibrium price level. External borrowing, F, here fills the
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gap between saving and investment. Given the exogenous nature of foreign
borrowing, this option is yet not controllable, and sometimes rationed in international
capital markets, as imposing an external borrowing constraint on investment. To see
this, I follow Weisskopf ( 1972), and write the ex ante savings function as follows
(21 )
where s': desired savings. If the country runs a trade deficit, the realised level of
saving becomes higher than its desired level, that is s· < S. Substituting (21) and (20)
into this inequality yields that
(22)
where I is realised investment. Equation (32) gives the maximum level of the
investment demand in the saving-constrained economy in the case where the inequality
constraint in (22) is strictly binding. If the inequality is not binding, realised
investment demand will be determined by other variables (such as described earlier)
than those determining savings.
Having excluded the foreign capital inflows as a controllable instrument for
macroeconomic adjustment, three main possibilities to equilibrate savings and
investment can usually be considered in developing countries, namely output
adjustment (i.e. accelerator effect), inflationary adjustment, and deficit financing and
credit creation [Leff and Sato (1980) and (1988)]. The first option is rather subject to
the response of output to excess demand in the short-run. Provided that investment and
saving are also responsive to the short-run changes in output, they adjust themselves to
the ex post equilibrium. Where output is not sufficiently responsive in the short-run
(e.g. because of full capacity utilisation in the economy), demand stimulus resulting
from excess demand in the commodity market would affect the aggregate price level.
In other words, excess of ex ante investment over (S+F) rises the general price level
under the demand pressure, and leads to new market equilibrium at a higher price level.
But price inflation, for many reasons, is undesirable in LDCs. In particular, the low
interest-rate policy is considered as one of the policy instruments to stimulate
investment and economic growth rate. Thus interest-rate changes are not allowed to
clear the financial market. In such a situation, the gap is filled by relaxing the saving
constraint through changes in the volume of real credit usually in response to the
government deficit. The increased volume of credit is expected to support insufficient
domestic savings and allowed to raise the realised investment demand towards its
desired level. Credit expansions to meet the ex ante investment target, however, are
subject to the balance-of-payment constraint. More precisely, since the excess demand
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for investment over savings in an open economy causes a fall in international reserves,
the Central Bank becomes less eager to expand the supply of credit, and even tightens it
[Eshag (1971 )].
Considering both the fact that demand for investment is constrained by the
supply of domestic savings ex post, and the possible effects of different adjustment
options upon savings and investment decisions, some empirical researches estimate an
investment-saving system simultaneously as follows [see Leff and Sato (1975), (1980)
and (1988)];
(23)
(24)
where ~Y: the change of real GNP; P: the rate of inflation; ~C,.: the change in the real
volume of credit. It is expected that al and a3 >0. The sign of a2 is ambiguous because
of the different saving behaviour of public and private sector. An increase in inflation
may cause the private sector to save more, but also could reflect the government
dissaving which is being covered by money creation. It is also expected that b p-O
because of the accelerator effect. An increase in real credit positively influences
investment because LDC firms are generally very dependent on credit to finance
investment (b3>0). The effect of the increase in inflation enters the investment equation
positively due to the fact that higher inflation creates higher profit ensuring higher rates
of return (b2>0).
Macroeconomic adjustment, particularly in LDCs, is usually not as easy as
described in the preceding paragraph. Inefficient and less-developed commodity and
financial markets, direct government interventions and a number of market
imperfections may prevent the economy from reaching equilibrium. In the following
section, one of the well-known financial market imperfections in LDCs and the role of
financial intermediation in the elimination of the gap between investment and saving are
discussed.
(i) Financial Intermediation and Investment
Some research on investment has been stimulated by the well-known financial
repression theory of McKinnon and Shaw postulating that substantial improvements in
financial intermediation are a precondition of an increase in the level of domestic
savings and of the better allocation of those savings from low-return projects to high
return ones [see e.g. Galbis (1977) and Fry (1988)]. It is for this reason that many
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developing countries started reforming their financial system in the 1980s. The original
theoretical model of the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis which provided a rationale for
financial liberalisation as a means of financial development and economic growth
emphasised particularly on interest rate ceilings on lending and deposit rates in terms of
financial repression. The formal model assumes that the private sector consists of a
single entity without any formal distinction between household and corporate sector,
although their saving behaviour differs totally in response to an increase in interest
rates. A crucial, (and also the most controversial) assumption of this theory is that
investors constrained by the availability of financial funds must accumulate money
balances before undertaking investment. The underlying presumption of the theory is
that higher real rates of return on domestic financial assets, especially bank deposits,
that are dominant in the case of financial markets in developing countries, would
encourage both savings and capital accumulation. It is argued that where the rate of
interest on bank deposits is below the equilibrium level, a higher level of real deposits
would increase the willingness to save and thus reduce the saving-constraint on
investment. Increases in the volume of domestic savings are not the only impact of
financialliberalisation.
Following a relaxation of the saving-constraint on investment, a high interest
policy allows the market to distinguish poor projects from relatively more productive
ones but with a high risk premium. In other words, under the fixed and low interest
rate policies, some profitable but risky projects could not be undertaken because lenders
would ration such projects by non-price means, and finance relatively safe projects at
the given interest rates. However, if interest rates are allowed to adjust freely, then
lenders can charge risk premium over the principle rates (or risk-free rates) to protect
themselves from the possible bankruptcy risk of the borrower, and then they relax the
high degree of stringency of borrowing constraints on firms' financing and investment
decisions. Therefore, potentially profitable but risk projects could find an oportunity to
be financed through bank credits at the rates determined according to riskiness of
borrowers.
Empirical research in the financialliberalisation literature stresses on modelling
the causality from increased saving and investment. McKinnon focuses essentially on
the response of the demandfor real money balances to the real interest rates, which is
the only financial source of investment in the McKinnon model. He assumes two
assets held by agents; namely money and risky capital. According to him, these two
assets are complements, but not substitutes. Since physical capital is indivisible, a
potential investor, who is initially constrained by the availability of financial funds, first
accumulates money balances and then undertakes investment project by using these
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accumulated funds. From McKinnon's point of view, increases in the real return on
money assets will raise the demand for real money balances under the complementarity
assumption. This theoretical explanation can be summarised by the following two
equations describing the real money balance and the demand for capital asset
respectively [Fry (1978)]:
(25)
Likewise, the demand for investment can also be written as a function of rand (d-p"):
(;) = g[r,(d - p')] (26)
where (MIP)* : the demand for real monetary balances including savings and deposits;
Y: real income; VY: the ratio of gross investment to GNP; d: the interest rate of
deposit.; p": the expected inflation rate; r: the average return to physical capital.
According to the McKinnon complementarity, the real return on capital
positively affects the demand for real money balances. In a partial derivation
representation, this can be shown as
a{MIP)' > 0
aUIY) , (27)
Note that the positive relationship between the ratio of investment to GNP and the real
interest rate will become negative when the real interest rate reaches positive values [see
Roe (1982)].
McKinnon's explanation of the financial repression is based on the assumption
that household-firms are the main units of the economy of a LDC, and rely only on
self-finance [Fry, (1988)]. Shaw (1973), on the other hand, considered the number of
financial assets intermediating between savers and investors, and introduced debt
finance into the model. In Shaw's model, the demand function for real money balances
is defined in a similar way, but a variable showing the average opportunity cost of
holding money, v, for the rate of return on capital is replaced for (I/Y) as follows.
(28)
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There is no complementarity assumption in Shaw's model because investment is not
self-financed. If the internally generated funds are not enough, it is assumed that
investors would borrow from formal and informal markets.
A substantial amount of empirical research has been carried out to assess the
validity of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis through the model described in (35)-(38).
Although the tendency is to accept the hypothesis [see Fry (1978), (1980), ( 1988),
McKinnon (1992)]. the results of some papers have been ambiguous [see Galbis
(1979), de Melo and Tybout (1986), Giovannini (1983)]. In a number of papers, Fry
has argued the importance of finance in economic development, and tested the
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis for a group of countries. He found supportive evidence,
in favour of the hypothesis, for the Asian countries over the time period of 1962-72,
reporting that the real interest rate has a positive effect on domestic saving and growth.
Giovannini (1983) questioned Fry's results, however, and assessed the robustness of
the results obtained for the same countries but over a different sample period. Then he
concluded that "a positive and significant real interest rate elasticity 4 savings [as
claimed in Fry (1978)] is hard to come by" [Giovannini (1983): 601]. Giovannini's
results were, to some extent, supported by Gupta (1987). Gupta examined the role of
interest rates and financial intermediation as determinants of aggregate savings for a
large group of heterogeneous countries which were selected from Asia and Latin
America. He reported that the coefficient of nominal interest rates is insignificant for
the entire sample group. Disaggregating sample countries, some supportive evidence
for the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis was found for Asian countries, but not for Latin
American countries.
(ii) An Alternative Modelling Approach
Empirical application of the theory developed by McKinnon and Shaw disregards the
negative effect on investment of high real interest rates above the equilibrium level via
increases in the user cost of capital as defined in the neoclassical model [see Roe,
(1982), Rittenberg (1991)]. Note that the positive effect of a rise in the real interest
rates is a consequence of the excess demand for investment. During the financial
liberalisation, however, an economy that was previously rationed by the available funds
(as postulated by the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis) may go into another disequilibrium
situation where the excess supply of investable funds due to the high real interest rate
over the equilibrium level is constrained by the shortage of investment demand. In
other words, in the wake of financial liberalisation the economy may switch between
excess demand for and shortage of investment. Any model assessing the effect of
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financial liberalisation on investment demand must recognise these different
disequilibrium situations and the endogeneity of saving constraints.
Consider the equilibrium condition described in the McKinnon-Shaw model as
follows
1== I" == S" (29)
where I: realised investment; Ill: the notional investment; S": the notional savings.
According to this identity, the demand for and supply of investable funds, IIIand Sll
respectively are identical to the realised investment. The real notional interest rate is to
be determined by the intersection of IIIand S". In a disequilibrium situation, in which
the realised investment diverges from its desired level, the actual level of investment is
determined according to
1=min(1",sn) (30)
where
I" = A1x1 +0)1
S" = A2x2 + 0)2
(31 )
(32)
where Xiis a set of exogenous variables, Ai is an unknown coefficient matrix, and Wi is
normally distributed random variables. The important aspect of the model is that only
the realised investment, I, is observed in reality. It is not known a priori whether any
value of I is determined by IIIor S",
In the financially repressed economy described by the McKinnon-Shaw model,
the desired investment demand function generates excess demand for investment at the
disequilibrium (negative) real interest rate, and the realised investment function is
determined by the desired savings function;
I" > i =5" (33)
On the other hand, if the real interest rate is too high (over the equilibrium rate), the
binding function will be the desired investment function which set the upper bound on
the supply of investable funds;
S" > I = I" (34)
At this stage the problem is to estimate the parameters of the market in disequilibrium
simultaneously. Maddala (1993), at the theoretical level, suggests a method for the
estimation. A similar method has been used, by Gersovitz (1982), to develop a
Chapter 4 Modelling Private Investment in Developing Countries 127
methodology in order to assess the prospects for estimating a two-gap model in LDCs.
The problems with disequilibrium estimations are that we can observe only realised
investment, It. but not desired investment and savings. However, it may be possible to
estimate the joint likelihood of having dependent variable conditional sometimes on
In<sn in the case of excess demand for investment (transactions in the market is
determined by the volume of savings supply), and sometimes on In<sn in the case of
excess supply of savings (transactions in the market is determined by the demand for
investment) . For this purpose, let h(I) denote the likelihood of the realised investment
and g(In,sn) be the joint likelihood of the desired investment and savings functions.
Therefore
~
h( I)= r g( I, s: 'fisn + f g( 1",S'fil"
,
(35)
The first part of the likelihood function h(I) refers to a situation where I" > I = S"
whereas the second part refers to a situation where t:» I = s. WI and W2 are
independently distributed with variances a~ and a;. Then the probability density
function, f(It), and cumulative density function, F(It), of the error terms are
(36)
~ ~
FI" (I) = J f" (I"}lil", Fs' (I) = f 1'." (S" }liS" (37)
Therefore, the joint likelihood function is
(38)
However the sample separation according to two different disequilibrium regimes is
still unknown. Gersovitz (1980) developed a method for regime membership.
Accordingly, the probability that an observation comes from one particular regime, say
the regime where S" > 1= t", is written as
(39)
Gersovitz (1982) applied this technique to a group of developing countries in Latin
America to determine which constraint, the saving or foreign exchange constraint, hold
at different times. The results suggested that economic growth is more often
constrained by savings than foreign exchange.
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(iii) The Modified Flexible Accelerator Model
Many models used to distinguish the determinants of private investment have been a
modified accelerator model that includes variables designed to capture the constraints
and structural characteristics of a typical developing country [Sundararajan and Thakur
(1980), Blejer and Khan (1984), Morisset (1993)]. The investment function for the
private sector is written as follows:
II' = BKI" -(B-8)KI'
, I I-I
(40)
where II': private investment; Kt": the optimal capital stock for the private sector; (): the
speed of the partial adjustment; D; the rate of depreciation. The models in this line
incorporate various constraints of concern through the definition of the partial
adjustment mechanism S. Following Coen (1971), they assume that the speed of the
capital adjustment process is influenced by some factors (such as the availability of
credit to the private sector, public capital stock); that is
B=f{x) (41 )
where x is a set of exogenous variables affecting the speed of adjustment. In this
section, some well-known adapted flexible accelerators are reviewed with their ways of
dealing with some characteristics of LDCs (such as credit rationing).
Sundararajan and Thakur (1980) is one of the first attempts to formulate
aggregate private investment in developing countries in this line. Their main concerns
are the roles of public sector, relative prices and domestic savings in the determination
of private investment. They make an effort to formulate the private investment model
particularly in line of the neoclassical model. The same model has been used
subsequently with minor modifications [Tun Wain and Wong (1982), Blejer and Khan
(1984), Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992), Morisset (1993), and Voridis (1993)].
Modelling starts with the minimisation of the sum of the present and future
costs of production and capital. As easily noticed, the model does not have any
adjustment cost, but assumes an ad hoc partial adjustment mechanism. Three
production factors -labour, private and public sector capital stocks- are included in a
Cobb-Douglas production function, supposing that the elasticities of substitution
between these factors are unity.
Y,= A(K,~t (K/'t (L,)f3, (42)
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where K,": public capital stock; L: labour; A: constant. They treat public capital stock as
exogenous. The first-order conditions of the cost minimisation give the definition of
the user cost of capital and the optimal capital stock in connection with the Cobb-
Douglas production function assumption.
(43)
KI" = (/ )(JI(K~)"1 y'"', all C, W, , , (44)
where c: the implicit user cost of capital; w: wage rate; q': the price of capital goods; r:
the short-term interest rate; ;y: the rate of inflation in the price of capital goods. In the
absence of adjustment costs, firms are able to adjust their capital stock instantaneously.
Despite this, the net investment function is assumed to be derived from the ad hoc
partial adjustment mechanism as follows
11K!' = B(K'!' - K!' )
, , I-I (55)
Even though Sundararajan and Thakur use the elements of the Jorgenson model
without adjustment cost, the adjustment mechanism noted above confirms the existence
of a lagged adjustment process which itself indicates adjustment costs.
So far, the model is quite identical to the original neo-classical representation.
However, like Coen (1971), they presume that the speed of adjustment, given by the
adjustment coefficient e, is a variable determined by the funds available to finance
investment expenditure [see Chapter 3]. In other words, an increase in credit
availability to the private sector generally will encourage real private investment. In the
case where the volume of such funds is low, the adjustment towards the optimal capital
stock would take relatively more time than it would be otherwise. Consider the partial
adjustment formulation given above. As will be noticed readily, the adjustment
coefficient might be defined as a ratio of actual investment to the desired investment.
But in the light of the discussion made above, the correct representations of e in a
constrained and unconstrained situations respectively ought to be
B = 11K:' if 5"'" > I1KI'
(K'!' - K!' )' ,I I-I
(46a)
(j = 5;'" if 5"" :5; I1KI'
(K'I' - KI' )' ,I I-I
(46b)
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where S,""': net savings; (j: the constrained level of the adjustment coefficient for the
capital stock. The adjustment would slow down only if s,"," < K," - K,'~\. Following
Coen (1971), Sundararajan and Thakur, therefore, apply the model to LDCs at the
macroeconomic level, assuming that the financial constraint is given by the amount of
saving net of public investment. Unlike our presentation of e, they write the following
formula to indicate the speed of adjustment without any distinction between constrained
and unconstrained situations:
(47)
where I;: public investment; q;': the price index of private investment goods. This
definition of e now requires a little attention. First of all it is quite misleading, since it
does not represent any binding credit constraint at all, and gives our derivation of e, we
believe that it is relatively more consistent with the fact that the desired investment level
is rationed by the amount of saving available to private sector, only if bo=O and b I= I
[see McKay and Whitley (1992)]. This can easily be seen in the following
representation of the above equation;
(48)
The right-hand side terms represent the partial adjustment effects of capital adjustment
and savings, indicating that the savings constraint is not strictly binding (bo, bl >0).
According to the ex post savings and investment identity however, the realised
investment demand will be limited by savings at the macroeconomic level. If bo=Oand
b I= 1, then the first term on the right-hand side will be eliminated, and a more accurate
form of the adjustment coefficient will be derived:
- (s -/~)/ /'(}= ' , q, if 11K,/' = (S, - I,g )/q,"
(K'" - K/' ), ,-\
(49)
Remember that gross investment is the sum of net investment dKt and depreciation
SKt-l. But with respect to the constraint above, savings cover only net investment, not
depreciation. In order to keep the capital stock unchanged, the assumption that savings
are net of depreciation is required. Sundararajan and Thakur's formulation can actually
be used only when the actual level of investment is always equal to total saving
available to private sector; in other words, when (s, -I;)::; I,". Moreover their
specification of e says nothing about what happens when (s, -I,g) > I," . In the last case
where the constraint is not binding, firms would follow the optimum paths of
investment and adjustment. The optimality in that sense would require an optimum
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investment level between zero and the upper bound set by the savings constraint
(s, - I;'). Assuming that (s, - In = Ii' , when the constraint is actually not binding, and
using the formula of e defined as in Sundararajan and Thakur (1980) would therefore
not be optimal since firms would be able to invest by the amount of desired investment.
In practice, an economy might move between those two situations defined here. Which
situation is prevailing in the paper is unfortunately not well defined, however.
At the next step, they simply substitute 8 and the optimal capital stock derived
above into the formulation of gross investment, and derive the following investment
function:
where a(L) is the lag polynomial of income. The model is able to capture the
accelerator effect of aggregate income by B2. The crowding-in effects of government
capital stock is expected to be given by B3 whereas the crowding-out effects of public
investment, by competing for the existing volume of credit in the domestic economy
and creating financial constraint on investment, are given by B4.
Their model is a three-equation system including private investment, savings
and production functions. The estimations of the neo-classical private investment
function fit the data of India and Korea (adjusted R2s are 0.95 and 0.99 respectively).
All explanatory variables are statistically significant, except public capital stock, and
have the expected signs. The accelerator effect is highly significant in both countries,
but its effect on private investment is higher in Korea than in India. The financial
resources measuring the crowding-out effect of public investment are highly significant
and very strong; for comparison, it is 0.63 in India, 0.26 in Korea which is lower than
in India. But this is not once-for-all effect. Since the model includes the public
production equation, which is a positive function of public capital stock, then the
positive effect of an increase in public investment on output overall will influence
output expectations, saving, and in turn may offset the immediate crowding-out effect
either partly or completely.
Tun Wain and Wong (1982) is another well-known study in the field. The
theoretical structure is similar to that of Sundararajan and Thakur's model but with a
number of modifications. First, unlike Sundurarajan and Thakur, Tun Wain and Wong
do not include any relative price variable. Second, they suppose the speed of
adjustment is determined by two different factors, namely changes in bank credit to
private sector and net capital flows, including foreign capital, to the private sector:
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(J _ f'( I1Crp, Gnp,)
- K ,,* - K" 'K ,,* - K"
f 1-1 , 1-1
(51 )
where !l.Crp: changes in bank credit to the private sector; CI1lP: net capital inflow
including foreign credit. The function relating those variables to the adjustment
coefficient is assumed to be linear. They then derive the gross investment function
through an ad hoc adjustment mechanism. From the naive accelerator model, the
desired level of capital stock is assumed to be proportional to the level of private sector
output, which is itself a function of public investment and private investment. Going
one step further, since the costs of credits from different sources are assumed not to be
significantly different (i.e. they are perfect substitutes), the origins of credit may be
immaterial. Thus, instead of defining two different variables of credit they employ only
one variable which is the sum of changes in bank credit and net capital inflows. They
derived two similar equations by assuming that (51) is linear. In the first linear one,
private investment is a function of the private sector output (Qt), bank credit to the
private sector, net capital inflow to the private sector, and the private capital stock.
(52)
In the second one, they assumed that private sector output is a linear function of
government investment and private investment, and they then reached a single linear
investment equation (53) in which government investment, total credit and the lagged
value of private capital stock appear on the right-hand side.
(53)
where F:': the sum of the change in domestic credit to the private sector and the net
capital inflow to the private sector. Government investment in the equation seems to
have a positive impact on private investment but it may exaggerate the crowding-in
effect if the likely crowding-out effect through financial variables is not considered.
This problem is simply sorted out by specifying two additional equations to the
previous one:
F, = P] + F; (54)
(55)
where F:: the change in banking system's claim on the government net of government
deposits plus net foreign capital inflow to the government. The first equation above
simply shows that the volume of total credit is allocated between public and private
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sectors. The amount of credit used by public is determined by government investment
as given in the second equation. Having substituted F:' -in terms of F, and I;~- into the
investment function defined earlier, the final reduced form, that is the second equation
to be estimated, is written in the following form:
(56)
They estimated two single equations (52) and (53) for each of Greece,
Thailand, Malaysia, Korea and Mexico. In the context of the single equation
estimation, they use two different forms, one of which is estimated under the
assumption that changes in bank credit and net capital flow are not perfect substitutes,
therefore each of them exhibit different effects on private investment. This equation did
pretty well for all countries in terms of the goodness of fit. Although the t-statistics of
the estimations are not very promising, they judged the relative importance of each
variable on the basis of partial correlation. Accordingly, apart from other variables,
public investment appears to be the most significant variable in Greece, Korea and
Malaysia. In Thailand, bank credit comes out significant whereas capital inflow is the
most important factor in Mexico. The results of the equations estimated under the
perfect substitution assumption are similar. Through the reduced form of a three-
equation recursive system, they were able to assess the net effect of public investment.
The net effect, the crowding-in effect less crowding out effect, seems to be positive in
Greece, Korea and Malaysia.
Blejer and Khan (1984) is, in many respects, similar to previous models. Their
main concern is upon the data problem with net investment, capital stock and public
investment. The model developed by them, to some extent, deals with that problem as
in what follows. Unlike the others, keeping the assumption that the desired stock of
capital is proportional to expected capital stock, they write the partial adjustment
equation for gross investment in steady state:
/j.Jl' = e( 1'" - I" )t I I-I (57)
where It is defined in terms of Kt, using the capital accumulation equation:
1/" = [1- (1- 8)L ]K/" (58)
where
KI" = V"~, r, (59)
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y;: the expected level of output; y: the capital-output ratio. The speed of adjustment,
given by 8, is assumed to be determined by a linear function of capital utilisation
indicated by the difference between actual and trend output (GAP), changes in real bank
credit to the private sector plus net private capital flows (~DCR), and real public sector
investment (GIR);
(60)
The effects of credit constraints are captured by ~DCR. The credit constraints
formulated in the form of (60) are assumed not to be strictly binding. Substituting all
these equations into the adjustment equation yields a dynamic reduced form for gross
private investment including financial constraints and public investment
The model is applied to a cross-section of 24 developing countries over the time
period 1971-1979. The study supported the direct link between government policy
variable and private investment. They also showed empirically that private investment
in LDCs is constrained by monetary policy by varying the flow of credit to the private
sector. The variable .1DCR has positive effects in the estimation, and its estimated
coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level. If the overall
quantity of financial resources is given, then any increase in the share of the
government's use of financial resources would lead to crowding out and to a decline in
the level of private investment. Blejer and Khan (1984) suggested that such a decline in
the share of private investment would also result in a fall in total investment.
3. Some Other Theoretical Issues
Although different groups of studies have given different weights to their relative
effects on investment, the empirical literature on investment in industrial countries has
consistently revealed three variables to be important in explaining the fluctuation in
private investment. These are changes in output (that can be taken as an 'accelerator'
variable), the cost of capital, and the financial position of a firm. A number of
additional factors can also be included to reflect the complexity of the investment
process in developing countries. In addition to those given for industrial countries,
public spending, trade and exchange rate policies, credibility of economic policies and
instability in the economic system can be considered to be significant influences on
private investment behaviour in LDCs. The present section deals with examining
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possible additional factors, other than financial ones, that have been widely studied in
the context of the determinants of private investment in developing countries.
3.1. Public Spending:
Public spending in most LDCs is effectively used as a policy variable to stimulate
economic growth. However, recent research activities have repeatedly shown that the
contribution of public investment to economic growth is lower than that of private
investment [Khan and Reinhard (1990)]. The effect of public spending on private
investment has, on the other hand, been ambiguous, and been shown to depend on two
fundamental opposite forces (as described below). In the wake of the World Bank-
IMF supported structural adjustment programmes, reshaping the composition of public
spending in favour of infrastructure investment has been the main policy
recommendation of structural adjustment programmes to encourage the private sector.
There are a number of reasons to believe that public spending has a positive
effect on private investment. First, if economic resources are not fully utilised, an
increase in public spending would increase the level of income through the Keynesian
multiplier effect and raise the profitability of the production of the private sector by
augmenting the demand for output produced by that sector. Second, public spending
on social and economic infrastructure capital formation would also have a positive
effect on the private sector through the elimination of some supply-side bottlenecks
such as lack of transportation and communication facilities, or the shortage of qualified
labour force. Third, public investment in certain areas such as transportation,
communication, energy, education, health etc. would generate externality effects on the
private sector, and increase total factor productivity. These effects together define the
crowding-in effect of public spending.
Having indicated the positive effects of public investment, one can also find
arguments indicating the opposite effect. On the real side of the economy, public
investment undertaken by heavily subsidised and inefficient state-owned firms may, in
general, discourage the production of the private sector. Public investment competes
with the private sector not only for scarce real resources, but also for financial
resources. For example, the government would finance public investment through
borrowing from the domestic financial market which eventually pushes up the rate of
interest or reduces the volume of credit available to the private sector, or both, thus
crowding out private investment.
There has been some empirical work on the effects of public investment on
private investment. Despite the recognition of the distinction between different kinds of
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public investment, such as infrastructural and noninfrastructural public investment, the
detailed analysis of the impacts of each type of public investment is limited by the lack
of disaggregate data at that level. Instead, many studies have used real aggregate public
investment [Wai and Wong (1982), Sundararajan and Thakur (1980), Greene and
Villanueva (1991), Shafik (J 992), Bairam and Ward (J 993), and Ramirez (1994)].
The only exception appears to be Chhibber and van Wijnbergen ( 1992), who employed
infrastructural and noninfrastructural public investment separately for the estimation of
Turkish private investment; however they were forced to use a shorter time series
because disaggregated public investment data is available only form 1970 onwards. In
Schmidt-Hebbel and Muller (1992), crowding in of private investment in response to
public investment in infrastructure capital was captured by employing the public sector
capital stock of Morocco.
Blejer and Khan (1984), however, generated proxy variables for infrastructural
and noninfrastructural public investment by suggesting two different methods.
Assuming that infrastructural public investment is a long-term investment because of a
long gestation period, and cannot be adjusted in the short run, they took the trend level
of real public investment to represent the infrastructural component. The
noninfrastructural component is, on the other hand, calculated as a difference of real
public investment from its trend level. According to the second method they employed
in their seminal paper, they distinguished the expected and unexpected levels of public
investment. Since the infrastructural component of public investment cannot be
changed by surprises in the short run, the expected value of real public investment is
assumed to be the infrastructural component of public investment. Because of the lack
of insufficiently long time series data, they assumed that the expected level of public
investment was determined by a first-order autoregressive data generation process (i.e.
AR(l )). Having estimated the AR(l) process of real public investment, they calculated
predicted values, and then regarded them as the expected value of real public
investment. Besides, the residuals from that autoregressive process were also
considered as the unexpected component, and substituted for the noninfrastructural
public investment. Blejer and Khan found that the level of public investment has
positive effects on private investment, whereas changes in government investment has a
negative effect. When they proxied public infrastructure investment by the trend of real
public investment, they found complementary effects of public sector infrastructure
investment, whereas other kind of public investment exhibits substitution effects. The
same pattern was obtained from equation in which the distinction is made between the
expected and unexpected increase in public investment. Accordingly, an expected
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increase in public investment raises private investment, but an unexpected increase has
the opposite effect.
3.2. Trade Liberalisation and Exchange Rate Policies:
Contractionary economic shocks facing many developing countries (such as an increase
in the world interest rate, the decline in foreign lending and the deterioration of terms of
trade etc.) led them to re-examine their development strategies with the guidance of
international institutions such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.
Many countries have then implemented relatively liberal market-based reforms which
have been expected to stimulate economic growth via capital accumulation. Trade
liberalisation aims to reduce the disparity between domestic and world relative prices,
created by intensive government interventions, and to ease the flow of goods and
services between countries. Trade liberalisation can, besides, influence the incentive
structure of private investment. The existing theoretical literature emphasises the two
potential impacts of trade liberalisation on private investment: i.) direct impacts through
easing to import the foreign components of investment goods; ii.) indirect incentive
effects through the implicit cost of capital. Since developing countries must import
most capital goods, trade liberalisation in the form of removal of quantitative
restrictions and reductions in tariff dispersion is expected to encourage investors to
invest more by enabling them to import more easily. If capital goods, however, had the
lowest tariffs, reductions in tariff dispersion could penalise capital goods [see Bleaney
and Fielding (1995)].
Given the dependence on imports not only of investment goods but also of
materials inputs, the cost of capital and production (thereby profitability) are also
indirectly affected by trade liberalisation. For example, tariff reduction might decrease
the cost of imported components of investment. To be more precise and to show the
direct and indirect incentive effects of trade liberalisation on the cost of capital, consider
the following optimality condition between the marginal productivity of and the cost of
capital-
a q,{r, + 8)(1- r)
aK F(w,/p"v,/p"K,)=c,= (I-'Z')
, P,
(62)
where F(.): the neoclassical indirect production function; w,/ p, : real product wage;
v.l», : the real price of materials inputs; s, : the price of capital goods; r, : the real
discount rate; 8 : the rate of depreciation; r : the corporate tax rate; p, : output prices; r
3 see Chapter 2 for the derivation of a relatively simple version of this optimality condition in
Jorgenson tradition.
Chapter 4 Modelling Private Investment in Developing Countries 138
: the present value of the after tax cash flow attributable to depreciation allowances,
investment grants and investment tax credits received by the firm [see Auerbach
(1990)]. To show the indirect effects of the real price of wages and materials inputs,
assume that the production function, F(.), has the separable form in which each
component determined by relative prices and the capital stock is separated as in
F(.) = e( W, / P" v,/ P, )G( K,}. Then (1) can be rewritten as
_l_C(K,) = C, = q,(r, + 8)(1- 1)
dK, e( w,/ P" V,/P, )P, (1- r) (63)
The indirect incentive effects of trade liberalisation emerge through the function e.
Interventions into trade such as imposing tariffs, and quantity restrictions might distort
the domestic prices of capita] goods and materials inputs from world prices. A tariff on
materials inputs at rate i., for example, acts as an indirect tax on investment by
increasing their prices to V, = (I+ tm}v • .where v, : the world price of material inputs. On
the other hand, a tariff at I" rate would also increase the output price, relative to the
world prices, to P, = (1+ t, )p" where P. : the world price of output.
To sustain external balance as considered in the two-gap models, trade
liberalisation in many developing countries has been accompanied by a combination of
a reduction in public spending and expenditure switching policies including changes in
the incentive structure between tradable and nontradable industries and a real
depreciation of domestic currencies. Devaluation, in fact, affects private investment
through various channels: i.) Since devaluation, other things being equal, raises the
demand for domestically produced goods and therefore their profitability, one might
expect it to increase private investment in sectors where those goods are produced; ii.)
because investment goods in developing countries combine domestic components
(nontradable goods such as constructions, infrastructure) and imported components, a
real depreciation of domestic currency raises the real cost of imported components of
investment goods and discourages the production of investment goods; iii.) real
devaluation affects private investment through the supply price of capital. A real
devaluation lowers the overall supply price of capital in sectors that depend heavily on
traded capital goods and raises the supply price of capital in sectors in which nontraded
goods have the largest share of investment cost. The net effect depends on the relative
shares of traded and nontraded goods in total investment cost. iv.) Given that nominal
wages remain fixed, a real devaluation lowers real wages, and leads to an increase in
profitability and then investment; v.) In an open economy, the real domestic interest rate
is regarded as the sum of the real foreign interest rate and the real expected depreciation.
It is then expected that a real depreciation decreases the real domestic interest rate to the
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level of foreign interest rates if the domestic and foreign assets are perfect substitutes;
vi.) A real devaluation also influences the real value of foreign liabilities. Depreciation
of the domestic currency will automatically raise the debt burden of firms with foreign
debt, reducing the net worth of firms producing home goods.
3.3. Credibility and Instability:
While uncertainty has been recognised as one of the important factors affecting private
investment decisions, the direction of this effect has been controversial. One branch of
research has argued that private investment of a risk-neutral firm always reacts
positively to an increase in output price volatility [Hartman (1972), Abel (1983)]. This
line of research has ignored both the irreversibility of investment decisions and the
curvature of the adjustment cost function [see Chapter 2 for details in adjustment cost
functions]. But Pindyck (1982), using different curvatures for adjustment cost
functions, suggested that an increased uncertainty in output prices tends to raise
investment only if the marginal adjustment cost function is convex. If the function is
concave, then this causes a positive relationship between the increased volatility of
output price and investment.
The recent literature on investment, however, has emphasised the irreversibility
of investment [Pindyck (1991), and Dixit (1992)]. According to this literature,
uncertainty plays a key role in investment decisions because of its three important
characteristics [Pindyck (1993)]: i.) investment expenditures are largely irreversible in
the sense that once put into place, the reallocation of capital involves an additional cost
(the sunk cost argument); ii.) the economic environment where investment decisions are
taken is uncertain and all relevant information about the feasibility of investment
projects arrive gradually, and these are the costs of acquiring this information; iii.)
investment expenditure can be delayed. Given all these factors, an increased
uncertainty leads firms to spend more money and time on acquiring precise information
before committing their financial resources. Particularly in a highly volatile
environment, they wait and postpone investment until more information about the
factors that might affect the future return of the project arrives. Instead of investing
now and obtaining less return from the project, firms anticipate to increase the expected
cash flows of the project to be owned in the future. The difference between the cash
flows of owning the project now and some time in the future is called the option value
ofwaiting to invest in the future [see Dixit and Pindyck (1994)].
From a policy perspective, the incomplete credibility of policy is another
important source of uncertainty in developing countries. The aim of policy reforms like
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those that have been put into place in many developing countries in the 1980s is to
move resources from economically less productive sectors towards relatively more
productive ones. During this adjustment of capital, some costs may arise due to the
facts that i.) capital is in fact not malleable but is sector specific, ii.) entry to new
sectors and exit from unprofitable ones involves some sunk costs, iii.) the presence of
other investment options with relatively less risk creates an option value to waiting in an
uncertain economic environment. All those cost elements of adjustment are sunk in
nature and cannot be recoverable once capital is put into place in the new sectors, and if
these sectors become less productive as a result of policy reversal. The success of any
type of reforms can be measured by the extent to which economic agents respond to
incentives created by the reform. For this, economic agents must first be convinced
that the reform is to be sustainable and there will be no policy reversal in the future, so
that there is no incentive to delay in fixed capital investment.
There are several sources of credibility problems that have been considered in
the literature [e.g. see Rodrik (1989)). First, the lack of credibility may arise from
inconsistent and conflicting policies implemented by the government. As such,
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies (that violate internal and external budget
constraint), over-valued exchange rate (because of nominal exchange rate policies
designed to lower the rate of inflation) and declining trend in export performance lead
entrepreneurs to anticipate the reversal from prevailing policies. Second, dynamic
inconsistency of policies may be another source of unsustainability. In trade
liberalisation, for example, after the private sector adjusts to signals of the
liberalisation, the government sometimes wishes to behave according to the interest of
beneficiaries of the previous policies as a result of pressures of lobbying groups. If
the investors in the export-oriented sector understand the real intention of the
government, then they may refuse to respond to the liberalisation policies. Third, the
government may create an unclear environment regarding its real intention. Agents may
wonder if the government fully commits itself to the reforms or is just trying to make
some international institutions happy. Fourth, economic agents may anticipate possible
political resistance to the reform from some social groups (such as trade unions) that
may jeopardise the sustainability of the reforms.
Recently several authors have argued that lack of confidence regarding the
future paths of economic reforms may induce failure of the reforms. Van Wijnbergen
(1985) and Rodrik (1991 a) attempted to conceptualise the relationship between the
credibility of trade liberalisation, aggregate (and private) investment and capital flight.
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At the macroeconomic level, van Wijnbergen (1985) demonstrated that after a
trade reform, foreign exchange acquires an option value if there is a large probability of
future reversal because of irreversibility of fixed capital investment. Increasing
uncertainty regarding the future of the reform will decrease fixed capital investment,
and induce capital flight. His conclusion is derived from a model where there are three
assets (namely physical capital in import-competition sector, physical capital in export-
oriented sectors, and foreign assets) with three different returns, that depend on the
probability of policy reversal except for the foreign asset. He also pointed out the role
of international institutions that could provide the loans necessary to sustain the
credibility of reform attempts. He noted that by providing conditional loans to a
developing country, those institutions may reduce the probability of such a reversal.
Using a simple model Rodrik (1991 a), on the other hand, investigates the
causal relationship between policy uncertainty and private investment at the
microeconomic level. He particularly considered the irreversible nature of fixed capital
investment in the presence of sunk cost of entry and exit between sectors with different
rate of returns to capital. His model benefited mostly from the theoretical development
in the irreversible investment literature, and was built upon the results of van
Wijnbergen (1985). He proved that "uncertainty regarding the lasting power of
reforms can act as a tax on investment, even when entrepreneurs are risk-neutral."
[Rodrik (1991 a): 230]. He argued that uncertainty of that type creates an option value
to waiting, and results in the postponement of investment in the desired sectors until
more information about the sustainability of the reform arrives.
He derived a basic equation which determines the factors influencing the
entrepreneur's response to the trade reform with a degree of uncertainty. In a simple
model he assumes that there are two options to employ capital. If an investor employed
his capital in the first option, then he earns (r-to) where r is the marginal product of
capital, to is the cost of distortions induced by economic policies. Or he alternatively
earns r" (for example in investing in foreign assets) that r*~r-t()}. Assume that after the
trade reform for instance, the distortion costs of economic policies is reduced to t
where to> t (so that Ir-to) < (r-t ) ), and r' « r-t). The investor also expects that the
reform has a constant probability of reversal, 1t, in the future. When the policy reversal
occurs, the distortion cost returns to its level prior to the reform. Since capital is
irreversible, adjusting capital from one sector to another requires sunk costs of entry
and exit (8 and E respectively). The risk-neutrality assumption of the investor also
holds. Given the probability of policy reversal, the problem faced by the investor is
how to allocate his capital between leaving capital assets in the existing sector where he
earns r* or moving it to where he earns (r-t).
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To find which option makes him better off, the investor calculates the values of
each option. If he keeps his capital in foreign assets after the reform, his behaviour will
be independent of the probability of policy reversal, and the option value of keeping
capital in foreign assets will be
(64)
where p is the discount rate, and "0" indicates the case where the investor does not
change behaviour in response to the reform. Holding capital in the alternative option at
the moment when the reform takes place also has the option value V I, and depends
both on the probability of the reversal and the cost that might occur if the reform is
reversed. If we note that the value of holding capital after the reform is reversed is vt ,
then 1f( VI - vn is the expected capital loss that may be caused by the reversal. Then the
option value of having capital in this option can be written as
(65a)
or
(65b)
After the policy reversal occurred, the marginal rate of return to capital returns to
(r - til)' and remains constant at that rate forever by assumption. In deciding whether to
move capital to foreign assets or hold it where it is, the investor considers exit costs, e
as well. If (r-to) < r' - pB where pB is the present value of exit costs, the value of vt
will be (r' -pB). Substituting VIR in (4), VI can then be rewritten as
(66)
Having calculated the option values of two options, namely holding capital in foreign
assets and investing in the domestic sector, consider now an investor who possesses
capital in foreign assets in the beginning of the reform period. The rational investor
would re-allocate his capital to the distorted domestic sector only if the option value of
doing so is greater than holding capital in foreign assets, that is VI ~ VII + E where £ is
entry costs to the domestic sector. Substituting this in (66) yields the following
inequality rule for the re-allocation of capital between two options,
(r-t)-r; ~ 7r(c+O)+cp (67a)
or
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t ~ (r - r') - lOp - Jr( E + 0) (67b).
This expression indicates the conditions under which the reform will be meaningful to
an investor possessing foreign assets. The first term is the benefit that the investor
might earn if he moves his capital to the domestic sector after the trade reform. The
second term is the discounted entry cost that occurs if the investor decides to move
capital to the domestic sector. The final term stands for the expected sunk cost of the
reversal from the reform. According to (67b) the reform can induce this investor only
if the difference of marginal benefits of alternative uses is higher that the policy-induced
distortions. The conclusion from this result is that policy reforms would not be
sustainable if there is doubt about their likely survival, and if they do not cover the
investor's possible sunk costs arising from entry and exit costs of capital allocation.
The higher the uncertainty regarding the survival of the reforms, the higher the
inducement created by the reforms to convince the investor. Otherwise, the high
probability of policy reversal may cause the investor to call off his investment plan until
uncertainty on the future of the reform is resolved.
Ibarra (1995) has very recently provided empirical evidence for such an effect
from the Mexican trade liberalisation experience. He quantified the probability of the
policy reversal using a simple probit model in which the likelihood of the reversal is
estimated depending on a set of values of the explanatory variables. In his simpler
model, he considered the case where the balance of payments and a certain limit on the
level of international reserves may determine the probability of reversal of the trade
liberalisation. He assumed that the balance of payment deficits comprises two
components, namely the component that is determined by the behaviour of rational
economic agents and a random shock term, that is
B, = B, +e, (68)
where e, - iid( 0, (52). These deficits may be financed by either external borrowing or by
international reserves that also impose an upper constraint on deficits. Then
(69)
where R;n;n is the lower limit of the level of international reserves. Therefore the
probability of policy reversal can be written as
(70)
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In a more general model, he linked the likelihood of policy reversal to the balance of
payments position, the trends of the real exchange rate, the type of fiscal policy
followed by the government, monetary policy, and to other relevant information. The
empirical results showed that the higher probability of reversal is associated with the
deterioration of the balance of payments, the failure of the exchange rate to increase at
the beginning and towards the close of the liberalisation period, and use of
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies. He then predicted the probability of reversal
from the estimated probit model, and then used them in the investment equation in
which the accelerator variable and the relative cost of capital are two other explanatory
variables in addition to the proxy variable for the probability of policy reversal. The
results provided evidence that lack of credibility has been harmful to the rate of capital
accumulation in Mexico.
George and Morisset (1995) re-examine the relationship between investment,
the capital price and the accelerator in the presence of price uncertainty. They
demonstrate that the sensitivity of private investment to variations in the price of capital
and the accelerator variable declines once uncertainty regarding the capital and output
prices are included. They also criticise the irreversible investment literature, which
provides an explanation for the opportunity cost of investment in an uncertain
environment, on two points: First, it is too restrictive in assuming that private
investment will always react negatively to an increase in uncertainty. Second, the
possible linkage between different sources of uncertainty (for example between
uncertainty on the price of capital and uncertainty on the capital price) is omitted. One
important conclusion emerging from their paper then is that private investment is more
sensitive to changes in the price of capital or in the accelerator variable ~li.) uncertainty
about the price of capital is low, ii.) variations in output and the price of capital are
positively correlated, iii.) the investor is risk averse, iv.) the volatility of output price is
higher than the volatility of the capital price. George and Morisset applied their
theoretical model to the Chilean economy, and estimated the following semi-log
investment equation,
In I:' = /i" + /i, In Y, + /i,q, +/i,( ~) + /i,Cov.(p"q,) +0,
f31 ,f31,f34 > 0 and f32 < 0
(71 )
where a:', a,~are variances in the price of output and the capital prices respectively,
Cov.(p"q,) being the covariance between the output and capital prices. Accordingly, if
uncertainty of the price of capital is higher than uncertainty of the output prices
(measured by their variances), then the optimal choice is less movement in private
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investment than in output. Given this, they argue that in order to obtain a desirable
outcome from fiscal incentives, the priority should be given to the reduction of the
volatility of the price of capital goods when the volatility of the output prices is already
too high. Unlike the conventional belief that tax incentives induce private investment,
they show that the type of policies that may create more uncertainty on the capital price
than that on the output prices will reduce private investment. This is challenging
because the main policy recommendation to stimulate private investment has been tax
cuts, investment allowances or exchange rate policies that are more likely to cause more
uncertainty about the price of capital. Therefore, the overall result from such incentives
may be ambiguous. To obtain a desirable result, incentives must be reasonably high to
cover the option value of waiting.
Aizenman and Marion (1993) investigate a causal link between macroeconomic
uncertainty and private investment in developing countries. Despite the vast amount of
theoretical literature concerning the interrelationship between uncertainty and
investment, empirical testing of this relationship is quite difficult mostly because of the
problem of the measurement uncertainty. They constructed measures of
macroeconomic uncertainty and added them to investment equations that have
previously been estimated in the endogenous growth literature. The measure of
uncertainty they used is derived from a first-order autoregressive data generation
process of each relevant macroeconomic variable. First, they estimate the AR( I)
process for a variable with only fifteen observations, and then calculate the standard
deviation of the residuals from the estimated AR( I) process. Variables, for which they
constructed a measure of uncertainty, are government consumption expenditure, the
share of public investment, the growth of government consumption expenditure,
average tax rate (measured as a ratio of government revenue to GOP), government
budget deficit scaled by GOP, domestic credit expansion and money growth. Then
they estimated a cross-section investment equation using 40 countries. Their results
supported the argument of the irreversible investment literature by estimating highly
significant coefficients on the macroeconomic uncertainty variable. Therefore they
concluded that uncertainty on macroeconomic variables has an important influence on
private investment in developing countries, and for a successful macroeconomic policy,
this uncertainty must be minimised.
Conway (1991) is the only study of the effects of relative price uncertainty on
private investment at the aggregate as well as sectoral level (that are agriculture,
housing, manufacturing, transport). He applied a standard Keynesian model,
augmented by proxies for price instability, to the Turkish annual data. Instability in
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two relative prices, the expected variance of real interest rate and the expected variance
of real exchange rate, are taken as measures of uncertainty. He regressed private
investment on the real gross domestic product, expected values of the real exchange rate
and real interest rates, and the variances of the real exchange rate and real interest rates.
He set up forecasting rules of the real exchange rate and real interest rate for investors,
and then estimated the optimal forecasts as the expected mean of the variable conditional
on information available at the forecast period by using the Kalman filter method,
which also provides the conditional variance of forecast of each price variable. His
empirical results suggest that the measures of relative price uncertainty have negative
and statistically significant coefficients. From the sectoral estimations, Conway also
finds strong negative effects on private investment in all sectors (particularly in
manufacturing).
4. Conclusion:
This chapter has reviewed the literature on modelling private investment in developing
countries. In addition to conventional determinants of private fixed capital formation
(namely the accelerator, the cost of capital, and financial factors), some other factors
significant in the case of developing countries, such as the implications of fiscal and
monetary policies, credibility of economic policies, have been discussed along with the
empirical modelling issue. This chapter reveals that there is no acceptable general
framework for analysing the determinants of private investment in LDCs. Most studies
have used an eclectic approach in the sense that there is no exclusive formal
microeconomic modelling on which the investment demand function is derived. Some
studies have preferred the eclectic approach to highly theoretical modelling due to its
more flexible structure to include additional variable of concern. The data availability to
test the more standard model (like those in neoclassical tradition) has been a major
problem facing researchers. To deal with this problem, some have used micro level
data from a cross section of firms or industries. In terms of specification of models,
these studies have shown much closer similarities to those for industrial countries.
However, at the macroeconomic level, specifying a more structural investment model
which is built upon the microeconomic foundation of firm behaviour still remains an
unsolved issue in the empirical literature, and indicates the direction of possible future
contributions to literature in this regard.
The recent research efforts in the empirical investment literature have been
devoted to developing dynamic investment models with a rich microeconomic
backround. These reseach efforts have already given rise to the Euler equation
approach (i.e. a direct estimate of the first-order conditions of a firm's cash flow
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optimisation). This approach has increasingly been very popular recently for
investigating the determinants of investment in developed countries. However, as seen
from our survey of literature, there has been no contribution in this respect to the
empirical investment literature in developing countries. To the knowledge of the
author, testing the significance of an increasing risk premium function and binding
borrowing constraint in a similar set up in particular has not been applied to any
developing country yet. This constitutes another direction of the research agenda on the
determinants of private investment in developing countries.
Part 2
An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Turkish
Private Investment
Chapter 5
The Turkish Economy from A Historical Perspective
1. Introduction
This chapter mainly deals with an overview of the development experience of the
Turkish economy from a historical perspective. Four distinctive sub-periods (each of
which ended with internal and external imbalances and with the implication of
stabilisation policies) are defined to analyse the sample period of 1960-1992 covered in
the following empirical chapters. Private investment in this period shows a great
variability in response to changes in economic policies. General trends in the share of
private investment in GNP are analysed from both an historical and an international
perspective. The sectoral composition of private investment over the 1973-1990 period
is also part of the aim of this chapter.
The experiences of two different industrialisation strategies before and after
1980 determine the nature of economic problems and crises in each corresponding
period. The interactions between the possible determinants of private investment and
macroeconomic policies are also analysed in the chapter. Suggestive evidence can be
found for the following factors affecting private investment in Turkey: high interest
rates, public investment and availability of credit to the private sector. For a more
detailed investigation, the present chapter reviews previous findings on Turkish private
investment, and distinguishes modelling approaches of the thesis from those in the
literature on developing countries in general, and Turkey in particular.
The chapter comprises seven sections. Following this introductory section,
Section 2 analyses economic development and problems pre- and post -1980. Section 3
investigates the general trend in investment over the 1970-1990 period, together with
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comparisons of investment with some developing countries, as well as looking at
changes in the sectoral composition. Being crucial factors in the determination of
private investment in Turkey, financial constraints and the causes of these constraints
are briefly explained in Section 4, together with some other factors. Section 5, on the
other hand, summarises the previous studies on Turkish private investment, and
distinguishes the differences of the modelling approach of the thesis from previous
studies. Section 6 introduces the data sets that are used to estimate empirical models of
the following three chapters, and discusses some problems associated with data. The
chapter ends with some conclusions in Section 7.
2. Brief Economic History
Turkey's first experience with liberal economic policies dates back to the early 1920s.
By the terms of the Lausanne peace treaty in 1923, Turkey was held responsible for the
large amount of commercial debt of the Ottoman Empire, and was obligated to maintain
a low tariff schedule until 1929 [see Kepenek and Yenttirk (1994) for details]. In the
early years of the Republic, the economy inherited from the Ottomans was heavily
dependent on the agriculture sector and on the imports of manufactured capital and
intermediate goods. Although the ultimate aim of the leaders was full national
economic sovereignty, the first ideological initiative in favour of import-substitution
industrialisation strategy in the 1960s and 1970s, they had no option (but liberal
policies) due to terms of the treaty until the Great Depression hit the world as well as
Turkey. The first years of the Republic between 1923-1928 ended with a disappointing
performance of this liberal strategy because there was little evidence of structural
transformation and improvement in income distribution. Besides, Turkey first
encountered its traditional problems, balance of payment and domestic imbalances
triggered by the Depression, in these years.
In the late 1920s, the country's leaders also realised that a fully market-oriented
development strategy, relying only on the private sector, was not adequate strategy to
achieve higher growth and ambitious development targets. In the beginning of the
1930s, internal political pressures forced a substantial shift in economic policy toward a
relatively restrictive state-led economic policy. Accordingly, the state was assigned to
become involved directly in industrial development in some fields where the private
sector was unable to operate. What was done by this so-called etatist policy (a unique
mixture of capitalism and socialism) was to create state-financed, state-owned, and
state-run enterprises [see Okyar (1975)].
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The Second World War, and authoritarian policies followed by the ruling single
party (the Republican Party) during the war, caused them to lose popularity, and
created a large public support for a newly formed right wing opposition that criticised
the state intervention in economic activities, and that campaigned in favour of free
enterprise and less public involvement. Increasing political unrest led the leaders of the
Republican Party to allow for the legal formation of the first opposition party (the
Democratic Party) in 1946, and ended with the loss of the first free election in the
history of Turkey by the Republicans in 1950.
Changes on the political front carne with a significant shift in economic policies
toward more liberal, market-oriented policies. The new strategy was pursued
successfully in the first three years of the 1950s partly because of expansion of the land
for cultivation and strong demand for agricultural commodities during the Korean war,
and partly because of foreign aid received through the Marshall plan [see Kepenek and
Yenttirk (1994)]. Once these external factors disappeared, and the agricultural
production level and the level of public investment started falling, the Turkish economy
then encountered its traditional balance of payments problem once again. The
ambitious rate of growth in the early 1950s (11.5 percent in the period 1950-53, and
4.3 in 1953-60) could not be financed through a rise in domestic savings (but rather
through money creation and external resources). A continuously rising rate of
inflation, import shortages, and in turn increasing repressive measures against political
opposition were general characteristics of the 1950s. Finally, in 1958, the government
decided to adopt a stabilisation programme that had been called by the International
Monetary Fund long before 1958. Measures of this first stabilisation programme
consisted of a devaluation of the Turkish Lira, increases in the price of commodities
produced by state economic enterprises (SEEs), and setting a ceiling on Central Bank
credit and on government expenditures.
The 1960s started with political turmoil, and political opposition to the
stabilisation programme gradually intensified. As political unrest erupted again, the
army took over the government for the first time in May 1960. But the transitional
period ended very quickly following the approval of a new constitution by the
parliament in 1961. The notable features of this new era between 1960 and 1970 were
a high growth rate (nearly 7 percent per year), and a reduction of dependence of the
economy on imports (mainly by encouraging domestic production). For these
purposes, the new constitution introduced the State Planning Organisation (SPO) that
was made responsible for formal economy-wide planning through five-year plans and
annual programmes. The SPO prepared three five-year development plans before the
post-1980 period (1963-67; 1968-1972; 1973-1977) which lost their policy
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Table 5.1 Basic Economic Indicators of The Turkish Economy (1963-1980)
(%)
The Ratio of Current
Exports to Account
Growth Rate Investment/GOP Saving/GOP Imports Deficit/GOP
1963-67 6.6 17.4 17.7 71.1 -1.8
1968-72 6.2 21.2 21.5 61.7 -0.8
1973-77 5.3 22.3 20.7 40.3 -2.5
1978-80 -0.7 21.1 16.2 43.7 -2.9
Source: The author's calculation from SPO (1993) Economic and Social indicators (i950-1992).
significance in the post-1973. The performance of the economy under the first and
second plans were achieved remarkably impressively with 6.5 percent and 6.6 percent
average realised rates of growth respectively.
While the import-substituting industrialisation (lSI) strategy was
institutionalised under five-year plans, the economy went through a significant
structural transformation. The first phase of the lSI between 1963-1967 put emphasis
on the production of consumer goods, and was achieved without any serious external
imbalances. On the contrary, current account deficits inherited from the previous
period were markedly reduced from $ 300 million in 1963 to $ 109 million in 1964,
and then to $ 78 million in 1965. This was not because of improved export
performance (which was, in fact, adversely affected by the trade regime), but rather due
to severe restrictions on imports. The second phase of the lSI, corresponding to the
second planning period between 1968-1972, aimed at the substitution of imported
intermediate inputs and producer and consumer durable goods. However,
sustainability of the lSI at this stage remained dependent on the availability of domestic
and external resources.
The aim of high growth rate in this period increased the dependence of the
economy on imported intermediate and capital goods, and started to cause trade deficits
in the late 1960s. The overvalued currency also put an additional strain on the external
balance. The response of the government to this negative effect of the lSI was to
intensify import restrictions, and to pursue the same policies without any modification.
The situation was not unlike the previous crisis that Turkey had faced in the late 1950s.
The government was eventually convinced once again to introduce an IMF-supported
stabilisation policy in 1970, involving a devaluation of domestic currency and curbing
public expenditures. But the liberalisation and stabilisation policies were largely
reversed after a partial military intervention in 1971 when civil social disorder erupted
again.
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Table 5.2. The Effects of The First Oil Shock on Some Selected Foreign Trade Figures
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974
The Rate of Change (%)
Exports" 9.6 15.0 30.8 48.8 16.3
Imports" 18.3 23.6 33.5 :n.5 81.1
Million s of us Dollars
Balance of Foreign
Tradea -359.1 -494.2 -677.6 -769.1 -2245.4
(35.8) (37.6) (37.1 ) ( 16.5) ( I92,(»
The Price Index of Oil
ImE0rts ~1986-1987=lOO~b 7.8 9.3 13.9 36.6 45.2
Sources: a.) SIS (1993) Statistical Indicators (1923-1992); b.) Quarterly Bulletin of the Central Bank of
Turkey. The figures in brackets shows the percentage change from the previous period.
2. 1. Dynamics of The Pre-1980 Economic Crisis
Over the period covering the years 1970-1979, external shocks were of considerable
magnitude in the world economy, and Turkey experienced a large number of economic
and social difficulties. Despite the changes in the world economy, Turkey chose
expansionary economic policies parallel to the economic objectives of five-year
development plans. Ambitiously high growth rates in these plans implied a particular
pace of investment. These growth rates and associated investment targets were,
however, subject to two constraints, namely a foreign exchange constraint (to the extent
that exogenously determined foreign capital inflows fell short of the import
requirement), and a saving constraint (to the extent that domestic saving fell short of
investment). Table 5. I, in general, displays the magnitude of both constraints for three
five-year-plan periods and the period corresponding to the crisis (1978-1980). As seen
in the table, the saving gap (indicated as the excess of the investment share above the
share of savings in GDP), and the share of current account deficits (as a simple
indication of the foreign exchange requirement) seem to deteriorate after the 1968-72
period.
In the early 1970's, the foreign exchange constraint appeared to have been
overcome partly because of the primary commodity price boom, and partly because of
short-term capital inflows from Euro-currency markets. In the mid-1960s, large
numbers of Turkish workers had emigrated to seek employment in Europe. The
increasingly growing inflows of their remittances (see Table 5.3) also contributed to the
optimism about the sustainability of the economic policies of the period. This bonanza
in workers' remittances was considered, by the government, almost as "a fact of life",
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Table 5.3. The Bonanza of Workers' Remittance
Remittance/
Remittance Foreign Trade Trade Deficit
Year {$ Mil1.! Deficit {$ Milq {%l
1971 471 -494 95.3 ( 25.7)
1972 740 -678 109.1 ( 14.5)
1973 1183 -769 153.8 (41.0)
1974 1426 -2246 63.5 (-58.7)
1975 1312 -3101 42.3 (-33.4)
1976 983 -2912 33.8 (-20.1)
1977 982 -3753 26.2 (-22.5)
1978 983 -2081 47.2 ( 80.2)
1979 1694 -2554 66.3 ( 40.5)
1980 2071 -4603 45.0 (-32. q
~: spa (1993) Economic and Social Indicators (1950- 1992). The figures
in brackets are the rate of changes from the previous period.
rather than a passing, temporary phenomena. Although the rate of growth of overall
output was quite respectable (on average 6 percent over the period 1972-75 period), the
import- substituting strategy had finally generated an economy highly dependent on
imports and foreign capital inflows. The optimism of the early 1970s disguised the
main weakness of the Turkish economy, namely an excessive dependence on imports
of intermediate and capital goods with no ability to increase the export performance to
finance the import bills. Hence the economy became more vulnerable to external
shocks. In Table 5.1, the ratio of exports to imports is given as a simple measure of
import dependence which fell from 71.1 percent in the 1963-67 period to 40.3 percent
in the 1973-77 period. It is evident from the table that the trade policy associated with
the overall development strategy was considerably biased against exports. The adverse
effect of increasingly growing import demand and falling export performance can also
be seen in the ratio of current account deficit to GNP. The favourable conditions in the
world economy helped the reduction in the current account deficit in the 1968-72 period
(-0.8 percent of GNP). However, increasing import dependence and a drastic rise in
the import bill after the first-oil shock resulted in an increase in the ratio of current
account deficits to GNP, first to -2.5 percent in the period 1973-1977, then to -2.9 in
the 1978-1980 period.
Three factors that have generally been considered as being responsible for the
economic crisis in the pre-1980 period, can be mentioned to describe the dynamics of
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Table 5.4. Supply and Uses of Resources
(percentage change from previous period)
%
Fixed CaEital Investment ConsumEtion
Years Total Public Private Total Publi(; Private
1971
-5.1 -8.7 -0.9 12.5 6.5 13.6
1972 14.8 13.9 15.7 6.6 7.3 6.4
1973 11.3 8.4 14.4 2.1 8.5 1.1
1974 2.1 0.7 3.5 7.2 4.7 7.7
1975 16.8 29.4 4.7 8.1 11.4 7.5
1976 15.6 17.3 13.5 9.1 16.1 7.8
1977 7.4 13.4 0.0 4.7 15.8 2.5
1978
-10.9 -13.8 -6.8 1.3 -:U 2.4
1979
-5.5 7.3 -19.3 0.8 3.0 0.4
Sources: OECD Economic Surveys: Turkey, various issues.
the Turkish economy in the 1970s: i.) the adverse impact of the world economy largely
because of oil shocks, and the recession in industrial countries; ii.) the inadequate
response of the government of the time to the shocks; and finally iii.) the short-run
nature of liabilities and the irrationality of external borrowing strategy.
Regarding the first factor, Turkey, like other countries, was hit very hard by the
first oil shock. Table 5.2 clearly shows the decline in the Turkish exports partly
because of the recession in industrial countries (falling from 48 percent growth rate in
1973 to 16.3 percent in 1974), and an increase in the volume of imports from the
growth rate of 33.1 percent in 1973 to 81.1 percent in 1974. The balance of foreign
trade shows a steadily rising pattern, and reached $2.2 billion in 1974 from almost $
0.4 billion in 1970. The effect of the oil price shock becomes more evident from the
price index of oil imports that rose by almost 23 points from 13.9 in 1972 to 36.6 in
1973. In addition to this direct effect on foreign trade, the first oil shock also
influenced the current account balance of the economy indirectly through the inflows of
remittances of the workers living in Europe. Even though the inflows of workers'
remittances continued after the shock, the recession in Europe slowed down the growth
rate of remittance inflows. As a consequence, the first oil shock in 1973-1975 took
back what a remittance bonanza in 1972-73 had given (see Table 5.3). Celasun and
Rodrik (1989) calculated the overall effects of the oil shock on the Turkish economy by
extending Balassa's (1984) calculations. They noted that although Turkey also
suffered losses arising from the deterioration of the terms of trade and a reduction in
export earnings, the real effects of the shock would be underestimated unless the
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Table 5.5. Public Sector Deficits
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Public Sector D~ficit
-3.7 -11.0 -13.3 -37.3 -63.1
Central Government -lA -4.3 -404 -24.1 -66.2
SEE -2.3 -6.7 -8.9 -13.2 3.1
Sources: OECD Economic Surveys, and SIS (1993) Statistical Indicators (1923-1992)
adverse effect of a fall in remittances was taken into consideration in the Turkish case.
According to their calculation, the total remittance-adjusted effect appeared to be 9.2
percent reduction in GNP for the 1974-76 period in comparison with 4.9 percent GNP
losses for 24 developing countries in Balassa's sample. Only the indirect effect of oil-
shock on the Turkish economy through decreases in the inflows of workers'
remittances was estimated at 1.7 percent GNP losses in the same period.
Despite changes in conditions of the world economy, Turkey continued an
ambitious development programme by setting the target of the growth rate around 6
percent in the third five-year plan. However, the government should have chosen an
expenditure reducing strategy by limiting its aggregate demand to correct the balance of
payment deficits fuelled by the oil shock. Table 5.4 displays the response of the
government of the time to the shocks by increasing public investment and consumption.
The most striking performance of this expansionary policy was observed in 1975 with
29.4 percent increase in public investment (following 0.7 percent increase in 1974),
and 11.4 percent increase in public consumption (after nearly 5 percent increase in
1974). This pattern of the public sector demand continued until 1978. Consequently,
public sector deficits, and in turn, public sector borrowing requirements, accelerated
largely because domestic resources could not be mobilised to achieve such high rates of
investment. Table 5.5 documents the steady state increase in public deficits rising from
TL 3.7 billion in 1975 to TL 63.1 billion in 1979. Although the budget deficits of the
central government were the major factor, the losses of the State Economic Enterprises
(SEEs) also placed a heavy, and increasing burden on public sector deficits (increasing
from nearly TL 2 billion losses in 1975 to TL 13 billion losses in 1978).
Table 5.6 presents the adverse influence of these expansionary policies on the
external balance in general. This table gives a simple idea about how current account
deficits over the 1975-1979 period were financed. In the last column of the table, the
cumulative figures of each corresponding account are given. The table shows that the
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Table 5.6. Financing Current Account Deficit (1975-78)
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 Cumulative
Current Account Deficit -1648 -2029 -3140 -1265 -1413 -9495
Nondebt Financing 597 89 359 -188 131 988 (10.4)
Direct Investment 114 10 27 34 75 260 (2.7)
Changes in Reserves 433 49 349 -187 102 746 (7.9)
Long-term Debt 154 525 874 1091 4m2 6676 ~70.3l
Sources: SIS (1994) Statistical Indicators (1923-1992); Long-term debt stock flows arc from World
Tahle (J 990).
cumulative current account deficit over the last half of the 1970s amounted to almost
$9.5 billion. Approximately 10 percent of this cumulative deficit was financed through
non-debt means of financing such as foreign direct investment (which accounted only
for a negligible amount, 2.7 percent of deficit), and changes in reserves (7.9 percent of
deficit). However, a more striking feature of the period was the high horrowing
pattern. Almost 70 percent of the cumulative current account deficits was financed
through long-term borrowing. It was the major factor behind the high growth rate in
this period, so that total outstanding external debt stock reached $15.9 billion in 1979
from $4.8 billion in 1975 (with 231.3 percent growth rate). As 24.2 percent of total
outstanding debt had the short-term maturity, this also rose to 48 percent in 1978. The
reason for this dramatic increase in the outstanding debt stock (particularly in its short-
term component) can best be explained by the borrowing strategy. To attract capital
inflows, the government of the time invented a borrowing strategy which was named
the Convertible Turkish Lira Deposit (CTLD) scheme. By this scheme, non-residents
were allowed to open accounts with Turkish commercial banks, of which principal and
interest payment were guaranteed by the government against all foreign exchange risks
arising from devaluation of the Turkish lira. Besides, the interest rate on these deposits
was set above the Euromarket rate for the corresponding currency I. Despite the fact
that most of such funds were short-term, they were largely used to finance investment
projects with long gestation periods. As a result, Turkey plunged into a full scale debt
crisis in March 1979. Celasun and Rodrik (1989) noted that Turkey alone was
responsible for 69 percent of the total volume of debt negotiated by developing
countries in the 1978-80 period.
Table 5.7 shows that the majority of this debt stock was public sector liabilities.
The figures in brackets display the growth rate of debt stock. In particular, the
I see Celasun and Rodrik (1989) for the nature and the dynamics of the CTLD scheme in practice.
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Table 5.7. Medium and Long-term Outstanding External Debt of Turkey
$Million)
1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
By Borrowers 2901 3256 4214 4819 6749 9883
(9.3) (12.2) (29.4) (14.4 ) (4{l.O) (46.4)
Consolidated Budget 2456 2786 3239 3448 5184 5511
(6.4) (13.4) ( 16.3) (6.5) (50.3) (6.3)
Other Public Sector 209 191 585 736 806 3630
(32.3) (-8.6) (206.3) (25.8) (9.5) (350.4 )
Central Bank 5 5 5 5 6 2845
(0) (0) (0) (0) (20.0) (472.2)
SEEs 203 186 580 731 799 784
(32.7) (-8.4 ) (211.8) (26.0) (9.3 ) (-1.9)
Local Administration
Private Sector 237 279 390 635 759 742
(27.0) (17.7) (39.8) (62.8) ( 19.5) (-2.2~
Source: SIS (1994) Statistical Indicators (1923-1992), and author's calculation; the figures in brackets
are percentage change from previous period.
borrowing requirement to finance the consolidated budget deficit through external
sources increased almost 50 percent from 1977 to 1978. The unsustainability of
economic policies can also be observed from the extremely large increase in the
outstanding debt stock of the Central Bank in 1979. In the same year SEEs reduced
their external debt stock by 1.9 percent, despite a 211.8 percent rise in 1976.
Along with expansionary fiscal policies and the irrationality of borrowing
strategy, the trade regime can also be considered as another reason for current account
deficits, and in turn for an accumulation of foreign debt. It is apparent in the trade
figures presented in Table 5.8 that trade deficits continued to grow in the late 1970s,
not only because of increases in dependence on imports and a rise in the import price of
oil, but also because of the poor performance of exports that was intensified by biases
in the trade regime against exports, and of overvalued exchange rates. As seen in Table
5.8, nominal exchange rate devaluations starting from 1976 were not enough to offset
the adverse effect of ongoing high inflation. Real appreciation also discouraged
workers' remittances after 1974 (see Table 5.3), and intensified the balance of payment
problems.
Overall, general characteristics of the 1970-79 period, which were of great
relevance for the 1980 stabilisation and structural adjustment programme, can be
summarised briefly as follows: i.) the rate of economic growth was very high. This
was carried out by a rapid expansion of public demand largely because of a investment
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Table 5.8. Trade Performance of Turkey (1974-79)
1974 1975 1976 1977 11)78 1979
(percentage change)
Export/GNpa 3.9 2.9 3.5 2.g 3.4 2.6
Imports/GNpa 9.7 10.0 9.6 1).5 6.9 6.2
(index 1987=1(0)
Price of Exportsl' 64.2 63.5 69.6 72.0 78.3 1)4.6
Price of Importsl' 60.9 63.8 62.6 67.2 (1).9 X7.2
Terms of Tradel' 105.4 99.6 111.2 107.1 112.0 IOX.5
(index J 986·87= 100)
Price of Oil Imports" 36.6 45.2 47.8 54.2 54.1 72.3
Nominal Exchange Rate" 13.9 14.6 16.2 IX.1 24.6 35.2
Inflation (%)3 29.9 10.1 15.6 24.1 52.6 63.1)
Sources: a.) SIS (1994) Statistical Indicators (1923-1992); b.) World Table (1993); c.)
Quarterly Report of the Central Bank (various issues). Inflation figures shows the rate of a
change in wholesale price index.
boom; ii.) the period of this expansionary policy, however, corresponded to the
recession in the world economy. The high growth rate could not be financed through
mobilising the corresponding amount of domestic resources, but was rather financed
through foreign savings; iii.) The restrictive trade regime accounted for the poor
performance of exports and ongoing trade deficits. High inflation rates and the real
appreciation of the Turkish lira can be considered as other reasons for the poor
performance of exports and trade deficits.
By the end of 1979, Turkey was under a severe foreign exchange strain (so that
the country was unable to import even essential items such as oil). The inflation rate
had accelerated and reached nearly 64 percent (see Table 5.8). During the period of
economic crisis (1977-79), the economic growth rate declined by 1.3 percent. These
worsening economic conditions were accompanied by political instability. Finally in
January 1980, the government embarked on a stabilisation and structural adjustment
programme, which was the largest operation undertaken by a co-operation of the IMF,
the World Bank, and the OECD. The initial objectives of the programme included
restrictive monetary and fiscal policies, restrictions on Central Bank funding of public
sector deficits, new tax measures, increases in interest rates, and continuous exchange
rate devaluation etc. [Kopis (1987)]. However, increasing political violence paved the
way to the third military take-over on the 12th of September 1980.
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2.2. Adjustment and Recovery:
The economic policy package put into practice in 1980 was not only a stabilisation and
adjustment package (like the ones Turkey unsuccessfully implemented in 1958 and
1970), but also intended a shift in the pattern of industrialisation strategy by putting
emphasis on exports expansion and domestic and international market price incentives
(rather than direct public intervention). This reform package has importance in Turkish
economic history because of the full commitment of the government to changing the
development pattern from the import-oriented development strategy to an export-
oriented one. Between 1980 and 1984, the World Bank granted Turkey five one-year
structural adjustment loans (SALs), amounting $1.6 billion. They were all used in
supporting policy reforms proposed by the adjustment programme [see Kirkpatrick and
Onis (1991)]. Among short-term objectives (including reduction in the rate of inflation,
immediate improvement in the balance of payment, and fiscal retrenchment), far-
reaching long-term aims of the reform package included:
(i) Trade Reform in the form of eliminating quantitative controls on imports such as the
quota and licensing system: The trade reform was the most important element of the
reform package. The government implemented a rather gradual import liberalisation
because of the worry that a rapid import liberalisation would deteriorate the balance of
payments. The trade reform between 1980 and 1983 included the reduction of stamp
duty from 25 to 1 percent; gradual shifting of goods from most restrictive Liberalised
Lists II to Liberalised Lists I [see Baysan and Blitzer (1991), Olgun and Togan ( 1990)];
simplification of import procedures; the removal of the explicit import quota lists. The
export promotion strategy was implemented by introducing a number of export
incentives. The improvement in the balance of payments was also of great importance
to the government to gain international creditworthiness and to compensate for the
depressed domestic demand.
(ij) Liberalisation of the Exchange Rate Regime: According to the very restrictive
previous exchange rate regime, a Turkish citizen could be penalised for having a single
US dollar in his pocket. But with the new regime, even opening a foreign exchange
saving account at any domestic bank was made possible. One of the essential elements
of the reform, which played a highly significant role in the Turkish recovery, was to let
exchange rates be determined by market forces. Nominal exchange rates were
gradually freed, starting with continuous mini-devaluations, and later moving to daily
determination in the market after May 1981 [see Asikoglu (1992), and Asikoglu and
Uctum (1992)].
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Table 5.9. Trade Performance, 1980-1986
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
(Million of us Dollar)
Exports 2910 4703 5746 5728 7134 7658 7457
(28.7) (61.6) (22.2) (-0.3) (24.5) (I 1.6) (-6.3 )
Imports 7909 8933 8843 9235 10757 11343 11105
(56.0) (12.9) (-1.0) (4.4) (16.5) (5.4) (-2.1)
(Index Numbers, 1984-86= J(X)
Export Price 122.1 120.3 106.4 100.1 100.4 98.8 96.3
Import Price 114.5 128.2 126.3 109.9 106.9 103.6 XlU)
Price of Oil Imports 131.7 155.5 141.1 125.4 120.5 IIX.5 61
Price of Intermediates 119.9 125.3 125.9 97.8 97.7 94.4 105 .3
(percentage shan' in total)
Export BXMajor Sectors
Agricultural 57.5 47.2 37.3 32.8 24.5 21.6 25.3
(24.4) (32.7) (-3.5) (-12.2) (-7.0) (-1.7) (9.7)
Mining 6.6 4.1 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.1 3.3
(44.4) (1.3) (-9.3) (7.6) (26.9) (1.8 ) (1.3 )
Total Industry 36.0 48.7 59.7 63.9 72.1 75.3 71.4
(33.4) (118.7) (49.7) (6.7) (40.6) ( 16.5) (-11.2)
Food Industry 6.5 7.8 8.7 9.9 9.1 6.6 7.2
(40.7) (93.3) (35.6) ( 14.5) (13.X) (-18.3) (1.4 )
Textile Industry 14.6 17.1 18.4 22.7 26.3 22.5 24.X
(12.5) (89.2) (31.6) (22.9) (44.4 ) (-4.6 ) (3.4)
(percentage of total exports}
Average Export Incentives 22.1 20.7 21.5 23.4 15.1 18.6 16.0
(%)
(percentage share in total)
Imports BXMajQr Se!(torll
Agriculture 0.6 1.4 2.0 1.5 3.9 3.3 4.1
(39.1 ) (145.6) (40.8) (-21.6) (2m.O) (- ro.o (21.5)
Mining 39.1 38.9 42.3 37.3 33.9 :n.o 19.3
(190.0) ( 12.3) (7.5) r-s.o: (5.9) (-o.s: (-40.8)
Manufacturing Industry 60.2 59.7 55.7 61.2 62.2 64.7 76.6
(20.1) (11.9) (-7.6) ( 14.8) (18.4 ) (9.7) ( 15.8)
Imports B;i Commodities
Investment 20.0 24.7 26.3 25.1 24.7 22.9 31.3
(-1.0) (39.6) (5.3) (0.3) (14.X) (-2.1 ) (33.5)
Consumption 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.6 4.4 s.o 8.6
(10.5) (-4.8) (5.0) (23.8) (69.3) (X1.8) (7.5)
Raw Material 40.5
(203.8)
(Percentage of GNP)
Exports/GNP 4.2 6.6 8.8 9.3 II.X 11.7 9.8
Imports/GNP- 11.6 12.5 13.8 15.3 18.2 17.0 14.8
Exchange Rate 90.1 133.6 186.8 282.8 444.7 576.9 757.8
Sources: SIS (1994) Statistical Indicators, The Quarterly Bulletin of The Central Bank (1993), Baysan
and Blitzer (1990); growth rates in brackets.
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(iii) Financial-Sector Deregulation and Reform: To boost domestic savings and then
mobilise domestic resources between sectors, first interest rates were liberalised. The
cost of previously repressed financial markets (in the form of holding the interest rate
below its equilibrium level) for the 1950-77 period was estimated by Fry (1979), in
which he finds that a one percent point fall in the real deposit rate reduces the saving
rate by 0.27 of a percentage point and raises the incremental capital loutput ratio by
0.25. Following the financial crisis in 1982, caused partly by the oligopolistic market
structure of the Turkish banking system [see Atiyas (1990) for details], new regulation
and institutions (such as the Capital Market Board in 1982, a new banking law in 1985,
the Istanbul Stock Exchange in 1986, an interbank money market in 1986), and
external financialliberalisation in 1984 followed by the full convertibility of the TL in
1990 were introduced to promote financial market development [Atiyas and Ersel
(1995), Arslan and Celasun (1995), Akyuz (1990)].
(iv) Fiscal Reform: The aims of the fiscal reform were reforming the tax system,
improvement in the operation of the state economic enterprises (SEEs), fiscal
decentralisation away from the central government to a greater fiscal autonomy for the
local authorities. The introduction of the value-added tax was the first development on
the fiscal front. To provide resource mobilisation, and to reduce public sector deficits
(in tum, public sector borrowing requirements), the prices of commodities produced by
SEEs were allowed to increase according to prevailing market conditions. The priority
in public investment was shifted towards investment in infrastructure rather than
investment in non-infrastructure [see Celasun (1990)]. In order to make the economy
more responsive to market conditions, privatisation was also proposed under this
reform package, but still remains the subject of intensive political debate in Turkey.
In the first years of the structural adjustment programme covering the 1980-86
period, the macroeconomic priority was given to the immediate improvement of the
balance of payments problem through a rapid increase in exports. A number of
incentive schemes were used to promote exports, including export tax rebates, credit
subsidies, and foreign exchange allocation that allowed for the duty-free import of
intermediates and raw materials. The total value of these direct incentives reached on
average 23.4 percent of total exports in 1983 (see Table 5.9). Changes in
macroeconomic policies and help from international institutions in the form of debt
relief and additional lending also influenced the export performance. As displayed in
Table 5.9, exports for the 1980-86 period grew very rapidly, at an annual 24 percent,
and then declined 6.3 percent in 1986. Although there is, more or less, a general
agreement on internal and international deriving forces of this export boom, the effect
of the incentive schemes on this outstanding achievement in exports has been
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Table 5.10 Macroeconomic Performance of the Turkish Economy, 1980-86.
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
a.) Real Growth Rate -2.8 4.8 3.1 4.2 7.1 4.3 6.8
Agriculture 1.3 -1.8 3.3 -0.8 0.6 -0.3 3.6
Industry -3.6 9.9 5.1 6.7 10.5 6.5 13.1
Services -4.1 5.8 2.3 5.3 8.2 5.0 5.2
b.) Supply and Uses of
Resources (%)
Investment/GNP 16.0 18.3 17.1 16.5 16.5 18.9 21.9
Savings/GNP 19.6 18.7 18.0 18.9 17.9 20.0 23.1
c.) Inflation Rate
Wholesale (1963=100) 107.2 36.8 25.2 30.6 52.0 40.0 26.7
Consumer Prices 115.6 33.9 21.9 31.4 48.4 45.0 34.6
d.) Monetary Parameters
MI/GNP 14.3 12.8 13.3 15.0 11.2 9.8 10.6
M2/GNP 17.8 22.2 25.3 25.0 25.0 24.3 24.1
Domestic Credit/GNP 31.3 30.9 34.4 36.4 40.4 41.0 43.7
(Millionof us Dollar)
Current Account Balance -3408 -1936 -952 -1923 -1439 -1013 -1465
Foreign trade Balance -4603 -3864 -2628 -2990 -2942 -2975 -3081
Interest Payments -1138 1443 -1565 -1511 -1586 -1753 -2134
Remittances 2071 2490 2140 1513 1807 1714 1634
(inpercent)
CAB/GNP)
-4.98 -2.71 -1.48 -3.18 -2.43 -1.51 -1.95
Debt/GNP 19.34 20.21 25.06 31.80 34.96 38.09 42.70
DebtlExports 454.59 307.21 280.07 335.87 289.60 320.13 430.50
Debt Services/GNP 0.29 0.63 0.94 6.03 5.91 5.92 5.73
~: SIS (1993) Statistical indicators (1923-1992).
controversial. For example, according to one sceptical view, Celasun and Rodrik
(1989) estimated that a maximum 30 percent of exports in this period might be a result
of real depreciation. They also found little evidence supporting the effectiveness of
export incentives. To them the most significant explanation of the Turkish export boom
was Turkey's closeness to the Middle Eastern market, and the war between Iran and
Iraq. They found little evidence for the effectiveness of export incentives. However,
accepting the fact that external conditions also contributed the export boom, Arslan and
van Wijnbergen (1993) calculated 20 percent annual growth rate in exports over the
1980-1987 period on the data corrected for overinvoicing, and they also noted that
exports to oil-exporting countries grew by 17.5 percent per year. Therefore according
to them the positive effect of export incentives was undeniable in Turkey's case.
In addition to the overall impressive performance of exports, its composition
also changed (see Table 5.9). The share of industrial goods exports rose from 36
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percent of total exports in 1980 to 75.3 percent in 1985 (at an annual average rate of
44.3 percent), while the share of agriculture declined from 57.5 percent to 21.6 percent
in 1985 (by the average growth rate of 5.5%). Within the industrial sector, textile
exports grew more rapidly than those of the food industry, 33 percent for the former,
29 percent for the latter from 1980 to 1986. Over the same period, the economy-wide
export-GNP ratio also rose from 4.2 percent in 1980 to almost 12 percent in 1985.
Following the relaxation of the foreign exchange constraint in 1980, a
substantial jump in imports (at a annual growth rate of 56 percent from 1979 to 1980)
was observed. Due to the reduction in the cost of oil imports from $3.3 billion in 1985
to $1.8 billion in 1986 (corresponding to a nearly 45 percent reduction), total imports
slowed down almost 2 percent in 1986. The most striking feature of the imports
figures is the observation of a rapid increase in imports of consumption goods from 2.1
percent share in total imports to 8.6 percent in 1986 (at an annual rate of almost 28
percent).
As seen in Table 5.10, the overall growth performance of the economy was
quite remarkable over the reform period between 1981 and 1986. Following a
contraction of growth rate by 2.8 percent in 1980, the economy grew at an annual rate
of nearly 5 percent over the period 1981-1986. One striking observation from the
sectoral breakdown was the low growth rate of agricultural output ( declines in 1981,
1983, and 1985), which was around 0.8 percent on average for the entire period. The
industrial and service sector output levels grew by 8.5 percent and 5.3 percent on
average for the same period respectively.
Macroeconomic policy in this period also aimed to reduce the rate of inflation.
In response to tight fiscal and monetary policies, inflation rates (measured as changes in
the wholesale price index) declined from 107 percent in 1980 to 25.2 percent in 1982,
and then accelerated to 52 percent in 1984. In addition to reducing the public sector
borrowing requirement (by rising taxes, reducing public expenditures and increasing
state economic enterprises' prices), a decline in wage costs associated with military rule
and liberalisation of interest rates provided a success in reducing inflation rates in the
early years. Regarding the interest liberalisation, the implementation of positive real
interest rates significantly increased domestic savings, and lowered the velocity of
circulation of money. Rodrik ( 1991b), for example, tested the significance of some
variables associated with the public-finance view of inflation. He regressed inflation on
public deficits, the real growth of GNP, income elasticity of demand for base money,
and the share of base money in GNP. He found supportive evidence for the view that
fiscal deficits financed at the margin by money creation have inflationary implications in
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Table 5.11 Economic Performance of the Post-1986 Period
1981- 1987-
1986 1990 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
alGrowth Rates (%)
GNP 5.1 5.2 9.8 1.5 1.6 9.4 0.4 6.4
Exports (Value) 18.1 15.6 36.7 14.4 -0.3 11.5 4.9 IU
Imports (Value) 6.0 20.1 27.5 1.3 10.2 41.2 -5.6 IU
ExportslImports (%) 63.9 71.3 72.0 81.4 73.6 5lU 64.6 64.3
PSBR/GNP (%) 5.2 7.9 7.8 6.2 7.1 10.5 14.4 12.6
CAB/GNP(%) -2.21 -0.01 -0.94 +1.76 +0.89 -1.74 +0.18 -0.60
b) Prices
Intlation I 34.2 53.7 39.3 60.8 65.0 49.6 52.6 67.1
Wages (1988=100)2 100 130 152 229
Real Exchange
Rate (1985=1) 3 0.93 0.92 1.00 1.07 0.86 0.73 0.79 0.81
Source: SIS (1993) Statistical Indicators (1923-1992), and spa (1993) Economic and Social Indicators
(1950-1992), Arslan and Celasun (1995).
I) They have been calculated as a ratio of change in wholesale price indexes (%) of Istanbul Chamber of
Commerce.
2) Gross wages are before taxes, including social benefits.
3) Real exchange rates have been calculated by e(Pusa/Ptr), where (e) is nominal exchange rates, Pusa
and Ptr are the consumer price indexes of the USA and Turkey respectively. Consumer price index for
the USA is taken from IMF Financial Statistics (various issue).
PSBR: Public Sector Borrowing Requirement
CAB: Current Account Balance
Turkey. Therefore, tight fiscal policies in the early 1980s might have led to a decline in
inflation. However, as seen in the panel (c) of Table 5.10, the acceleration of inflation
rates in 1984 coincides with the general elections year when fiscal discipline was
loosened.
Table 5.10 also shows important evidence on Turkey's response to the debt
crises in the early 1980s. Unlike other highly indebted developing countries of Latin
America, Turkey was not forced to generate trade surpluses to service or repay its
external debt. Turkey was therefore able to continue to have current account deficits.
Besides, it received generous capital inflows to support the reform programme from
international institutions. However, external debt continued to grow.
2.3. Returning to Macroeconomic Instability 0987- )
Despite being a success story in economic liberalisation [see Saracoglu (1991 )], the
Turkish experience with structural reforms has not recorded any substantial progress on
the fiscal side of the economy, and in fact, failed to yield credible results in attaining
fiscal balance. The post-1987 period witnessed a change in the way of financing public
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Table 5.12. Some Indicators on Deterioration in Public Sector Balance (% of GNP)
1981- 1987-
1986 1990 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
~
Revenue 17.7 17.8 17.2 16.9 17.R 19.2 21.3 22.1 +4.9
Taxes 15.3 15.1 15.5 14.1 15.0 15.8 17.4 18.2 +2.7
Non-Taxes 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.5 0.9 1.1 -0.3
Ex~nditures 20.7 22.1 21.7 20.9 22.3 23.4 28.7 29.4 +7.7
Personnel 5.2 6.7 5.1 5.0 7.4 9.2 10.9 11.8 +6.7
Other Current 3.3 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.5 2.6 0.0
Investment 4.0 3.3 3.9 3.1 3.0 3.1 3.8 3.8 -0.1
Transfers 8.3 9.7 10.0 10.4 9.6 8.7 11.6 I 1.1 + 1.1
Net Defidl<;
-2.9 -4.4 -4.4 -4.0 -4.9 -4.3 -7.4 -7.3 +2.9
Financing
Deht Pl!~m~nts 1.8 3.8 4.0 3.7 4.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 +0.5
Foreign 1.2 2.1 2.0 2.3 2.2 1.9 2.0 1.9 -0.1
Domestic 0.7 1.7 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.6 2.0 2.6 +0.6
Borrowing 4.3 7.5 7.2 7.5 8.2 7.1 10.1 10.8 +3.6
Foreign 1.2 2.1 1.6 2.6 2.1 1.9 2.4 2.6 +1.0
Domestic 3.0 5.5 5.7 4.9 6.1 5.1 7.7 8.2 +2.5
Central Bank 0.7 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.3 0.1 2.4 2.3 +1.7
Sources: SPO (1993) Economic and Social Indicators (1950-1992).
deficits. The adjustment programme in the early 1980s was successful in financing
fiscal deficits through price increases of the state economic enterprises, real wage cuts,
and restrictions on public expenditures. In the post-1983 period however, bond-
financing became a complementary tool of fiscal policy, and its weight gradually
increased after 1987.
The 1987-1990 period and afterwards can be considered to be marked by
unsustainable public sector behaviour, as well as by further external financial
liberalisation and convertibility of the Turkish Lira. Table 5.11 assembles some
economic indicators to highlight these and other characteristics of the period.
Compared with the 1981-1986 period, the average growth rate of GNP in the period
between 1987 and 1990 remained at the same rate (5.2 percent on average) but showed
a great fluctuation. As seen in the earlier section, the external components of the
Turkish structural adjustment had generated a credible improvement in terms of
increasing trade performance of the economy, and easing foreign exchange constraints
on import financing. But in the 1987-1990 period, the real appreciation of the TL
against US$ (see Panel (b) of Table 5.11) led the average growth rate of exports (in
value) to fall while creating an import boom in the same period. In contrast to the
important role played by price stability in the adjustment in the earlier period, inflation
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Table 5.13. Measures of Currency Substitution in Turkey, 1986-1996.
1984 1986 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992
C!.!rrenc~ Substit!.!tiQn
FXD/(M2+FXD) I 18.3 25.7 22.9 21.3 30.7 35.S
FXD/GNp2 1.2 3.2 5.6 4.7 4.7 7.2
Reserve/GNp2 9.4 7.7 7.6 7.0 5.8 5.7
Sources: 1) Author's calculation from the Quarterly Bulletin of Central Bank of Turkey.
2) SPO (1993) Main Economic Indicators (A Comparison of the Old and New Income Series)
in Turkish.
FXD: Foreign Exchange Deposits
in 1987-1990 averaged around 54 percent per year, and continued to destabilise the
economy.
The table also draws attention to the growing public sector borrowing
requirements, PSBR, in the 1987-1990 period. As a measure, the ratio of PSBR to
GNP rose to 7.9 percent in the 1987-1990 period from average 5.2 percent in the 1981-
1986 period, and continued to worsen in the early 1990s. In particular, the public
sector saving gap, measured by this ratio, became 14.4 percent of GNP in 1992 (an
almost 100 percent increase compared with 1987). Most interestingly, the rise in the
PSBR coincides with drastic jumps in the index of wages (first to 130 in 1989, then to
152 in 1990, and finally to 229 in 1991).
The Turkish net public deficits widened by almost 3 percent of GNP between
1987 and 1992, increasing from -4.4 percent of GNP in 1987 to -7.3 percent in 1992
(see Table 5.12). Growing public deficits possess great importance due to their
impacts on private investment through two main channels in Turkey, and pose a threat
to the sustainability of Turkish economic development. One channel is the one by
which financing increasingly large fiscal deficits diminishes available financial funds
for investment directly. The second channel is rather indirect, and related closely to the
way of financing these deficits. Particularly in the Turkish case, financing fiscal
deficits started relying increasingly on domestic (as well as foreign) borrowing. Such
an option, however, pushed real interest rates upwards, and increased the costs of
borrowing and of capital.
Table 5.12 presents some indicators of public revenue and expenditure items
(measured as percentage of GNP) from 1987 to 1992 to bring out the source of these
fiscal deficits in the post-1986 period. From the table, personnel expenditures emerge
as a single source of these deficits. The table reports that between 1987 and 1992,
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Table 5.14 Selected Items from Balance of Payments ($ Millions)
1986-1989 1990 19991 1992
Trade Balance
-3077 -9555 -7340 -8191
Current Account Balance 72 -2625 258 -943
Direct Investment 312 700 783 779
Portfolio Investment 798 547 648 2411
(Credit Received from Capital Mark.) 816 592 592 2806
Other Long-Term Capital 350 -210 -808 -938
Short-Term Capital
-501 3000 -3020 1396
Assets
-578.9 -409 -2563 -2438
Liabilities 78 3409 -457 3834
Deposit Banks 445 2048 -140 2093
Foreign Exchange Deposit 257 1034 -803 -311
Foreign Exchange Credit 189 1014 663 2404
Changes in Official Reserves I
-1353 -1308 1029 -1484
Source: Quarterly Bulletin of Central Bank, 1993 IV (Ankara, Turkey)
I) (-)indicates an increase in reserve, vice versa.
central government's personnel expenditures have been adversely affected by a sharp
reversal of wage trends after 1988.
The downward flexibility of real wages was exploited by the government of the
time to implement a successful external adjustment programme in the early 1980s.
During the period between 1980 and 1983, some measures were introduced by the
Turkish military in power, such as forming a centrally controlled High Board of
Arbitration, and banning trade unions. According to Borotav (1990), low real wages in
the urban sector in the early years of the 1980s were maintained at about 30-40 percent
below the level of the pre-adjustment period, and created attractiveness for international
capital. This adverse development in real wages was subsequently supported by
currency devaluation in favour of export-oriented sectors. Following general
parliamentary elections in November 1983, the government of the time continued to
repress real wages in order to compensate the losses of export-oriented sectors arising
from a reduction in direct export subsidies and import protection. However, with the
gradual return to democracy and emerging severe political competition, real wages
started recovering after the 1987 general elections. Given the fact that the public sector
employs about 40 percent of formal wage earners [Arslan and Celasun (1995)], the
reversal of real wage trends resulted in large fiscal deficits after 1987. Arslan and
Celasun (1995) noted that the private sector companies in the post-1986 period
absorbed wage shocks better than the public sector by sacrificing some of their profits.
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The Turkish liberalisation proceeded in a gradual pattern [see Uygur (1993) and
Celasun (1994)]. Following the initial steps of trade liberalisation and the liberalisation
of domestic financial markets in the early 1980s, further measures were taken for
external financial liberalisation starting from January 1984. As a part of these
measures, firstly restrictions on residents' dealings with foreign exchange currencies
were gradually lifted, and residents and non-residents were allowed freely to open
foreign currency deposit accounts in Turkey. The full convertibility of the Turkish
Lira then followed in April 1990. These relaxations of controls on capital flows were
used by the government to attract international capital to Turkey to finance public sector
deficits, and generated a rapid increase in foreign currency holding. Using some fairly
simple measures, Table 5.13 reports the rapid expansion of replacement of the Turkish
TL by other currencies (i.e. currency substitution).
Two measures for currency substitution were calculated in the table. The first
one is the ratio of foreign exchange deposits to the sum of M2 and foreign currency
deposits. By this measure, 25 percent of total deposits in the banking sector was
comprised of foreign exchange deposits in 1985. Despite a small fall in 1989, a rapid
expansion of currency substitution (together with high inflation of around 70 percent
per year) reached almost 36 percent in 1992. The second measure was calculated as the
share of foreign exchange deposits in GNP. A drastic rise in foreign currency deposits
become more evident with this measure, reaching 7.2 percent of GNP in 1991 from 1.2
percent in 1984. The last measure in the table indicates the demand for reserve money
that establishes a base for seigniorage revenue of the public sector, and exhibits a
decreasing pattern over the period between 1984 and 1991. This pattern is particularly
important because according to Rodrik's ( 1991b) calculations, 1.5-3 percent of GNP
was generally used to finance public sector deficits through revenue from money
creation (or seigniorage) and inflation taxes in Turkey. Therefore a decline in the
demand for reserve money restricts the possible use of seigniorage as a means of
financing fiscal deficits. This is because widening deficits cause further currency
substitution, and inflation rates become highly sensitive even to a small increase in
deficits.
Another implication of external financial liberalisation was that the possibility of
currency substitution reduced the government's ability to adopt independent monetary
and fiscal policies without considering their impacts on internal and external balances.
Using a VAR methodology with monthly data covering the sample period of January
1986 to January 1992, Selcuk (1994) found an empirical evidence for currency
substitution in Turkey, and showed that there is a positive relationship between the real
depreciation of the TL and currency substitution. His empirical results suggested that
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to stop or reverse currency substitution, the confidence of residents must be re-
established. The results also indicated that an increase in nominal interest rates together
with a real depreciation of the currency may reverse currency substitution in favour of
domestic currency.
Despite the removal of controls on capital movements and weakening
independent control of the government on financial markets, fiscal deficits continued to
grow in 1991 and 1992 (see Table 5.12). Also, a decline in seigniorage revenue led the
government to rely largely on domestic borrowing (with high interest rates) and on
short-term capital inflows from abroad between 1990 and 1992. High interest rates in
the end became a key element of this mode of deficit financing to avoid capital flight,
and encouraged further short-term capital inflows. To see the implications of this
policy, Table 5.14 presents some indicators from external accounts.
As noted earlier, trade deficits after 1989 widened, mainly because of further
reductions of import tariff, real appreciation of domestic currency (partly as a result of
sizeable capital inflows in 1990) and an import boom in 1990. The table also gives
strong evidence on the sensitivity of financial markets to changes in market conditions
with a large fluctuation in short-term capital inflows between 1990 and 1991 (moving
from an average $ 0.5 billion net outflow in the 1986-1989 period to $ 3.0 billion
inflow in 1990, then to $ 3.2 billion outflow again in 1991). Increasing public sector
borrowing requirements were met largely by net capital inflows through high interest
rate policies. In this respect, portfolio investment components of balance of payments
reached $ 2.4 millions in 1992 from almost $ 0.7 in 1991 by rising almost 272 percent.
Fluctuations in short-term capital inflows were determined mainly by the foreign
exchange credit components of deposit banks' liabilities. Interestingly, in connection
with the development in fiscal balances, the table indicates that high interest policies in
the I990s strongly encouraged investors to hold government securities. In the same
period, the real appreciation of domestic currency also helped investors move in this
direction. As seen in Table 5.14, this development was reflected by an increase in the
liabilities components of deposit banks between 1991 and 1992. Having risen to $ I
billion in 1990, the foreign exchange component experienced a decline (decreasing $
0.8 billion in 1991 and $ 0.3 billion in 1992) towards government securities.
However, the reductions in foreign exchange deposits coincided with significant rises
in foreign exchange credits (which reached $ 2.4 billion in 1992). The response of the
banking sector to high interest policy has been considered as a reason behind such a
drastic capital inflows [e.g. see Borotav (1994)]. In connection with real appreciation
in 1990 and 1991 (see Table 5.11), real returns on holding foreign exchange decreased,
and government securities with high nominal interest rates became a more attractive
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Table 5.15. The Shares of Total, Private, and Public Investment in GNP
~% ofGNP~
Year Total Private Public Year Total Private Public
1973 20 12 8 1987 24 II 13
1974 19 11 8 1988 24 13 II
1975 22 II 10 1989 22 12 10
1976 24 13 II 1990 22 13 10
1977 26 13 13 1991 23 12 10
1978 23 12 11 1992 22 12 10
1979 21 11 10 1993 21 12 9
1980 20 9 10
1981 19 8 II
1982 18 8 10
1983 19 8 11
1984 18 8 10 1973-79 22.1 11.9 1(). 1
1985 20 8 12 1980-84 18.8 8.2 10.4
1986 23 10 13 1985-93 22.3 11.4 1n. 9
Source: SPO (1993) Economic and Social Indicators (1950-1992), p. 13.
portfolio investment option. Then investors (mainly commercial banks) shifted their
resources to government bonds by largely borrowing capital short-term from abroad.
3. General Trends in Investment (1973-1993):
Investment in Turkey shows high volatility in response to changes in economic policies
over the period between 1973 and 1993. The distinctive feature of the period before
1980 is the high share of total investment in GNP, indicating the expansionary
response of the Turkish economy to the world economic crisis in 1974. Following the
first oil shock, Turkey maintained high growth rates by utilising foreign capital inflows
(mostly with short-term maturity) from Euro-currency markets and a large volume of
workers' remittances from Europe. The deterioration in economic conditions in 1977-
79 resulted in the introduction of an economy-wide stabilisation and structural
adjustment programme in 1980. The period of 1980-1984 reflects the effect on
investment of the stabilisation policy in the early 1980s. The effect was drastic: the
share of the total investment in GNP declined to 18 per cent in 1982 from a maximum
of 26 percent of 1977; the share of private investment fell from 13 per cent in 1977 to 8
per cent in 1982 while the average share of public investment expenditure remained
almost the same compared to the average of 1973-1979 (see Table 5.15). From 1985
onwards, however, an overall recovery in investment expenditures can be observed.
Although the share of the total investment has not yet reached the 1977 level, the
highest level so far, I believe that the comparison of any figure after 1980 with 1977
may be misleading, since the high performance of the economy in 1977 was not
sustainable and attained at the cost of a severe economic crisis in 1979. On the other
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Table 5.16. Investment Shares for Some Selected Regions and Turkey
1973-1979 1980-1984 1985-1990
Regions
Total Privat. Public Total Private Public Total Private Public
Forty LDCs 20.7 12.1 8.6 20.7 11.6 9.1 18.1 10.6 7.4
Latin America 19.8 12.4 7.S 18.4 I 1.1 7.3 16.6 10.3 6.0
East Asia 23.3 15.7 7.6 26.8 16.5 10.4 21.9 14.9 7.1
South Asia 16.2 8.S 7.7 19.6 9.4 10.1 18.2 9.4 R.R
Sub-Sahara 22.0 10.3 11.7 19.7 9.9 9.8 16.1 7.8 8.1
Africa
TURKEY 22.1 11.9 10.1 18.8 8.2 10.4 22.5 11.4 10.9
Source: The author's calculation from P. Guy, P. Pfeffermam and A. Madarassy ( 1992).
hand, total investment in the period 1985-1993 remained at almost 22 per cent of GOP,
which is the same rate as the average for the period of 1973-79.
Table 5.15 reveals a number of interesting results. First, the share of public
investment expenditures after 1980 remained as high as that in the 1970s. Second, a
great deal of the fluctuation in total investment in the stabilisation period of 1980-1984
appears to have been caused merely by private investment, suggesting that private
investment was the one that suffered more from the worsening economic environment
in the early 1980s. An improvement in private investment, as a share of GNP,
contributed positively to the overall recovery in total investment after 1986.
When viewed in the comparative perspective of the other developing countries,
the Turkish investment performance, in fact, looks quite respectable after 1984. As
Table 5.16 shows, the share of total investment in GOP in the period of 1985-1990 is
the highest one among the respective figures for LDCs and regions. The source of this
high share seems to be the large proportion of private investment -which is the second
highest according to the table- and particularly public investment, which is far above
those of all other regions. During the stabilisation period (1980-1984), the share of
public investment remained the highest along with the average of East Asian countries.
Total investment, though, reflects the severe effect of stabilisation policies, and stayed
at around 19 percent of GOP over the period 1980-1984, the lowest except for Latin
American countries, many of which undertook a contractionary stabilisation and
adjustment programme as a result of the debt crisis in 1982. When compared to Latin
America, where many of the countries chose to adjust by cutting public expenditures
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Table 5.17. Sectoral Distribution of Investment
~% of Total Investment~
1973-1979 1980-1984 1985-1990
Sectors Total Pub. Prvt. Total Pub. Prvt. Total Pub. Prvt.
Agriculture 9.9 9.8 9.9 10.6 9.6 11.9 7.2 8.6 6.1
Mining 3.6 6.9 0.7 5.2 8.8 0.9 3.5 5.3 1.4
Energy 8.6 15.3 0.4 13.3 23.5 0.7 13.1 26.7 1.2
Housing 18.4 2.4 30.8 15.1 2.1 31.0 21.9 2.3 41.5
Manufacturing 32.3 23.1 40.0 25.8 19.4 33.8 17.1 7.3 27.4
Services 28.4 42.4 16.7 29.9 36.6 21.7 37.1 51.9 22.3
Total lOO 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Services+Housing 46.8 44.8 48.9 45.0 38.8 52.7 59.0 54.2 63.9
Source: The author's calculation from SPO (1993) Economic and Social Indicators (1950-1992).
[see van Wijnbergen (1989)], the stabilisation policies hit private investment mostly in
Turkey, while the share of the public investment in GNP continued to expand as a
share of GDP. This was because Turkey pursued a high growth strategy mainly by
relying on public investment. As discussed in Section 2, in particular in the early
1980s, the government constrained public expenditures on consumption to provide
enough room for this public investment expansion.
Perhaps more surprising is the discovery that the recovery in Turkish
investment has been accompanied by a drastic change in the composition of investment.
This comes across clearly in Table 5.17 which presents the investment share (both
private and public) of six sectors (agriculture, mining, energy, manufacturing, housing,
and services) in total investment. The share of the manufacturing sector in total
investment has declined considerably, from 32 percent, the highest in 1973-79, to 17.1
percent in 1985-1990. This undistinguished performance of the manufacturing sector
has gone alongside a dramatic increase in the share of the housing sector, which
exceeded that of manufacturing by almost 5 percent in the 1985-1990 period.I Overall,
the service sector accounted for almost 60 percent of total investment in the period of
1985-1990. This reveals the fact that the investment performance of the service sector
-including housing- is, in fact, responsible for the resurgence in total investment in the
2 This is a quick response of the housing sector to the newly created incentives (low mortgage rate,
easily access to housing credit etc.) The government has established extra budgetary funds to direct
credit to such selected uses as to finance mass housing scheme.
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Table S.lS. The Average Share of Sectoral Outputs
~% of Total OUl!:!ut!
Periods Agriculture Manufacturing Services Mining Energy
1973-1979 18.72 40.82 36.71 2.09 1.65
1980-1984 17.31 41.98 36.91 1.82 1.98
1985-1990 14.30 42.75 38.90 1.89 2.16
Source: The author's calculation from Maraslioglu and Tiktik (1991)
last period. When viewed in the comparative perspective of the sectoral breakdown
into public and private, the drastic decline in the share of public investment in
manufacturing and the rise in services (excluding housing) becomes more evident
compared to the period of 1980-1984. This evidence suggests that investment in
different sectors responded quite differently to changes in economic environment and to
new incentives.
The output levels in these sectors at the same time also presents an interesting
pattern. Because of the lack of data, Table 5.18 reports only the total share of sectoral
output aggregating public and private sectors. Three sectors appear to be important in
Turkey with respect to the shares of their production level in total production; namely
manufacturing, services, and agriculture. Among them, the rate of investment in
agriculture and the share of agricultural output show a declining pattern. The share of
services' output in total, on the other hand, steadily increased investment as well as
output over the period 1973-1993. Despite the decline in the share of investment in
manufacturing, the output share of manufacturing in total output has increased along
with that of services in these periods. Increasing shares of output in manufacturing
over time suggest that increased capital utilisation may take responsibility for some part
of this decline between 1973 and 1990.
Two important results come out from the discussion above. First, it is quite
clear that Turkish public investment has remained at around 10 percent of GDP
throughout the whole period of 1973-90 (11.5 in the second half of the 1980s), and did
not contribute to a reduction in total investment. Fluctuations in total investment are
thus mainly due to private investment. Second, the distribution of investment across
sectors has changed drastically, and the share of the manufacturing sector has declined
while that of housing has increased significantly. Investment in the non-tradeable
sector, namely housing and other components of services, makes up the majority of
aggregate investment. Evidence from Table 5.17 suggests that instead of creating new
productive capacity, capacity utilisation in the manufacturing sector may have increased
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despite the decline in the share of investment. On the other hand, economic incentives
launched in favour of mass housing, such as a special credit scheme, stimulated the
purchase of houses particularly in a high inflationary environment.
4. Some Key Factors Affecting Private Investment
In previous sections, macroeconomic policies and the interaction of these policies with
investment performance have been presented. Macroeconomic policies affect
investment (as well as other component of aggregate demand) through their impacts on
some macroeconomic variables such as the availability of credit for investment purpose,
interest rates, relative prices, savings. In this section, several channels by which
macroeconomic policies influence private investment demand in Turkey, are
considered.
In the earlier theory of investment, such as the neoclassical accelerator model,
real and financial decisions of a firm have been assumed to be independent, and thus,
financial variables have been excluded from many empirical models. The Modigliani
and Miller theorem, according to which firms' financial structures are irrelevant to real
investment decisions as a consequence of a perfectly operating capital market
assumption [Modigliani and Miller (1958)], has been the main justification for these
earlier empirical researches. Following the relatively poor empirical performance of
these studies, recent empirical studies have begun to include financial variables in
investment models (see Chapter 3 and Chapter 8 for theoretical discussion in detail).
Theoretically, imperfections in financial markets arising from asymmetric information
and exogenous distortions (such as externally imposed ceilings on interest rates, high
reserve requirements etc.) violate the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem, and create
a difference between the costs of internally generated and external funds. The empirical
evidence regarding the roles of financial factors in the determination of investment
demand has been investigated by some studies in assuming that a representative firm
was rationed in financial markets and had to rely on its own internally generated funds;
then a profit variable has been used as a reflection of such a constraint [as in Driver and
Moreton (1992), Catinat et al. (1987), Fazzari and Athey (1987)].
Some models, in particular ones for developing countries, have used the credit
availability to the private sector, instead of profit, to define credit constraints in their
model only because of the nature of the capital market in developing countries [as in
Blejer and Khan (1984), Sundurarajan and Thakur (1982)]. Along with the existence
of asymmetric information, agency cost etc., financial repression in LDCs provides a
good justification for the inclusion of credit constraints (instead of profits or retained
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earnings) in investment demand equations. Among others, ceilings on deposit and
lending rates, credit rationing and subsidised credits to priority sectors, excessive
taxation of financial incomes and transactions, high liquidity and reserve requirements
and intermediation costs, and excessive reliance of corporations on credit rather than
equity finance and other direct security issues are common characteristics of financial
repression [see McKinnon (1991), and Fry (1988) also provides an extended survey of
the literature]. The literature on financial repression argues that various direct or
indirect credit restrictions, which reduce the supply of credit available for investment
expenditure, have a direct real effect on investment and thus on production [see Blinder
(1986)]. Therefore, the credit constraint becomes a potential determinant of private
investment expenditures particularly in financially repressed countries.
In this respect, financial liberalisation in Turkey undertaken in the post-1980
period aimed to eliminate various imperfections in financial markets. Financial
liberalisation for this purpose has brought about new financial instruments and facilities
for the use of the Turkish corporate sector as presented in Section 2.2. Increased
efficiency and competition in the banking sector, and institutional innovations aiming to
increase alternative financial possibilities, have been implemented by the liberalisation.
Besides, the Istanbul Stock Exchange was re-opened in 1986, and became one of the
fastest growing stock exchanges in the world. In spite of the increased number of
financial facilities, Ersel and Ozturk (1993) report that bank loans are still a very
important financing tool for the Turkish corporate sector. This is clear evidence of the
vulnerability of the Turkish firms to high interest rate policies.
Regarding the endogenous constraints of the financial system, the Turkish
financialliberalisation has not been so successful in eliminating credit rationing arising
from imperfect information in financial markets [see Atiyas and Ersel (1994)]. Despite
the removal of government control on interest rates, financial markets in Turkey can
still be regarded as imperfect largely because of high government involvement with
financial markets and different credit policies to preferential sectors. Atiyas et al.
(1993) implemented a survey designed to examine the lending behaviour of banks in
Turkey. The survey was conducted in 1991, and consisted of 16 large, medium and
small size banks. The result of the survey suggests that the Turkish banking system
still rations some small companies by non-price measures.
In addition to financial factors, the literature on the Turkish economy
emphasises a number of other factors which may also have played significant roles in
the private sector's performance. These factors have generally been related to the
structural adjustment programme undertaken in the 1980s. Despite its favourable
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effects on private investment through a rise in the availability of financial funds for
investment, financial liberalisation also led to higher interest rates, and caused an
increase in the cost of borrowing. The high interest rate policy, which was largely
caused by high public borrowing as discussed in Section 2, successive exchange rate
deprecations, soaring inflation rates, restricted domestic demand, and the increased rate
of capital utilisation are among these factors. The rise in the cost of the Turkish firms'
financial requirements, in particular, has been considered as the major factor for
Turkish firms in the 1980s [see Ersel and Ozturk (1993), and TUSIAD (1984»).
The effects of the structural adjustment and liberalisation policies on various
sectors have been different. At an industry level study, Nas and Odekon (1993) report
the influence of the high interest rate policy and devaluation both on profitability and on
investment. Some supportive evidence for financial liberalisation shows up in such
industries as foods, non-metallic minerals, and metal products enjoying the increased
financial funds available to the use of these sectors, although the cost of borrowing is
still very high. However, three industries -wood products, chemicals and automotive-
have suffered from high interest rate policies via the high cost of capital. While
providing competitiveness for the Turkish exportable sectors, the exchange rate policy
throughout the 1980s, on the other hand, had a discouraging effect on private
investment through the cost of imported inputs. This effect becomes even more evident
in import-dependent sectors like chemicals. Some exportable sectors, such as mining,
textile, wood products, and basic metals, though, have benefited from exchange rate
deprecations.
As seen in Table 5.17, priority in public spending has been given mainly to the
service sector which includes most of the infrastructure sectors such as transportation,
construction etc., and public investment in manufacturing has been cut drastically. The
economic rationale behind this reallocation of public investment relies on the idea that
an increase in the share of public investment in such social and economic fields as
transportation, construction, education, health etc. raises both total factor productivity
and labour productivity through its externality effects on private sector capital stock at
margin, and crowds in the private sector. The theory also suggests the negative effects
of public investment undertaken by state-owned public enterprises that may reduce the
possibilities of investment by the private sector operating in the same sector as public
firms. The question of which effect is dominant in Turkey would be a matter of
empirical testing. Above all, another mechanism of crowding-out, through which
public sector investment influences private investment, is interest rates. In this respect,
Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992) suggest that high public investment would
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increase the fiscal deficit, which might necessitate an increase in public borrowing and
in turn real interest rates (and in tum the user cost of capita!).
5. Previous Studies on Turkey
Private investment is a highly volatile component of GNP. As summarised in the
earlier sections, the macroeconomic performance of the Turkish economy in different
periods has been affected by economic policies implemented in these periods. Internal
and external factors have played an important role in determining different economic
policies. Moreover, the question of how these changes in economic policies and
environment contribute to the overall growth performance of the economy is related to
the determinants of private investment and the interaction between these determinants
and macroeconomic policies. In this respect, sections above presented the general trend
and the pattern of Turkish private investment over the period 1973- I990. The ultimate
aim of these sections was to give some suggestive evidence on the possible
determinants of the Turkish private investment and their interaction with
macroeconomic policies.
However, more conclusive evidence requires more detailed empirical research.
There have been other studies for Turkey in this line. Amongst these, there has been
very little attempt to apply existing neo-classical models to Turkey. But, as discussed
in Chapter 4 for developing countries in general, there has been no unified approach to
studying the determinants of the Turkish private investment. These studies can mainly
be grouped in three main sections; 1) those without any consistent microeconomic
foundation for their empirical models (i.e. eclectic approach)[e.g. see Uygur (1993),
and Rittenberg (1991 )], 2) those using some elements of neoclassical flexible
accelerator mode without providing any microeconomic foundation [e.g. see Chhibber
and van Wijnbergen (1992)], 3) those using a data-oriented approach such as vector
autoregression models [e.g. see Conway (1990)]. Data availability and different
aspects of the determinants of private investment that can be emphasised by different
models determine the use of different approaches. I must, in this regard, note that
despite the common acceptance of the q-theory approach in empirical research, there
have been no studies using this framework. This is partly because the Istanbul Stock
Exchange has recently become efficiently operative (in particularly after 1986) and
partly because the stock markets as well as the stock market values of firms in
developing countries are subject to speculative attacks and bubbles. Therefore, the use
of q-approach has not been appealing to study the determinants of private investment in
developing countries in general.
Chapter 5 The Turkish Economy from A Historical Perspective 178
The aim of Uygur (1993) is to test to what extent the Turkish experience of
financial liberalisation supports the theoretical expectations of the McKinnon-Shaw
hypothesis, or in other words, to what extent financialliberalisation stimulates savings
and makes larger funds available for fixed investment. For this, he estimated two
regression equations for saving and private investment. His investment model. similar
to the ones occasionally used by Maxwell Fry [e.g. Fry (1980), (1982)], is an eclectic
one, relating the share of non-housing private investment in GNP to an accelerator
variable (which is proxied by a three-year average of the growth rate of real GNP), real
deposit rates as a cost variable, the availability of credit, uncertainty, housing
investment, public investment, and a dummy for 1974 when the war in Cyprus and the
first oil shock hit the Turkish economy. According to this study, all variables are
significant at least at 5 percent. The accelerator variable is the most significant one, and
has the expected positive sign. The effect of real deposit interest rates comes out
significantly negative, indicating that the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis may not be
totally true in Turkey. On the other hand, the effect of credit availability is in
accordance with the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis, and significant. Public investment
exhibits a positive, crowding-in effect. Considering the reallocation of public
expenditures over consumption and investment, high public investment in infrastructure
contributes to growth by stimulating higher private investment. Provided that the
volume of credit is very limited, housing investment has become another competitor,
along with the government, for the existing financial funds, crowding out non-housing
private investment.
Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992) assess the effect of public policy on
private investment. Their study mainly attempts to measure the extent of the "crowding-
out" and "crowding-in" effects of the public sector. Their model is basically the same
as the one in Blejer and Khan (1984) which is discussed in Chapter 4 earlier. The
model was estimated with annual data over the period 1970-1986 (with 17
observations), and included such variables as the effective cost of borrowing" , the
availability of credit, capacity utilisation, and the composition of public investment.
Three determinants of investment come out strongly significant, namely the real
effective cost of borrowing, the stock of credit to the private sector and the expected
level of output (which was proxied by the lagged value of actual output). Apart from
these factors, the non-infrastructure component of public investment had a negative
effect on private investment while the infrastructure one was not significant at all.
3 The real effective cost of borrowing was defined as the real lending rate comprising the impacts of
special charges and taxes on financial intermediation that were easily passed on the borrowers in
Turkey.
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The model of Rittenberg (1991) is a simple regime-switching disequilibrium
model. She implicitly assumes that economic agents have two lending options for their
savings; lending either to official financial institutions or to the unofficial ones. She
follows Roe (1982) in assuming that an increase in the official rate of interest towards
equilibrium raises loanable funds in the official market by encouraging economic agents
to shift their saving from the unofficial market to the official one. There is, thus, a
positive relationship between interest rates and the supply of loanable funds in the
official market as suggested by the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis [see also Roe
(1982)]. She notes that the effect of the rate of interest, as a cost factor of her
investment model, depends entirely upon its actual position with respect to the
equilibrium level. When the rate of interest is liberalised, an increase in an initially
below-equilibrium interest rate might raise the volume of loanable funds, and lead to
higher investment, and thereby higher growth. This is the expected result of the
McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis. But, on the other hand, during some periods of
liberalisation, the negative effect of a "too" high interest rate (i.e. an interest rate above
equilibrium) could have discouraging effects on private investment. From the empirical
results of the study, the real interest rate in Turkey has been sometimes above,
sometimes below the equilibrium level+. The opposite effects of below- and above-
equilibrium rates are particularly obvious in the estimation of non-housing private
investment, including investment expenditures in manufacturing and transportation
sectors. Accordingly, a one percent increase in interest rate, when it is below
equilibrium, results in a 3.4 percent increase in real investment. On the other hand,
when it is above the equilibrium rate, the same increase produces a 0.5 percent
reduction in the real private non-housing investment. She then concludes that
investment in Turkey was highly sensitive to interest rate changes.
Conway (1990) attempts to assess the effects of relative price-based structural
adjustment policies on private investment using Sirn's VAR methodology. When the
economic structure changes, this VAR framework becomes even more valid because a
set of coefficients of a structural model will also alter [this is the well-known Lucas
critique which was put forward first in Lucas (1976)]. Like Rittenberg (1991 ), he also
concentrates on non-housing investment. The overall result of Conway is that, unlike
Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992), the relative price-based structural adjustment
programme has worked to reduce private non-housing investment. He pointed out that
nominal interest rates, which have increased steadily with financial liberalisation since
4 The same approach has been applied to Mexico to test the financial liberalisation hypothesis by
Warman and Thirlwall (1994). The procedure to find the unknown equilibrium interest rate was
described as a trail and error process, by which the sum of square residual of the proposed investment
equation is minimised. Note that the sum of square residual at the equilibrium rate should be zero.
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Table 5.19
Empirical Specifications of Investment Models for Turkey
van Chhibber &
Wijnbergen van
et al. Cunway Conway Rittenberg Wijnhcrgen Uygur
(1992) (1990)3 (1991)3 (1991)b ( 1992) (1993)
Specification Eclectic Eclectic Flcxihlc
Accelerator VARModel Eclectic Eclectic Accelerator Eclectic
Data Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual Annual
1970-86 1962-86 1964-88 I 964-X6 I tJ70-X6 1l)6l)-90
Dependent '1' '1' '1' '''''1' '1' (/;,101' jGNPt)It It It It 't
Variahle
Accelerator Yt-I Yt-I Yt-I Yt-I and s, Yt-I gt-I
Relative - ...... (Pt~1 - PH) ---- ---- ---- ----
Prices
Financial (crdl' - y ) ---- ---- ---- (mil' - \' ) !1CRP!,t . t t . t
variable
Interest Rate (I+ rr;) b (r;' - 1Ct) rrd ref;-:' ,.r;'rH t
( ·",1 .~)It_.1 -It-.1
(.jnlr .~) 'K --- ---- andPublic Sector It-3 - It-3 IH ( '/1",1 .~) (/~jGNP)'t-.1 -'t-.1
Capacity Ut ---- ---- ---- Ut -----Utilisation
Inflation ---- nt_I ---- ---- ---- ----
Exchange ---- eH ret ret ---- ----
Rate
Uncertainty ---- ---- vrr;' and ---- ---- (Flt/GNPt)
vr«,
Notes: i": Public investment; i": Private investment; tnl: puhlic investment in infrastructure; itllnl: Non-
infrastructure public investment; y: output (proxied by GDP); g: growth rate of output; p: output prices
(proxied by the GDP deflator); p": price of capital goods; crd": credit to the private sector; rr': real lending
rate; r": nominal borrowing rate; refr": real effective borrowing rate r": nominal deposit rate; u: index for
capacity utilisation; e : nominal exchange rate; re: real exchange rate; vrer; variance of the real exchange
rate: vrr": variance of the real borrowing rate; FI: foreign direct investment.
a includes sectoral level estimations for four sectors such as agriculture, manufacturing, transportation, and
housing.
b includes sectoral estimations for two sectors such as manufacturing, and transportation.
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1982, led to declines in aggregate investment in the 1980s. Although he argues the
importance of credit rationing in the determination of investment, his model does not
capture this factor.
Conway (1991) is the only study of the effects of relative price uncertainty on
private investment at the aggregate as well as sectoral level (agriculture, housing,
manufacturing, transport). He applies a standard Keynesian model, augmented by
proxies for price instability, to the Turkish annual data. Instability in two relative
prices, the expected variance of real interest rate and the expected variance of real
exchange rate, are taken as measures of uncertainty. He regresses private investment
on the real gross domestic product, expected values of the real exchange rate and real
interest rates, and the variances of the real exchange rate and real interest rates. He sets
up forecasting rules for the real exchange rate and real interest rate for investors, and
then estimates the optimal forecasts as the expected mean of the variable conditional on
information available at the forecast period by using the Kalman filler method, which
also provides the conditional variance of forecast of each price variable. His empirical
results suggest that the measures of relative price uncertainty have negative and
statistically significant coefficients. From the sectoral estimations, Conway also finds
strong negative effects on private investment in all sectors (particularly in
manufacturing).
As explained above, investment studies on Turkey show great variability in
terms of the specification of the investment demand model, and the variables that have
been included (see Table 5.19 for a brief summary). Nevertheless, all of these
empirical models have been estimated by using relatively short samples of annual data
[the longest time period contains 25 observations in Conway (1991 )], with limited
degrees of freedom (see Table 5.19). This thesis has two main advantages in
comparison with previous studies. One is the use of a larger sample size covering both
the period 1963-1991 for the estimations in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, and the period
1963-1993 for Chapter 8. The other one is related to the modelling approaches in
subsequent chapters. No one, so far, has made any attempt to analyse the determinants
of private investment expenditure in line of the neoclassical theory. In what follows,
such an attempt is presented with a consistent microeconomic framework.
The present thesis emphasises the use of theory-based approaches. For this
purpose, three different models are developed and empirically estimated in the
following chapters. The main motivation of doing so is the lack of theory-based
models for developing countries in general, and for Turkey in particular. By a theory-
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based model, it is meant the studies that explain the investment behaviour of a
representative firm using a framework of either cash flows maximisation or cost
minimisation. As presented in Chapter 4, some studies have adapted neoclassical
models to private investment in individual developing countries. These studies have, in
general, borrowed two main elements of the neoclassical theory, namely the ad hoc
partial adjustment mechanism of the actual capital stock (or the actual level of
investment) to its desire level, and a definition of the unobservable optimal capital stock
(or the optimal investment level) in terms of some observable variables. Some
distinctive features of developing countries are incorporated mainly through two
different ways: I.) by defining the optimal level of the capital stock (or investment) in
terms of variables reflecting these features, 2.) by defining a linear relationship between
the adjustment cost coefficient and some exogenous variables.f
By a theory-based modelling in this thesis, I present three different models
which are defined through an optimisation problem of a representative firm. Chapter 6,
in this respect, presents a neoclassical model to provide empirical evidence on the
importance of the neoclassical determinants (the accelerator, and the relative cost of
capital variables) of private investment in Turkey. The relationship between the main
neoclassical determinants is derived from a cost optimisation of the firm which
produces for a demand-constrained output market. Two different investment models
are derived under two technology assumptions about the form of the production
function (namely putty-putty and putty-clay technologies). The effects of the
availability of credit are also included in an eclectic way in the model to investigate the
importance of borrowing constraints in Turkey.
The recent history of applied economics has witnessed a number of
developments, one of which has been the co-integration and the error-correction
approach. Although this approach is mainly data oriented, and tries to find out the best
and the most reliable representation of the data from the statistical point of view only,
the theoretical economic framework for this approach has been largely neglected. Most
recently this approach has started being used in modelling private investment in
developing countries [e.g. see Fielding (1993) and Shafik (1992)], with this defect.
With Chapter 7, I attempt, however, to provide some additional support for the
neoclassical determinants of the Turkish private investment by proposing a theoretical
economic explanation for the error-correction representation of the investment data.
However, the inclusion of the effects of borrowing constraints still remains eclectic.
5 see Chapter 2 for a theoretical discussion. Chapter 4 also presents the use of this idea to formulate
the adjustment coefficient for developing countries in general.
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Unlike the earlier model, the dynamic features of the model arise because of the
expectations about the future. The model is also applicable to test rational expectation
hypothesis with a larger sample size. However, a more general model is reduced to a
simple error-correction model by assuming that the future expectations evolve
according to a random process with drift.
The final model developed in Chapter 8 aims to discover the role of financial
factors (such as imperfections in capital markets and borrowing constraints) in the
determination of real private investment decisions. Unlike previous two models,
Chapter 8 suggests a new modelling approach to testing the effects of financial factors
with an explicit microeconomic foundation. For this purpose, an empirical model with
an explicit theoretical framework is developed and estimated. The empirical investment
equation (called Euler equation) is derived from a dynamic investment model by a
maximisation of the intertemporal discounted cash flow of a representative firm subject
to capital market imperfections, borrowing constraints, and capital adjustment costs.
The Euler equation for the rate of the capital accumulation is derived by re-arranging the
first-order condition for capital, which is influenced by the binding borrowing
constraint through an unobservable shadow price. Unlike previous studies [e.g. see
Whited (1990)], the novelty in my approach is that the model specifies the
unobservable shadow price associated with the borrowing constraint in terms of other
observable variables of the model, using the first-order condition for the state variable,
the outstanding debt stock.
6. The Description of The Data Used in the Empirical Chapters
This section describes the sample size and the nature of the data that were used in the
following empirical chapters, and their sources. The sample period between 1963 and
1993 chosen for the empirical analysis in Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8 was
largely determined by the data availability. The main data source is the State Planning
Organisation (SPO) from which most data on public and private investment, price
indices of public and private capital goods, and the rates of depreciation both at the
aggregate and the sectoral level have been obtained. The sources of aggregate and
sectoral capital stock data are the newly available semi-official series in Maraslioglu and
Tiktik (1991). To the knowledge of the author, there is no such time series on
aggregate and disaggregate capital stock series that has been published officially.
Maraslioglu and Tiktik (1991), which is prepared for the use of the staff at the SPO,
comprises official aggregate and sectoral data (on public and private investment, the
price indices of private and public investment goods, and depreciation rates), and semi-
official capital stock series. The extension of the sample for the period between 1991
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and 1993 of the relevant series have kindly been provided by Maraslioglu and Tiktik of
the SPO.
The data on credit to the private sector in Turkey was compiled from various
IMF Financial Statistics Yearbooks which report it as claims on the private sector.
Nominal deposit rates for twelve months deposits, which are reported as end of period,
on the other hand, are taken from The Quarterly Bulletin of the Central Bank of the
Republic of Turkey (various issues). The econometric estimations in Chapter 8,
however, require data on riskless interest rate that may be proxied by the net yield of
government securities. However, no data on the rate of government securities before
1986 are available. This lack of data led us to use nominal deposit rates instead,
although it is not a good proxy for the riskless interest rate.
The other troublesome variable is wages. Unfortunately, no published data on
wages for the period of analysis could be found. The SPO generates a general index
for wage earners for the purpose of internal research and five-year plans, but this series
goes back only to 1975, and cannot capture the real decreasing trend in real wages in
the early 1980s. Other series by The Social Insurance Institution (SSK) and the Labour
Placement Office are all subject to some severe criticisms . The data on wages is taken
from Ozmucur (1992), covering the period of 1963-1991, in which total non-
agricultural wage and salaries and the total populations of wage and salary earners are
reported. The wage series is constructed simply as a ratio of these two series.
7. Conclusion
The chapter briefly analysed the recent Turkish economic history over the period (1960-
1990) on which the empirical models in the following chapters are based. In the pre-
1980 period, the industrialisation strategy was based on import substitution, and had
reached its limits by 1977 by creating internal and external imbalances. As essential
elements of this strategy, repressed financial markets, stimulated domestic demand, and
high share of public investment in GNP have played an important role in the
determination of private investment. Turkey launched an economy-wide stabilisation
and structural adjustment programme that proposed to change the entire development
6 Employers in Turkey must pay insurance premium for each worker to the SSK, which is determined
by his/her monthly wage. In an inflationary economy like Turkey, the majority of employers do not
pay the insurance premium to the SSK on time and consider this insurance premium as a cheap
financial source. Besides, they usually claim that they would pay minimum wage to employees, even
if they paid more, in order to avoid from paying more insurance premium. Since the wage statistics
published by the SSK are based entirely on those claims, they are always downwards hiased. Because
this kind of avasion is the common practice in Turkey, wage statistics by the SSK may be regarded as
not reliable at all.
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strategy of the country after 1980. Following the 1980 stabilisation policies and the
adjustment programme in the following years, Turkey experienced an economy-wide
structural transformation, and the economy became relatively export oriented.
The incentives system has shifted from import-substitution sectors towards
export-oriented ones. To provide sufficient funds and close the saving gap between
investment and saving, financialliberalisation was implemented. The trade policy was
liberalised, and foreign exchange constraints were relaxed. However, this new
orientation of the economy has brought out new factors affecting private investment.
The declining share of public investment in manufacturing has shifted to infrastructure
investment with the belief that an increase in public infrastructure investment raises the
productivity of the private sector investment at the margin, and crowds in the private
sector. The private sector response to the reform programme has been determined,
negatively, by repressed domestic demand, high interest rates, uncertainty about the
sustainability of the reforms in the future, and positively by low real wages, real
depreciation, subsidies given to export-oriented sectors, and easing availability of
financial funds for the use of private investment.
The composition of investment, as a result, has changed drastically in the post
1980 period. The services sector made up more than half of total investment while the
share of manufacturing was continuously declining. In particular, the investment
response of export-oriented sectors was sluggish, partly indicated by slowdown in the
share of manufacturing exports.
Previous studies on the determinants of the Turkish private investment have
been discussed in Section 5. The main conclusion from these studies is their eclectic
structure and the lack of microeconomic foundations on their empirical models. Also,
the present chapter has put emphasis on the differences of the empirical models in the
following chapters from those in the literature, and concludes that unlike previous
counterparts, these models have consistent theoretical microeconomic foundations. The
data used on which empirical estimations are based are also described in this chapter by
stressing the larger size of the sample in comparison with the earlier studies.
In the following chapters, the roles of different factors in determining private
investment behaviour in Turkey are empirically investigated with a special attention to
financial factors. I also pay attention to deriving theoretically consistent models with
the guidance of the neoclassical theory investment. Despite the eclectic nature of
modelling financial factors in Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, Chapter 8 provides a theoretical
model including a financial factor in the firm's dynamic optimisation problem.
Chapter 6
Accelerator Effects, Borrowing Constraints, The Cost of
Capital, and The Turkish Private Investment
Expenditures
1. Introduction
Determinants of private investment have been extensively studied in industrialised
countries. Empirical researches are in broad agreement on what determines
fluctuations in private investment in these countries. Three main determinants
emerge from these researches: namely expected level of output, internal funds
availability or cash flows, and the cost of capital relative to labour. However, private
investment in developing countries (LDCs) has not drawn so much interest until
recently. Some distinctive structural and institutional differences of these countries
and the availability of relevant data limit the application of an identical model of
investment to LDCs. The most widely accepted practice, though, is that one should
adapt the model (which is originally developed for an industrialised country) to take
account of those different features of developing countries. A similar approach is
adapted in this chapter. However, the model throughout this chapter remains
essentially neo-classical.
According to discussions in the earlier chapters, the theories of investment on
which econometric specifications of investment expenditures are based, can usually
be separated into three distinctive theoretical models: i.) accelerator model in which
investment demand occurs as a result of an adjustment of capital stock to expected
demand [Chenery (1952), Clark (1917)], ii.) neo-classical models mostly relying
upon Jorgenson's studies in which a maximisation of the present and future expected
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cash flows determines the desired capital stock, and firms invest until they reach that
level of capital stock [Jorgenson, (1963)], iii.) profitability theory, originating from
the works of Kalecki and developed by James Tobin, in which investment
expenditures are implicitly related to a measure of profitability of firms [Kalecki
(1954), Tobin (1978, 1969), Tobin and Brainard (1977)]. Kalecki (1954) suggested
that investment decisions are closely related to 'internal' accumulation of financial
capital (i.e. internal savings), and related the rate of investment to changes in profits.
The last profitability theory of investment is also known as the q-theory of
investment and copes with the forward-looking characteristic of investment
decisions by connecting investment expenditures to the so-called average-q (the
stock exchange value of a firm) through which all expectations on the firm's market
value are incorporated implicitly. One extension of the profitability approach leads
one to the financial theory of investment where financial conditions of the firm and
the economy, in which the firm operates, influence investment decisions.
The distinction between different theories depends on the variables included
in the empirical investment equations, and gives an opportunity to study the effects
of different variables on investment. The debate in the literature, however, focuses
mostly upon the question of which theory explains investment expenditures better in
industrialised countries. Empirical studies have suggested that no single theory
could yield a satisfactory explanation of variations in private investment
expenditures. The various combinations of these theories, or modifications of each
of them according to different circumstances for different states of an economy,
would be a more reasonable way of modelling investment demand rather than simply
applying a more specific theory. In the studies for a developing country, this
approach is an even more plausible strategy. Above all, such problems as data
availability and institutional differences may force someone to combine different
theories and to modify them in the light of these problems. This is the strategy
pursued in this chapter. Unlike other studies in the literature, the model in this
chapter avoids an eclectic modelling approach, and is derived with a strong reference
to a microeconomic framework. In the following section a model, which is a
combination of accelerator and financial theories of investment, will be discussed,
and estimated with Turkish data. However, the inclusion of a financial factor
(namely availability of credit to the private sector) is less sound, and serves only to
investigate the importance of credit constraints in investment behaviour in Turkey.
The purpose of this chapter is three fold: The first is to answer the question
of to what extent the neo-classical accelerator type of models can be successfully
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applied to a developing country, namely Turkey. The second is to find out what
determines Turkish private investment expenditures. The third is to discern the
dependence of the Turkish private investment expenditures on finance constraints.
For these purposes, I specify an investment function, which can be named as the
flexible-accelerator-relative cost model. The model is modified on the grounds that
under-developed financial markets may impose credit constraints on investment
expenditures.
The determinants of private investment in Turkey have been studied by a
limited number of researches subject to a severe data availability problem [Uygur
(1993), Rittenberg (1991), Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992), Conway (1990,
1988)] I. In this chapter, the sample covers 30 annual observations for the period of
1963-1992. A unique feature of the present chapter, with Chapter 7 and Chapter 8,
is the sectoral estimations of private investment demand equation, although the
sample size for these estimations is quite small (26 annual observations) covering the
time span between 1968 and 1993.
In contrast to many empirical models that have been applied for developing
countries, the model employed here is an attempt to implement a theory-based model
to Turkey. Some more recent studies, such as Sundurarajan and Thakur (1980), Tun
Wain and Wong (1982), Blejer and Khan (1984), Conway (1988), have attempted to
incorporate some features of the neo-classical model for groups of LDCs, taking
account of data problems and other structural characteristics. The model in this
chapter, however, differs from theirs in the sense that different technology
assumptions - such as putty-clay, putty-putty, clay-clay - are also tested.
The chapter is divided into seven sections. Following the introductory
section, the flexible accelerator model is developed in Section 2. Section 3 describes
the effects and significance of some key variables in the Turkish case. Section 4
reports estimation results. In Section 5, the Sundurarajan-Thakur modified flexible
accelerator model as well as its estimation results are presented. Following sectoral
private investment models in Section 6, conclusions drawn from the empirical
practice in this chapter are highlighted in the last section.
1 For example, the sample sizes of referred papers have been relatively small. Uygur (1993) uses 26
annual observations covering the period of 1965-1990; Rittenberg (1992) covers the 1964-1988
period (25 observations); Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992) estimate a private investment equation
with 17 observations for the period 1970-1986; and finally Conway (1990)' estimation benefits 24
observations for the period between 1963 and 1986.
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2. Flexible Accelerator-Relative Costs Models with a Credit Constraint
The accumulation of real private physical capital is widely considered as a very
important factor in economic development [see Khan and Reinhart (1990)]. The
question of what determines real physical capital investment in developing countries,
therefore, is as important one. Thus far, the investment theory has revealed three key
factors in the determination of fixed capital formation in industrialised countries,
namely demand, the relative cost of capital, and profits or cash flows. These
variables in the private investment models for developing countries can be extended
according to the different economic structure of these countries (e.g. public
investment expenditures, public capital stock, credit to private sector, exchange
rates, etc. are the most frequently used additional factors for developing countries
depending on the data availability).
This section addresses the role of these factors in the context of the Turkish
economy, using two different models. The first one is a naive neoclassical model
that highlights the importance of the accelerator variable. This is also known as a
partial adjustment clay-clay model, in the sense that substitution between factors of
production is not allowed, so that the relative prices of production factors do not play
any role in the determination of investment demand. The second model, that is
essentially in accordance with Bischoff (1971), is borrowed from Artus and Muet
(1990) and Catinat et al. (1987), and developed into a very flexible form to contain
the impacts of borrowing constraints Unlike the first one, this model allows factor
substitution and takes account of the effects of relative prices. I thus call the second
one the flexible accelerator-relative cost model. The specification of the model rests
on assumptions about both market conditions (i.e. competitive or rationed output
market) and the form of the production function. The model here particularly
focuses on effective demand for output; i.e. the firm determines its investment
expenditures according to the level of expected demand for output in the market.
The responsiveness of investment demand to the relative cost of capital, as well as to
the expected level of output depends on technology assumptions about the
production function, which is specified by the elasticity of substitution and the
degree of malleability of capital. In what follows, the second model is discussed
under two distinctive technology assumptions, namely putty-clay and putty-putty
technologies [see Section 2.3 in Chapter 2].
In putty-clay production technology, the rate of capital-labour substitution is
assumed to be fixed ex post, but variable ex ante, so that the factor proportions can
be changed only for new plant and machinery. Putty-putty technology, however,
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assumes that the rate of factor substitution is variable ex post as well as ex ante, so
that the possibility of substitution between capital and labour does not depend on
whether capital goods are new or old. No capital-labour substitution in the clay-clay
production technology, and continuous substitution in the neoclassical putty-putty
production technology correspond to two extreme cases. An intermediate case
arising from making the rate of substitution between capital and labour differ ex post
and ex ante is, however, more plausible in reality. Therefore the putty-clay
assumption becomes more appropriate to specify the technology of the production
function.
The Model
The model, in general, assumes that there is disequilibrium both in the output market
(so that investment demand of a representative firm becomes responsive to changes
in the level of expected demand), and in financial markets (so that the firm may be
constrained by the availability of external funds), For simplicity I assume that the
rate of wages is fixed. The firm's objective is to choose the optimal investment level
that minimises the cost of production subject to given demand for output and the
production technology, such that
rmmrmse TC= WL+CK (I)
subject to Y= F[exp(at)K,exp(J3t)L] (2)
C=q(c5+r-q)
where Te= the total cost of production; W= wages; L= labour; K= capital; Y=
demand for output which is assumed to be given; c= the user cost of capital; q= the
price of capital goods; q= inflation rate on the price of investment goods q = qlq; r=
nominal interest rate; 8= the constant rate of depreciation; a. and P are coefficients
indicating technological progress embodied in capital and labour respectively
Minimising total cost subject to constraint (2), the desired level of the capital stock
can be derived as follows [see also Bean (1981)]2
" ) I· (C)K =a+(a-J3 b+-:;;Y-ab W (3)
2 Full derivation of the optimal (or desired) level of the capital stock is presented in appendix-B.
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where k* = changes in the desired level of capital; 1) measures returns to scale;
(k' =(dK'ldt)/K')Csee appendix B),
dln(K/L)
er = ---'--'--":-
dln(W/C)'
b= WL
WL+CK
Cf= the elasticity of substitution, b= the share of wage costs. Using the capital
accounting identity, dK'ldt = /- 8K', where / is gross investment and 8 is the rate of
depreciation, the same equation Ceq. 3) can equivalently be written as follows (see
appendix B for detail),
(4)
where E(.) indicates the expected values of variables, and has been approximated by
a distributed lag process. This is the "putty-putty" version of the investment model
suggesting that (IlK') is a positive function of the rate of change of demand, and a
negative function of the rate of variation of relative prices. If the elasticity of
substitution, er, is zero (the Leontieff production assumption), then the model is
reduced to the "clay-clay" technology, where the rate of capital accumulation is only
a function of the variation of demand. The clay-clay model is also estimated in the
Section 4.1 as a naive neo-classical investment model. To include the capital
adjustment process into the model, assume a simple Koyck adjustment mechanism
(5)
where A is the partial adjustment coefficient; k = (dK/dt)jK in continuous time is
identical to t1K/K,_, in discrete time; thereby the capital accounting identity can also
be written as (t1K/Kt-I = J/KH -8) in discrete time. Using (4) and (5), the following
putty-putty version of the investment model can be obtained
(6)
where E(r)=a,(L)r and E(C/W)=a2(L)(C/W), and the sum of the coefficients of the
lag polynomials are equal to /t(I/v) and -/tab respectively.
When the production function is putty-clay, factor substitution no longer
affects total capital stock but only investment, and the dependent variable of the
model should be investment (instead of the rate of capital accumulation as in
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equation (6». For the putty-clay version of the model, first write the Koyck's
distributed lag scheme (equation 5) as
K, = AK; +(1- A )K'_I (5a)
or
11K,= IL(K; - Kt-J) (5b)
then using the capital account identity, define in terms of gross investment,
11K,= I, - 8K'_1 (7)
Equalising the left-hand sides of equations (5b) and (7),
I, =AK; +(8-A)Kt-I (8)
Lagging (8) by one time period, and multiplying both sides by (I-D), and then
subtracting the product form (8), the Koyck transformation generates the following
equation that is not a function of the lagged actual capital stock term, but only of the
desired level of capital stock
I, =A[I-(1-8)L]K; +(I-A)/'_I
or
I, =\I'(L)K; +(I-IL)/t-I (9)
where L is a lag operator by which LK; = K'~I' However, K; is not directly
observable in the model, but can indirectly be derived from equation (3). Integrating
(3) over time (by assuming b is constant), the following specification of the desired
capital stock is obtained (see appendix B),
In K; = [a - (a - fJ)b]t + (Vu) In Y, - ab In( CjW), (l0)
In order to derive the "putty-clay" version of the model, suppose that investment is
related only to new plants and machinery (i.e. the most recent vintage, not total
capital stock). The additional demand to be met, which is a cause of investment,
hence relates to the difference between total output before and after the installation
of the new vintage, net of depreciation. Hence, instead of using Y as an accelerator
variable, changes in demand which acquire new vintage capital (equal to investment)
net of depreciation, are used. Catinat et al. (1987), Driver and Moreton (1992), and
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Kaskarelis (1993) all take new capacity as a linear function of the change in actual
output Yt; i.e. YY, = [Y, -(1- O)Y,_I] where <5 is the rate of depreciation. Then
In K; = Yo + YI In YY, - Y2 In( C;W), + Y/ (I 1)
where 'Yo, 'Y1 and 'Y2 are positive functions of coefficients in (10). Having taken the
logarithm of equation (9), the investment equation under the "putty-clay" technology
assumption can, therefore, be obtained as
In I, = Yo + (I -It) In t.,+ P{ L) In YY, +Q( L) In( : ), + rlt ( 12)
where peL) and Q(L) are lag polynomials.
These two models, equation (6) and equation (12), are quite similar to the
ones developed for industrialised economies. However, the theory of private
investment in LDCs suggests that the applicability of these equations may be very
limited due to some institutional and structural differences as well as data
availability. A model, proposing to explain private investment in LDCs, must be
flexible enough to allow for these characteristics. In this respect, an important
characteristic of the Turkish corporate sector is the extensive dependence on external
funds for financing investment expenditures [see Ersel and Ozturk (1993)]. If
Turkish firms are constrained in the level of internally generated funds available,
investment expenditures in the private sector will also be dependent on the
availability of external funds, and will exhibit fluctuations according to changes in
the level of the borrowing constraint. The theoretical modelling of external
borrowing constraints in this chapter is less sound, and is modelled, rather in an
eclectic way, by the inclusion of a variable on credit inflows to the private sector. In
what follows, a variable capturing borrowing constraints is included as an argument
to test whether, among others, the quantity or price variable is more important in
investment decisions in Turkey. The final reduced forms of investment models
under putty-putty and putty-clay technology assumptions can therefore be written as
follows:
i.) Putty-putty technology assumption
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Up U, > 0, a2 < o. Equation (6a) is the original specification of the model that has
been given by the theory. Note that in equation (6a), all variables on the right-hand
side (except the rate of capital accumulation) correspond to the changing rate of the
relevant variable. Equation (6b), on the other hand, stands for the double log-linear
form of equation (6a) including the rate of capital accumulation term. The
estimation results of both models are presented in Section 4.2.
ii.) Putty-clay technology assumption
( 12a)
where YY, = [Y, - (1- 8)y,-d; cra]: credit inflows to the private sector. Note that all
lower case letters indicate the logarithm of the respective variable.
A Note on the Relationship of Equation (14) with a Model that has mostly been
applied for LDCs:
A variant of this flexible accelerator model with putty-clay technology, which
enables us to modify (12a), was developed by Blejer and Khan (1982), and has been
used by Voridis (1993), Morriset (1994), van Wijnbergen (1992). The main
advantage of Blejer and Khan (1982) is that through the varying partial adjustment
coefficient assumption -borrowed from Coen (1971)- the model can be reduced to
one including some features of developing countries such as the credit availability to
the private sector.
Following Blejer and Khan (1982), now assume that the flow of investment
is away from its steady state level (i.e. desired level), but itself adjusts towards
equilibrium in the long-run according to the partial adjustment mechanism:
1nl, = 8Inl,* +(1- 8)lnl'_1 (9)
where I,*: the desired level of investment, 8,: the adjustment coefficient assumed to
be varying as a function of some macroeconomic variables. There are two
modelling strategies to incorporate some features of LDCs. Some authors, such as
Ramirez (1994), adapt a rather ad hoc approach, and assume I,* as a linear function
of some macroeconomic variables. The final reduced form equation is not the same
as the putty-clay accelerator model above. Others (i.e. Driver and Moreton, 1992
and Blejer and Khan 1982), on the other hand, may relate 1,*, for example, to new
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capacity and relative factor cost, and substitute this into the partial adjustment
equation. They may then derive a reduced form which is entirely the same equation
as equation (12a). In an effective demand model such as the one above, the desired
level of capital stock can be written as a function of output (determined by a given
level of demand in the output market), and the relative user cost of capital. Adapting
the specification of King (1972), the desired investment is a log-linear function of
change in the actual output and relative capital-labour cost,
( 13)
where s. > O.g2 < O.
The adjustment coefficient here has crucial importance, in the sense that the
speed of adjustment, measured by that coefficient, is assumed to be affected by some
other macroeconomic factors, which are supposed to reflect relevant features of the
economy, such as public investment, the cost of the factor of production, or credit
availability. Driver and Moreton (1992) use a similar formulation of the adjustment
coefficient in order to incorporate the impact of profitability into the investment
equation. However, in Blejer and Khan's framework, if one assumes that the speed
of the adjustment process is influenced by the user cost of capital, credit available for
the use of the private sector and public investment, then
f[.1CrP"I;, ... ]
8, = 80 + 81 (. )
I, -1'_1
(14)
where 1;= public investment; the function f{.) is assumed to be linear in all
variables. Finally, substituting the expression for the desired investment and the
adjustment coefficient into the partial adjustment equation gives rise to the
following, relatively more general, investment equation,
(15)
where lower case letters indicate the logarithm of the respective variable. The
modified Blejer and Khan model is reduced to the one quite similar to the above
putty-clay investment model. Unlike the putty-clay models developed by Catinat et.
al. and Artus and Muet (1990), Blejer and Khan's (1982) model is more general
since different definitions of the function of the adjustment coefficient may yield
different reduced forms of investment functions. Note that with the specification of
the adjustment coefficient in (14), I implicitly assume that credit availability is not
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strictly binding, but influences the speed of adjustment towards steady-state
equilibrium.
3. Some Key Variables in The Model
The many econometric studies of investment have consistently shown the
importance of the adjustment of capital to demand -i.e. accelerator variable-, and the
length of this adjustment. Anand et al. (1990), Conway (1990), and Chhibber and
van Wijnbergen (1991) found a similar result for the Turkish economy, leading to
the conclusion that the expansion of real gross domestic product, which was used as
a proxy of demand, increases real private investment with an elasticity significantly
greater than unity.
If Turkish firms are constrained by internally generated funds, investment
decisions in the private sector will be dependent on the external availability of funds.
In the Turkish experience, the findings of various studies suggest that the availability
of credit to the private sector is important (see Chhibber and van Wijnbergen, 1992,
Anand et al. 1990, Rittenberg, 1990); and it is expected to have a positive sign in the
equation. In the present study, the availability of external borrowing, as such, will
be proxied by the real credit volume of the Turkish banking system to the private
sector. In what follows, private investment is related to changes in real bank credit
to the private sector, along with the inclusion of interest rates in the formulation of
the cost of capital.
Two variables have been used to measure the cost of capital. The first one is
similar to Jorgenson's definition of the implicit cost of capital, which comprises
interest rates, the price of capital goods, the constant rate of depreciation, and
inflation in the price of capital goods [see Jorgenson (1963)]. Depending on the
availability of data, a more complicated form may also include some additional
fiscal variables such as the corporate tax rate, depreciation allowances, investment
grants, investment tax credits [see Dailami (1992), Auerbach (1990), and Hall and
Jorgenson (1971)]. In this present study only the simple definition of the cost of
capital variable has been used because of the shortage of a sufficiently long historical
data on the fiscal variables described above. This specification of the relative cost
variable allows for testing the theoretical model derived, and is calculated as «(',Iw,)
where c, = q, X (r, + a - !uj,/q,), where c, stands for the cost of capital, r, 8, Sq, being
the interest rate, depreciation rate and changes in the price of capital prices
respectively; w, stands for wages.
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Given the fact that the Turkish financial system is still repressed by various
forms of price and non-price rationing arising from informational imperfections [see
Atiyas et. al. (1993)], and that demand for the capital stock demand would be more
responsive to changes in the availability of credit to the private sector than to
changes in the interest rate, I have also defined the relative price of capital goods as
the second cost of capital variable. In such an economy, the Keynesian equilibrium
relationship between the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of interest, as we
discussed in Chapter 3, may not hold, and the former may become more responsive
to the supply conditions of capital goods, which may be reflected by the supply
price of capital goods. In a developing country where capital goods imports take up
a major share in total imports, the changes in the supply price, say as a result of
nominal devaluations, would raise the cost of private investment expenditure. Their
effects on the investment decision are expected to be negative.
The following acronyms are used in the presentation of the empirical results:
C1
/"1 = private investment,
= public investment,
= net changes in capacity, YY, = (CDP, - O. 95CDPH),
= the relative user cost of capital, c, = q/(r, + 8 - !!.q,/q,),
= index of wages,
= price deflator of private investment goods,
= the availability of credit to the private sector,
= nominal interest rates,
= the rate of depreciation, constant (assumed to be 5 percent) [see
Maraslioglu and Tiktik (1991)],
= difference operator indicating the first difference of a variable,
YY,
W 1
4. The Estimation and Results
In this section, the estimation results of equations (6a) and (12a), namely putty-putty
model in accumulation-rate form and the log-linearised putty-clay model, are
presented. In addition to these models, a naive accelerator model under the clay-clay
technology assumption is also estimated. Unlike (6a) and (12a), the naive
accelerator model allows for no factor substitution between capital and labour,
therefore the relative prices do not appear in the model. However, the naive
accelerator model is appropriate to see the response of the capital and adjustment to
demand shocks (i.e. to the accelerator effects). For this purpose, the naive
accelerator model of private investment is specified both in accumulation-rate form
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and in log-linearised form respectively. The estimations in this section are based on
the data that are described in Chapter 5.
4.1. Naive Accelerator Models with a Clay-Clay Production Function:
The response of the capital adjustment to the accelerator effect is investigated in this
section, using a clay-clay production function. Two forms of investment models,
namely accumulation-rate form and the log-linearised form, are employed, and are
presented by using a distributed lag polynomial function. This gives us a familiar
partial adjustment model in the end. Since there exist insufficient observations, the
length of the polynomial lags is restricted to one which can be represented by the
following first-order distribution,
(16)
where A's are coefficients to be estimated; L is the lag operator indicating that
LI," = I,'~I' Using this first-order distribution (16), the unrestricted specifications for
accumulation-rate form and log-linearised form of private investment respectively
are derived as follows
(17)
( 18)
(all lower case letters indicate the logarithm of the relevant variable) where Yt is the
logarithm of GDP; yYt is the logarithm of (CDP, - O. 95CDPt-I); k,T is the logarithm of
total capital stock including public and private capital stocks." The ordinary least
square (OLS) estimation has been used for estimations. The OLS estimation of the
capital-accumulation-rate form (eq. 17) displays a first-order autocorrelation in error
terms, and the possible upward bias of coefficients due to autocorrelation is
eliminated by using Cochrane-Orcutt estimation method. This final estimation is
reported as follows.
(i" -k~l) =-0.587+0.263Lly, +0.502LlYt-I +0.826(i'· -k~l)
, (-2.1126) (1.213) (2J(I'I) WWII) ,-I
-2R = 0.902, UT =0.475Ut-I +e,
(2.854)
3 The capital stock series is available at the aggregate level comprising the public and the private
sector [see Maraslioglu and Tiktik (1991)].
Chapter 6 Accelerator Effects, Borrowing Constraints, The Cost of Capital 199
where "R2 is the adjusted R2. Figures in parenthesis indicate t-statistics. The
explanatory power of the model is quite high, around 0.92. The coefficient of the
current changes in GDP is not significantly different from zero. The rest, however,
confirms the existence of the accelerator relation between the rate of capital
accumulation and changes in demand (proxied by GDP).
The second specification for the log-linearised form of private investment, on
the other hand, fits the data relatively very well. There is no indication of
autocorrelation, functional misspecification, or heteroscedasticity (see test statistics
reported below the estimated equation).
i/, = 0.800+0.088yy, +0.107 YY,_I +0.841 .:
(3.1~5) (3.1XO) (3.594) m.5n)
IP = 0.976, D. W(h) = 0.450, se = 0.170, FF = 0.0002, N = 0.970, H = 0.411.
where SC = Lagrange multiplier test for autocorrelation, FF = RESET test for
function misspecification using the square of the fitted values, N = Normality test
statistics based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals, H = Test for
heteroscedasticity base on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted
values. All reported test statistics are chi-square versions of the relevant tests.
According to both models, the adjustment of capital is responsive to
accelerator variable, GDP. The length of the adjustment is given by mean lags of
these models, which indicate the average time period that is required to adjust the
actual capital stock to its desired level in response to changes in demand. They are
about 5.4 years for equation (17) and 5.8 years for equation (18) (t-statistics of both
of them are significantly high at 5 percent; 1.861 and 4.512 respectively). The long-
run multiplier of (17) is not significant at any significance level, but that of ( 18) have
been estimated 1.23 (t-statistics is 5.1). Consequently, in terms of R2 and the
diagnostic tests, the accelerator model (18) has performed very well with the Turkish
data. The results have shown that the accelerator variable was important in the
adjustment of capital in the long-run, but in the short-run its effects on investment
were rather small. The adjustment overall takes almost 5.8 years according to the
model in (18).
4.2. Accelerator Models with the Putty-Putty and Putty-Clay Production
Function Assumptions
Unlike the models presented in Section 4.1, the so-called flexible-accelerator-relative
cost model takes into account the effects of the relative price of capital. Following
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the theoretical discussion in Section 3, I define two separate empirical models under
two different production technologies (namely putty-putty and putty-clay
technologies). The results are presented in Table 6.1, Table 6.2, and Table 6.3. The
estimates of the theory-based putty-putty and putty-clay models as well as their
modified versions with alternative cost variables and the credit constraint variable
are presented in these tables. Two different specifications of the putty-putty model
have been estimated. The results in Table 6.1 a belong to the origi nal theoretical
specification (6a) in which the dependent variable, the rate of capital accumulation,
is regressed on the lagged value the rate of capital accumulation and the growth rates
of output and the relative cost of capital. In Table 6.1b however, the same equation
has been estimated in double-log form including the logarithm of the rate of capital
accumulation (equation 6b) to see relative empirical performances in functional form
specification and goodness of fit. Tables 6.2 and 6.3, on the other hand, report
results on the estimations of the log-linearised investment demand equations under
putty-clay technology, which correspond to equations (l2a) and (15) respectively.
In the first two columns of Tables 6.1 and 6.2, the purely theoretical models
without a variable reflecting the effects of credit availability, have been estimated in
the light of discussion in earlier sections. Each model has been estimated with
different definitions of cost variables (the relative user cost of capital, the relative
price of capital goods, and the price index of capital goods) to test the robustness of
the empirical findings to changes in the definition of the cost variable. And finally,
in Table 6.3, the availability of credit has been included to capture the effects of
financial factors on investment with the putty-clay technology assumption. Most
importantly, aggregate public investment (comprising infrastructure investment and
investment undertaken by state-owned enterprisesr' has also been included in
modified models, but the results in most cases have not improved. On the contrary,
the inclusion of public investment has worsened the functional form specification
(denoted by FF, RESET-test) of a large number of estimations.
The estimations, which were carried out for annual data, cover the period of
1963-1993. The results reported are estimates using ordinary least-squares (OLS).
Microfit 3.0, developed by Pesaran and Pesaran, has been used for estimations [see
Pesaran and Pesaran (1991)]. The possible simultaneity (or weak-exogeneity)
between investment and the accelerator variable (investment being one of the
components of GDP) was ignored in equations where the accelerator variable enters
4 A sufficiently long disaggregate public investment data for the 1963-1993 period could not be found
from official sources. Although the SPO published a official data on infrastructure investment and
non-infrastructure, these data are available for the period starting from 1975.
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Table 6.1a
Econometric Results for Putty-Putty model
Original Putt:t-Putt:t Model Modified with Credit Constraint
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 0.0053 0.0068 0,CJ042 0.0055
(2.179) (2.470) ( 1.450) ( 1.817)
L1Yr-I 0.0174 0.0178 0.0125 0.0128
(1.976) ( 1.825) (2.334) (2'c)27)
L1(C/W),
-0.0081 -0.007
(-2.428) (-2.754)
L1(q/W),
-0.0270 -0.0240
(-3.780) (-3.988)
L1CRDI' 0.0120 0.0118,
(1.821) (1.933)
(!//K~IL 0.880 0.819 0.898 0.8442
~13.299~ ~11.491~ ~l1.950~ ~IO.9632
'R2
0.875 0.886 0.887 0.900
SE 0.0038 0.0037 0.0040 0.003
se chi-sq. (1) 0.288 0.001 0.167 0.681
FF chi-sq. (1) 2.043 1.479 2.965 3.062
N chi-sq. (2) 1.181 0.841 0.927 0.595
H chi-sq. (1) 6.553 4.908 6.185 4.673
Note: The capital variable is taken as total capital including public and private capital
stocks. se = Lagrange Multiplier test for serial autocorelation, FF = Ramsey's RESET test
for functional misspecification, N = Normality test, H = Heteroscedasticity test. Figures in
parenthesis are t-statistics. Variables are
Y, = Gross Domestic Product,
C, = the user cost of capital; c, = q, (r, + 8 - L1q,),
q, = the price deflator of capital goods,
W, =wages,
CRD; = credits to the private sector,
K,T = total capital stock including public and private sectors.
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Table 6.tb
Econometric Results for Putty-Putty model
Original Putt~-Putt~ Model Modified with Credit Constraint
Variables
~q ~2l Pl ~4~
Constant -00407 -0.599 -0.342
-().54 I
(-2.218) (-3.351) (-1.999) (-2.779)
ily,_, 00495 0.515 0.369 OA4X(2.213) (20414) (1.733) (2.00S)
il{c-w), -0.194 -0.167
(-3.235) (-2.961)
il(ln q - w), -0.625
(-3.614)
il(ln q - wL -0.512(-2.725)
Scrd! 0.307(2.214)
Scrd'', 0.309(2.288)
(il' -e) 0.871 0.819 0.894 0.840
, -1 ,-1
p5.697l ~15.103l ~17.200~ ~14.013}
JP 0.907 0.914 0.922 0.908
SE 0.085 0.082 0.078 0.084
SC chi-sq.( I) 0.337 0.017 0.282 2.979
FF chi-sq.( I) 1.314 1.874 2.148 3.60()
N chi-sq.(2) 1.423 1.704 0.687 2.311
H chi-sg.(1) 2.100 0.509 00488 (J.()37
Note: The capital variable is taken as total capital including public and private capital stocks. SC =
Lagrange Multiplier test for serial autocorrelation FF = Ramsey's RESET test for functional
misspecification , N = Normality test, H = Heteroscedasticity test. Figures in parenthesis arc t-
statistics. Variables are
i," = Logarithm of gross private investment
y, = Logarithm of Gross Domestic Product,
c, = Logarithm of the user cost of capital; c, = q,(r, + 0 - Sq, ),
In q, = Logarithm of the price deflator of capital goods,
w, = Logarithm of wages,
crd] = Logarithm of credits to the private sector,
k,T = Logarithm of total capital stock including public and private sectors.
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as a first-lag form. t-statistics are presented in the parenthesis below each estimated
coefficient. Along with estimated coefficients, some diagnostic test statistics to
detect autocorrelation, functional form misspecification, non-normality, and
heteroscedasticity have also been reported at the bottom part of tables. All reported
diagnostic test statistics are chi-square versions. se in tables stands for Lagrange
Multiplier tests which are more general than a simple Durbin-Watson test in the
sense that it is applicable to models with and without lagged dependent variables.
They are also applicable to testing the hypothesis that the disturbances are not
serially uncorrelated against the alternative that they are autocorrelated of order p.
This test has been carried out for each equation by setting p equal to three to test for
up to the third order autocorrelation in the error term.
Ramsey's RESET test for functional form misspecification, denoted by FF in
tables, refers to the simple case where only the square of fitted values, .\',",are
included in the extended regression of e, = y, -x/fi, on x' and .v;. The test for
heteroscedasticity provides an LM test of y=0 in the model E( u,2) = a; = a" + r( x'fi, r.
All equations reported here show no indications of heteroscedasticity (except some
in Table 6.1a), and functional misspecification. The normality test proposed by Bera
and Jaque (1981) is valid irrespective of whether or not the regression includes an
intercept. The normality test provides an indication that enables us to use normal
distribution to evaluate any value of an estimated coefficient within an accurate
confidence interval. Normality tests in all estimations confirm that we can accept
the hypothesis that error terms are all normally distributed. Both specifications
(putty-putty and putty-clay) of the investment equation seem to fit the Turkish data
well. Around 90 per cent of the variation of the dependent variable is explained by
these models. The signs of all variables are in accordance with theory. The t-
statistics, presented in parentheses below estimated coefficients, are generally
statistically significant.
Putty-Putty Technology:
The putty-putty model of investment fits reasonably well. In terms of t-statistics, the
"double-log" specification in Table 6.1 b resulted in slightly higher t-ratios and
goodness of fit, indicating better fit to the data. The problem with the estimates in
Table 6.1a is the presence of heteroscedasticity (see H). For all estimates in Table
6.1 a, the estimated equations indicate heteroscedastic error terms. All reported t-
values of heteroscedastic estimates are based on the White heteroscedasticity
consistent standard error estimations.
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Table 6.2
OLS Estimation Results of The Naive Flexible Accelerator Model with Putty-Clay
Technology
if' =bo +bl(L)yy, +b2(L)(c-w), +bi:~,
Theoretical Model Modified Putt:i-Cla:i Modcl
Variables
~I~ ~2~ ~3~
constant 0.695 -0.080 0.824
(2.413) (-0.235)'" (3.050)
)')',-1 0.097 0.103 0.109
(2.907) (3.694) (3.608)
il(c - w), -0.144(-2.576)
illn q, - 0.394(-3.(00)
il(lnq-w), - 0.467(-3.114)
." 0.892 0.988 n.8711,-1
~23.9942 ~21.8722 {25.6472
R2 0.971 0.980 0.973
SE 0.0763 0.0675 0.0726
se chi-sq.(1) 1.262 0.999 0.196
FF chi-sq.(l) 0.169 0.071 1.256
N chi-sq.(2) 1.361 0.858 1.586
H chi-s9'P~ 2.171 1.447 0.995
Notes: se = Lagrange multiplier test for serial autocorrelation. FF = Ramsey's RESET test
for functional misspecification, N = Normality test, H = Heteroscedasticity test. t-statistics
are presented in parentheses. (a) indicates variables that are significant at a 10 percent
significance level. On the other hand.
y)', = log( GDP, - O. 95GDPt-I); c, = log[q,(r, + 0 - 4, Iq,)]
where q = the price deflator of investment goods, r = nominal interest rate, w = the index of
wages.
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Table 6.3
OLS Estimation Results of The Flexible Accelerator Model with Putty-Clay
Technology and The Credit Constraint
Variables and Test
Statistics
~I~ ~2~ ~3~ ~4) (5~
constant 0.724 0.673 0.502 0.046 0.044
(2.813) (2.463) (1.719) (0.135* (0.128)*
.\'Y,-I 0.092 0.083 0.082 0.109
0.111
(3.096) (2.533) (2.560) (4.006) (3.933)
Ll(c-w)r-i -0.136
(-2.726)
Ll(ln q - w), -0.432 -0.336
(-2.970) (-2.141 )
Inq, -0.303 -0.318(-2.540) (-2.491)
Ll'K 0.195I, (1.431 )a
Lli:_1
-0.0496
(-0.381 )*
tscrd] 0.356 0.189 0.199(3.480) (1.641)a (1.628)a
Llcrd:~1 0.224 0.251(1.738) (1.969)
." 0.889 0.897 0.916 0.968 0.967
',-1
~27.6651 {25.0301 {24.542~ {21.267~ ~20.8872
R2 0.977 0.976 0.977 0.981 0.980
SE 0.064 0.070 0.061 0.065 0.066
se chi-sq. (I) 0.091 0.018 0.211 0.008 0.002
FF chi-sq. (I) 0.069 1.209 0.697 0.006 0.011
N chi-sq. (2) 0.917 1.033 0.295 0.978 0.853
H chi-sq. (1) 1.267 0.462 1.261 1.052 1'()48
Notes: se = Lagrange multiplier test for serial autocorrelation, FF = Ramsey's RESET test for
functional misspecification, N = Normality test, H = Heteroscedasticity test. The numbers in bracket
are the critical values at a 5 percent significance level. t-statistics are presented in parentheses. For the
definitions of variables, see notes in table 3. Ll stands for the first difference of a variable.
yy, = log( CDP, - O.95CDP,_1 ) ; e, =Iog[q,(r, +o-q,jq,)]
where q = the price deflator of investment goods, r = nominal interest rate, w = the index of wages.
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Putty-Clay Technolo&y:
These models were estimated in level first. But the first-order lagged values of the
cost variable consistently came up with opposite sign, although they were not
different from their current values in magnitude. The Wald-test of a zero restriction
on the sum of the lagged and current values of the cost variables was, therefore,
applied to test the restriction that the coefficients of both current and lagged values
of the cost variable are identical. The results of the test support the specification in
which the relative cost variable enter the putty-clay model in differenced form, rather
than in level as suggested by the theory. The same procedure was applied for the
credit constraint variable, if required.
From the statistical point of view (higher measure of goodness of fit, higher
t-values of variables and lower standard error), the putty-clay model seems to be
more satisfactory although both models are acceptable. Also, with respect to the
closeness to the theoretically derived models, the putty-clay model did not require
any alteration while the putty-putty needed to take the logarithm of the dependent
variable for the sake of better fit to the data.
The results pertaining to the variables deserve some explanation. The signs
of all variables are in accordance with theoretical expectations. The accelerator
variable is highly significant (always at 5 percent) in all equations irrespective of the
technology assumption and the choice of cost variable. The accelerator variable was
defined in two different forms depending on the technology assumption imposed on
the form of the production function; namely changes in output (that is proxied by
GDP) in the putty-putty model, and changes in output net of depreciation in the
putty-clay model. While the accelerator model is significant in all equations, its
impact on private investment was affected by the definition of the accelerator
variable. The adjustment of the capital stock to changes in demand through the
accelerator mechanism has also been found very significant by others [Conway
(1990), Anand et al. (1990), Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992)]. In particular,
Anand et al. (1992) and Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992) found that a variation
in output demand increases the real private investment in Turkey with an elasticity
significantly higher than unity. However, the same result was not supported by the
estimation results in Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, resulting in a nearly 0.37 percent
increase in investment as a result of a 1 percent change in output in the putty-putty
technology case [see equation (3) in Table 6.1b], and a nearly 0.09 percent increase
in response to change in output net of depreciation in the case of the putty-clay
technology [see equation (l) in Table 6.3].
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Table 6.4 Long-Run Multipliers
i.) For Table 6.1b
Variables (I) (2) (3) (4)
Accelerator 3.821 2.846 3.466 2.806
( 1.593)8 ( 1.889) ( 1.346)8 ( 1.528)8
Cost -1.502 -3.455 -1.573 -3.211
(-1.825) (-2.720) (-1.6578) (-2.315)
Credit 2.907 1.927
( 1.397)8 ~1.507~8
ii.) For Table 6.2
Variables (I) (3) (4)
Accelerator 0.902 8.945 0.849
(2.911) (0.262)'" (3.525)
Cost -1.341 -34.167 -3.629
(-1.70) (-0.240t p.337~
iii.) For Table 6.3
Variables (I) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Accelerator 0.833 0.808 0.972 3.395 3.474
(3.116) (2.836) (2.460) (0.766)* (0.747)*
Cost
-1.222 -4.202 -3.985 -9.424 -9.927
(-1.934) (2.066) (-1.686) (-0.576)* (-0.567)*
Credit 3.208 2.181 2.974 5.868 5.958
(2.274) ( 1.269)* (1.240)* (0.725)* (0.710)*
Public Inv. 2.318 -1.549
!1.056t !-O.332~*
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. * denotes insignificant long-run multipliers. a indicates
coefficients which are significant at the 10 percent significance level. Long-run multipliers are
calculated according to the following formula
long - run multiplier = Li=l ai
I-b
where Li=l Qi is the sum of coefficients of all lags and present values of a relevant variable b is the
coefficient of the lag of the dependent variable.
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High dependence of the Turkish corporate sector on external borrowing has
been noted by Ersel and Ozturk (1993) and Atiyas (1990). This dependence affects
the response of the Turkish corporate sector to a variation in the availability of
financial funds. Our empirical findings from Table 6.1b and Table 6.3 confirm this
conclusion with significant (at 5 percent) and positive coefficients of the credit
variable in both models. In Table 6.3, for example, credit appears to have the most
influential impact on private investment after the cost of capital. As noted earlier,
the inclusion of the credit variable in both models improved the overall explanatory
power of the models. The reduction in t-values of all variables after including the
credit variable, could be interpreted as an indication of a possible omitted variable
effect in the original specifications. This estimated effect on real private investment
appears with a one-period lag according to our empirical results [except equation (5)
in Table 6.1 a, and equation (I) in Table 6.3]. Although other studies on Turkish
private investment have also recognised the importance of the volume of credit to
the private sector, only three out of six studies summarised earlier explicitly included
a credit variable, and concluded that external funds availability is important (see
Chapter 5).
The cost variables are also significant. In particular, the negative sign of the
relative user cost of capital term in all estimations implies that increased cost of
capital reduces investment while rises in wages increase capital accumulation and
investment which indicates substitution of capital for labour. In both specifications
of the investment model, the relative cost of capital is the most significant one at the
5 percent significance level. According to the estimated coefficient in Table 6.1b, a
I percent increase in the cost of capital (say, as a result of an increase in the interest
rate) decreases the rate of capital accumulation by almost 0.19 percent in the putty-
putty model [eq, (I) in Table 6. Ib]. The same elasticity has been estimated as -0.14
percent in the putty-clay model [eq. (l) in Table 6.3]. Introducing the price index of
capital goods as a cost variable into the model magnifies the impact of the supply-
side factors (such as devaluations and changes in the terms of trade) on private
investment. In Table 6.2, the change in the estimated coefficient is drastic from 0.13
using the relative cost of capital variable in equation (1) to 0.43 using the relative
price of capital variable in equation (2). The inclusion of the credit variable has
improved the explanatory power of all models while decreasing the impacts of
accelerator and cost variable on investment. This result remains robust for all
equations irrespective of how differently the cost variable is defined. In Table 6.3,
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for example, credit appears to have the most influential impact on private investment
after the cost of capital.
Along with the credit variable, public investment was also included in Table
6.1 b and Table 6.3. But in many cases, this variable either caused misspecification
of the model with too high RESET test statistics, or became insignificant and
reduced the significance of all other variables. However, the best results with the
public investment variable are reported in Table 6.3 (eqs. 3, and 5). Among them,
the effect of public investment estimates is negative but insignificant at any
significance level in column (5); it is significant only at 10 percent in column (6),
and positive (indicating the crowding-in effect of public investment). Note that no
significant result including both the relative cost of capital and public investment
could be obtained. One explanation for this poor performance of the public
investment variable may be the choice of the aggregate public investment
comprising infrastructure and non-infrastructure investment. Although this is not
theoretically ideal, the availability of the relevant data determines the use of
aggregate data on capital stock.
In Table 6.4, long-run elasticities of accelerator, cost, credit and public
investment are presented for both putty-putty and putty-clay models. At the top of
Table 6.4, long-run multipliers of putty-putty model in Table 6.1b are presented for
the accelerator, the user cost of capital, and credit. The distinctive feature of these
multipliers is their statistical significance at 10 percent. The long-run multiplier
effect of credit in the putty-putty model comes second after the accelerator effect.
The results in the middle of Table 6.4 belong to the putty-clay model in Table 6.2.
All cost elasticities, which are significant at 5 percent (except those in the second
column), reveal the relatively higher cost elasticity in the long-run for Turkish
private investment. Output elasticities are also significant, but all of them less than
unity.
I also estimated five elasticities of each variable for corresponding equations
in Table 6.3. The bottom half of Table 6.4 reports these results. With the exceptions
of equations 4 and 5, all long-run multipliers of the accelerator variable are
significant, and their values vary between 0.81 and 0.97. All long-run multipliers of
cost variables are also significantly different from zero, except those in 4 and 5. The
distinctive characteristic here is that almost all of them indicate very high long-run
cost elasticities. In the case of equation 2, this multiplier turn out even higher (about
-4). The multipliers of credit are significant mostly at 10 percent in panel (i), and
quite high compared to those of cost variables. It should be noted that according to
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the results in panel (iii), one long-run multiplier of credit out of five is insignificant.
However, all multipliers of the first column, which belong to the theoretical putty-
clay model (l2a), are significant. With respect to these results in column (I) of
panel (iii), the multiplier of the credit term is higher than those of the accelerator and
the cost of capital variables. The cost, on the other hand, comes second, and is
followed by the accelerator variable. The t-statistics also indicate that the effect of
credit on investment is in fact significant at 5 percent level. However, the empirical
results suggest that the long-run effects of public investment be insignificant in all
three equations.
To sum up, amongst two specifications (putty-putty and putty-clay), the
putty-clay specifications of the investment model appear more desirable in terms of
R2s. In both specifications, however, the inclusion of a credit variable has improved
R2s, and kept them around 0.90 and 0.95 percent of total variation in private
investment. According to the putty-clay results, credit availability and cost of capital
are the two major factors to which private investment is highly responsive in the
short run as well as in the long run. The third influential factor is the accelerator
variable. The long-run effects of mainly credit and then cost are high. Accelerator
effects, on the other hand, are mostly less than unity (see panel (iii) in Table 6.4).
The results of Table 6.1, Table 6.2 and Table 6.3, therefore, mirror the conclusion
that the putty-clay model of investment demand is slightly more satisfactory on
statistical grounds than that of putty-putty, and three determinants of the Turkish
private investment are crucial for the future policy recommendations.
5. Sundurarajan and Thakur's Model: A Modified Flexible Accelerator Model
A model has been developed by Sundurarajan and Thakur who modified the neo-
classical theory of investment in order to incorporate some of the channels through
which public investment influences private investment [Sundurarajan and Thakur
(1982)]. It is assumed that the private sector determines its desired level of capital
stock by minimising total cost, defined as the discounted present value of future
costs including both the costs of production and the cost of acquiring capital.
Incorporating this desired level of capital stock into the partial adjustment of capital
(14)
and recalling the capital account identity (1/ = llK, + oK/_I)' the investment demand
equation can be derived as follows
( 15)
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Like Blejer and Khan (1984), they also relied on the definition of the adjustment
coefficient in order to include public investment and saving.
In this section, I present the estimation results of Sundurarajan and Thakur's
model with the Turkish data. I have adapted their model only with a small
difference. Since the sufficiently long disaggregated capital stock of private and
public sectors are not available in Turkey, I estimated the model by using total
capital stock, including public and private. Following them, I first define the
adjustment coefficient as
( 16)
This coefficient measures the effects of resource availability to the private sector on
the speed of adjustment of the actual capital stock to the desired level of capital
stock. Then, substituting e in the partial adjustment mechanism yields the
investment demand equation, which is
( 17)
where S,= aggregate domestic savings, K,T =total capital stock, q,= the price of
capital goods. The expectations of the signs of the coefficients of output and the
relative user cost of capital is the same as before. The last term, however, resource
availability is expected to capture important channels through which crowding out of
private investment occurs. As explained earlier, in developing countries two
channels of crowding-out can be mentioned, one through an increase in prices and
interest rates following an increase in public investment (which can be defined as
rationing through price), and nonprice rationing such as licensing or other controls.
This credit rationing effect, therefore, is taken into account by postulating a direct
linkage between total resource availability and fixed private investment.
The estimated equations are presented in Table 6.5. Due to the simultaneity
between private investment and saving, the instrumental variable estimation method
has been used instead of the ordinary least square method. The time period of the
estimation is 1963-1991. The model provides a good fit for private investment. The
estimated t-ratios are generally very significant at the 5 percent level. The standard
diagnostic tests show no indication of the violation of OLS assumptions. Sargan's
over-identification test indicates the validity of the instruments chosen. The
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Table 6.5
Instrumental Variable Estimates of Sun dura raj an-Thakur Model (1963-1991)
In It = -4.742+ O.4061n GDP, + O.3191n GDP,_I - o.129In(!:_) - D.I04In(_:_)
(-2.K7K) (J55R) (2.74h) (-JU42) W, (-JUM) W t-I
[(S -IX)] [(S -/")]+0.256In ' , +O.IISln ,-I t-I +O.377ln K,~,(5.4<m q, (2.123) q.; (2.6XX)
R2=0.992, D.W.= 1.980, SE= 0.0396, MLL=53.613
se= 0.002, FF= 1.976, N= 0.574, H= 0.760, Sargan's Over-identification Test: chi-sq.(3)=2.253
implicit assumption in this form is that the impacts of public investment and
aggregate savings (as proxy for the availability of financial resources) on private
investment are the same.
A test of the flexible accelerator model is given by the statistical significance
of the accelerator variable and the user cost of capital; both significant at 5 percent.
With respect to estimates in Table 6.5, accelerator variables have very high t-
statistics. The relative cost of capital also has a significantly negative effect on
private investment, and its effects occurred with a time lag of one year.
Accordingly, an increase in interest rates -therefore the relative user cost of capital-
tends to depress investment demand in Turkey.
The results suggest that net saving available to the private sector is a highly
significant variable. This effect is measured by the coefficient of the variable on
financial resources availability to the use of the private sector. The effects of
aggregate savings and public investment can indeed be measured by this coefficient.
For example, increased public investment would compete with the private sector for
the financial sources in the economy, and reduce net saving and then private
investment. However, the model can only capture this crowding-out effect of public
investment, but the crowding-in effects through the externalities of public
investment expenditure on infrastructure remain untouched by the model.
6. Sectoral Private Investment Models (Flexible Accelerator)
Due to the data availability, five different sectors here are considered; namely,
agriculture, mining, energy, manufacturing, and services. Disaggregated data
available on sectoral investment and output only for the period of 1968-1993 have
been obtained from Maraslioglu and Tiktik (1991). Both putty-putty and putty-clay
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Table 6.6
Putty-Putty Estimations for Manufacturing
Semi-Log SEecification Double-LoB SEecification
Variables I il! i2l Pl ~4! i5! i6~
Constant 0.002 -0.014 -0.003 -0.629 -0.598 -0.790
(0.441)* (-1.546)3 (-0.362)* (-4.048) (-4.(25) (-4.719)
Y, 0.145 0.153 0.148 2.068 2.193 2.109
(4.680) (5.233) (5.709) (4.212) (4.653) (4.80 I)
(C/W),
-0.014 -0.015 -0.016 -0.293 -0.314 -0.315
(-3.071) (-3.552) (-4.040) (-4.016) (-4.468) (-4.834)
CRD" 0.027 0.017 0.370 0.242,
( 1.937) ( 1.274)* ( 1.732) (1.161)*
iM 0.014 0.198,
(2.375) ( 1.940)
(I," / K~I), 0.825 0.905 0.813
(15.448) (14.001) (11.760)
(i/' - k~I), 0.821 0.886 n.807
p5.5222 {14.1992 ~11.4152
iP 0.942 0.950 0.961 0.942 0.948 0.955
SE 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.104 O.IOO 0.092
SC chi-sq. (I) 0.161 1.146 0.196 0.234 0.467 0.048
FF chi-sq. (I) 0.740 1.746 6.052* 0.251 0.967 2.594
N chi-sq. (2) 1.301 1.075 0.851 0.335 2.013 0.496
H chi-sq. (l) 0.210 0.192 1.107 0.417 0.109 3.112
Note: I) X for any variable indicates the rate of growth in that variable.
models have been tried for each sector, but only the data from manufacturing have
provided significant results for the putty-putty model. These results are also
reported in Table 6.6. The functional specification chosen for all sectors is the putty-
clay model of equation (12a). Table 6.7 reports the results for the putty-clay model.
Two main different models are reported for each putty-clay model. One of them is
the pure flexible accelerator model linking private investment to both the accelerator
variable -which is output of the relevant sector- and the relative user cost of capital
(comprising sector specific rate of depreciation, and the price of capital goods). The
second one is the generalised version of the flexible accelerator model including
credit availability to the private sector and public investment. Since no time series
on sectoral credit are available, aggregate credit to the private sector has, instead,
been used as a proxy. A similar difficulty arises for the data on sectoral wage levels,
and instead, general wage index derived from the data on total non-agricultural wage
and salaries has been substituted. However, since this wage index does not cover
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wage and salaries in the agricultural sector, the price index of fixed capital goods has
been used for this sector.
Two putty-putty models have been estimated for manufacturing, semi-log
which is consistent with the theoretically derived model (6a), and its double-log
version [equation (6b)]. Both results are presented in Table 6.6. The estimations
have started with the flexible accelerator without any additional term apart from the
accelerator and cost variables, and then successively credit and public investment
variables have also been included. Although all variables seem to be significant
(except for credit in (3) and (6»), the inclusion of public investment caused
functional form misspecification in the theoretical putty-putty model (see eq.3).
However, by changing the functional form to the double log, the problem has been
overcome. According to the results in the table, the accelerator and cost variables
are the two strongly significant variables at the 5 percent level. Despite the fact that
credit is significant when it is included alone, once public investment is included, it
becomes insignificant.
The putty-clay models of manufacturing along with those of other sectors are
reported in Table 6.7a and Table 6.7b. The first columns of each sectoral
estimations in the table represent the results of the pure accelerator model without
credit and public investment. The next columns are, on the other hand, the
estimation results of the generalised accelerator model. There is no unexpected sign
in any of the estimations in Table 6.7.
The pure accelerator model fits the data well with high adjusted R2 (0.85 %
of total variation), and shows no indication of the violation of the standard OLS
assumptions. The putty-clay model performs better than the putty-putty in the sense
that the inclusion of credit and public investment does not lead to any functional
form misspecification problem. The results in column 2 mirror the fact that private
investment in manufacturing is highly sensitive to credit availability, public
investment in manufacturing, and the relative cost of capital, but is not responsive to
shocks caused by demand. This, together with the negative impacts of high interest
policies and the shortage of credit, may however, explain the drastic fall in the share
of private investment in manufacturing in the period 1985-1990 in an environment
where the share of public investment declined from 19.4 % on average between
1980-1984 to 7.3 % in the period 1985-1990 (see Table 5.17 in Chapter 5).
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Table 6.7a
Sectoral Investment Equations (all variables are in logarithm)
Manufacturing Agriculture Services
Variables
~12 ~22 ~12 ~22 ~Il (2l !3l1
Constant 1.391 3.196 2.517 2.850 -4.311 -1.611 -10404
( 1.624) (3.893) (2.619) (3.121) (-2.556) (-2.022) (-1.011)
yy, 0.050 0.969 0.466 00496
(3.050) (5.595) (3.658) (2.346 )
YY,-I 0.022
(1.168)
YY,-2 0.072 0.049
( 1.985) ( 1.386)
(c - w),
-0.116 -0.284
(-2.206) (-3.762)
~(c-w),
-0.358
(-3.(60)
~(c-wL
-0.269 -0.384
(-3.666) (-4.544)
~Inq,
-00495 -0.635
(-2.350) (-3.034)
crd] 0.151
(2.895 )
Mrd/, 0.433
(2.374)
~crd:~1
0.456
( 1.950)
~.~ 0.242I,
( 1.523)
~'M 0.253',-I
(2.423)
Dummy --0.826 -0.941 -0.692
(-4.545) (-6.202) (-6.651 )
./,
0.782 0.589 0.562 0.569 0.263 0.652 0.195/,_1
p.9232 !5.5422 !4.1152 !4.3982 ~1.864 2 ~4.2852 ( 1.3952
'R2 0.850 0.838 0.520 0.611 0.856 0.888 0.910
SE 0.098 0.102 0.167 0.150 0.154 0.132 0.121
se chi-sq.( 1) 0.024 0.000 0.007 0.057 0.147 0.882 2.514
FF chi-sq. (I) 0.038 0.144 0.085 1.737 2.114 0.545 0.736
N chi-sq.(2) 0.826 0.552 0.298 0.247 0.172 0.071 0.984
H chi-sg.~12 0.626 0.237 0.593 1.574 1.714 0.139 5.203
Note: Dummy in the service sector is for 1989.
I) t-ratios are based on the White's heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors
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Table 6.7b
Sectoral Investment Equations (cont)
Mining Encrg~
Variables
~q ~2~ ~3l Pl P) (3)
Constant -3.064 -3.071 -3.915 -0.814 -O.4R5 -0.558
(-2.232) (-1.558)3 (-3.654) (-2.077) (-0.859)* (-1.195)*
yy, 0.795 0.955
(2.318) (4.411)
Y)',-I
0.113
0.103 0.1070.721 (2.229)(2.510) ( 1.743) ( 1.8(9)
(c-wL
-0.104
(-I.MI )a
.:1(c-w),
-0.277 -0.289 -0.008
(-2.471) (-3.059) (-0.095)*
.:1(c-wL
-0.319
(-2.580)
crd:~1 0.023 0.007
(0.690)* (0.182)*
.:1·s
-0.225 -0.1041,-1
(-1.686)3 (-2.245)
Dummy -0.794 -0.792 -0.806
(-5.681) (-4.454 ) (-21.439)
./'
0.584 0.424 0.401 1.045 0.965 0.988',-I
~3.548l p.216~ p.224~ ~22.813l p.1(9) p9.658)
IF 0.900 0.943 0.938 0.964 0.958 0.961
SE 0.166 0.143 0.134 0.135 0.153 0.149
SC chi-sq.( I) 0.113 0.620 0.717 3.160 0.219 0.308
FF chi-sq.( I) 0.468 0.760 0.483 2.948 0.036 0.001
N chi-sq.(2) 0.200 1.571 0.848 3.820 1.564 1.621
H chi-s9·~ Il 0.501 0.692 1.296 1.105 4.051 4.180
Note: Dummy in Energy is for 1986. a) significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 6.S
Sectoral Long-Run Multipliers
Manuf Agri. Services Mining Energ~
Variables (2) (2) (2) (3) (I) (3) ( I) (2)
Accelerator 0.050 0.102 1.341 0.293 1.734 1.595 2.511 2.927
(l.l53) 0.249) (3.661) (2.530) (5.509) (8.566) (0.966) (0.247)
Cost -0.891 -1.316 -1.028 -0.353 -0.667 -0.483 -o.rzs
(-3.754) (-2.459) (-1.567) (-4.186) (-1.910) (-2.967) (-().093 )
Credit 1.003 0.945 0.188 0.185
(2.257) ( 1.867) (3.356) (0.441 )
Public Inv. 0.587 -0.375 -2.938
~2.512~ ~-1.686) (-0.259~
The putty-clay model performs reasonably well for the agricultural sector.
Despite the fact that the inclusion of credit improves the goodness of fit slightly, the
adjusted R2 is the lowest of five sectors. The distinctive feature of the results is the
high responsiveness to the price of capital goods in agriculture. This effect becomes
even higher when credit and public investment are both included.
The model for the service sector has first been estimated without any dummy
variable. However, the normality test of the estimation was too high. Using the
visual inspection in residuals, it has been decided to smooth the outlier in 1986 by a
dummy. In Table 6.7, only the results with the dummy variable are reported. The
accelerator model appears to work better for services. Unlike manufacturing and
agriculture, the accelerator variable has the highest impact on investment. This is
followed by cost and credit variables in column 3. Note that due to the existence of
the heteroscedastic disturbance term, all t-ratios in the column 3 of the service sector
are based on the White's heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors.
The accelerator model provides the best fit to the data from the mining sector
(see column 3 of Table 6.7b). The adjusted R2s in all three estimations are about
0.90 percent of total variation. The accelerator effect comes up significantly very
high, and not different from unity (the Wald test was calculated 0.941 for equation I
in Table 6.7). While the cost variable is significant and, as expected, has a negative
sign, the credit variable seems not to have any significant effect on the determination
of private investment in the mining sector. Instead, public investment in the mining
sector appears to have significant and negative effects on investment at 10 percent.
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The estimation result in the energy sector has also been improved by using a
dummy variable for the outlier in the disturbance term in 1986. The explanatory
power of the model is quite impressive, although significance of the cost variable in
(I) and the credit term in (2) are not significant at all. As noted in the second
column of the energy sector, the accelerator model has been estimated without any
cost variable, but with credit and public investment in the energy sector. In eq. 3, the
cost variable in level has become significant. Overall, the only consistently
significant variable in all three equations is the accelerator variable. Although public
investment seems significant in the second estimate, its significance totally depends
on the presence of credit term in the equation.
In Table 6.8, the long-run multipliers of some selected equations of each
sector are presented. The long-run multipliers for manufacturing and agriculture
show a great similarity regarding the significance of accelerator, cost and credit
effects. For manufacturing, the credit availability in the long run is the main factor
that constrains firms (it is almost unity in magnitude). According to the long-run
multipliers in magnitude, the cost factor of capital investment is, on the other hand,
slightly more important factor in agriculture (whose long-run multiplier of cost is
-1.3) than credit (its multiplier's value is 0.95). However, the accelerator factor in
the long-run is not an influential determinant of private investment in both sectors.
It appears that there are three highly significant constraints determining
private investment expenditures in the services sector in the long run. Their long-run
elasticities are however small. The cost variable whose long-run multiplier is -0.353
is the most influential and followed by accelerator (0.29 is the value of the
multiplier), and by credit (whose value of the multiplier is about O. 19). These three
sectors (manufacturing, agriculture, and services) are the only sectors that are
sensitive to the availability of credit. Among the rest, the energy sector's investment
decisions in the long term seem not to be affected by any of these factors at all.
Mining, on the other hand, has responded mostly to the accelerator (whose value of
the multiplier is about 1. and 1.6 for each corresponding equation), and to cost (-0.67
and -0.483 respectively). Also, public investment seems significant in mining in the
long run at 10 percent.
7. Conclusion
This chapter initially has three main aims. The first one is to find out to what extent
a theory-based neoclassical flexible-accelerator type of investment models can be
successfully applied to a developing country, namely Turkey. In this respect, I have
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Table 6.9
What Determines Private Investment In Turkey:
General Summary of the Estimations of the Putty-Clay Model
Variables Aggregate Manufac. Agricultural Services Mining Energy
not
Accelerator at 1% significant at 10 % atS % at I % at S~,
not
Cost atS % at 1% at 1% at I % at I~' significant
at 1% not not
Credit and5 % at5 % at 5 % at 1% significant significant
not not
Public Inv. significant at5 % at 10 % significant at 10 % at 5 %
Note: Figures in each cell indicate the significance levels of the variables in the first column
provided a microeconomic foundation for a so-called flexible-accelerator-relative
price model by borrowing to a great extent from Catinat et al. (1987) and Artus and
Muet (1990). Two versions of the model have been derived and estimated under two
alternative production technology assumptions, namely the putty-putty and the putty-
clay technologies. Assuming that factor-substitution between capital and labour is
variable ex post and ex ante, the putty-putty version of the model has been derived in
an accumulation-rate form in which the rate of capital accumulation is a positive
function of the rate of growth in output and a negative function of the rate of changes
in the relative cost of capital. Empirical results, however. required some
modification in the specification of the model, and then the double-log form of the
putty-putty model has performed well with the Turkish data.
Alternatively, the putty-clay version of the model (assuming that the rate of
capital-labour substitution is variable ex post but fixed ex ante) has been derived, in
a double-log-linearised form, as a function of the net change in output and the
relative cost of capital. As being a more realistic assumption, the model with the
putty-clay technology has performed relatively better than the putty-putty model in
terms of better fit to the data. However, the data have also required a modification in
the specifications of the explanatory variables in the putty-clay model. The
econometric tests carried out with this model have revealed that the cost of capital
and the credit variables should enter the putty-clay model in the first-differenced
form, rather than in levels as suggested by the theory.
The second purpose of the chapter is to find out what determines Turkish
private investment expenditures. Theoretical model allows for the effects of two
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main neo-classical variables in the determination of investment demand of a firm.
These are the accelerator (the rate of growth in output in the putty-putty case, the net
change in output in the putty-clay case), and the relative cost of capital comprising
the rate of interest and the price of capital goods. Expected effects of these two
variables are positive for the accelerator, and negative for the cost variable.
Apart from the functional modifications of the investment model on the
statistical ground, two additional variables, namely the availability of credit to the
private sector (in line with the third purpose of the paper to test the effects of
dependence of the Turkish corporate sector on external funding), and public
investment (to find out the crowding-in and crowding-out effects of the public
sector). The inclusion of these variables are, however, theoretically less sound, and
an eclectic approach has been adapted to do so.
Empirical results have not provided any significant evidence to support the
important impact of public investment on private fixed capital accumulation at the
aggregate level. I must, on the other hand, note that the public investment data used
in the estimations are aggregate data including both infrastructure and non-
infrastructure public investment. Any further investigation on the effects of the
public sector's investment requires disaggregate data on public sector infrastructure
and non-infrastructure investment, that are available only for a shorter time period
between 1975 and 1993 in the Turkish case.
Importantly, despite the fact that the original theoretical model does not
include the credit variable, its inclusion into both specifications improved the
explanatory power of the model, and reduced the previous value of t-statistics
estimated without the credit variable. This may empirically be interpreted as the
misspecification of the original model without the credit term.
The empirical results, that have been obtained in the earlier sections, belong
to the estimations that are based on a relatively larger sample size (including 31
observations) than those previous models applied to Turkey. In Table 6.9, the
general summary results of the putty-clay models are presented. The table reports
the significance level of each variable for aggregate and sectoral private investment
equations. At aggregate level, all three variables -the accelerator, the relative
capital-labour cost, and the credit availability to the private sector- appear
significant. Given the results in Table 6.9, the significance level of the impacts of
the accelerator consistently is higher than those of the relative prices and the credit
constraint. However, in the long-run, credit and the cost of capital variables become
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more influential than the accelerator. According to the result from Table 6.4, the
long-run elasticities of credit and cost are reported to be 3.2 and -1.2 respectively
-both are significant at 5 percent- (see panel (iii) in Table 6.4). The long-run
elasticity of the accelerator, however, comes last with 0.8 (less than unity), and
significant at the 5 percent significance level.
At the sectoral level, the estimates on private investment in manufacturing
have revealed that changes in credit availability to the private sector, the cost of
capital and public investment in manufacturing are important factors (all significant
at 5 percent). In particular, public investment is very sensitive to changes in credit
availability; a unit increase in credit to the private sector in general increases private
investment by 0.43 percent. In the long run, this effect is unity and significant at 5
percent level. Cost of capital's effect is -0.36 percent as a result of a unit change in
the cost of capital, -0.89 percent in the long-run. Public investment also positively
affects private investment both in the short and long run. Given the high volatility of
interest rates (that is one elements of the composite definition of the cost of capital)
and a continuous decline in the share of public investment in the manufacturing
sector, the estimates of the model give some suggestive evidence on the likely
factors that might play an important role.
Agriculture shows some similarities to manufacturing. While the share of
agricultural private investment declined (along with successive drops in production
levels), the capital cost and decreasing agricultural public investment might
contribute to this poor performance in the agriculture sector. However, in the long
run the cost term and credit availability are two important factors affecting
investment behaviour in agriculture with -1.3 percent and 0.95 percent elasticities
respectively (both significant at 5 percent).
Services, on the other hand, have enjoyed increases in credit, and stimulated
demand, although they were adversely influenced by the cost of capital. But the first
two factors as a whole seem to have overcome the negative effect of the last. The
last two sectors, mining and energy, have very little share in aggregate investment
and in total production. The mining sector has emerged positively sensitive to the
accelerator and negatively to cost and public investment. Overall the empirical
performance of the energy sector has been very poor, but the accelerator and public
investment have come up very significantly.
How robust are these results to the specifications of a particular model (such
as the one presented in this chapter)? In the next chapter, the neoclassical
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determinants of the private Turkish investment (at both aggregate and sectoral
levels) are analysed, using a different (data-oriented) econometric methodology.
Chapter 6Accelerator Effects. Borrowing Constraints. The Cost of Capital 223
Appendix-A
Panel Data Estimation of The Putty-Clay Model of
Private Investment Demand
Finding an adequately long time series for a specific variable is rather difficult task
in developing countries. In addition to a comparatively better econometric
explanation, my main purpose here is to make the optimal use of all available data
on investment. For this purpose, I adopt a rather different econometric approach in
the present appendix. This new approach accounts for the combination of cross-
sectional and time series components of the available data. As defined earlier, the
data set consists of five different sectors (agriculture, manufacturing, services, and
energy) over a ten-year-time period between 1968 and 1993. A relatively short time-
period of my data-set may shed some doubt upon the reliability of the results in the
text. But the panel data set, which combines observations on different individual
cross-section units over several time period, on the other hand, contains more
information for each time period unit. However, the approach adopted in this
appendix is not totally free of problems. The dynamic nature of investment
decisions has not been taken into account because of the insufficient number of cross
sectional units in the sample which was required for the dynamic estimation.
The new econometric methodology possesses several major advantages to
deal with some economic and econometric questions; see BaJtagi (1995) for a
detailed account of these advantages. First of all, the panel data econometrics give a
relatively large number of observations for each corresponding time period, and
increase the degree of freedom, making use of more information available from data.
From the econometric point of view, panel data estimation techniques reduce the risk
of multicollinearity among variables introducing the effects of all omitted (or
excluded) variables into the intercept term, and increase the efficiency of
estimations. Secondly, they control the individual heterogeneity across cross-
sectional units.
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In this respect, the theory of panel data has defined three sorts of omitted
variables [see Hsiao (1986)]: i.) individual time-invariant variables, which are the
same for a given cross-sectional unit through time, but vary across cross-section unit,
ii.) period individual-invariant, that are the same for all cross-sectional units at a
given period in time, but vary through time, ii.) individual time -varying variables,
that vary across cross-sectional units at a given point in time, and also exhibit
variation over time. When we pool the data, the assumption we usually maintain is
that the effects of all omitted variables are reflected into the intercept term. In most
of the panel data applications in economics, these unobservable, or omitted,
variables are assumed to be time-invariant or individual specific factors. The
estimation strategies of a panel data regression differ from each other according to
how to treat the omitted individual-specific factors in the regression. The theory has
so far suggested two different methods for this; the first one assumes that individual-
specific effects are fixed, whereas the second one treats them as random. In this
appendix, however, the model is kept as simple as possible in the sense that the time
effects are ignored, as in many similar economic applications, and only the one
which is known as the fixed-effects model, is covered.
Following most economic studies in the applied panel data literature [see
Cardellichio (1990), Fazzari and Mott (1986) for example], I have employed a
pooled data estimation strategy relying mainly on a priori assumption that intercepts
vary across over cross-sectional units, but not through time. In the present appendix,
two models are considered, and the decision of which one is appropriate is
determined by the sample data on the ground of some statistical testing. The most
simple model considers that all individual cross-sectional units are identical
imposing the same slope and intercept coefficient on each cross-sectional unit, and
the OLS has been applied to the entire pooled data. The second one, known as the
fixed-effect model, recognises the differences among cross sectional units, and
attempts to capture these differences by specifying a different intercept coefficient
for each cross-sectional unit. In doing this, the crucial assumption is that the effects
of all omitted variables are to be reflected in the variable-intercept term. and that all
these effects are independent of explanatory variables on the right hand side (that is
known as the orthogonality condition).
Fixed Effects Models:
When several individual units are observed over time, the problem of specifying the
stochastic nature of the disturbances becomes conceptually more difficult. In the
one-way error-component model, the effects of the numerous omitted individuals
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varying variables may be individually unimportant, but may be collectively
significant. To see this, assume that we have i = 1" .. ,N cross-sectional observations
and t = 1,... ,T time-series observations, and consider the following pooled data
regression of the investment model
(A-A I)
where i denotes five cross-sectional units (manufacturing, agriculture, services,
mining, and energy), t denoting time. X is a matrix of four explanatory variables
(accelerator, the cost of capital, credit and public investment), and its individual
elements are denoted as Xit,k where k= I,...,4. The U;/ are independent and
') ?
identically distributed random variables with E[uit] = 0 and E[Ui~] = a,; . When
cross-section and time-series data are combined in the estimation of the regression
above, certain unobservable, omitted factors may be present in the data. Without
considering those factors, the pooled OLS estimates of the slope coefficients may be
biased and inefficient. To introduce these omitted factors into the regression, the
most of the error component models decompose the error term ui/ into three
components as follows,
(A-A2)
where Pi represents all the omitted factors affecting the error term that are time-
invariant and specific to each cross-sectional unit. At reflects time-specific factors
that affect all cross-sectional units equally over time. And finally e., represents the
remaining factors which are assumed to vary over both cross-sectional units and
time. This is called the two-way error components model since the disturbance term
ui/ is broken into both individual-specific and time specific error components (p,
and At respectively). Following common practice in the economic applications of
the pooled data estimation, we simplify the model by assuming that only the
individual time-invariant component of the error term is included, then reduce the
previous regression equation into what we called the one-way error component
model as follows,
(A-A3)
It is assumed that the slope coefficients are the same for all cross-section units, but
the intercept term may differ over cross-sectional units, and remain constant over
time. This is called fixed effects model (also known as the dummy-variable model,
covariance model, and within-groups estimator).
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The Estimation and Results:
The primary purpose of this appendix is to see whether or not the results obtained in
the text change when the cross-section pooled data is used. Investment decisions are
dynamics in character, and the dynamics is represented in investment equations by
including lagged dependent variables such as one in eq. 12. But the estimation of
such an equation is complex, and requires a large number of cross-section units to
achieve the consistency property of the estimation. Instead, I changed the functional
specification of equation 12 by excluding the lagged investment, and making the
equation static. Estimation results are presented in Tables A-I, A-2, A-3, and A-4.
The results in Tables A-I and A-2 are those of equation 12, excluding the
agricultural sector since the time series on wages does not cover this sector. Given
the poor performance of the energy sector in the previous time series analysis, it is
also excluded from the sample in Table A-2. Tables A-3 and A-4 are the results
from the pooled data covering all sectors. The specification in these tables are, in a
sense, Keynesian because the price index of capital goods (that is supposed to
capture the supply side effects) is used to utilise all data available. Particularly in
Table A-4, the energy sector is excluded again. Each table reports two estimation
results for the same specification. OLS in these columns stands for the ordinary
least square estimator results of pooling all sectors, but not considering sector-
specific effects. On the other hand, in the second column of each specification,
sector-specific but time-invariant effects have been included by defining a dummy
variable for each sector in the sample. The estimation method used is noted by
DVLS (which stands for dummy variable least square estimator).
The credit variable and public investment have subsequently been included
starting from a simple accelerator relationship between private investment, the
capital-labour cost, and the accelerator. Dummy variables in all estimates are both
individually and jointly significant (F tests in tables are the joint test). With respect
to DVLS results in the third columns of Table A-I and Table A-2, all variables are
significant (including public investment). Unlike the time series analysis, the effects
of the cost variable have come up lowest, followed by that of the accelerator. The
credit variable and particularly public investment have become the most influential
factors according to the panel data estimations. However, according to the results in
Table A-3 and Table A-4, the price of capital goods emerges insignificant.
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Table A-I
The Panel Data Estimations of The Accelerator-relative-Cost Model
(Without Agriculture)
1 2 3
Variables OLS DVLS OLS DVLS OLS DVLS
qqt 0.489 0.181 0.482 0.078 0.426 0.058
(7.275) (4.712) (6.784) (2.220) (5.870) (1.736 )
qqt-I 0.530 0.148 0.531 0.094 0.487 0.084
(6.605) (3.004) (6.582) (2.274) (6.076) (2.162)
L1CWt -0.276 -0.031 -0.284 -0.060 -0.273 -0.060
(-3.615) (-0.726)'" (-3.529) (-1.711) (-3.483) (1.821)
crpt 0.018 0.146 0.028 0.145
(0.341 )'" (6.694) (0.556) • 0.124)
igt 0.376 0.258
(2.528 ) (3.752)
Constant -1.577 -1.650 -3.727
(-2.560) (-2.518) (-3.584)
D1 5.356 5.587 3.1)63
(10.123) (12.768) (6.650)
D2 5.205 5.693 3.858
(8.480) (11.135) (5.540)
D3 2.301 2.353 0.888
(5.032) (6.239) ( 1.(86)
D4 2.029 1.966 0.256
(5.026) (5.906) (0.463)
SSE 153.07 34.734 152.88 23.358 143.15 20.221)
log-likelihood -163.179 -89.022 -163.118 -69.183 -159.829 -61.992
F 79.2 127.5 138.2
DF 96 93 95 92 94 91
Notes: OLS = Ordinary Least Square; DVLS = Dummy Variable Least Square; F = The joint
significance test of dummy variables; DF = Degree of Freedom.
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Table A-2
The Panel Data Estimations of The Accelerator-relative-Cost Model
(Without Agriculture and Energy)
(I) (2) (3 )
Variable OLS DVLS OLS DVLS OLS DVLS
44t 0.450 0.185 0.460 0.194 0.307 0.164
(5.645) (4.572) (5.681) (5.340) (3.963) (5.06H)
qqt-I 0.433 0.170 0.410 0.100 0.244 0.OH9
(4.485) (3.358) (4.035) (2.059) (2.557) (2.105)
<'lCWt -0.231 -0.065 -0.236 -OJ)64 -0.179 -0.077
(-2.413) (-1.394) (-2.455) (-1.546) (-2.107) (-2.213)
crpt_1 0.047 0.104 0.OX9 0.112
(0.774)· (4.230) (1.675 ) (5.239)
igt O.HOI (>.376
(4.773) (4.74H)
Constant -0.269 -0.482 -4.056
(-0.318) (-0.540) (-3.754)
DI 5.144 4.915 2.452
(9.663) (10.237 (3.6HO)
D2 4.955 4.819 2.043
(8.021) (8.688) (2.695)
D3 2.111 1.815 -0.417
(4.591 ) (4.341 (-0.701)
SSE 119.50 23.381 118.49 18.511 H9.07S 13.HSO
log-likelihood -123.889 -62.712 -123.570 -53.953 -112.H70 -43.075
F 70.9 91.8 92.2
DF 71 69 70 68 69 67
Notes: OLS = Ordinary Least Square; DVLS = Dummy Variable Least Square; F:= The joint
significance test of dummy variables; DF = Degree of Freedom.
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Table A-3
The Panel Data Estimations of The Accelerator-relative-Cost Model with The Price of
Capital Goods
( all Sectors)
~2~ 3
Variables OLS DVLS OLS DVLS OLS DVLS
qqt 0.430 0.175 0.443 0.201 0.616 0.204
(6.963) (5.187) (7.151) (6.548) (8.836) (5.432)
qqj.] 0.382 0.163 0.371 0.084 0.261 0.058
(6.041) (4.762) (5.512) (2.479) (4.138) (1.886)
Pt -0.107 .o.o I I
(-4.333 ) (-0.953)*
Pt-I -0.083 -0.015
(--3.041 ) (-1.206)*
LlPt -0.035 -0.012
(-1.914) (-1.370)
crpt_1 0.124 0.122 0.124 D. I I I
(2.480) (5.448) (2.680) (5.289)
igt -0.021 0.190(-0.288)* (2.763)
constant 0.149 -0.982 -1.385
(0.269) (-1.464) (-1.900)
DI 4.034 3.519 2.997
(11.075) (9.337) (6.881 )
D2 5.318 4.816 3.709
(13.624) (11.698) (6.301 )
D3 5.110 4.722 3.484
(11.201) (10.456) (5.376)
D4 2.356 1.838 0.834
(6.788) (5.066) ( 1.595)
D5 1.938 1.375 0.226
(6.195) (4.105) (0.417)
SSE 21.044 47.682 198.670 38.219 184.82 35.993
log-likelihood -209.923 -117.132 -206.326 -103.306 -201.808 -99.556
F 36.0 97.4 95.1
DF 121 117 120 116 119 115
Notes: OLS = Ordinary Least Square; DVLS = Dummy Variable Least Square; F = The joint
significance test of dummy variables; DF = Degree of Freedom.
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Table A-4
The Panel Data Estimations of The Accelerator-relative-Cost Model with The Price of
Capital Goods
(without energy)
~2~ 3
Variables OLS DVLS OLS DVLS OLS DVLS
qqt 0.351 0.176 0.365 0.194 0.324 O.IM
(5.342) (4.760) (5.419) (5.536) (4.730) (4.739)
qqt-I 0.296 0.149 0.267 (>.087 0.217 0.073
(4.522) (4.077) (3.689) (2.263) (2.t)33 ) ( 1.9X5)
i1Pt-1 -0.025 -0.011 -0.023 -0.066 -0.0 It) -0.059
(-1.454) (-1.215)' (-1.334) (-0.772)' (-1.(79)* (-0.727)·
crpt_1 0.047 0.089 0.047 (U)75
(0.950)· (3.663) (0.956)* (3.184)
Igt 0.1 XX 0.270
(2.266) (3.283)
constant 1.748 1.542 1.039
(2.766) (2.306) (1.503 )
D1 4.129 3.828 3.138
(10.654) (10.256) (7.611 )
D2 5.424 5.157 3.62X
(13.053) (12.990) (6.053 )
D3 5.235 5.033 3.347
(10.765) (10.938) (4.962)
D4 2.450 2.143 0.757
(6.642) (6.012) ( 1.4(0)
SSE 151.520 38.839 150.090 33.896 142.320 30.306
Log-likelihood -162.670 -94.606 -162.197 -87.800 -159.53X -82.203
F 67.5 78.8 84.1
DF 96 93 95 92 94 91
Notes: OLS = Ordinary Least Square; DVLS = Dummy Variable Least Square; F = The joint
significance test of dummy variables; DF = Degree of Freedom.
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Appendix-B
Derivation of the Optimal Demand for Capital in an
Effective Demand Model
Assume that a representative firm minimises the cost of production subject to a
given demand in the output market. The production cost consists of the costs of
labour and capital;
Minimise C=wL+cK
Subject to
where w is the unit cost of labour, c being the unit cost of capital. In the production
function technological progress is assumed to exist. And the production function is
assumed to be a homogeneous degree of v. A simple Lagrange function can be
written for this cost minimisation problem as follows,
L = (wL+ cK) + ,u(f - F(eut K,e{31L))
where ,u is a Lagrange multiplier. The first-order conditions with respect to capital
and labour respectively are
Then the optimality condition becomes
e{JIF w
__ L ==_
eat FK C
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Some essentials of the model:
In addition to the optimality condition derived above, the share of wage costs, b, as a
proportion of production costs is the second fundamental of the model,
b= wL
wL+cK
The elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is also
d(K/L)/(K/L)a-- _
_ d(c/w)/(c/w) _
dln(K/L)
dln(c/w)
(see Varian 1992 for detailed explanation). Lastly using the Euler theorem and the
homogeneity of the production function degree of v, the following can also he
written
Having shown the essentials of the model, let me write the following total
differential of the production function which is itself a function of three variables,
capital, labour, and time:
dY_I( =r.« f3/lIFL)d aIF(K)dK liIF(L)dL
-_- ae + e t+e - -+e --Y Y K L KYK I.YL
Further arrangement yields
d InY = ~ (ae at F KK + f3e/llF LL )dt + ~ (F ~/" Kd InK + FI (,IiI Ld 1nL)
din Y = ~ (.)dt + ~ [FKeat Kdln K + (FLe/l1 Ldln K - FLePI Ld InK) + F/(,Iil Ld InL]
Using the Euler theorem,
I I (K)din Y = -(.)dt+vdln K +r,« LIn -Y Y - L
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From the formula of the elasticity of substitution, we have
dln(KI L) = -adln(clw)
Substitute this into the last version of total differential,
I I (c)din Y= -(.}dt+vdIn K+- FLe/lf Lain -
Y Y w
Make use of the relative share of the labour cost,
F K=}_(I-h}Fe/lfL
K b I.
Having substituted these in the equation before, we obtain
dIn Y = v[a( I - h) + {3h]dt + vd InK + bvaln( : )
where
Y = dIn Yjdt , i< = dIn Kldt , and (c - w) = d In{c/w)/dt
Therefore
Y = v[ a( I- h) + {3h] + vi< + bva( c - w)
This finally leads us to the expression for the optimal capital stock
j(' =}_ Y -hva(c- w)-[ a(l- b)+l3h]
v
The Integration of i'with Respect to Time
G· " dK'ldt . '. . f IIiven K = --, -, now mtegrate K over time as 0 ows
K
J dK'~dt dt = _!_J dY/dt dt- bvaJ d(c - w}/dt dt - [a(l- h) + f3h]JdtK v Y (c-w)
f
dK I fdY Jd(c-w) [ ]J
-, =- --bva - a(l-h)+l3h dt
K v Y (c-w)
In K' = _!_ In Y-bvaln(c- w)+[(a - f3)h- a]t
v
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Koyck Geometric Distribution Function in terms of The Rate of Capital
Accumulation
Given that
i = Ai' +(l-A )k_1 and k = /- 8K in continuous time,
also
!!:.K 1 !!:.K· ( 1)!!:.K 1 d l:' di ,
- = /l -.- + 1- /l --- , an !!:.K = /- uK -I In iscrete tune,
K_I K_I K_2
the following can easily be written
Chapter 7
An Alternative Econometric Analysis
1. Introduction
Estimating investment equations is difficult because economic theory provides only the
relationship between the determinants of the capital stock in the long-run steady state
equilibrium, but does not say anything about the short-run disequilibrium behaviour.
Theory defines equilibrium as a state in which there is no tendency to change.
Economists generally consider a stable equilibrium to be one to which an economic
system always tends to return in the long-run. Although economic theory is useful to
formulate the long-run equilibrium relationship, this equilibrium may never hold in the
short-run, if persistent shocks continuously keep the system away from its steady state
level. Consequently, the problem of formulating the short-run relationships in addition
to the long-run determinants of, say, investment, becomes crucial. This chapter
presents an alternative of the accelerator model to private investment, particularly taking
into account the short-run behaviour of investment within a self-contained theoretical
model, and provides additional evidence for the robustness of the findings of the earlier
chapter using a different econometric methodology.
Time series analysis stresses the difficulties associated with traditional
econometric model building (as the one used in Chapter 6), mainly because of the fact
that many macroeconometric time series are in fact not stationary (indicating time
dependent mean and variance), and using non-stationary variables in a regression
equation results in so-called spurious correlation [Granger and Newbold (1974)]. The
new econometric methodology has basically been built upon this fact.
The application of this innovative method in the modelling of investment is quite
new, and there already exists a growing literature [e.g. Fielding (1993), Kaskarelis
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(1993), Driver and Moreton (1992), Shafik (1992), and Bean (1981)]. The most
popular approach to modelling investment in developing countries links investment to
variables that determine the optimal level of capital stock. and includes the dynamics
using an ad hoc partial capital adjustment mechanism (e.g. see Chapter 6). The new
econometric method that I have suggested here considers a more general adjustment
process in the sense that the partial adjustment mechanism is nested by it. This general
model of adjustment is known as the error-correction model. According to the model
here. the adjustment towards the long-run involves some costs, and a representative
firm is assumed to reach the long-run optimal level of investment by minimising the
costs of adjustment, and determines the short-run investment behaviour subject to these
adjustment costs. The model in section 3 develops the short-run adjustment mechanism
of investment decisions, and combines the long-run determinants of investment with
the short-run adjustment process. The problem of determining which adjustment
process is more appropriate is the challenging one, because the initial purpose of using
the error-correction model is statistical (rather than theoretical) in order to avoid the
spurious correlation associated with trended time series. However, the theoretical
model in section 3 allows for such testing of the error-correction mechanism against the
partial adjustment process.
The following sections develop arguments relating to the determinants and the
functional representation of private investment with the data from Turkey. In section 2,
the main elements of the new econometric methodology are discussed. Section 3
develops the model, and in section 4, estimation strategies available to estimate such a
dynamic model are presented. Section 6 reports the empirical findings for aggregate
and sectoral investment from the Turkish data. The comparison of the model with the
one used in Chapter 6 is briefly summarised in section 7. Finally section 8 is devoted
to some concluding remarks.
2. Concepts of The New Econometric Methodology
2.1 Cointegration
Equilibrium relationships are quite important in the new econometric model building
methodology. The idea is that the variables connected to each other in equilibrium in
accordance with a certain economic theory, should not diverge from each other in the
long run. The existence of this long-run relationship indicates that these variables are
cointegrated. Such variables may drift away in the short run, but show a tendency to
return to a particular equilibrium state in the long run. The concept of cointegration
may therefore be used to test the presence of a steady-state long-run relationship
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between economic variables as suggested by economic theory. The formal definition of
cointegration of the set of variables, xt' can be adapted from the seminal paper of
Engle and Granger (1987) as follows:
Definition: The components of the vector Xl are said to be co-integrated of order d, b,
denoted xl-C/(d-b), if (i) Xl is I(d) and (ii) there exists a vector a such
a/xl - I( d - h), d~b>O. The vector a is called the co-integrating vector. (Engle and
Granger, 1987: 253)
In the previous chapter, the dynamics of investment were assumed to follow the
Koyck distributed lag specification. Accordingly, actual investment demand was
assumed to adjust to its steady-state level by the partial adjustment mechanism in which
changes in investment are proportional to the discrepancy between the desired (in
steady state) and actual investment (in the short-run) levels. The determinants of the
desired investment derived in the long run are simply substituted into the partial
adjustment model to give a dynamic representation of the short-run investment model.
In the new econometric methodology, the equilibrium relationship also plays an
important role in the specification of the short-run dynamics. Suppose that there exists
a long-run relationship between the desired level of investment and its long-run
determinants, XI such as
I,d = {3X, (I)
(assuming that there are no stochastic components of the relationship), where f3 is the
cointegrating vector. This relationship between lId and XI holds in the long-run, but
the short-run investment level may diverge from this desired level, that is
I, -{3X,:;t 0 (2)
where It is the short-run level of investment which I, :;t /;1. This discrepancy (/;1 -I,) is
taken as an error made by agents, and becomes important information in the next
decision period of agents in the sense that they correct their actual investment demand
depending upon whether I, < I,d or I, > I,d. If this error, for example, is positive
(I, > In, then actual II is expected to fall in the next period in order to satisfy the
equality between the actual (short-run) investment and its long-run level. The term,
(/;1 -I,), is known as an error-correction term. Unlike the partial adjustment model, the
explicit long-run relationship between the desired level of investment and its
determinant is included in the short-run specification of the model through the error-
correction term,
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According to the cointegration analysis, if II and XI are both non-stationary
(indicating that their movements over time are towards steady state equilibrium), the
existence of the linear long-run relationship between II and XI' as mentioned above,
confirms the cointegation between these variables. The problem with co-integration
relationship (I) is that the vector of f3 s is in general not known, and should be
estimated separately using either OLS or Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimators, which
are discussed in section (4).
The most important implementation of cointegration analysis is the Granger
Representation Theorem [Engle and Granger, (1987)]. This theorem implies that if a
set of variables is cointegrated of order (1, 1), denoted CI( 1,1), then there exists a val id
error-correction representation between these variables. The inclusion of the error term
into the equation guarantees that the errors eventually becomes smaller and smaller, and
finally zero in the long-run. Error-correction models are currently so popular because
they incorporate both long-run relationships between variables as suggested by the
economic theory, and short-run disequilibrium behaviour.
In statistical theory, the concept of equilibrium indicates stationarity of time
series, that are not tending to grow over time and eventually converge to its
deterministic mean value. The difficulty with the traditional econometric model
building arises from the fact that many macroeconomic time series are in fact non-
stationary and may yield so-called spurious results if they are regressed on each other.
The theory suggests that a convenient way of making a non-stationary time series
stationary is to take first difference [Granger and Newbold, (1974)] rather than using
variables in levels. Sometimes it is necessary to difference a series more than once in
order to accomplish stationarity. This sort of series is defined by the concept of
integration. Engle and Granger (1987) define this as follows:
Definition: A series with no deterministic component which has a stationary, invertible,
ARMA representation after differencing d times, is said to be integrated of order d,
denoted X, -I(d) (Engle and Granger, 1987: 252).
Before carrying out any regression analysis, it is necessary first to determine the
order of integration of all variables in question (given that the order of integration is
also the number of times the variables needed to be differenced in order to achieved
their stationarity). This is known as testing for a unit root. Methods of testing for unit
roots are described in the next section.
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2.2. Stationarity, Non-Stationarity and Unit Roots
The application of the ordinary least squares method (OLS) assumes that a random
process generating a time series, say xt' is invariant with respect to time. This is
simply known as a stationarity property of the time series. The stationarity requires that
the random process be in a particular statistical equilibrium, and not affected by time. If
we characterise this equilibrium by the first and the second moments of the random
process, the statistical equilibrium, known as stationarity, yields
E( X, ) = E( X,_I) = E( X,_2) =.... = E( X,_II) = 111
V( x,) = V( X,_I) = V( X,_2) =... = V( x,_,.) = s~
where m is the constant mean of the stochastic process x,; ~/ is the constant variance of
the series. For any lag k, the covariance of the series,
Y, = Cov(x,.x,_k)= E[(x,-m)(xH -m)]
must also be independent of time. But these properties of a time series are hardly
applicable to any economic time series, whose means and variances sometimes show
radical changes over time, indicating non-stationarity. The application of the OLS
technique to these non-stationary series becomes inappropriate because a regression of
one non-stationary economic variable against another may cause spurious results in
which conventional significance tests could indicate a strong relationship between these
variables when in fact there is no such a relationship. And OLS would not yield a
consistent parameter estimation at all.
Many economic time series, however, follow a non-stationary random walk,
such that
X, = XH + E, (3)
where E( E,) = 0, E( E,E,) = 0 for t;F. s ; i.e. Et is white noise. Using a simple
backward lag operator, (3) can be written as
I
X, = LE} where XII = 0
i=)
(3a)
The variance of X, can then be derived from (3a) as a function of time;
I
Var(x,)= LVar(Ej)=ta:
j=1
(4)
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This means that the variance of X, becomes infinitively large as t approaches infinity.
So, the stochastic process cannot be in a particular statistical equilibrium as required by
the stationary of a variable. Instead, it converges to such an equilibrium only in
infinity.
Although many economic time series are non-stationary, they can generate
stationary series if they are differenced one or more times. The order of differencing is
a matter of statistical testing as will be explained shortly. Take the above random walk
representation of x; for example. Its first-difference, ~t' will be
Ax, =E, (3b)
which is stationary, since Et is a white noise stationary disturbance term. This means
that x" which follows a random walk, is integrated of order one, I( I), but Sx, is
integrated of order zero, 1(0) (the number in the parenthesis shows the order of
differencing the series required before having stationarity). Before starting any time
series analysis, the determination of the order of differencing, that converts the series
into a stationary one, is crucial. Testing the order of differencing is usually known as a
unit root test. Many economic time series are however first-order differencing series,
so that if they are differenced once, the resulting series become stationary.
This random walk representation of the stochastic variable X, is, in fact, an
AR( I)model where the coefficient of X,_I is unity. One likely simple test which X, is a
random walk is to fit a regression of X, against X,_I' and test whether or not, the AR( 1)
coefficient is unity. The OLS estimation of the coefficient of X'_I' however, will be
biased downward, particularly in a small sample, and leads falsely to the conclusion
that the series is stationary. Dickey and Fuller, on the other hand, showed that the
distribution of the AR( 1) coefficient is not a standard Student's t distribution [Dickey
and Fuller, (1979)]. They then produced a number of statistics to test the null
hypothesis that the time series in question is stationary [Dickey and Fuller, ( 1979) and
(J 981 )]. The distribution of the statistics to test AR(l) data generation process is
denoted by rJ1 in order to distinguish it from the standard t-distribution.
It is important to note that tables of critical values depend on the data-generation
process. The simplest data-generation process is
XI = pXI_1 + El' EI- IID( 0, er;) (5)
The null hypothesis is that p = 1, against the alternative !PI< 1. If the error term in this
equation is a white noise process, then this equation represents a random walk process
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when p= I. Such a data generation process is nonstationary. But if Ipi< I, then the
process is integrated of order zero, and is stationary. The critical value r is given by
the top part of table (8.5.2) of Fuller (1976). The test can also be applied to the
following more general AR(l) data-generating process where X follows a random walk
with drift,
x, =a+px'_1 +£" (6)
where a is a drift parameter. The null hypothesis is that p= I against Ipi< I. The
qualitative interpretation of this process is similar to the previous one. However the
distribution of 'rJi for p is different and consequently a different table of critical values
should be used. The 'rJi statistic to be calculated from the above AR( I) process is
compared with the critical value of 'rJi given in the middle part of the table (8.5.2) of
Fuller 1976. If the calculated 'rll does not exceed the critical value from the table at a
chosen significance level, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis of a unit root.
A stochastic trend is often combined with a deterministic trend. The last data-
generation process also accounts for both drift and a linear deterministic trend as
follows,
X, = a + yt +PX'_I +e, £,-lID( 0, (1';) (7)
With this equation, it is possible to test simultaneously for the absence of a stochastic
trend (p= I) and the absence of a deterministic trend ("(=0). The test is the Lagrange
multiplier test whose critical values are reported in Dickey and Fuller ( 1981).
A weakness of the Dickey-Fuller test (DF) is the possibility of autocorrelation
in the error-term. Since the OLS estimator with autocorrelated error term is not
efficient, Dickey and Fuller suggest the inclusion of lags of the left-hand side variable
as additional explanatory variables [Dickey and Fuller (J 981 )). This is described as the
Augmented Dickey and Fuller test, ADF, and widely used data-generation process
among others. The representation of the process is
X, = a + PX'_I +~ r 8/ll,_ +£" £,-lID(O, (1';)
£")=1 J )
(8)
(8) is called the augmented regression. The determination of the order of lag, p, is
subject to the number of observations used in the analysis, and should be relatively
small in order to save degrees of freedom, but large enough to allow for the existence
of autocorrelation in the residuals. The test is exactly the same as before, but the critical
values are presented in Dickey and Fuller (1981).
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3. Error-Correction Representation of The Investment Model:
The model suggested here aims to explain the short-run dynamics of investment
decisions. I assume a representative firm that maximises its intertemporal profit. Such
an optimisation problem involves the direct cost of production and highly complex
costs of capital adjustment. The full solution of the problem. particularly the one
including a non-linear cost of capital adjustment, is rather difficult, and may yield a
non-linear decision rule. To cope with this complexity, I divide the problem into two
parts [e.g. see Cuthbertson and Gasparro (1992), Ireland and Wren-Lewis (1989), and
Moran (1989)]. The first part considers a static optimisation problem which gives the
so-called long-run (or steady-state) solution of the model. The second part introduces
the dynamics into the model using an optimisation of a quadratic cost function in the
adjustment process of investment towards its steady-state target value.
The model is a version of the well-known accelerator models. I begin with a
simple, but fairly general, maximisation problem of the firm by assuming that the
firm's profit maximisation is restricted to the current and the next period. This is a
simplified and discrete-time version of Jorgenson's cash flow maximisation, and has
been used by various authors in different contexts [e.g. see Rama ( 1993) and Artus and
Muet (1990)]. The firm's total cash flows are assumed to consist of the cash tlows of
each period. In the present period, current profit from production plus the discounted
capital gain from the capital installed earlier, and expected profit plus expected
discounted capital gain in the next period will be the elements of the optimisation
problem. The model can finally be written as
Maximise
(9)
subject to ( 10)
f, = F(K"L,) ( 11 )
( 12)
where Vt: the value of the firm, Pt : the price of output, Y, : output, qt: the price of
capital goods, Kt: capital stock, 0: depreciation rate, rt: discount rate, It: investment Wt:
nominal wage, L: labour. The first term in the objective function (9) represents current
profits in period t. The second one is the discounted capital gains (or losses) during the
first period that arise from changes in the price of capital goods. The third term shows
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investment expenditure in period t. The fourth term is the discounted expected profit in
period (t+ 1) and the fifth term measures the discounted expected capital gains (or
losses) during the period (t+ 1). The objective function is maximised subject to a set of
technological and economic constraints. The first constraint is the law of motion of the
capital stock [equation (10)]. The second and the third ones [equations (11) and 12)]
are technological constraints given by production functions for periods t and (t+ 1). By
assumption, the firm faces a strictly binding constraint in the output market [see
Precious (1987)].
The firm is assumed to choose the optimal level of output, capital. and labour to
maximise its profit in the current period. The optimisation of (9) subject to ( 10), ( I I)
and (12) then produces the supply of output and labour for period t and output supply,
demand for capital and labour in period (t+ I). As seen from (9), demand decisions for
production factors of the firm in both periods are independent of each other, and the
investment is the only variable connecting these two periods through constraint ( 10).
This separability of periods and the constraint (10) allows us to write the objective
function (9) as follows, substituting (10) for investment in the objective function using
equation (10),
where Cr+1 = q,[ 8 + r, - (q'+1 - q, )/q,] is the user cost of capital. The maximisation in
period t [in (9a)] determines output and demand for labour in t subject to prices and
output constraint (11) in the first period, and the initial capital stock Kt-I. The
optimisation for period (t+ 1) determines demand for labour and capital together in (t+ I)
on the basis of expected prices and the demand constraint in the output market. In this
case, the decisions are independent of those in period t, so the overall problem become
a maximisation of the profit function in period (t+ I); that is
Maximise ( 13)
subject to ( 12)
This is the static optimisation problem that leads us to the desired level of capital. In
this case, I am interested only in demand for capital Kt+ I,which sets the demand for
investment decided in period t [see equation (10)]. Note that in this so-called
Keynesian situation, where the supply of output is determined by demand for output,
and is assumed to be strictly binding, then demand for labour for a given level of output
will be a function of output and capital stock,
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r:+1 = F( K'+I ' L'+I ) (12a)
where [,+1 is the constrained demand for labour. Therefore, after substituting (12a) into
(13), the first-order condition with respect to Kt+1 will give the optimal level of capital
stock depending on the constrained demand for output, and the relative user cost of
capital,
( 14)
Demand for investment can finally be determined using ( 10). However, in the long-run
steady-state equilibrium, changes in the capital stock will be zero (i.e. I,' = OK; or
111;= 8~K; if the target variable, either I; or K; moves), and the long-run-steady state
demand for investment will be
( 15)
where b is the constant rate of depreciation, Q'+I the given level of demand in the output
market, (C/wtl the relative user cost of capital. Having obtained the long-run
determinants of investment, suppose that the next problem the economic agent faces is
to decide on how much to invest in the short run to achieve this target value in (15).
Assume that in the process of moving towards the target level of investment, the
economic agent wishes to minimise the costs arising from adjustment of the capital
stock. Following Nickell (1985), consider the case where the adjustment cost
functions are quadratic for simplicity and easy tractability. This optimisation problem
facing the agent can then be written as
Minimise ( 16)
where 0t = (1,,1,_1' • • . ;X" X,_p ... ;u
"
u,_p ... ) is the information set of the economic agent at
time t, 0:5~:51 is the discount factor, 1,:., is the target value of the desired investment
derived in equation (15). Equation (16) is a fairly general adjustment cost function
which encompasses simpler specifications as special cases. The first term in the square
bracket represents the cost of being away from the long-run equilibrium level of
investment. The second one is the cost of changing the speed of adjustment towards
the target. The last one implies that the loss is attenuated if the agent moves in the right
direction; this last term will go to zero if the target level of investment remains constant.
The optimal strategy with the last term in (16) is to close the gap between the choice
variable It and the target as the latter grows. This adjustment cost term ensures that the
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gap, which arises from being in disequilibrium, is asymptotically closed; see, for
example, Hendry and von Ungern-Sternberg (1981) in the context of consumption
analysis. It is also worth noting that in earlier investment studies, the partial adjustment
mechanism, in which f}2 = 0 (i.e. the target is constant), has extensively heen used to
introduce the dynamic nature of investment into the modelling [Griliches (1967) and
Nickell (1978)]. This might be true if the target variable is constant, and can be tested
here by imposing the restriction 82 = 0 on (16).1 The objective function (16),
therefore, is a simple but fairly general dynamic form of adjustment including the partial
adjustment model as one of special cases.
The complete solution of the problem can be found in Nickell (1985) in more
detail. To minimise the total adjustment cost function, we differentiate the function
with respect to investment, It+s, to obtain the first-order condition. This produces a
Iinear decision rule for s=O given by
The solution of this second-order difference equation yields the following unrestricted
equation for If
If we assume that 82 = 0, then the forward-looking solution of the difference equation
(17) generates the following alternative short-run investment demand equation
( 18a)
In (18) and (I8a), E(I,*+jln,)s are not observable, but it is assumed that its actual values
are determined by a random variable l,+j for j > O. The sequences of ,;+' can then be
defined by
( 19a)
( 19b)
I Chhibber and Shafik (1992) defined a quadratic cost function similar to (16), hut neglect the
importance of the restriction that 92>0 to derive the error-correction representation of the investment
model. As noted in the text, assuming that 92=0 only leads us to the conventional partial adjustment
model, not the error-correction mechanism.
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Ifwe follow Nickell (1985) and assume that 7 . follows a random walk with drift,
'+J
(20)
where E,+} is white noise, 11the drift term. Given (19a) for j > 0 and (20),
(21 )
By recursive substitution for i.; defined in (20), the following can be obtained
r.; = J1j +E(7,) (22)
Therefore, using I,:j = t: for j s 0,
I" . I"Hj = IlJ + I (23)
If the random variable 7 ., however, follows a random walk without drift, a similar
I+}
version of (23) can be derived as
f,+j=I," (23a)
Substituting first (23) into (18) yields a familiar error-correction representation of the
dynamic investment demand model
(24)
This is a more general version of the partial adjustment model which contains the
simple partial adjustment mechanism as a special case under restriction 82 = O.
Substituting (23a) into (18) and assuming that the restriction 82 = 0 holds, the familiar
partial adjustment mechanism can thus be derived
(24a)
We can then test the validity of the error-correction model (24) against the partial
adjustment model (24a) by testing the restriction hi = h2 in (24). The full test is
presented in the appendix in more detail.
In equations (9)-( 15), the long-run equilibrium level of investment has been
derived. Assuming the functional relationship between long-run investment level and
its determinants are linear, the following equation can be written
(25)
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Replacing (25) in (24) yields an estimateable error-correction model, such as.
(26)
where (/, - () is so-called error-correction term which is supposed to capture the
adjustment of prediction error made by agents. This is an error-correction
representation of the accelerator model. In the following section, the issue of
estimating (26) is considered.
4. Estimation Strategy:
There are a number of strategies that one can apply to the estimation of equation (24).
Cointegration analysis, which is one of them, particularly deals with the estimation
issues that arise when the variables of interest are integrated of order I. Using the
concept of cointegration, one can easily establish whether or not there exists a long-run
relationship given by economic theory. If investment and its determinants are all
integrated of order I, then a simple test of cointegration is to test the stationarity of the
error-term from the long-run regression of investment on its long-run determinants.
Stationarity requires that the error term will be integrated of order zero.
There are two methods of estimating dynamic relationship between cointegrated
variables. In this section, I have summarised two different estimation approaches. The
first one is the simple two-stage Engle and Granger method, and the Johansen
maximum likelihood approach. The insufficient number of observations however
(covering the periods of 1963-93 and 1968-93 for aggregate private investment and
sectoral investment respectively) limits the usage of the second econometric technique.
I therefore choose to use the Engle and Granger two-step method to estimate equation
(25) and (26) in this case.
4.1. The Two-Step Engle and Granger Method:
Specifically, the method first explores the long-run equilibrium levels relationship
before estimating a short-run dynamic equation. At the first stage, the hypothesised
long-run relationship in levels is estimated by using the simple OLS estimator. The
significance of the result (high R2 and significant t-ratios) confirms the existence of
cointegration between the variables. In particular, if private investment 1/' and one set
of determining variables, say X" are integrated of order I, then the formal test for
cointegration involves testing whether or not the error term, e" from a regression of 1/'
on XI is stationary. For this test procedure, the DF and ADF tests can be applied to the
residuals. If the hypothesised long-run relationship between investment and other
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exogenous variables are given as in equation (25), the disturbance term from this
regression will be
The DF or ADF test is applied to these residuals to test its stationarity. If it is
stationary, the long-run relationship written in equation (25) actually exists, and the
estimates of the coefficients of this equation can be interpreted as the cointegration
coefficients or the long-run multiplier.
The second stage consists of using the lagged error terms from the levels
regression to pick up the process by which economic agents correct for expectational
error in previous periods. These error terms, together with differences of other
variables, reflect the short-run dynamics. For the simple economic interpretation I have
included only the first lag of the error term. The residuals from that long-run equation
are then used as the error-correction term in the following short-run dynamic equation,
(26')
4.2. The Johansen Maximum Likelihood Approach
This is a multivariate generalisation of a model in differences with an error-correction
mechanism. The Engle and Granger method cannot guarantee a unique cointegrating
vector if there exist more than one variable that is suspected to be cointegrated. The
Johansen procedure however allows for the presence of more than one cointegrated
vector, although there is always one in the Engle-Granger. The main reason for this
may be the econometric methodologies on which both methods are grounded. Unlike
the Johansen, the Engle-Granger method made a clear exogenous-endogenous division
of variables assuming that a unique cointegration relation between these variables is as a
result of that division. In contrast, the Johansen is grounded upon the vector
autoregression representation of all possible relationships between variables, that does
not hold any priori exogenous-endogenous distinction between variables. If one
suspects that there exist more than one cointegrating vector, then the Engle-Granger
method is not appropriate.
The application of the method is quite straightforward [see Johansen (1988),
and Johansen and Juselius (1990)]. Regardless of the exogenous-endogenous division
of variables, consider now the following general vector autoregressive regression
(VAR)
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(28)
,
where Yt = [It Xt] assuming that Yt- /(1) and a linear combination {3'Yt- /(0) where
f3' is a vector of cointegrating coefficient; Yt is a (n x I) vector of endogenous
variables, ~ is an (n xl) vector of constants as et is an (n xl) vector of random
disturbances of zero mean and variance matrix Q, i.e. et- n.i.d.(O,Q). The
cointegration transformation of the same VAR model (28) can also be written similar to
ECM of the Engle-Granger,
(29)
where rj =-I+A1 +A2+ • • • +Aj (Iisaunitmatrix)
n= -(I - Al - A2- • • •-Ak)
For the purpose of cointegration analysis, the attention is on the matrix Il , and, in
particular, on its rank. Since N is the number of variables, the rank must be at most
equal to N. If the rank is equal to N, all elements of Yt are stationary, and there is not
such a matrix as Il. However, if the rank is R which is less than N, then this time
Il= a{3' (30)
where ~ and a are both N x R matrices, and ~ is called the cointegrating vector which
has the property that {3'yt - /( 0) while Yt - /(1). On the other hand, the rank of matrix
Il also gives the number of co-integrating vector. a is regarded as the adjustment
matrix, indicating that the speed of adjustment of particular variables with respect to a
particular disturbance in the equilibrium relation.
5. Empirical Results:
5.1. Unit Root Tests:
The annual data for aggregate private investment from 1963 to 1993 and the data for
agriculture, manufacturing, mining, and services from 1968 to 1993 are used for
estimation. All variables are at constant prices. Following the above discussion, time
series properties of each individual series are tested to determine the order of
differencing, if any, required to attain stationarity. Provided that all variables are I( 1),
the Granger Representation theorem can be applied to the data. Dickey-Fuller (DF) and
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are applied to test whether variables are
stationary or needed to be first-order differenced. The results are presented in Table
7.1. The cointegrating regression Durbin-Watson (CRDW) statistics [Sargan and
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Table 7.1a.
Unit Root Tests
With Trend Without Trend
Variables CROW OF AOF OF AOF Results
Aggregate
.t: 1.011 -1.317 -2.761 -0.814 -1.(1)7 I( I )t,
ig 1.378 -1.080 -1.708 -2.637 -2.506 I( 1),
V 1.865 -2.076 -3.234 -1.217 -1.710 I( 1)· ,
crd] 1.649 -2.776 -3.499 -0.866 -0.661 1(1)
('wt 1.465 -1.793 -2.109 -0.386 -0.6% I( I )
Agriculture
.r 1.809 -2.330 -2.484 -2.476 -2.762 1(1)'t
.~
1.568 -2.679 -4.257 -1.057 -1.282 I( I)t;
V 2.885 -2.281 -3.102 -1.387 -3.:N7 I( I )
· t
q;' 0.149 -2.553 -1.955 3.135 1.054 1(1)
Manufacturing
." 1.566 -1.510 -2.020 -1.490 -1.855 I( I)It
'g
1.349 -1.737 -1.743 -O.OSI -O.2()2 I( I )I,
). 1.383 -1.817 -3.428 -1.614 -1.657 I( I )· t
CW, 1.440 -1.678 -1.887 -0.733 -1.016 1(1)
Services
ir 2.924 1(1)
"
-3.682 -1.641 -I. 757 -0.336
'g
1.243 -3.157 -0.683 -O.9()5 I( I)It -1.958
)' 2.393 -2.395 -1.519 -0.411 0.140 1(1)· ,
CW, 1.751 -1.706 -2.096 -0.902 -0.535 I( 1)
Mining
./'
1.471 1(1)'t -1558 -2.568 -0.726 -O.8l)4
'g
1.708 -1.212 I( 1)
"
-0.688 -0.783 -1.255
v 1.455 -1.608 -1.909 -0.315 -0.503 1(1).r t
('wt 1.688 -1.633 -2.136 -0.655 -O.90() I~11
Note: i/,: logarithm of private investment, if: the logarithm of puhlic investment, .vt: the
logarithm either of gross domestic product for the aggregate model, or of output level in sectoral
models, crd": the logarithm of credit to the private sector, cw,: the logarithm of the relative user
cost of capital, Pf the logarithm of the price of capital goods. At 5 percent, the upper and lower
values of small sample test for 25 observations are -2.00 and -2.11 respectively. They are -2.26 and
-2.05 for the sample size 30 at the same significance level. At I percent, however, they arc -3.43
and -2.81 for the sample size 25, and -3.33 and -2.72 for 30 ohservations.
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Table 7.lb. (cont.)
Variables 2 2 Rcsults''
Aggregate
)'
· ,
crdj'
Agriculture
./,
I,
)'
· I
Manufacturing
'K
"
cw,
Services
./,
I,
v,
cw,
Mining
v
· ,
3.674
2.793
7.088
6.303
1.994
2.595
6.466 5.174*
11.032 9.074*
0.115
1.556
2.572
7.440 5.327*
1.671
2.094
4.424
5.104
2.150
2.540
1.652
3.126
1.968
4.009
3.221
5.977
6.124
2.243
RW. no drift
RW. no drift
RW with a drift
RW with a drift
RW. no drift
3.713 RW. no drift
9.095 7.405 RW. no drift
9.408 3.665* RW with a drift
0.162 RW. no drift
2.088 RW. no drift
3.502 RW. no drift
6.994 3.405* RW, no drift
1.836 RW. no drift
1.473 RW, no drift
4.994 RW. no drift
1.231 RW. no drift
2.215 RW. no drift
3.402 RW. no drift
2.454 RW. no drift
1.826 RW. no drift
2.295 RW. no drift
Note: The first column is the results of the regression in which first-order differenced
dependent variable is regressed on intercept, a time trend, lagged dependent variable. and one-
period lagged value of first-order differenced dependent variable. In the second column. some
results are reported for the regression equation in which two-period lagged value of first-order
differenced dependent variable is also included along with those in the tirst column.
a RW indicates random walk. The 95 % point distribution of <1>2for the sample size between
25 and 50 is between 5.68 and 5.13. The 95 % point distribution of <1>3for the same sample
sizes is between 7.24 and 6.73.
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Bhagrave (1983)], DF and ADF tests were applied to test whether or not variables were
stationary or needed to be first-order differenced to attain stationarity. The number of
times that a series needs to be differenced is given by the order of integration; i.e. if the
variable is integrated order of 1, it will be differenced once. These results are reported
in Table 7.1 a separately for regressions with intercept and trend, and those without a
time trend. The empirical reliability of standard tests for unit roots is related to their
performance with small-samples. The critical values of the standard tests have already
developed for large samples. The usual practice in unit root testing with small samples
has been to choose the test that requires relatively small degree of freedom such as the
DF test. Bearing this in mind, two different tables for critical values for the null
hypothesis that the variable is I( 1) are used for testing unit roots. The first one is the
standard tables of Fuller (1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1981). The second one is the
critical values for a small sample developed by Blangiewicz and Charemza ( 1990) and
reported for different small sample sizes and significance levels in Charemza and
Deadman (1992). In the latter, they report an upper and a lower critical value for each
sample size at a given significance level. Those values differ with respect to the
number of explanatory variables in the cointegration relationship (two in equation (25),
and zero for a simple unit root test of a variable). If the estimated t-statistic, for
instance, is smaller than the lower critical value for a particular number of observations,
the null hypothesis (that the variable has unit root) is to be rejected. If it is greater than
the upper critical value, then the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The upper and
lower critical values for 25 observations at the 1% significance level, for example, are
respectively -2.81 and -3.43 [see Charemza and Deadman (1992): p.]. For 30
observations they are-2.72 and -3.33 respectively. However Charemza and Deadman
(1992) have developed the critical values for the regressions, either with intercept or
without intercept, which exclude a time trend. In this case, the standard table for
critical values in Fuller (1976) has been used. For some inconclusive results (such as
the price of capital goods in agriculture), the appropriateness of the ADF test has heen
checked by estimating the augmented regression that &, = Co + C1X,_1 + ('2&1-1 where x is
a variable to be tested. Due to the data availability just one lag of the first-order
difference term has been included, and checked whether C2 is significantly different
from zero; if it is not, I only use the results of the simple DF test. In Table 7.1b, the
statistical significance of stochastic and deterministic trends are also tested. Since the
null hypothesis involves more than one parameter, the appropriate test is the Lagrange
Multiplier test as suggested in Dickey and Fuller (1981). The results of each test in
Table 7.la and Table 7.lb are reported in the last column of each table.
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Table 7.2
Co-integration Relationships
(the dependent variable is if')
Constat )" cw, ns, IF SE CROW OF AOF
Model I 0.251 1.302 -0.192 0.953 0.105 2.7R -3.:n2 -2.333
(0.434) (19.12) (-6.384)
Model II -0.382 0.987 -0.179 0.283 0.980 0.069 3.02 -4.669 -3.031
(-0.97) (14.07) (-8.999) (5.838)
Note: )" = log of gross domestic product, cw, = log of the relative price of capital to wages, ns, =
log of domestic saving net of public investment deflated by the deflator of private investment.
With respect to the critical values in Charemza and Deadman (1992), the last
two columns of Table 7 indicate that we can accept the hypothesis that all variables are
indeed I( 1) at 1 and 5 percent significance levels. The OF test statistics with a time
trend, in general, also confirm this conclusion at the 5 percent significance level with
the only exceptions being the AOF statistics of price of agricultural capital goods and
the OF test of private investment in services. However, these two variables also
comply with the general conclusion of the non-stationarity of all variables at the I %
significance level. Since the lag of the first-differenced term in the augmented
regression described above was insignificant, the conclusions of the OF test have been
used in the results columns. Additional supports are also provided by Table 7.1b.
5.2 Aggregate Private Investment
The Engle and Granger two-step procedure has been applied to the Turkish data. The
first step is the estimation of a long-run cointegration relationship [equation (25)] using
the levels of the variables. Evidence of cointegration includes high R2, significant t-
statistics of the coefficients, and significant OF and AOF tests on the residuals. The
long-run equations in Table 7.2 enable us to decide whether or not the variables in the
levels equation are cointegrated. The theory indicates that two variables are important
in accelerator type of models; the accelerator variable (which might be proxies such as
demand, output etc.), and the relative capital-labour cost. Before estimating the long-
run equation (25), public investment and the volume of credit available to the private
sector have also been included in this long-run equation to investigate the significance
of their influences on the long-run investment, but were not found to be significant in
the long run. However, a new financial variable, domestic saving net of public
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Table 7.3
Dynamic Equations for Private Investment
(All variables are in logarithm)
Model I
Sip, = 0.034+ O.351ligdpt - 0.173 licwt + O.262licrPt-!(1.656) (1.754) (-3.089) (2.061)
+0.144;.liip'_I- 0.367 RESt-!
(0.984) (-2.119)
JP = 0.561, SE =0.071,
SC=0.0002, FF=2.609, N=0.912, H=I.807, DF = -4.978, ADF = -2.965, t-statistics in parenthesis.
Model II
Sip, =0.036+0.428ligdp, -0.1l9licw, -O.071licwH +O.194lins, -O.758RES'_1(2.1('0) OI7~) (-1244) (-1.1~) (4.2D) (-4 7~21
-2R = 0.828, SE = 0.045,
SC = 0.201, FF = 0.003, N =1.126, H = 1.385, DF = -4.657. ADF = -4.373
investment. has been tried. and found significant estimates of all coefficients.J Two
different versions of accelerator models of equation (25), therefore. were estimated.
The model I is the one in which the logarithm of private investment is regressed on
constant, the log of gross domestic product, and the log of relative cost of capital goods
(as the theory in Section 3 suggests). The second, modified version of the accelerator
model is, in fact, in the line of the Sundurarajan - Thakur model which, unlike the
true accelerator model, includes domestic savings net of public investment. which has
been thought to capture the possible effects of the availability of financial funds.
In the first-step estimations, (25) was estimated by ordinary least square
estimators, and the results are reported in Table 7.2. The results enable us to accept a
presence of the cointegration relationship between private investment, output and
relative prices in the long run. Like the tests of variables for unit roots in the earlier
section, the OF and ADF tests have been applied to residuals. Although the AOF value
of the first model seems small compared with the critical value -3.84 of Fuller (1976),
the lag of the first-order difference variable of the disturbance term in the augmented
regression was insignificant, and the OF indicates a stationary disturbance term. The
second model indicates a very high computed OF value, -4.67, that achieves the
stationarity of residuals with respect to the critical value (-3.60, -3.50) at 5 percent
2 In incorporating the financial variable. particularly the presence of a credit constraint. the justification
can be provided by assuming that the share of firms facing credit constraints is constant over time, and
the long-run investment function is the sum of constraint and unconstrained firms altogether [e.g. see
Catinat et al. (1987) and Tybout (1983)].
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significance level for the sample size between 25 and 50. But the critical values for
small samples in Charemza and Deadman (1992), which are -2.96, and -2.80 for the
sample size 30 at the 10 % significance level, display the stationarity of all residuals
from both equations except for the ADF of the model I.
The coefficients in Table 7.2 can be regarded as long-run multipliers.
Accordingly, the accelerator effects of GDP on private investment in both models are
around unity. The long-run cost elasticities are statistically significant and, about 0.2
in both models as a consequence of a unit increase in relative cost of capital goods. In
the long-run, private investment has been, as expected, positively related to the level of
output -proxied by GDP-, and negatively to the relative cost of capital goods as the
estimation in Table 7.2 indicates. The residuals from these long-run equations have
been used to capture the short-run dynamics of the investment process in the second
step.
Having sequentially dropped higher-order lags in both models, the two
equations have been reported in Table 7.3 as preferred specifications. The results are
encouraging. Signs of all variables are in accordance with the theory. According to the
Lagrange multiplier test, which has been performed for up to a third-order
autocorrelation in the residuals, there is no indication of serial autocorrelation. The
functional form of the model is correctly specified due to the supporting evidence from
the RESET test (noted by FF). The model also exhibits a normal distribution of
residuals (noted by N), and appears to be free of heteroscedasticity (see H). The DF
and ADF statistics are high enough to display the stationarity of the residuals of the
second modeJ.3 The ADF value for the true accelerator model, however, is significant
with respect to the critical values in Charemza and Deadman (1992). The results of the
short-run dynamics of aggregate private investment reveals that the accelerator variable,
GDP, has the highest effects, followed by credit to the private sector and the relative
price of capital goods. t-statistics appeared to be significant at 5 percent, except for the
first-differenced term of private investment in the model I. The coefficient of the net
saving term in the second equation is also highly significant. Although public
investment has not emerged so significantly in the first model, its impact on private
investment can be captured through the significant net saving term in the second model,
so that public investment displays negative crowding-out effects. The lagged residual
3 For a small sample. the results of the DF and ADF tests from the short-run regression arc more
reliable than those from cointegration regression.
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Table 7.4
Co-Integration Relations for Agriculture, Manufacturing,
Services, and Mining
(the dependent variable is the logarithm of private investment)
MiningVariables Agriculture Manufacturing Services
Constant -10.959 -5.072 -8.095
(-2.601) (-3.538) (-3.166)
V 1.728 0.961 1.364• f
(4.157) (9.752) (7.022)
q;'
-0.139
(-3.416)
cw,
-0.342 -0.240
(-9.164) (-3.404)
JP 0.394 0.817 0.763
DF -3.143 -4.976 -4.721
ADF -4.220 -2.426 -4.123
-13.729
(-5.437)
2.186
(K.I97)
-0.147
(-2.114)
O.K43
-2.3lJ4
-2.4KO
variables capture the adjustment of prediction errors made by agents, and they are
highly significant in both equations. Results also show strong evidence of the
appropriateness of an error-correction framework, implying that agents always adjust
their desired level of investment to unexpected changes according to the error-correction
mechanism.
5.3. Sectoral Private Investment
I now turn to the determinants of private investment in these five sectors. The Engle-
Granger estimation procedure has been applied to each sectoral data set. The sectors,
as described in the earlier chapter, consist of agriculture, manufacturing, services, and
mining. Although the data are available for energy, the empirical results are not
statistically satisfactory, and have not been reported here. Only the true accelerator
model has been estimated, and the results of the long-run equilibrium equations are
presented in Table 7.4. The agricultural sector displays a difference from the rest with
the inclusion of the price deflator of agricultural capital goods instead of the relative cost
of capital.
The presence of the long-run cointegration relationship between output and the
relative-cost variable was tested at the first stage of the Engle-Granger methodology.
The residuals from the long-run equations display mixed results in terms of stationarity
of disturbance terms. In particular, the mining sector's residuals fail the DF and ADF
tests. The ADF test for manufacturing also indicates that we cannot accept that
residuals are stationary. Therefore the presence of a cointegration relationship is
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Table 7.5
Short-run Sectoral Private Investment
Agriculture Manufacturing Services Mining
!Il !21 ~l2b !2l !Il (2l (qh !2lh
Constant -0.0189 -0.035 -0.106 -0.223 -0.076 -0.046 0.012 0.025
(-0.182)* (-0.340)* (-2.115) (-3.113) (-0.608)* (-0.646)* (0.280)* (0.544)*
!1 y, 1.218 1.356 1.579 2.305 1.913 1.933 1.679 1.981
(2.071 ) (2.324) (3.239) (5.237) (2.777) (2.901 ) ( 1.940) (2.670)
!1 q;'
-0.722 -0.741
(-3.109) (-3.161)
!1 CW,
-0.247 -0.305 -0.308 -0.318 -0.321
(-3.942) (-1.859) (-1.933) (-2.483 ) (-2.218)
!1 CW,_I
-0.245
(-3.824)
!1 crd] 0.558 0.617 0.347
(2.132) (2.371) (2.224)
!1 crd/~I 0.129 0.086
( 1.240)* (0.293)*
!1 i;~ 0.168 0.109
(2.128) (1.340)8
!1 i;~1 0.263 -0.324 -0.346
(1.199)* (-2.387) (-2.280)
!1 '1' 0.280 0.341 0.381 0.154 0.155 0.329"_1
( 1.488)8 ( 1.853) (3.479) (0.782)* (0.807)* ( 1.427)8
RESt_1
-0.773
-0.699 -1.461 -0.432 -1.196 -1.201 -0.662 -0.502
~-4.048~ ~-3.821~ !-4.448~ p.041l p.737l ~-2.827~ p.183l ~-1.8321
-') 0.580 0.569 0.745 0.688 0.613 0.634 OA67 OA18W
SE 0.145 0.147 0.081 0.089 0.210 0.205 0.144 0.150
SC 0.508 0.818 0.924 0.071 1.377 0.980 0.444 0.895
FF 0.181 0.087 0.001 0.532 0.046 0.010 n.91S 0.142
N 0.811 1.183 1.033 0.365 3.343 2.850 IA99 3.599
H 0.632 0.339 4.813 2.739 0.060 0.073 !UlJl 9.689
DF -5.098 -5.286 -3.945 -4.734 -4.260 -4.262 -5.318 -4.247
ADF -5.333 -4.693 -2.432 -3.912 -3.827 -3.826 -2.845 -3.106
Note: * indicates insignificant coefficients at 5 % and 10%. a stands for significant variables at 10 percent. b
indicates heteroscedasticity corrected results. se = Lagrange multiplier test for serial correlation; FF = Functional
misspecification test; N = Normality test; H = Heteroscedasticity test.
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confirmed only for agriculture, manufacturing and services, but not for mining.
Despite the fact that the mining sector does not show the existence of the cointegration
relationship, the short-run dynamic equation has also been estimated and reported in
Table 7.5 by employing the disturbance term from the cointegration regression in the
short-run ECM regression. All cointegration relationships appeared to be significant;
R2s are, in general, very high with the only exception being the agricultural sector. The
t-statistics are all significantly high, and different from zero. The government's sectoral
investment and the availability of credit to overall private sector have not been
significant in the long-run relationship.
The results from the estimations of sectoral dynamic equations appear in Table
7.5. All estimates are of the expected signs, and the majority of them are statistically
significant. The error-correction terms in all estimates are significant, and have the
expected negative signs. The DF and ADF test statistics also show stationary residuals
from all short-run estimates. In particular, the results for mining indicate no
cointegration relationship between the variables on the basis of calculated DF and ADF
statistics. However, we must be cautious to accept this conclusion from the results of
the long-run estimation because the estimations with a small sample might reveal such a
misleading conclusion. Therefore, I estimated the short-run dynamic models for all
sectors, including mining, in the next step. The results (presented in Table 7.5)
support the choice of the error-correction representation of the data. Despite the
opposite conclusion of the long-run estimates, the error-correction term in the estimates
for mining has emerged highly significantly at the 5 percent significance level
confirming the error-correction model. The overall goodness of fit of the error-
correction specification to the sectoral data is satisfactory in terms of R2 and the
statistical tests reported in Table 7.5. The general conclusions of these empirical results
are the high and significant effects of accelerator variables in the short-run, that are
greater than unity in all sectoral estimates. This is followed by the relative cost of
capital (the price deflator of agricultural capital goods in agricultural sector). The credit
variable appears significant in only agricultural and manufacturing sectors. In services,
the true accelerator without any additional variable, apart from accelerator and the
relative cost variable, has not emerged significantly. In mining, however, although
credit has not come out significantly, public investment exhibited negative, crowding-
out effects on private investment.
6. The Comparison of the Result of the ECM with those of Earlier Chapter
Although the functional specifications of models are quite different, the results in this
chapter show strong similarities to those in the earlier chapter. In this section, I focus
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Table 7.6
The Comparison of The results of the ECM with those in Chapter 6
Aggregate Investment
Variahles The Putty-Clay TheECM
Accelerator * significant at I % * significant at 5%
Cost * significant at I % * significant at 1%
Credit *significant at I % with the
capita- labour cost
* significant at 5%
Public Investment * not significant with the
capital- labour cost
* not significant
Manufacturing
Variahles The Putty-Clay The ECM
Accelerator * not significant with credit and
public investment variables
* significant at 5%
Cost * significant at 1% * significant at 1%
Credit * significant at 5% * significant at 5%
Public Investment * significant at 5% * significant only at 10 %
Agriculture
Variables The Putty-Clay The ECM
Accelerator * significant only at 10 % * significant at 5%t
Cost * significant atl % * significant at 5%
Credit * significant at 5% * significant at 5%
Public Investment * significant only at 10 % * not significant
Services
Variables The Putty-Clay The ECM
Accelerator * significant at 1% * significant at 1%
Cost * significant at 1% * significant at 5%
Credit * not significant * not significant
Public Investment * not significant * not significant
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Table 7.6 (cont.)
Mining
Variables The Putty-Clay Model The ECM
Accelerator * significant at 1% * significant at 1%
Cost * significant at 1% * significant at 1%
Credit * not significant * not significant
Public Investment * significant only at 10 % * significant at 5%
on these similarities. The comparison has been done on the basis of the qualitative
importance of each variable. Despite the different functional specification of functional
form and some variables (e.g. accelerator variable in both models, and the dependent
variable), the same kind of variables appear almost the same in terms of significance
among the determinants of investment.
Table 7.6 summarises these similarities. The significance of each variable has
been evaluated according to the value of t-ratios. The variables are evaluated as
significant if the t-ratio just passes the test at to percent. It might be a significant
variable if its t-value rejects the zero coefficient at 5 percent. Finally, the variables
whose coefficients were different from zero at 1 percent have been regarded as highly
significant. The common feature of two models is the evidence of the significant
effects of the accelerator (except for manufacturing), the cost of capital, and the
availability of credit to the private sector. Services and mining sectors support the true
accelerator model where accelerator and the capital-labour cost variables are significant
without referring to the presence of credit and public investment among the
determinants of private investment.
7. Conclusion:
The general model developed in this chapter has allowed us to take simultaneous
account of the influence of accelerator, relative capital-labour cost and credit
constraints. The model has been built upon a combination of the accelerator and
financial theories of investment. Unlike the previous chapter, here I employed a
different econometric methodology in order to take into account the non-stationarity of
the data used. The aim of the chapter, as in the previous one, was to define the role of
the main determinants of private investment for the Turkish economy, and to measure
their relative importance. The econometric technique used was the recently developed
error-correction method.
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Bearing the statistical problems associated with small sample size in mind, the
results of the chapter ought to be taken as suggestive. The estimations and the
comparison of the error-correction model with those in the earlier chapter revealed that
the accelerator effect remained a determining factor in investment decisions. The
adjustment process of investment to its optimal level, captured by the lagged residual
term in the dynamic specification of the model, appeared to be fairly fast; one percent
correction in previous mistakes of previous periods affects the current period's private
investment almost 0.4 percent in the model I, 0.8 percent in the model II. This
confirms the conclusion of Chhibber and van Wijnbergen (1992), although they
assumed a partial adjustment mechanism. Private investment was influenced in the
short run by credit constraints, which are proxied by the variable of the credit
availability to the private sector. The credit variable did not emerge as a long-run
determinant of private investment, but appears to influence only the short-run
fluctuation in private investment. The same effects of the financial factors were also
proxied by the domestic saving net of public investment. This last specification of the
credit constraint in the model enabled us to define the influence of public investment,
that was insignificant in the so-called true accelerator model.
The relative cost of capital variable is another significant variable (always at 5
percent level). According to the results of the model I, a unit increase in the relative
cost of capital (say because of a rise in lending rates) would decrease private investment
by 0.17 percent. This effect, however, comes as the lowest after those of the
accelerator and the credit variables.
The sectoral estimations show great similarities to those of aggregate
estimations. The credit variable appears not to affect the long-run level of private
investment, but only short-run fluctuations in the estimations of agriculture and
manufacturing. Unlike aggregate results, the effect of the credit variable is high, 0.6
point, in agriculture. Two sectors, namely services and mining, showed no evidence
of significant impact of the credit variable. The sectoral results also suggest a strong
accelerator effect for all sectors (higher than unity). Regarding the impact of public
sector, the so-called Sundurarajan- Takur model revealed the highly significant
crowding-out effect of public investment, which was indeed indirect through the net
domestic saving term. In mining, public investment reveals a significant negative
effect.
For sectoral estimations, it seems that the true accelerator model, without any
proxy for credit rationing, fits the data from mining and energy very well. Once the
credit variable is included, the results displayed relative fragility. Particularly, the credit
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variable has been found significant only in agriculture and manufacturing. Therefore,
the main conclusion of the chapter is that credit constraint is an important determinant of
short-run fluctuations in private investment at the aggregate level, and at the sectoral
level, it is important only for manufacturing and agriculture sector. The accelerator
variable and the cost variable are significant in all estimations at the aggregate and
sectoral levels.
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Appendix
A Hypothesis Test of the Error-Correction Process
Against the Partial Adjustment Mechanism
Using the assumption that the future level of investment in equation (18) is rational and
follows a random walk without a drift term, the error-correction model of investment
(26) can be written
(A-I)
where
(A-2)
(A-3)
Substituting (A-2) and (A-3) into (A-I) yields the following
Which is the unrestricted regression equation. When the restriction that hi = h2' the
restricted equation becomes
(A-5)
The test I have carried out is a simple F-test in the form of
F = (RSS - URSS)/n
URSS/(N - k -1)
where RSS = restricted sum of square of error, URSS = unrestricted sum of square of
error term, n = the number of restrictions, N = the number of observations, k = the
(A-6)
number of parameters to be estimated in the unrestricted regression. The F statistics
from the models described above for the degree of freedom (1, 21) have been calculated
6.45, which was larger than the critical value 4.32 at 5 percent, implying the rejection
of the restriction.
Chapter 8
The Intertemporal Investment Decision of a Firm
Borrowing in the Imperfect Credit market Subject to a
Liquidity Constraint
1. Introduction:
The importance of financial factors is a subject with a long history in the course of
literature. It is assumed in the neo-classical theory that cash flows and external
borrowing do not play any direct role in investment decisions. Although earlier
literature has drawn some attention to the importance of financial variables,
Jorgenson, in his well-known survey, argued that accelerator type models were
superior to those including financial variables [Jorgenson (1971)]. Using a relatively
larger sample, on the other hand, Elliott (1973) found supportive evidence in favour
of profit models by reversing the ranking of Jorgenson (1971). From the econometric
point of view, both studies used aggregate data, and the comparisons were based on
statistical prediction error or goodness of fit.
The neoclassical theory of investment and Tobin-q theory are both based on
the assumption of a "representative firm", and do not distinguish firms according to
their sizes and access to external financial opportunities. This is basically a
consequence of the assumption of perfect capital markets. According to Fazzari et al
(1988), the representative firm assumption is the reason that limits the significance of
the financial variable in empirical investment models. Once the perfect capital
market assumption is relaxed, the aggregation problem appears because small firms
with relatively less access to external financing would be more vulnerable to the
availability of financial funds than those with great access. Therefore, the application
of the same empirical investment model to all firms would be inappropriate. Fazzari
Chapter 8 The lntertemporal lnvestment Decision of a Firm 265
et al ( 1988) studied the effects of financial variables on investment behaviour by
introducing capital market imperfections and applying an investment model to
different groups of firms with different financial characteristics. Unlike earlier
researches. their empirical investment models with financial variables were applied to
panel data rather than aggregate time series data.
Much of the accelerator type of researches have been based on the
assumptions that financial markets were perfect, and that complete information was
available to all participants in those markets. The consequence of this assumption
was the perfect substitutability of internal and external sources of financial funds,
which is widely known as the Modigliani and Miller theorem. The Modigliani and
Miller theorem provided the theoretical basis for the neoclassical theory by
demonstrating the irrelevance of financial structure and financial policy for real
investment [Modigliani and Miller (1958)]. By this theorem, it has been assumed that
there was no wedge between the opportunity cost of internally generated funds and
the costs of external funds (such as issuing equity and/or borrowing). The demand for
external financing was exogenously determined by the difference between the value
of investment expenditure and internal funds. The supply of financial funds was
ignored in empirical neoclassical models to a great extent because of the irrelevance
theorem.
Recent empirical studies, however, have explored the violation of the
irrelevance theorem. and described financial factors as one of the determinants of real
investment expenditures [e.g. Fazzari and Athey (1987), Fazzari et al (1988), Bond
and Meghir (1994), Estrada and Valles (1995)]. This also brought a new dimension
into investment modelling. The availability doctrine and the irrelevance of the
irrelevance theorem have begun to occupy an important place in theoretical
discussions. At the macroeconomic level, a wide empirical consensus on the real
effects of financial policies on investment spending has led economists to question
the relevance of the Modigliani and Miller theorem [see Blinder and Stiglitz (1983)],
and to revise the judgement of Jorgenson about the role of financial factors in the
determination of real investment expenditures. The question of whether internally
generated funds and external funds are, in fact, the perfect substitute has gained a
central importance in the new empirical and theoretical researches. It has also been
suggested that internal funds are actually less costly than external financial resources
to a great extent because of the presence of transaction costs, tax advantages, agency
problems. costs of financial distress, and asymmetric information.
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In many studies, however, the most prominent explanation of the high cost of
external funds is the existence of asymmetric information. This generates a
significant cost disadvantage of external finance for some firms. The theoretical
reasoning behind this disadvantage is supported by the "lemons" problem of Akerlof
(1970). For example, in the case of fixed capital information, the lemons problem can
be applied to a situation where the firm's managers are assumed to have full
information about the quality and the real value of a project, but the lenders do not.
The implication of the Lemons problem for some firms is credit rationing in the form
of restriction on loan size. The reason for this is that good borrowers may prefer the
restriction because small loan sizes may lower the market default risk, reducing the
lemon premium; bad borrowers, on the other hand, must follow along in order not to
reveal themselves. Asymmetric information on a project's quality and the high cost of
getting information about borrowers' riskiness could create this lemon problem and
then credit rationing. Jaffee and Russel (1976) first drew attention to the result that
as the interest rate rises. lenders cannot distinguish borrowers' quality and riskiness of
the project and can limit the amount of credit. Latter, Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)
theoretically showed that credit rationing in equilibrium is perfectly consistent with
the rational behaviour of economic agents. In such a situation. borrowers who wish
to borrow at ongoing effective rates of interest could not obtain financing because of
asymmetric information on the quality of the project.
In earlier chapters. the significance of financial variables together with some
standard neoclassical determinants of investment (such as the accelerator and the
relative user cost) has been investigated by using a completely neoclassical
investment model. Modelling the effects of financial factors in the previous two
chapters remained rather eclectic. The present chapter in this respect rules out this
defect of previous chapters. and aims to endogenise the impacts of imperfections in
financial capital markets. Relying on the empirical results of these chapters, financial
factors are brought into closer examination in the present chapter. For this purpose, a
more comprehensive theoretical model, in which financial market imperfections and a
liquidity constraint are empirically taken into account, is suggested. The chapter
consists of the following seven sections. In section 2, credit market imperfections and
credit rationing are discussed in general. Section 3 provides a discussion on financial
market failures and financial liberalisation in developing countries. The experience
with financial liberalisation and the structure of financial markets in Turkey are
described in section 4. Section 5 presents the assumptions and the derivation of the
investment model. After reporting the empirical results in section 6, some
conclusions drawn from the empirical results are discussed in section 7.
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2. Credit Market Imperfections and Credit Rationin~:
The recent literature of investment builds upon the theory of imperfect information.
According to this literature, when financial markets intermediate between borrowers
and lenders, they must cope with some informational imperfections about borrowers.
Not only do these imperfections determine the allocations of financial funds among
projects with different returns and risks, but they also determine the efficiency of
those markets [see e.g. Blinder and Stiglitz (1983), Greenwald et al. (1984) and
Blinder (1986)]. This literature also attempts to develop consistent microeconomic
foundations of investment behaviour, considering linear quadratic capital adjustment
costs and imperfect information in the capital market. It is generally argued that in
contrast to the neoclassical theory, financial markets are not flexible enough to
generate a sufficient amount of increase in interest rates after a certain point. The
inflexibility of interest rates can be explained by the imperfect structure of financial
markets which may occur for one reason or another (such as interest rate ceiling
imposed by usury law or the presence of the default risk). Keynes, for example,
discussed the failure of the interest rate to fall sufficiently to restore investment to a
normal level by putting forward the concept of liquidity trap. In the new literature,
the reason for the inflexibility is based on informational imperfections.
The explanation is briefly as follows: As shown in Stiglitz and Weiss (1981),
due to asymmetric information between lenders and borrower, lenders' supply of
credit to an individual borrower becomes perfectly inelastic at some rate of interest
because of diminishing expected return on loans to bad-quality borrowers (those with
high default risks). Therefore, no increase in the loan rate induces the lender to raise
the amount of credit. Lenders perceive that the interest rate is no longer a good
indicator in the presence of default risks; therefore credit rationing on the amount of
loan sizes, rather then an increase in interest rates, becomes a rational response of
lenders.
Two Kinds of Credit Rationin~:
Credit rationing can broadly be defined as a disequilibrium situation where the
demand for loans exceeds the supply at the ruling price level. One can clearly
distinguish two types of credit rationing, which are widely known as temporary and
permanent [Baltensperger (1978)]. The difference between them arises due to the
roles of price and non-price adjustments. Non-instantaneous adjustment of markets to
disequilibrium (mainly because of sluggish price adjustment) forms a cause of
temporary credit rationing. For example, high cost of adjustment such as
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administrative cost. from the banks' point of view, could be one possible reason for
this type of rationing.
Permanent rationing, also known as rationing in equilibrium, occurs via non-
price elements of adjustments, and refers to situations where borrowers' demands for
loans are unfulfilled. even though they are willing to pay the ruling price. The recent
credit rationing literature has been dominantly concerned with the permanent
rationing and its rationality within the profit maximising behaviour of lenders [Jaffee
and Russel (1976), and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)]. The hypothesis about the supply
of loan has essentially been based on the existence of default risk. In essence, the
argument is that, after a certain amount of loan, no increase in interest rates could
compensate lenders for the default risk of the borrower associated with further
increases in loan, and those borrowers within the high default risk group cannot
obtain more than a certain amount of credit, regardless of the interest rate he is willing
to pay.
This theory has been built upon informational imperfections. Many
informational problems arise from asymmetric information about the investment
projects between borrowers and lenders. Banks do usually not know how the credit
they lend is being invested. As the interest rate charged to any class of borrowers
increases, so does the probability of default on loan contracts. Following Stiglitz and
Weiss (1981). it is usually assumed that the contract between borrower and lender is a
debt contract that allows for bankruptcy. Due to the nature of debt contracts, the
borrower keeps any extraordinary profit while the lender simply gets paid the interest
charge if the project turns out fruitful. When the project fails, the borrower can
default and leaves the bank with all losses. Under imperfect information about the
quality of the project, expected profit to the borrower then increases, and expected
returns on loan to the lender falls as the riskiness of the project rises. According to
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), if there are a discrete number of potential borrowers, each
with a different risk, then the bank's expected return from lending to a specific group
of borrowers will not be a monotonically increasing function of the interest rate [see
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) for a formal derivation]. They showed that, given certain
assumptions. the loan curve may bend backwards so that credit rationing can emerge.
From the banks' point of view, reacting to excess demand for loans by increasing the
rate of interest may lower the banks' expected return because of moral hazard and
adverse selection problems. Moral hazard (or incentive effect) in such a situation
occurs where borrowers become more risk takers at higher rates of interest, and
eventually a higher proportion of riskier borrowers would accept the loan offer as the
lender increases the interest rate, but the increased risk of bankruptcy would actually
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decrease the lender's expected return. This would not be a problem if the lender could
observe and control the nature of the project undertaken by the borrower. Adverse
selection. on the other hand. is a situation where as the interest rate increases, safer
borrowers drop out of the application pool, and more and more riskier borrowers
come forward to accept the loan offer at a high interest rate. As a result, the lender
may prefer to ration credit rather than to raise the interest rate in order to protect
himself from the increased probability of bankruptcy.
3. Financial Market Failures and Financial Liberalisation in Developing
Countries:
The most predominant assumption of the neoclassical literature is that markets work
very well in the allocation of economic resources if there are no distortions caused by
government interventions to markets. The financialliberalisation literature implicitly
accepts this role of markets, and supports policy implications aiming to remove all
distortions. However. this concept of the market economies may be subject to a
broad criticism that markets do, in fact, not necessarily operate well even without
distortions. This would not be more evident than financial markets in developing
countries. Excessive reliance on debt finance of the corporate sector, and the
domination of credit markets, mostly by banks, make firms in developing countries
even more vulnerable to such problems as asymmetric information and credit
rationing than those in developed market economies.
Financial markets in developing countries are, in general, imperfect and
financially repressed by various government interventions. According to the
neoclassical view, these distortions are the reasons preventing financial markets from
working efficiently. These distortions may include interest ceilings on deposit and
loan rates, high reserve requirements, and preferential credit policies to certain sectors
etc. [see McKinnon (1991): 43-46]. The consequences of the financial repression are
to reduce the supply of financial funds to formal financial markets and to set a
limitation on the quantity of real investment expenditures. Liberalising financial
markets, meaning the removal of such distortions caused by government and Central
Bank regulations. is considered to be a necessary condition for efficient markets and
faster economic growth. The theoretical back-up for this argument has been provided
by the McKinnon and Shaw hypothesis which provides a rationale for financial
liberalisation as a means to promote growth and financial development.
The formal theoretical model of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis focuses
particularly on interest ceiling on deposit and/or lending rates. Briefly, this
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hypothesis argues that regulated interest rates at a constant level create non-price
rationing in credit markets. Since banks are not allowed to charge risk premium over
fixed interest rates, riskier but potentially more productive investment projects cannot
be undertaken [Fry (1982)]. McKinnon and Shaw argue that interest rate ceiling
discourages economic agents from depositing their money in the banking sector, and
promoting current consumption, then reduces the quantity of investment. As a result,
the removal of interest rate ceilings and all types of government regulations that cause
distortions in financial markets, will be a recommended policy implication. Once
liberalisation is achieved, additional savings are expected to be forthcoming in
financial system. Investment, as they suggest, also rises automatically since an
increase in savings and bank deposits creates more loanable funds for investment.
The presumption of the McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis is based on the fact that
the liberalised interest policy eliminates non-price rationing which is defined as
temporary earlier, but overlooks the possibility of permanent rationing which may
occur due to imperfections in financial markets even when the financial market is
liberalised. Given informational imperfections and adverse selection problems in
financial markets, banks in developing countries cannot charge an interest rate high
enough (even though interest rates are freed from government interventions) to cover
the default risk of riskier projects In fact, limited bank-based credit markets, which
are severely affected by the adverse selection problem, cannot finance these riskier
project, and skew the allocation of credit leaving some demand for loan unsatisfied.
Following Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Cho (1986) analysed the potential
limitation of financial liberalisation in developing countries. He basically argued that
full-scale liberalisation of the banking sector would not necessarily achieve efficient
capital allocation in the absence of well-functioning equity markets. Financial
liberalisation aims to eliminate non-price rationing, but to ignore the second type of
rationing arising from the adverse selection and moral hazard effects. He suggests
that the need for developing well-functioning equity markets should be a part of a
comprehensive financial liberalisation. Since equity financing, as he discussed, is
free from adverse selection and moral hazard problems of debt financing, equity
capital can also finance those risky but productive projects which are rationed in debt
markets due to asymmetric information.
In addition to Cho (1986), Fazzari et al. (1988) argued that equity financing is,
in general, not enough to solve credit rationing problems raised from asymmetric
information associated with debt financing. If firms face asymmetric information
problem in credit markets, they probably also need to pay a risk premium to obtain
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new equity because of agency problems in equity markets. The conflicting interests
of firms' managers and creditors cause this problem. Managers usually have the
incentive to forego some desirable investment opportunities, particularly in the case
of high debt-equity ratio. acting in the interest of the equity owner and against the
interest of creditors. They also have the incentive to issue new debt that raises
riskiness and increase the existing debt stock. Since creditors realise this conflict,
they request a premium to restrict the behaviour of managers as the debt stock
Increases.
McKinnon (1991) developed a version of Stiglitz and Weiss' s model
including macroeconomic instability. Instability in this sense may come out in the
forms of unexpected inflation, real exchange rate variability and so on. The inclusion
of macroeconomic instability is characterised by strong positive covariance in project
yields. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) assume that banks in their model are risk-neutral,
and the hank's optimal strategy is independent of its own risk characteristics. In other
words. the expected profit of the bank is not stochastic. However, in a risky
environment, banks cannot diversify away risks they themselves face, so that the
expected profit to banks becomes stochastic. McKinnon (1991) distinguished two
different risk situations from the bank's point of view. First he assumes the case of
no moral hazard. In such a situation, the effect of increased macroeconomic
instability on a risk-averse bank's lending policy would generate lower expected profit
to the bank and more severe credit rationing. Increased macroeconomic instability is
likely to lower the a risk-averse bank's optimal real loan rate and expected profits.
Second, he assumes a situation with moral hazard, in which an increase in instability
leads banks to extend their customer bases including relatively riskier projects that
they would not otherwise lend. Unless the government imposes some measures on
banks (such as increasing reserve requirement and forcing banks to choose lower
interest rates to minimise the bankruptcy risk in the banking sector) banks would
continue to expand credit to riskier projects to maximise their expected profits. In the
case where hanks are likely to have undue incentives to make a high-interest loan and
the lack of government control on banks is missing, the interaction between instability
and moral hazard may cause non-performing loans to increase. McKinnon (1991)
also drew attention to the consequences of lack of governmental supervision in the
banking sectors and the practice of deposit insurance. In particular, the existence of
moral hazard in the banking system induced by deposit insurance and macroeconomic
instability leads the monetary authority to impose a ceiling on the loan rate to
minimise the losses that are covered by deposit insurance. The general response of
banks to such measures would be to introduce even more stringent credit rationing.
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4. The Turkish Experience:
Like many other developing countries, Turkey undertook a comprehensive financial
liberalisation effort to eliminate exogenous constraints - which were mostly created
by intensive government interventions - in the beginning of the 1980s. Before the
financial liberalisation reforms, the financial markets in Turkey were severely
repressed. The main features of this repression were the ceiling on interest rates for
deposit and credit - real interest was often negative because of high inflation -. high
reserve and liquidity requirement, the practice of preferential credit allocation suhjcct
to subsidies, the monetarisation of high public deficit, restricted entry to the hanking
sector, and finally constrained foreign exchange operations.
The financial liberalisation took place in July 1980. The reform strategy was
to promote financial market development through the deregulation and inducing
competition by easing entry into the banking sector. The liberalisation was
implemented into three different phases. In the first phase, the liberalisation was
rather premature, and relied mostly on the measures increasing competition in the
banking sector in order to improve the allocation of financial resources, and on the
removal of interest ceilings on borrowing and lending rates. The financial reform was
also expected to improve the balance sheet of the Turkish corporate sector hy
inducing firms to reduce their reliance on the bank credit. The important aspect of this
financial deregulation attempt was the stabilisation programme that was undertaken
simultaneously with the financial deregulation as a part of a more comprehensive
reform programme. The stabilisation and liberalisation of the economy was
accompanied by some measures that aimed at reducing high inflation. and solving the
twin deficit problem by encouraging domestic financial savings and activities which
were supposed to provide a rapid expansion in foreign earnings. This period.
however, ended with a financial crisis, so-called Banker's crisis, and the liberalisation
process was partly reversed.
The failure of this first deregulation attempt was related closely to the
responses of Turkish banking and the corporate sectors to reform and stabilisation
policies. On the one hand changing macroeconomic environment adversely affected
the profitability and the cost of borrowing of the corporate sector that was highly
leveraged, and consequently caused insolvency of some firms. leaving the financial
system with a huge amount of non-performing loans (which was expected to he 10-30
% of the total asset in the banking system in the period 1980-1982) [sec Atiyas
(1990)]. Two major factors of the worsening macroeconomic situation were drastic
increases in the cost of borrowing and a decline in gross earnings of the corporate
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sector because of tight income management policies. On the other hand. the
behaviour of the banking sector was initially to fulfil the objective of deregulation by
attracting more deposits through a higher interest rate policy. However. the poor
earning performance of the corporate sector and non-performing loans eventually led
to excessive increases in interest rates. To solve the cash problem. some small hanks
and brokerage houses tried to attract new deposits by increasing interest rates. and
refinanced non-performing loans. This Ponzi game lasted almost two and half years.
and ended with a financial crisis. According to Atiyas (1990). "financial
liberalisation may not generate desired responses if it is carried out when there arc
changes in the macroeconomic environment that adversely affect the profitability of
and cause financial distress in the corporate sector, and consequently the banking
sector.." [Atiyas (1990): 133].
The influence on the corporate sector of the initial deregulation attempts of the
financial market was drastic. Increases in interest rates on time deposits resulted in a
rapid increase of the average cost of bank loans. This was the major influence on the
corporate sector that had already been vulnerable to the cost of borrowing. As bleak
economic conditions persisted, drops in retained earnings in the Turkish corporate
sector caused liquidity constraints, and reduced the ability of firms to finance even the
service payment of outstanding debt stock. Therefore, firms relied heavily on bank
credits. As a result, excess demand for bank credit eventually pushed the lending rate
further up.
The Turkish experience with the deregulation in the early 80s fits very well to
the McKinnon (1991)'s story mentioned earlier. The Turkish banks and brokerage
subject to moral hazard set their loan rate at higher and riskier levels knowing (or
guessing) ex ante that favourable macroeconomic conditions would lead to high
profits, and that they could walk away from heavy losses under the government
guarantee. Although there did not exist such an explicit guarantee by the government.
the loosely regulated banks were foreseeing ex ante that the government would have
to intervene in order to maintain the stability and confidence of the banking sector.
Following the democratic election in 1983. the financial reforms in Turkey
gained a new momentum, proposing structural changes in the Turkish financial
system and introducing new financial institutions. This second phase covered the
period of 1983-1987, and witnessed a number of legislative and institutional measures
such as the establishments of the Capital Market Board and an interbank money
market, reopening the Istanbul stock Exchange market. enactment of a new banking
law, allowing the holding of a foreign-currency-deposit. The third phase is the period
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between 1988 and 1990 when the government devoted itself to development of
advance financial markets by taking further actions to establish a foreign exchange
and banknote markets to ease exchange rate operation and international capital
movement (i.e. convertibility of the Turkish Lira).
Regarding the endogenous constraints of the Turkish financial system, the
Turkish financial liberalisation has not been successful in eliminating informational
imperfections in financial markets [see Atiyas and Ersel (1994)]. Despite the removal
of government control on interest rates, financial markets in Turkey arc still
imperfect, and the allocation of credit is still skewed. Atiyas ('I al. (1993)
implemented a survey designed to examine banks' lending behaviour in Turkey. The
survey was conducted in summer of 1991 and consisted of 16 banks, a mixture of
large, medium-size, and small banks. According to the findings of Atiyas et al.
(1993), banks in Turkey typically distinguish their customers amongst three risk
groups in the Stiglitz-Weiss sense; namely the blue chip companies, the relatively
risky but creditworthy companies, and the companies that are not eligible for loan.
The presence of the last group of companies proves the fact that the banking system
in Turkey still rations some companies by nonprice measures. The risk attributed to
this last group of companies is related to firm-specific features rather than
macroeconomic conditions. The majority of small and mid-sized banks concentrated
their activities on predominantly blue chip companies in big cities. Besides, bigger
banks had a much wider customer base.
Another well-known fact arising from the survey was that bank lending rates
show a wide variation in Turkey. In contrast to the general belief of developed
financial markets that banks announce a prime rate and then increase it according to
the riskiness of borrowers, many banks in Turkey first announce a minimum rate and
then negotiate it downward. The basic idea for this was that negotiating lending rates
with riskier borrowers in that way is much easier than asking for a premium over a
prime rate. However, small firms preferred to work over a prime rate, but were less
reluctant to announce it to the general public. In terms of the type of debt contracts,
small number of banks and companies were willing to agree on a loan without
collateral. In general, roughly 80-90 percent of all banks required collateral in
Turkey.
The Turkish private and public banking sectors have gone through a
considerable amount of adjustment during the financialliberalisation starting in 1981.
One of the aims of the Turkish financial reform was to increase the efficiency and
competition in the banking sector which was dominated mainly by commercial hanks.
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Table 8.1. The Finance Structure of The Turkish Corporate Sector.
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Debt! Equity 1.41 1.55 1.82 1.66 1.72 1.25
Short Term Debt (0.74) (0.78) (0.80) (0.78) (0.79) (O.7~)
The Share of Bank Loan 0.47 0.46 0.47 039 0.42 O.3fl
Direct Financing 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.03 0.04
Other Liabilities 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.54 0.54 0.55
Source: Ersel and Ozturk (1993).
Zaim (1995) evaluated the improvement in the technical and allocative efficiency (or
inefficiency) of the Turkish banking sector by estimating the nonparametric
production frontiers of the sector. Regarding inducement in the technical efficiency
of the financial liberalisation, the banking sector has increased the technical efficiency
by 10 percent from 1981 to 1990. Also the differences in technical efficiencies
between banks has decreased over time.
Another characteristic of the Turkish banking sector is the public dominance.
Zaim indicated that inefficiency in public banks is due to irrational credit allocation.
Technically state-owned banks appear to be more efficient compared to the private
banking sector. However the gap between private and public sector has been
decreased due to stimulation to the banking sector (such as easing entry to the
banking sector and allowing more competition, and achieving optimum scale) given
by liberalisation.
Aydogan (1993) assessed the competitiveness in the Turkish banking sector
by testing the operational efficiency of the system. The operational efficiency.
measured by the difference between deposit and loan rates, requires a narrow spread
between these two rates. The empirical findings of Aydogan (I 993) pointed out that
the Turkish banks still have market power in the deposit market. and financial
liberalisation could not be successful to achieve a competitive banking sector.
Aydogan reached this conclusion through the positive effects of inflation and excess
demand for loan in the determination of the spread. Due to the market power of the
banks, they easily control the cost of deposits as they increase the lending rate.
Moreover in an inflationary environment, banks require an additional risk premium
over the lending rate that increases the spread. Aydogan also noted the role of the
capital market in collecting deposit as a main competitor for the banks. However. the
size of the Turkish capital market and the involvement of the banks in the capital
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market transaction limits the capital market to perform its competitive role in the
economy.
What were the effects of financial liberalisation on the financial structure of
the Turkish corporate sector? To see this, the debt composition of firms registered at
the Capital Market Board of Turkey is reported in Table l. Three important
conclusions emerge from these figures. First, the strong dependence of the Turkish
firms on bank credit is more evident when its share is taken into account. The share
of bank loans is about one fifth of total finance although it dropped to 36 % in 1989.
Second, the share of direct finance options, such as bonds and financial bills, are quite
negligible, around 3 % over the period 1984-1989 (the only exceptions are 1987 and
1989 with the 6% and 4% shares respectively). Third, other liabilities including
reserves, allowances, revaluation funds, retained profit etc. take up almost half of total
finance. The vulnerability of the Turkish firm to the implications of any
imperfections in financial markets becomes clearer when the share of the short-term
debt is considered. Almost three quarters of total debt are recorded as short-run
commitments.
Overall, banks in the Turkish financial system still ration some companies by
non-price measures. Despite increases in the technical efficiency and competition
(due to stimulation brought about by the liberalisation), the operational efficiency of
the banking sector, measured by the spread between deposit and loan rates, is still low
because of the high inflation premium and excess demand for bank credit. The
corporate sector, on the other hand, consistently remained heavily dependent on hank
loans even after financial liberalisation. Direct finance options, including issuing
equity, still take a very small component of total finance although financial
liberalisation brought new institutions (such as the Istanbul Stock Exchange and
Capital Market Board) and financial instruments. Given these characteristics of the
Turkish financial markets and corporate sector, the following section develops an
empirical model that takes into account the imperfect structure of the Turkish credit
markets and the dependency of the corporate sector on bank loans.
5. Capital Market Imperfections and Empirical Investment Equations:
Imperfections in credit markets may have great effects on the volatility of fixed
capital investment expenditures at times when there exist credit constraints and the
firm is unable to smooth investment expenditure through borrowing or issuing new
equity. The reliance on internally generated financial funds in such situations makes
investment expenditures more vulnerable to fluctuations in cash flows and profit. The
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empirical models concerning the impacts of capital market imperfections on a firm's
real decisions should concentrate particularly on the role of financial variables in
investment. In this section, the impacts of financial constraints on investment
expenditures in Turkey are to be investigated with an intertemporal model of a
representative value maximising firm. Before the formal presentation of the model,
the following section aims to provide a general survey of a more recent literature on
the modelling of financial constraints in real decisions.
5. 1. General Overview of the Recent Literature:
The significance of cash flow, in particular financial variables in empirical investment
models, is the subject of a long historical discussion. In the last decade, the
economic theory concentrated on the imperfections in financial markets, and provided
an explanation for the impacts of financial markets on real economic decisions. In
relation to private investment behaviour, two crucial financial market imperfections
have drawn significant attention in the literature. From the lenders' point of view,
incentive effects and the moral hazard problem caused by asymmetric information in
financial markets limit the lenders to extend credit to the firms within higher default
risk groups. From the manager's point of view, another informational problem
allows the manager to prefer more borrowing instead of issuing equity. While the
managers find the borrowing option profitable, issuing new debt will not be to the
benefits of equity holders since an increasing borrowing also increases the riskiness
of the company. Therefore, these conflicting interests lead the equity owners to claim
an extra risk premium which is called agency cost.
Although there has been a general theoretical agreement on the importance of
financial variables in real decisions, the empirical findings had been rather mixed
since the seminal paper of Jorgenson (1971). However, the most recent empirical
studies have raised the question, and paved the way for a new insight into the
question of what determines company investment. The innovation in these studies is
the use of company level panel data over a limited time period instead of using
aggregate time series. The principal data sources of these studies are published
company accounts. They, however, deal not only with the theoretical modelling in
association with how to model financial variables within a consistent optimisation
framework of a representative firm, but also with some measurement problems and
econometric estimation issues of panel data.
There have been three types of modelling of investment demand in the
literature. The maximisation of the value of a firm's market value is at the centre of
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those kind of models. In the earlier research by Jorgenson and his associates [e.g. see
Jorgenson and Stephenson (1967) and Jorgenson and Siebert (1968)] during the 1960s
and 1970s, the aim was to derive the optimal capital stock from the firm's
maximisation problem without explicitly considering the optimal path of adjustment.
and to provide evidence to support the idea that price variables have superiority over
quantity variables in the determination of investment expenditure. The dynamic
nature of investment was incorporated into the model by delivery lags which were
assumed to be a barrier to instantaneous adjustment. Given the formal elegance of the
Modigliani-Miller theorem, they abstracted financial considerations from investment
models. The ModigJiani-Miller theorem was taken as a convenient justification for
ignoring the effects of capital markets when they solved the intertemporal cash
maximisation of the firm.
However, the methodological revolution in macroeconomics in the 70s and
80s, as discussed earlier in this chapter, has shifted attention towards financial matters
[for example, very influential paper by Stiglitz and Weiss (1980) and Greenwald and
Stiglitz (1988)]. Alternatively, two different models to study the effects of financial
variables in investment decisions were developed in the 1980s. The basic idea in the
first group of modelling was to add both a financial variable, usually based on the
neoclassical technology assumption and a convex cost of capital adjustments. yielding
the fundamental relationship between investment and the unobservable shadow value
of capital, which is known as marginal-q. But in many empirical studies, the
unobservable shadow price of capital is simply related to the observable market value
of the firm relative to the replacement cost (which is known as average-q) under some
specific assumptions [see Hayashi (1982) and Chirinko, (1987) for example]. The
main advantage of the q approach is that with the inclusion of the convex cost of
adjustments, the investment decision becomes forward-looking, and does not require
any assumption on the formation of future expectations. The q variable controls
future expectations using the stock market value of the firm by which expectation on
future is reflected. But in the late 1980s, a question was raised regarding whether or
not the stock market value, which is itself very sensitive to speculative attacks, is
actually a good indicator for the value of a firm. Instead of relying on the unreliable
market value of a firm, Abel and Blanchard (1986), however, developed another
approach to incorporate the q value into the investment model. What they do is to
define an auxiliary equation - along with the original investment demand equation -
and then use it to forecast the future value of the marginal revenue product of capital
(see chapter 2 for more explicit discussion). The empirical performance of the q
model has not yet been very satisfactory on its own terms, and its explanatory power
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has not been favourably high in comparison with competitive models. Although the q
variable has appeared very significant, empirical estimations have indicated the
presence of misspecification error through autocorrelation. The attempts to improve
the empirical performance of the q models cover a large range of theoretical effort
including the allowance for the existence of multiple capital product [Hayashi and
Inoue (1991)], the inclusion of financing options and taxation [Cuthberson and
Gasporro (1995), Fazzari et al. (1988), Hayashi (1985), and Poterba and Lawrence
(1983)], and violation of the perfect product market assumption [Schiatarelli and
Georgoutsos (1990), and Galeotti and Schiatarelli (1991)].
The second group of empirical approaches also starts with the assumption of
neoclassical technology and convex cost of adjustment. Like the previous one, this
approach also uses the first-order condition of the firm's optimisation problem, and
directly estimates the Euler equation for investment without requiring the q variable.
Due to the lack of reliable data on the market value of the firm (not only in
developing countries, but also in developed economies), the choice is usually in
favour of this, so-called Euler equation approach. This approach was first developed
in the investment literature by Abel (1980), and has been extensively used in public
finance literature by others [e.g. Poterba and Summers (1983)]. Like the q-theory of
investment, the new approach relates investment rates in successive periods by using
the costs of capital adjustment. Although expected investment rates are not directly
observable, the fact that the Euler equation approach requires only a one-period-ahead
forecast value of investment rate, provides its major advantage. Instead of using an
auxiliary equation to forecast the unobservable expectations of the marginal product
of capital as in Abel and Blanchard (1986) and Abel (1980), the expected value can
be replaced by the actual investment rate in the next period with a measurement error.
In what follows, an empirical investment equation will be derived by using the Euler
equation approach. Unlike the current literature, the empirical testing in this chapter
will be carried out using aggregate time series data [the exception in the literature is
Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990)].
Why the Euler Equation Approach?:
As explained above, there have been various alternatives to investigate the impacts of
imperfect capital markets on the rate of investment; apart from eclectic models, those
studies would be divided into two basic groups, namely q-models of investment and
the Euler equation approaches. My choice in this chapter is the latter one because of
the following reasons: The Euler equation approach is particularly appealing for
developing countries where the stock exchange, that provides the main variable (the
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market values of firms) of the q-model, is either not present or not well-developed.
The Euler equation approach avoids this problem by simply not requiring the stock
market values of firms.
Euler equations are also appealing because of their flexible structure to
incorporate rich economic relationships into the empirical modelling such as
imperfect output market [see Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990)], imperfect credit
markets and credit constraints [see e.g. Whited (1992), Hubbard and Kashyap (1992),
Jaramillo, Schiantarelli and Weiss (1993), and Galeotti, Schiantarelli and Jaramillo
(1994)], and multiple inputs [see Hayashi and Inoue (1991 )]. Therefore, one is able
to use all information from the firm's optimisation problem.
In relation to the previous paragraphs, the Euler equation approach is suitable
when taking into account the intertemporal effects of all economic and technological
constraints through Lagrange multipliers. For instance, the functional representation
of the unobservable multiplier associated with an exogenous borrowing constraint, as
in the present chapter, can be derived in terms of observable, and substituted in the
first-order condition of the capital stock in order to reflect the effects of a binding
constraint when the value of this multiplier is greater than zero. The parameterisation
of the Lagrange multiplier in my model is based on the first-order condition of the
outstanding debt stock; i.e. the derivation of the investment demand equation benefits
from information that is already given by the optimisation. The omission of the
effects on capital stock decisions of the unobservable multiplier, that indeed might be
correlated with the other pre-determined variables of the model, would cause a
misspecification of the estimated model. However, one also can parameterise the
unobservable multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint in an eclectic way,
and relate it to some observable variables which are exogenously included into the
model [see Pesaran and Smith (1995), and Whited (1992)].
5.2. Basic Fundamentals of the Model:
The aim of the model of this section is to find out the interactions between real and
financial decisions on the basis of empirical evidence from the Turkish economy. In
doing so, the model accounts for the impacts of capital market imperfections (e.g.
asymmetric information) and liquidity constraints on investment decisions. For this,
an Euler equation approach to modelling investment demand is used. A similar
approach has been used by various authors very recently with some differences [Bond
and Meghir (1994), Galeotti, Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1994), Jaramillo,
Schiantarelli and Weiss (1993) and Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990)]. Unlike
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similar models, the present one uses all information associated with a binding
borrowing constraint through an unobservable Lagrange multiplier. I define this
multiplier in terms of observable variables given by the solution of the optimisation
problem. With this feature, the model represents a new approach to modelling
borrowing constraint in empirical investment literature.
One of the first applications of this approach was developed by Abel (1980).
His Euler equation was used to investigate the relative elasticities of price and output
variables in neoclassical tradition. However, some studies have reviewed the
importance of quantity and cost variables (such as debt as a means of financing
investment, and the risk premium being charged by lenders according to the riskiness
of a borrower) other than output and the relative price of capital. Abel's model
considered the forward-looking nature of investment through the relationship between
the current rate of investment and the future profitability. His treatment of multi-
period expectations involves a standard Koyck transformation applied to the
investment function which is in the form of a distributed lead function. Unlike his
approach, the Euler equation in the following sections does not require multi-period
expectation formation. The future is included only through the one-period-ahead
expected rate of investment.
In the present chapter, a theoretical intertemporal model is developed using
the cash maximisation of a representative firm subject to imperfect financial markets -
justified by a quadratic risk premium or agency cost function - and a credit constraint
which was defined as a maximum limit on the outstanding debt stock of the firm. In
the derivation of the investment function, a quadratic cost function of capital
adjustment was assumed. Concerning capital market imperfections, it is assumed that
asymmetric information exists in credit markets where the firm has more accurate
information about the investment project than lenders do. It is further assumed that
lenders charge a default risk premium over the risk-free interest rate due to both
agency problems [e.g. see Fazzari and Athey (1987)] and incentive effects as
described in Stiglitz and Weiss (1983). Following the discussion in the preceding
sections, the default risk premium is supposed to be sensitive to the firm's debt-capital
ratio in a way that as the latter increases, the default risk-premium also increases. In
the following sections, changes in the perceptions of the riskiness of a firm are
modelled with the help of a quadratic risk-premium function.
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5. 2.1. Definitions and Assumptions:
The model is a discrete time analysis in which the firm is assumed to maximise the
present value of the shares received by shareholders. For empirical simplicity, the
model developed in this section requires some standard assumptions.
Assumption I. The firm uses two inputs of production, capital (K) and labour (L) ill
its production process.
Assumption 2. The capital input K is regarded as quasi fixed, but the labour input L
is perfectly variable.
Assumption 3. The input K depreciates at a constant rate D.
Assumption 4. The firm's manager is risk neutral, but lenders are risk-averse.
Assumption 5. The nominal discount rate is constant p.
Assumption 6. There are no taxation and investment incentives.
Assumption 7. Borrowing is the only externalfinance option available; the firms
neither issue new equity nor retain any earning.
The purpose of these and similar assumptions is to avoid a highly non-linear dynamic
structure for the investment equation. The setting up of the problem is a standard one.
By assumption, the following arbitrage equation holds for the representative firm in
equilibrium:
(I)
where p is the nominal discount rate; Vt is the value of the firm's shares; DI is gross
dividends; Et denotes expectations conditional on information available at time t.
According to (I ), firm's discounted value (pVt) is equal to the sum of dividends paid
in the current period and the expected change in the value of the firm in the next
period. The objective of the firm is to maximise the value of the firm's shares, VI'
Solving equation (1) forward with respect to Vt- the following objective function can
easily be obtained:
v,=E,[I:Op'D,ln,] (2)
where f3 = 1/(1+ p) is the constant discount rate; 0, is the information set of the
economic agent at time t. A basic cash-flow identity also holds between the firm's
financial sources and expenditures. The firm's financial sources are in general
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internally generated funds and external funds which consist only of borrowing by
assumption 7. Internally generated funds are defined as revenue from the sale net of
output produced, the costs of borrowing and capital adjustment costs. Finally the
cash-flow identity can be represented as follows
(3)
where q, = the price of capital goods; I, = investment expenditures; B, = outstanding
debt stock; dB, = a change in outstanding debt stock (i.e. borrowing); i, = riskless
interest rate; K, = capital stock; L, = labour which is costlessly adjustable production
factor; n(.) = the neo-classical revenue function net of labour cost; r(.) = a quadratic
agency cost function or the function of financial distress which captures the premium
paid by firms above the safe rate; \f(.) = a quadratic adjustment cost function. The
model thus has five endogenous variables: dividends, labour, the capital stock, the
outstanding debt stock, and investment. The objective function described above is to
be maximised subject to some economic and technological constraints. The first one
is the usual capital accumulation equation
(4)
where 8 is the rate of depreciation. The second constraint benefits from the
following assumption
Assumption 8. Dividends are to be non-negative, and cannot exceed the excess of
revenue over labour cost, interest rate payment including risk
premium, and the costs of capital adjustment [see e.g. Edwards and
Keen (1985), Schiantarelli and Georgoutsos (1990) for example];
that is
(5)
and
(6)
Using (6) and the definition of sources and uses of funds (3), one easily obtains the
following
(7)
which implies that external sources cannot exceed investment expenditures.
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In addition to imperfection in credit markets, I also allow for another type of
capital market imperfection using the assumption below
Assumption 9: Thefirm faces an exogenous upper bound on the level of
outstanding debt stock, After that level, the firm becomes too
risky for lenders. and is rationed [Whited (1992)]
(8)
where Br is an exogenous upper bound on the maximum debt stock that the firm is
able to accumulate.
5.2.2. The Complete Model and The Solution:
In the solution of the model, constraint (5) introduces an additional Lagrange
multiplier into the first-order conditions. This unobservable multiplier cannot be
eliminated from the Euler equation unless another assumption is made. Since the
purpose of the model is to find out the interrelationship between investment decisions
and the cost and availability of borrowing, I particularly concentrate on the
imperfections related to these issues, which are of great importance in the chapter. In
this respect, before starting the solution to the optimisation problem, assume that the
following also holds;
Assumption 10: The upper bound of the dividend constraint is strictly binding;
i.e. the borrowing is equal to investment expenditure. This
assumption simultaneously states that dividend payment is
strictly positive.
Besides, the assumption also indicates that the firm does not transfer any retained
earnings to next periods, and is totally dependent on external borrowing for the
finance of investment expenditures; therefore ~, = q.l.. In a situation where the
slack condition of borrowing (0< aBt<qtIt) holds, the borrowing constraint would not
influence the first order-condition of the capital stock. However, the purpose of the
model here is to see the impacts of a binding exogenous borrowing constraint on the
capital stock and investment decisions. With the slack condition, the firm would be
able to use some retained earnings which have not necessarily been distributed to
shareholders. In this case, the borrowing constraint would occur once retained
earnings are exhausted at margin, and borrowing would finance investment without
being affected by capital market imperfections. However, the danger of getting a
misspecified Euler equation still exists if this assumption does not hold. In that case,
the final estimated equation would include the effects of unobservable multiplier
associated with constraint (5). In order to concentrate on the imperfections only
related to the cost and availability of borrowing, assumption 10 is assumed to hold.
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The firm maximises the following discrete problem to find the optimum levels
of labour, investment, dividends, capital and debt stocks.
Maximise v, = E'[L~f3'D,ln,J (9)
Subject to
(i) cash-flow identity:
(ii) constrain on the accumulation of the capital stock:
(4)
(iii) non-negativity constraints on dividends:
(5)
(7')
(iv) Borrowing constraint:
(8)
where Kt and B t are both state variables; It is the control variable of the model.
Consider the case where the firm pays maximum amount of dividends, and then the
multiplier associated with the upper bound of dividend will be zero. Let AI and 1]1be
the multipliers associated respectively with capital accumulation equation and with
the credit constraint (A" 11, >0). Combining equations (7') and (8), the Lagrangean
function can be written as
L, = [n( K" L,) + B, -(1+ i'_1 )B'_I - r(B"K, )-q,l, -q,'P(I" K,)]
-A, (K, -I, - (1-8)K,_I) + 1],(8, - q.l, - Br-!) (10)
The first-order conditions of the objective function with respect to labour,
investment, capital stock and debt respectively are
(II)
-q, -q,'P~ +A, -q,l1, =0 (12)
(13)
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s.. (1- r~)- /3{1+ it)- /3Et{ 7Jt+ l) = 0 (14)
lim (fiT BT) =0 and lim (fiT KT) = 0 vt,
7_'oo T_'oo
(15)
where superscript and subscript ts indicate time; X~(.)= aX{.)jalt etc. [see appendix
for the solution in more detail]. The first-order conditions (1I) to (14), along with the
transversality condition (15), simultaneously give four endogenous variables (labour,
the optimum level of the capital stock, the outstanding debt stock, the level of
investment to achieve that optimum capital stock level), and two Lagrange
multipliers. These endogenous variables are generally functions of the exogenous
variables of the model. including interest rates, the price of output, the price of capital
goods, and the output level. Particularly, the functional derivation of the Lagrange
multiplier TJ, (see 14') in terms of exogenous discount factor and the riskless interest
rate will enable us to derive the first-order condition of the capital stock by
eliminating this unobservable multiplier (see appendix for the derivation).
(14')
The economic interpretation of the first-order conditions (11) to (14) are as
follows. The first one for labour indicates that the firm equates the marginal
productivity of labour to its price in each time period. Remember that labour is a
variable productive factor, and that there is no imperfection in labour market.
According to (14), one pound increase in debt stock by the firm, net of the risk
premium. will be paid back with an additional interest payment in the next period. In
the presence of a credit constraint ( TJt>O), the price of capital will be augmented by
7J, in (12); i.e. the presence of 17t increases the expected marginal benefits from an
additional capital. The last condition is the simple transversality condition on
borrowing which prevents the firm from borrowing an infinite amount to payout as
dividends. In order to provide economic interpretation for the first-order conditions
for the capital stock and investment, the following substitution may be convenient.
Solving for At and TJt into the second condition for investment (12), and substituting
it in the condition for the capital stock (13) yields the following reduced Euler
equation for capital.
(13')
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The left-hand side of the equation above gives the difference between the incremental
profit. which is generated hy a unit increase in the capital stock, and its user cost. The
right-hand side of the equation is the quasi-forward difference in marginal adjustment
costs due to investment. Accordingly the marginal adjustment cost of investing today
must he equal to the incremental profit of the new unit of capital stock net of its user
cost. Note that the existence of the risk premium, which has been assumed to be
elastic to the capital stock. provides some relief from not having high debt-capital
ratio for the firm as the capital stock with respect to the stock of debt increases. The
last term in (13') including the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing
constraint is the net changes in the value of an incremental increase in the capital
stock as the harrowing constraint relaxes. Its existence raises the expected user cost
of capital.
5.2.3. Empirical Specifications:
In order to obtain an empirical model of investment, we must specify the functions of
the risk premium and the costs of capital stock adjustment. In the preceding sections,
the costs of horrowing of the firm are assumed to comprise two elements. The first
part represents the riskless cost of outstanding debt stock, it_IBt-!, and is not affected
by the firm's financial structure. in particular by the debt-capital ratio (i.e. leverage
ratio). The second part is. however. assumed to represent the default risk premium
(or agency cost) over the riskless interest rate. Due to agency costs and incentive
effects in imperfect capital markets. as discussed earlier, the creditors of the firm
demand this risk premium against the probability of bankruptcy. According to the
theory that has been mentioned earlier, the debt-capital ratio might be a good
indicator to measure the riskiness of a firm. An increased debt-dependency of the
firm raises the risk of lending money to this firm. Following the current investment
literature, the function of this risk premium can be represented by a quadratic, convex
function of debt over capital ratio [see Galeotti, Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1994)
and Chirinko ( 1993) for example], so that
Assumption I I. The financial distress function is a convex increasing function of
debt, and decreasing function of the capital stock as follows:
r(B,. K,) = !!_(_!i_)BI'
2 q,Kt
a>O ( 16)
where the term in the parenthesis is the debt-capital ratio. The convexity of the
function with respect to debt stock, B" provides the increasing risk premium at
margin. Also. the agency costs are a decreasing function of the existing capital stock.
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Thus, the marginal default risks of the firm with respect to debt stock and the capital
stock respectively are
( 16a)
The second parameterisation is carried out for the function of the costs of adjustment,
'P(.). The most popular form of convex adjustment cost functions in the q-theory
literature is generally used due to its simplicity. However, unlike many applications
in the literature, the capital adjustment cost in this chapter is assumed to be external to
the firm which may arise from imperfections in capital goods markets where the firm
has no individual effect on factor markets, and where anticipates a rising supply price
because all identical firms behave similarly as a result of any demand and price
shocks [see Mussa (1977) and Lucas (1967)].
Assumption 12.The adjustment cost function is a convex function of the rate of
investment, and defined as follows:
'P(Ip Kt) = !!_(lL - c)2 K"
2 Kt
b>O and c c- O ( 17)
where c is the required minimum level of investment [see Summer (1981 )]. The
partial derivatives of the function with respect to investment and capital respectively
are
( 17a)
The marginal productivity of capital must also be parameterised for the
estimation purpose. This may be specified either by assuming a particular form of the
production function [see Abel (1980) for example], or alternatively by relying on a
Constant returns to scale assumption and the homogeneity of the production function.
Despite wide criticisms [see Eisner and Nadiri (1968) for example], if we assume that
the production function is Cobb-Douglas, then the marginal productivity of capital
can be written as follows
( 18)
where e is the share of capital in the production of Q. and the Cobb-Douglas
production is Q == KaLI-a
I ",
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5.3. The Derivation of Estimateable Euler Equations:
Using (18), two empirical investment equations are derived, depending on whether 11t
is greater than or equal to zero. By the first one in which the credit constraint is
assumed to be not binding, the significance of the increasing risk premium as well as
the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance can be tested. In the second equation where the
credit constraint becomes binding, however, the aim is to test the significance of that
constraint along with the imperfect market assumption. Before stating the derivation
of the estimateable investment equations, one must note that the performance of the
estimation results will be closely related to the functional specifications chosen in this
section. The empirical results in the following sections may also provide support in
favour of, or against those specifications.
5.3.1. An Euler Equation With a Non-Binding Credit Constraint (n =0):
The assumptions here are that the firm issues debt, distributes positive dividends, and
is constrained by the upper bound of dividends. The borrowing constraint is assumed
not to constrain the firm's behaviour; i.e. 11t = 11t+l=O' The Euler equation (15) for
capital thus becomes
(l5a) is almost similar to Galeotti, Schiantarelli and Jaramillo (1994) with the minor
difference that my definition of the agency cost function is much simpler. The right-
hand side of the equation is the quasi-forward difference in marginal adjustment cost.
The left-hand side is the incremental profit, obtained as a result of a unit increase in
the capital stock, that is net of its user cost and the expected saving in the marginal
cost of borrowing avoided by not installing capital tomorrow but today [the second
and third term on the left-hand side of (lSa)]. Having made use of (16a), (I7a) and
(18), and arranged the Euler equation (l5a), one can easily obtain the following
empirical investment equation,
( ISb)
where <1>'+1 = f3(I- o)(q,+tiq,) is the real discount rate; (1- <l>t+I) is the user cost of
capital. Let
('/101'1('1" /0/ The lntertemporal lnvcstment Decisim: ofa Firm 2()O
IK, =(J/K)" QK, =(pQ/qK),. HK, =(U/tIA'),
Before estimation (15b), the one-period-ahead forecasted values of investment
and the real discount rate variables must be replaced by their observable counterparts.
If expectations are rational, replacing all expectations by their realised values
introduces a measurement error V'+I' which is a serially uncorrclutcd forecast error
that is the error made in forecasting one-period ahead of the investment rate and the
price of capital goods. For the estimation purpose. ( I5b) can he re-arranged in the
following way, Leaving the expected value of the rate of investment on the right-
hand side, the first estimateable Euler equation can he written as
where
ao=-(,2/2. a,=O.5. (xl=l. (x,= lI/h. Cl1=1I/2h,
a~ = (he -1)/" ( 19)
The restriction that 2al = a2 helps the recovery of all structural par.unctcrs from
equation (19). The signs of the variables in equation (ISc) arc similar to those in
previous studies [in particular to those in Galeotti, Schiantarclli and Jaramillo ( 11)1)4) I·
The presence of the output term captures the accelerator effect in the output market.
The debt term appears because of the assumption of non-sepurahilitv between
investment and borrowing decisions. Thus, it reflects thc effects of imperfect credit
market; with the irrelevance assumption of the Modigfiani-Millcr hypothesis, this
term disappears, and two decisions become separable. The insignificance of u4 in
estimation is an evidence of the irrelevance assumption of the Modrp liani-Millcr
hypothesis as well as of an increasing agency cost. In order to recover structural
parameters from the estimates, the exact identification of the model Gin Ill' provided
by imposing the restrictions that a2 = 2(11, ll.1 = -(X~.
To estimate (15c), the expected rate of investment must be defined in terms of
observables or replaced by its realised value, so that
The additive error-term in (20) can be regarded as one due to technological shocks
instead of measurement. One way to include the error term into the model may he re-
writing the adjustment cost function of the capital stock (equation 17) depending on
technological shocks; i.e. '1'(1,. K,) = (h/2)[ (I,/K,) - (' - -l
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5. 3. 2. An Euler Equation With a Binding Constraint Cn >0):
The equations above are correctly specified only if the borrowing constraint is not
strictly binding. When the credit constraint becomes binding, an additional variable
appears in the shadow value of capital (equation 16) through the unobservable
multiplier of constraint (8). Using the first-order condition for debt, this muhiplier
can be defined in terms of observable variables. Using (14') I
= (1- r)(1-lP1+1) +V4 +VBK, (22)
where r = 1/f3, VBK, = r{BK,-, - ct>,+, BK,) and Vi,= (;,_, - ct> ,.,i,). A simple substitution
of (22) into the Euler equation of the capital stock (13') leads to the following form of
the investment demand equation;
- (c2 ) -2 [ -] ((J)- (a )-2 (bc{3 - I) .( )t«, = - "2 +O.5lK, + E, <I>,+,/K,+, + b QK, + 2b BK, + b{3 I'", 1- <1>",
(23a)
The difference of this equation from the one derived earlier (JSc) is the last two terms
emerging due to the binding credit constraint on borrowing. The joint significance of
the coefficients of all financial variables is to be tested if there is evidence in favour
of the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance hypothesis. Besides, the joint significance of a5
and a6 also confirms the binding borrowing constraint in the imperfect credit market.
Imposing the restriction that (~=2*a3) reduces (23a) to
Using these equations, the Modigliani-Miller irrelevance theorem will he
tested in the next section for Turkey. The joint significance of all finance variables
(including quadratic, linear debt-capital ratio, and the interest rate variables) wi II he
an indication of the violation of this theorem. Additionally. the significant positive
coefficient of the quadratic debt-capital ratio alone will he an evidence of the
I see appendix for the more detailed derivation.
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presence of an increasing agency cost resulting from increasing the debt stock and not
installing capital. With respect to the theory developed in the chapter. the joint
significance of the last two finance variables will prove the existence of the
borrowing constraint.
Besides the relevance of the choice of the functional form of the adjustment
cost function, the production function can also be tested. The significance of the
coefficients of the rate of investment on the right-hand side and the joint restriction
tests on these coefficients would provide a justification for the lise of quadratic
adjustment cost function.
6. Empirical Results:
The model has been estimated for the period 1963-1993 on the aggregate data and for
the period 1968-1993 on the sectoral data. I have started with the estimation of the
unrestricted equation (23) and subsequently imposed the restriction (a6=2*'q). In
estimating (23), the only problem is that the one-period-ahead forecasted rate of
investment is unobservable, and should be replaced by some measure using the
rational expectation (or perfect foresight) assumption. The one-period-ahead
forecasted values of investment and the real discount rate variables have been
replaced by their observable counterparts. If expectations arc rational. replacing all
expectations by their realised values introduces an additive measurement error V, II•
which is a serially uncorrelated forecast error that is the error made in forecasting the
one-period ahead of the investment rate and the price of capital goods [sec equation
(24)]. We then assume that this is the only component of the error term and there is
no error component associated with technology shocks. Including such a technology
shock yields an composite stochastic term combining forecasting error and
technology shocks. Doing so, however, introduces an additive and orthogonal
expectation error made when forecasted values of the one-period-ahead rate of
investment are based on information available in period t, and the stochastic arm
term of the Euler equation becomes correlated with the regressors. so that the OLS
estimator may give inconsistent parameter estimations. McCallum (1976) suggests
that the instrumental variable estimator ensures consistency. and that the lagged
values of the present variables in the equation dated until the period when expectation
are formed can be used as instruments.
The Euler equation in (23a) has been estimated for the linear rate of
investment instead of the quasi difference dependent variable ( 1/\ I - u ~//\: ) on the left-
hand side. Although the estimation has been carried out on both the aggn.·gatl· data
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and sectoral data, the results have indicated a strong functional misspccification (very
high Ramsey test statistics) for all estimations, and have not been reported here. The
equation estimated has finally been chosen as
where uo=-c2/2, ul=l, u2=8/b, a3=a/2b, a4={bc{3-I}/b{3, a~=I/", 11,,=0/".
The results of this first method are reported in table 2 for the aggregate investment
model. Two different estimations are presented for the aggregate investment model
in table 2. The first column of each estimation reports the unrestricted version of the
Euler equation (24), whereas the second column is the restricted version (24) after
imposing the restriction (a6=2a3). In addition to conventional test statistics [c.g.
autocorrelation (SC), functional form misspecification (FF), normality (N) and
heteroscedasticity (H)], Sargan's over-identification test (ST) is reported to test the
validity of the choice of instrumental variables and to determine whether the
instruments are correlated with the disturbances. Two Wald statistics (W I and W2)
are also presented in table 2 to test the restrictions imposed: W I is the joint
significance test of all financial variables, W2 the joint significance test of the last
two terms in (24) that arise simultaneously due to the binding borrowing constraint.
Finally W3 is the test for the restriction <16=.2a3.The numbers in brackets below each
test value indicate the relevant degrees of freedom. In estimation, a different order of
lags of each variable has been tried. Some results in table 2 and in others arc in fad
derived by regressing the quasi differenced form of dependent variable on some
lagged dependent variables. For example. the unrestricted form of the second
estimation results (column 3) in table 2 includes only the first order lag of the interest
rate variable. The instruments chosen are the second lags of all variables. Although
we also estimated the models using the first order lags as instruments. the ST over-
identification test indicated that the choice of instruments was not correct.
The explanatory power of all equations in table 2 is very good. around <)()
percent. The ST test indicates that the choice of instruments is acceptable. The t-
values of the coefficients in the first column are based on the adjusted White's
heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors because of the presence of
heteroscedasticity. The coefficients in all variables are according to the predictions of
the theoretical model developed earlier. except for the signs of the quadratic risk
premium variable and the interest rate variable. Despite the thcorcucal cxpccuuions.
the quadratic debt-capital ratio has a negative sign, but is statistically insignificant.
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TabJe 8.2
Ae;e;ree;ateInvestment Under the Rational Expectation Assumption
(Instrumental Variable Estimation)
(I )8, b
Variahles Unrestricted Restricted
constant -0.2026
(-3.967)
10.722
(9.043)
0.0327
(2.951 )
-0.1298
(-0.295)*
0.2099
(3.996)
-0.1517E-3
(-6.063)
0.0045
( 1.447)*
- -2
VBKt +0.5BKt
(2)'" d
Restricted
-0.1923
(-4.187)
10.615
(7.840)
0.0311
(2.775)
0.200
(4.156)
-0.1524E-3
(-4.903)
0.0041
(1.521)··
Unrestricted
-0.2846
(-3.665)
12.144
(6.862)
0.0372
(2.318)
-0.101
(- 1.435)*
0.2909
(3.685)
-0.1438E-3
(-3.644)
0.0084
(2.179)
-0.205
(-4.285)
11.380
(7.664)
0.0244
(2.078)
0.212
(4.240)
-0.152E-3
(-4.417)
0.0052
( 1.883)
SE
0.935
0.0023
0.969
0.117
0.481
3.857
12.504
[6]
31.142
[3]
39.026
[2]
0.102
I
se chi-squarer I )
FF chi-square (I)
N chi-square (2)
H chi-square (I)
ST chi-square
WI chi-square
W2 chi-sq
W3 chi-sq (I)
0.937
0.0023
0.830
0.002
0.400
3.80
4.690
[5]
32.272
[2]
42.054
[2]
0.910
0.0027
1.063
2.069
0.1 J()
2.819
2.650
[4]
20.637
[3]
29.517
[2]
2.047
I
0.931
0.0024
1.061
0.081
0.817
3.058
6.083
[51
21.643
[2]
35.715
[2]
~ WI: The Wald statistics to test the restriction that a3=a5=a6=0.; W2: The Wald test statistics to
test that as=<l6=O.;W3: The Wald statistics to test that a6=2a3 ; il Without lag of any variahle.; b : The
second lag values of each variable have been used as instruments.; ~: Heteroscedasticity consistent t-
values are reported in parentheses.; d: Only the interest rate variable has been lagged once. * indicates
insignificant coefficients either at 5 percent or JO percent significance level. ** shows the variables
that are significant only at 10 percent.
1P'+1 = f3(I- 8)"'+1/"" Vi, = (io-l -lPl+li,), VBK, = (1//3)( BKI-l -1P'>1 BK,)
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On the other hand, the interest rate variable again has the opposite sign, but is highly
significant. The linear debt-capital ratio (the last one in the first column) is
expectedly positive, but is significant only at the IO percent significance level.
However, overall, a joint significance of the last two financial terms, namely the
interest term and the linear debt-capital ratio, supports the presence of borrowing
constraints at the aggregate level. The test for the restriction (a6=2a3) confirms this
conclusion (see W2) as well. Once this restriction is imposed (see the second column
of the first model), only the sign of the interest rate variable remains opposite to our
theoretical expectation. W I indicates the joint significance of all the financial
variables in the Euler equation. The results of the second model in table 2 (the third
and fourth columns) qualitatively confirm those of the first model. The perverse sign
of the interest rate variable still remains a puzzle. However, one explanation of this
unexpected result might be the use of the nominal deposit rate instead of riskless
interest rate in the calculation of this variable. The result would then suggest that the
nominal deposit rate is indeed a very poor proxy for the riskless interest rate.
Another drawback of this estimation is the rejection of the hypothesis that the
coefficient of the one-period-ahead expected rate of investment is unity. Therefore it
is not possible to recover and estimate the structural parameters, such as the
adjustment cost parameter, the coefficient of the agency cost function, and the capital
share of production. Despite this result, the expected rate of the investment variable
is highly significant and its sign is positive, as expected.
The significance of the output term and the user cost of capital is quite
strongly supported by the data. The sign of the user cost variable depends mainly on
the relative size of the structural parameters, which is itself a combination of these
parameters. The size of output term is, though significant, quite small, similar to
results obtained in earlier empirical studies.
Overall, these results indicate that the representative firm faces increasing
agency costs of debt which is increasing in the debt-capital ratio (the interpretations
are based on the restricted functions since the coefficient of the debt variable has the
expected sign, and is significant at 10 and 5 percent levels in the first and the second
models respectively). Besides, the borrowing constraint is also binding on the firm.
The application of the quadratic form for capital adjustment costs has not been
supported by the data, despite the significant coefficients of the expected rate of
investment, which has been estimated as greater than unity.
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Table 8.3
Sectoral Investment Equations (Instrumental Variable Estimation)
['K, - O.5IK;] = tlf) + tIltP",IK,+1 + '" QK, + ", BK; + tI.(I- tP",) +tI,(i, ,- tP,.i,) + lI,.( l//J)( 11K, 1- cp,., UK,) + I',.,
Manufacturing Agriculture Mining
Variables il~ i2~ il~a (2t ( I )e i2~d
Constant -0.381 -0.435 -0.638 -0.449 -0.0612 -O.ORO
(-3.246) (-3.956) (-4.859) (-5.(52) (-1.924 ) (-2.339)
cP
'
+1IKl+1 8.269 10.353 1.585 13.526 12.578(3.295) (5.561 ) (3.228) (9.199) (8.744)
QK, -0.923E-3 -0.0014 0.026 0.025 0.423E-4 0.286E-3(-1.148)" (-1.944 ) (29.512) (38.524) (O.14(l)• (0.932)"
-0 0.080 -0.0054 -O.51IE-4
BK~ ( 1.254)" (-2.290) (-0.188)·
O.OSII
(1- cP'+I) 0.417 0.468 0.665 0.482 (),()62 I (2.331 )(3.390) (3.987) (4.900) (5.643) (1.919)
Vii -0.405E-3 -0.340E-3 0.0047 0.0055 -0.989 O.529E-3(-4.526) (-4.661) ( 1.704) .... (2.IOO) (-1.343)** (0.840)·
VBK,
0.0036 0.0015 0.12IE-3
( 1.936) (2.295) ( 1.979)
- -2 0.0047 0.959E-5 0.125E-3
VBK, +O.5BK, (2.856~ ~().161~. ~2.635l
R2 0.942 0.954 0.989 0.987 O.Rn 0.878
SE 0.0053 0.0054 0.0046 0.005 0'(){)09 0.(){)O9
SC chi-square (I) 0.709 1.653 0.398 1.376 o.oooox 0.020
FF chi-square (I) 0.048 0.460 3.178 0.0585 1.662 0.290
N chi-square (2) 0.108 0.883 0.455 3.622 0.277 0.110
H chi-square (I) 0.854 0.574 0.661 0.293 3.06R 0.624
ST chi-square 8.394 4.915 1.366 1.491 10.138 7.451
[6] [5] [6] 14] 161 15]
WI chi-square 38.430 35.875 10.031 4.722 8.298 7.212
[3] [2] [3] [2] 131 [2]
W2 chi-square 38.197 9.912 6.304
[2] [2] [21
W3 chi-square 1.666 5.233"· 0.0013
[I] [ I] III
W4 chi-square 1.420
[ I]
W5 chi-square 5.284
2
Notes: .Il: The first lags of the quadratic debt-capital variable and the user cost term; h: the first lag of
the user cost term; ~: the lags of the linear debt-capital variable; d: the lags of the linear debt-capital
ratio and the interest rate variable; W4; The Wald statistics to test that al = I ;W5: The Wald stal. jointly
to test that a I= I and a6=2a3. See the table I for the explanation of the rest of the legends. The second
lags of all variables have been used as instruments.
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Table 8.3 (Cont.)
Sectoral Investment Equations (Instrumental Variable Estimation)
Services Services
Variables
~1~ ~2~ ~I)a (2)b
constant 0.0188 0.0145 0.026S 0.016
(0.4828)* (0.445)* ( 1.025)* (0.621 )*
$'+1 IKt+1 8.408 8.763 7.136 7.64S(6.112) (6.362) (6.465) (6.7R8)
QK, 0.668E-4 0.732E-4 0.984E-4 0.IOIE-3( 1.225)* (1.763) (2.278) (3.092)
BK~
0.0663 0.463
(0.448)* (1.403 i"
-0.0086
0.011
(1-$,+1) -0.0135 -0.0126 (-0.437)*(-0.373)* (-0.275)* (-0.426)*
v\ -0.0053 -0.0058 -0.0057 -0.006(-2.564) (-2.717) (-3.419) (-3.519)
VBK,
-0.777E-3 -(>.0075
(-0.446)* (-1.548)**
- -2
-0.001 -0.837E-3VBKt +0.5BKt (-0.689)* (-0.766)'"
-o.ooa -0.008
Dummy p.OOO~ ~-2.973~
7/ 0.858 0.868 0.914 0.909
SE 0.0041 0.0039 0.0032 0.0032
se chi-square (1) 1.892 1.151 0.590 0.291
FF chi-square (I) 1.587 0.720 0.104 0.598
N chi-square (2) 0.632 0.564 0.567 0.269
H chi-square (1) 0.054 0.015 0.007 0.145
ST chi-square 6.423 1.872 6.711 4.84
[6] [5] [6] [5]
WI chi-square 6.718 7.499 15.241 12.827
[2] [2] [2] [2]
W2 chi-square 0.200 1.964
1 I
Notes: l!: The lags of the quadratic debt-capital ratio and the user cost variable; h: No lags variables.
Dummies have been used for outliers in 1981 and 1985. All instruments are the second-order lags of
all variables.
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Sectoral Estimations:
Equation (24) has also been estimated at the sectoral level. The sectors consist of
manufacturing, agriculture, mining, and services. The sample period between 1968
and 1993 is mainly determined by the number of observations available for the
production level of each sector. Sectoral results show a great similarity to those of
aggregate investment. The Euler equation fits the Turkish sectoral data better; the
degrees of freedom adjusted R2 is about 95 percent for manufacturing, agriculture,
services and around 87 percent for mining. The majority of estimated coefficients are
significantly different from zero either at the 5 or 10 percent significance level
[remember that the sample size for sectoral models is 26]. Generally the estimation
suffers from the same drawbacks, in other words the unexpected negative signs of
interest rate variables as the aggregate model and the rejection of the unity restriction
on the coefficient of the expected rate of investment, at least in the estimations for
manufacturing, services, and to some extent mining. However, interestingly, the
agricultural sector, to a great extent, differs from others in a way that none of those
drawbacks has accounted for. Additionally, imposing the joint restriction of a unit
coefficient on the expected rate of investment and that a6=2a3 appeared to be
plausible at 5 percent on the basis of the Wald statistic in table 3 (see W5 in table 3).
In the unrestricted estimations, the effects of financial variables seem to he jointly
significantly different from zero. But once imposing restrictions, their effects become
insignificantly different from zero (see test statistic W I for restricted estimation).
Therefore the data on agriculture sector did not show any evidence that any financial
factors such as an increasing agency cost and a borrowing constraint are effective in
the determination of the rate of investment in agriculture. On the contrary, the output
(i.e. accelerator) effect and the effect of the user cost of capital are the most important
factors among the determinants of the rate of agricultural investment.
In mining, while the unrestricted form resulted in the unexpected sign on the
interest rate variable -which is significant at 10 percent level-, it turned out to be
positive, albeit insignificant, in the restricted version. In addition to the insignificant
interest rate variable, the output effect also came up insignificant. The overall
significance of the financial variables, including the interest rate and the combination
of quadratic and linear debt-capital ratio terms, supports the hypothesis that financial
factors are important in mining. With regard to the general issue of which factor
among quantity and price variables is dominant in the determination of investment,
the data in the mining sector indicated that the financial quantity variable (the
availability of debt) as well as the user cost of capital are two important factors to
which the rate of investment in mining is sensitive.
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For services, the estimation results of two different models are presented in
table 3. The first two columns of the table are the results without any dummy
variable on the right-hand side. Although the normality test statistics (N) show no
indication of non-normality, the visual inspection of the plot of residuals reveals two
outliers in 1981 and 1985 respectively. The third and fourth column, however,
reports those results with the dummy variable on the right-hand side. Many variables,
which had been insignificant previously, became significant in the second model
with the dummy variable. As seen in the last column of table 3, the joint Wald test on
the significance of all financial variables confirms the same conclusion as given by
the data in manufacturing and mining, that financial quantity and price variables are
important. The increasing agency cost hypothesis is weakly confirmed by the results
of the unrestricted form in the third column (note that the estimated coefficient is
significant at the 10 percent significance level), but rejected by the restricted model
(see the t-value of the combination of linear and quadratic debt-capital ratio). Output
is another important factor in terms of its significance, but is negligible in magnitude.
More interestingly, the user cost of capital emerged insignificant with respect to other
estimation results.
In the derivation of the estimateable Euler equation, I have made use of some
specific technology assumptions, such as the quadratic agency cost and the
adjustment cost functions, and the Cobb-Douglas production function. Despite these
restrictive assumptions, the Euler equation has performed well both on the aggregate
and sectoral data. Two issues are quite important for the best fit on the data. The first
one is related to the appropriateness of the quadratic agency cost function assumption.
Despite the overall satisfactory results, the unexpected negative signs of all interest
rate variables shed doubts on the choice of functional form of the agency cost
function. The second issue is that the simultaneous effects on the rate of the capital
accumulation of decisions regarding demand for labour and other inputs of production
are omitted. Despite the fact that the Euler equation approach is flexible to
incorporate relatively rich economic relationships into the modelling using
optimisation framework, the model here has intentionally ignored the effects of other
economic decisions such as labour and raw materials etc. in order to concentrate on
the interaction between investment decisions and decisions on financing investment
expenditure.
The empirical results obtained in this chapter qualitatively showed that
financial variables are quite important determinants of investment. Although the
output (or accelerator) variable is also a "significant" factor in many estimations, its
quantitative effect is quite small. The indication of the increasing agency cost is the
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significant quadratic debt-capital ratio in the unrestricted models and the variable
derived as a combination of quadratic and linear debt-capital ratio in the restricted
models. For the aggregate and the sectoral data from agriculture and mining, the
quadratic debt-capital ratio turned up negative, opposite to the theoretical expectation.
But once imposing the restriction on the coefficients of this quadratic term and its
linear counterpart, the signs become positive. Moreover, because of the rejection of
the unit coefficient on the expected rate of investment variable, the structural
parameters could not be recovered at the aggregate as well as at the sectoral level,
with the sole exception of agriculture. Referring to the restricted Euler equation in
the second column of table 3, the structural parameters of agency cost function (a),
adjustment cost function (b), minimum required investment (c) are 0.0017, 181.8 and
0.592 respectively. Like other similar studies [e.g. Galeotti at al. (1994), and
Schiantarelli and Georgoutos C 1990)], the estimate for agricultural investment under
quadratic adjustment costs yielded very high values for the adjustment cost
parameter, implying that huge costs are required in changing the capital stock. This
rather unconvincing result of the estimate agricultural sector might be due to the
inappropriate form of the adjustment cost function.
7. Conclusion:
In the 1980s, Turkey undertook a large scale structural adjustment programme in
which trade and financial liberalisation have great importance. The effects of
financial liberalisation on investment and in turn on growth have been studied by
many researches [see Zaim (1995), Atiyas and Ersel (1904), Atiyas et. al. (1993),
Uygur (1993), and Akyuz (1990)]. The aim of financial reform was to increase the
availability of financial funds and to improve the efficiency of financial
intermediation. They have been done by freeing interest rates, easing entry to capital
markets, allowing for foreign competition, and introducing new financial institutions
and instruments. Over the ten-year period from 1980 to 1990, the Turkish financial
reforms appears to work in terms of increased efficiency in the banking sector [see
Zaim (1995)]. However, the market structure still remains imperfect, and the Turkish
banking system still rations some companies by non-price measures [see Atiyas and
Ersel (1994) and Atiyas et. al. (1994)].
Thus far, any study on Turkey has emphasised the impacts of financial market
imperfections on private investment expenditures. More importantly. no one has
developed any theoretical investment model which is explicitly based on a value
maximisation of a representative firm. For this purpose, I developed a model, in
which imperfections in financial markets (justified by an increasing debt-capital or
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leverage ratio) and borrowing constraint exist, using the quadratic capital adjustment
cost function. Due to more reliable data availability to develop a rather more well-
known theoretical model (such as Tobin's q-models), my model in this chapter aimed
directly to estimate the first-order condition of capital from the optimisation of the
stock market value of the representative firm. This estimation strategy is known as
Euler equation approach to modelling investment. Euler equations have proven that
they were more flexible to account for any kind of technical and economical
constraints related to the concern of this chapter. The only difference of the model
developed here from those in the literature is the presence of the borrowing constraint,
and its explicit inclusion into the final investment equation through the multiplier
associated with that constraint.
The data from the Turkish economy fit the Euler equation very well, but
raised some equations about the appropriateness of the choice of the quadratic agency
cost and capital adjustment costs functions. Although I could not recover the
structural parameters from the estimates, the results confirmed two suggestive
conclusions: The first one is the presence of significant interaction between financial
and real decisions in Turkey. This is confirmed by the joint or individual significance
of finance variables in estimates. Besides, the data supports the fact that the Turkish
firms face an increasing agency cost as well as borrowing constraints in general. In
the sectoral level estimations, the same conclusions have been accepted for
manufacturing, mining and services, whereas agriculture appeared to be more
sensitive to the user cost of capital and the accelerator type of variable than finance
variables.
The aggregate level data (either at whole economy level or sectoral level) have
shown no supportive evidence to use quadratic capital adjustment cost function.
However, as noted before, these results altogether should be regarded as suggestive,
and more researches need to be done in this respect; in particular at firm level (using
panel data) in order to test the quadratic cost function of capital adjustment, and also
to see the interaction between the different financial and real decisions.
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Appendix
The Solution of The Intertemporal Maximisation of the
Firm's Value
The firm is trying to maximise its objective function (the value of the firm) through
time subject to the constraints of (i) its production technology, (ii) the capital account
identity, (iii) an upper bound on dividends, (iv) non-negativity of dividend payments,
(v) the borrowing constraint. The problem has been solved using a simple dynamic
optimisation technique: for technical help, see Dixit (1990) for example. In a
dynamic optimisation such as
Max. (A. I )
Subject to D, = Il(K" L,) + B, - (1+ i.; )B'_I - r(B" K,) - q.l, - q,'J1(!" K,) (A.2)
K, = I, + (1- 8)K'_1
D,~O
(A.3)
(A.4)
(A.5)B, = q.l, + B'_I
(A.6)
where
Il(K" L,) = p,Q( K,. L,) - w,L, (A.7)
we can use the usual Lagrangean function by introducing new variahles At and 111
associated with the constraints (A.3) and (A.6) respectively. But before introducing
the Lagrange function. substitute (A.S) in (A.6)
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(A.6a)
This transformation enables us to deal with a relatively simple Lagrangean function.
together with assumption-lOin the text. According to this assumption. (A.6a) is
strictly binding, and the non-negativity constraint on dividends simultaneously holds.
Doing so will eliminate a possible Lagrange multiplier, and simplifies the
optimisation problem. Then the Lagrangean function can finally be written as
L, = [n(K" L,)+ B, -(1+it-l)Bt-I - I(B,. K, )-q,I, - q,'l'(!,. K,)]
-A,( K,-I, - (1- 8)K,_,) + 1}, (B; - q,l, - Br_I) (A.8)
The first-order conditions with respect to labour, investment, the capital stock. and the
outstanding debt stock are
(A.9)
-q, - q,'l'~+A, - q,1}, = 0 (A.IO)
(A. I I )
(1- r~)-f3(1 +i,)-f31]'+1 = 0 (A.12)
(A.13)
From (A.12)
1}, = (~ ) 1- I;' )- (I + i.; )
1}'+1=(~)l-I~)-(l+i,)
(A.12a)
From (A.IO)
A, = q,+q,'l'~+q,1}, }
A'+I = s.; + qHI 'l'~+1 + q'+I1}'+1
(A. IDa)
Substitute (A. IOa) in (A. I I)
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where
cD = f3(1 - 8)q'+1
,+1 q,
The derivation of the term (11, - cD/+I11,+I) in (A.I 1a)
Let y = I/f3 , then
(A.13)
Dividing (A.lta) by qi and substituting (A.13) in the resulting equation yield the
following
(~,)n~-(~,)r~- 'P~ - (1- <1>/+1) - ('P~- cD/+I'P;+I)
+[(1- y)( 1- <1>'+1)+ y(r';1 - <1>/+1r~) + (ii_I - <1>Hli,)]
Use the functional specifications defined in the text
e(PQ) +~(!!_)2 _[_!!_(.!_)2 +bc2]_(I_cD )-[b('!_) -hc-h<1> (.!_) +bc<1> ]K 2 K 2 K 2 1+1 K HI K 1+1q, q, 1 , 1+1
Let
Hence
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- (a)-2 (h)-2 _ _ ('}(.2) ( )8QK,+ "2 BK, + "2 IK, -bIK,+hcf>t+JK,+I- 2 +bc-y I-cf>'+l
-bccI>'+1+ay( BK,-I - <Ilt+1BK,) + (i'-I - <Il,./,) = 0
Having divided by h
(8)- (a )-2 (I)-2 _ _ ( (.2) ( y)( )b QK, + 2b BK, + "2 IK, -IKr+ cf>,+JKt+1 - 2" +c - h 1-<Il'+1
After arranging the last equation, the following estimateable Euler equation under a
binding borrowing constraint can be obtained
(- -2) (c2) - (8)- (a )-2 (y)( )IK,-D.SIK, = 2" +<Ilt+JK'+I+ b QK,+ 2b BK,+ C-y; I-<Il,+,
(A.14)
Chapter 9
Concluding Remarks
This thesis has examined the investment behaviour of firms both at the theoretical and
empirical levels. In doing so, financial factors have received particular attention
because they have also been a main concern of recent empirical investment literature for
developed countries. The theoretical chapters have analysed optimal investment
policies and conditions for the interdependence of investment and financial decisions.
In this regard, these theoretical chapters have developed various models subject to
different assumptions about the financial capital market. The literature for developing
countries has also examined the role of financial factors in the determination of private
investment in developing countries but without developing a sound microeconomic
foundation. The primary aim of this thesis has been to suggest an empirical model(s)
with a sound microeconomic foundation for a developing country (namely Turkey)
subject to the problem of 'data availability'.
In chapter 2, I examined the neoclassical theory of investment. It was found
that this theory reveals two main determinants of investment, namely the cost of capital
and the accelerator variable. I also found that the responsiveness of investment demand
to the cost and accelerator variables is closely related to the technology assumption
about the production function. Chapter 2 noted that investment is more responsive to
net changes in output than changes in the relative cost of capital under the putty-clay
technology assumption. In Chapter 2, Jorgenson's presentation of the neoclassical
model was also reviewed with two important assumptions, namely a perfect capital
market and the absence of adjustment cost of capital. The main finding of the chapter in
this regard was that Jorgenson's model is, in fact, a theory of the optimal demand for
capital, and the derivation of an investment demand equation is inconsistent with the
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assumptions of the derivation of the optimal capital demand (a particular one is the
cost less and instantaneous adjustment assumption in the derivation of the desired capital
stock, and the violation of this assumption in the derivation of the investment demand
function). I also noted that the derivation of a stable and continuous relationship
between investment demand and its determinants is possible only if one introduces
either the adjustment cost of capital stock, or an upper (or lower) bound on investment
(or disinvestment). Particularly, the presence of adjustment costs corresponds to a
more general case than imposing constraints on investment that the firm can undertake
for each period of time. I showed that if the production function possesses constant
returns to scale and future prices are expected to be unchanged, then the convex
adjustment cost of capital imposes a constant upper bound on the amount of investment
for each time interval during the adjustment process of the capital stock.
Chapter 3 analysed the interdependence of investment and financial decisions.
For this purpose, the chapter enlarged the model developed in the previous chapter by
incorporating capital market imperfections. I noted that the perfect capital market
assumption of Jorgenson's model leads to the Modigliani and Miller theorem in which
the financial structure of the firm plays no role in investment decisions. I examined the
effects of two forms of capital market imperfections on investment decisions. First,
two forms of quantitative constraints on debt financing were examined, namely an
upper profit and retained earning constraints. Second, a rising cost of capital schedule
for borrowing was assumed. The rate of capital adjustment becomes very sensitive to
the forms of capital market imperfections. It was found that profits and retained
earnings of firms become important determinants of investment expenditures in a
liquidity-constrained model. I also noted in this chapter that the rate of adjustment of
the capital stock to its equilibrium level significantly depends on the assumptions in the
production function and risk premium function of borrowing cost. By this, I
concluded that the speed of adjustment is endogenous variable to the firm, and variable
rather than a given to the firm.
The significance of both the neoclassical and financial theories for investment in
developing countries was examined in Chapter 4. In addition to conventional
determinants of private investment (namely the accelerator, the cost of capital, and
financial factors), some other factors significant in the case of developing countries
(such as the implication of fiscal and monetary policies, credibility of economic
policies) have been discussed, along with the empirical modelling issue of private
investment in general. This chapter revealed that there is no acceptable general
framework for analysing the determinants of private investment in developing
countries. Most studies have studied this issue with an eclectic model in the sense that
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there is no exclusive formal microeconomic framework on which the investment
demand function is derived. Chapter 4 also revealed that the literature lacks a suitable
theoretical approach to modelling private investment with a microeconomic optimisation
framework.
Chapter 5 analysed recent Turkish economic history and its interaction with the
pattern of investment both at the aggregate and sectoral levels. This chapter also drew
attention to a substantial shift in the composition of sectoral investment from
manufacturing toward the services sector. It was noted that the previous studies on
private investment in Turkey have been eclectic, and used relatively small sample sizes.
In Chapter 6 - 8 an empirical analysis of the determinants of the investment
demand behaviour of Turkish firms at the aggregate and sectoral levels was carried out.
The analysis covered the period 1963-1993 and was based on annual data. The data
was disaggregated into five sectors (i.e. manufacturing, agriculture, services, mining,
and energy). The concern of these chapters was to investigate the roles of the
neoclassical and financial determinants of investment in Turkey. In doing so, the novel
feature of these chapters was a theoretical approach to modelling investment, in the
sense that each model is derived explicitly from an optimisation framework.
Chapter 6 developed the first empirical model to investigate the role of
neoclassical and financial determinants of investment. Two essential features of the
model are worth noting. First, the model was derived from the cost minimisation
problem of a representative firm subject to a given demand level in the output market.
Second, two models were obtained subject to two alternative technology assumption
about the production function. The first model is derived under the putty-putty
assumption in which the rate of substitution between capital and labour is variable ex
ante and ex post. The second one is the model derived under the putty-clay assumption
by which the rate of substitution between capital and labour is assumed variable ex
ante, but constant ex post. The inclusion of financial factors in the model was less
sound theoretically, and was carried out by simply adding the variable on the volume of
credit to the private sector on the right-hand side of the equations. The putty-clay model
fits the data slightly better, and the inclusion of the credit term representing financial
constraints in the imperfect capital market improved the explanatory power of the
model. At the aggregate level, all three variables - the accelerator, the relative cost of
capital, and the credit variable, were quite significant. According to long-run
multipliers, the credit availability to the Turkish private corporate sector and the cost of
capital have the strongest effects on private investment. In three major sectors in the
Turkish economy, namely manufacturing, agriculture, and services sectors, the credit
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term and the cost of capital are the most influential factors in the determination of
private investment decisions. The empirical results of this chapter suggest that fiscal
and monetary policies influence investment behaviour both via the relative cost of
capital and via the credit availability to the private sector. In particular, the results
suggests that a high interest rate policy may have discouraging effects on investment
decisions through its direct effect on the user cost of capital. But this negati ve effect
may be compensated, to some extent, by an increase in credit availability as a result of
this high interest rate policy.
The model developed in Chapter 7 examined the significance of the accelerator,
the cost of capital, and the credit variables, using an alternative econometric
methodology. The main motivation of the model was to avoid some statistical
problems arising from the non-stationary nature of time series. The different structures
of two models do not allow us to carry out any statistical test between these two
models, and the result obtained from the model in Chapter 7 should be taken as
supplementary to those in Chapter 6. This chapter also suggested a theoretical
framework for an error-correction representation of investment demand. The
recognition of the adjustment costs of capital was a essential part of this model. The
empirical findings from both aggregate and sectoral estimations showed great
similarities to those in the previous chapter. One important finding in this chapter was
the influence of the credit variable on the short-run fluctuations in private investment.
Thus far, no study on Turkish private investment has emphasised the impact of
financial imperfections on private investment using a sound microeconomic has is.
Unlike the previous two chapters, the model in Chapter 8 takes into consideration
imperfect capital markets with a sound theoretical model for the first time, but in the line
of the theoretical discussions in Chapter 3. Accordingly, the model formulated
imperfections both in the form of a rising risk premium function and in the form of
quantitative constraints on borrowing. The data from Turkey fit the model quite well,
but also raised the question of the appropriateness of the choices of the quadratic risk
premium and adjustment cost functions at the macroeconomic level. Two suggestive
results from the model must be worth noting. The first one is that the data suggest the
presence of significant interactions between financial and real decisions in Turkey.
Second, the data supported the hypothesis that Turkish firms face increasing agency
costs as well as borrowing constraints. In the sectoral estimations, the same
conclusions were accepted for manufacturing, mining, services, whereas agriculture
appeared to be more sensitive to the user cost of capital and the accelerator type of
variables than financial variables.
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